
Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 1--An Overview 4/6/2009
What this covers
Dan Klein, of George Mason University, joins EconTalk's Russ Roberts to examine Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments, framing it not as a work in tension with The Wealth of Nations but as its moral foundation. The conversation centers on Klein's argument that Smith designed a coherent moral system across both books: the earlier work establishes the principles by which we judge conduct; the later applies those principles to commercial life and the pursuit of profit. Klein walks through Smith's architecture for moral judgment, paying close attention to passages often overlooked and to the logical tensions Smith himself acknowledged but accepted rather than resolved.
The episode maps Smith's four sources of moral approval—sympathy with an agent's motive, the recipient's gratitude or resentment, propriety to the established rules of a setting, and system-level utility—and shows why most moral questions remain "loose, vague, and indeterminate" because these sources carry no fixed weights and often conflict. Klein emphasizes Smith's sharp distinction between commutative justice (the precise, enforceable rules against violation of person, property, and contract) and beneficence or distributive justice (moral obligations that cannot legitimately be coerced among equals). The conversation turns contentious when examining the modern welfare state, the relationship between markets and human virtue, and whether governmental action systematically blinds us to long-term consequences that the fourth source of moral judgment would otherwise weigh. Klein also positions Smith as a comparativist who accepted commerce's moral costs—anonymity, loss of small-community bonds—while arguing its alternative suffers worse problems and produces greater downstream welfare than the visible harms critics emphasize.
Klein argues that Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments is not a book in tension with The Wealth of Nations but the moral umbrella that contains it, framing markets as a moral authorization of honest profit; its core analytical contribution is that moral judgment draws on four irreducible, conflicting sources and rests on a sharp distinction between precise, enforceable commutative justice and the loose, vague, indeterminate domain of beneficence.
- The Wealth of Nations is the application of TMS's moral system to commerce and statecraft, morally authorizing the honest pursuit of profit.
- Moral approval flows from four sources (agent's motive, recipient's gratitude, propriety to context, system-level utility) that have no fixed weights, making most moral judgment loose, vague, and indeterminate.
- Only commutative justice (abstaining from what is another's) is precise and forcibly enforceable; distributive justice/beneficence cannot legitimately be coerced among equals.
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The 'man of system' is so enamored with the supposed beauty of his ideal plan of government that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation, imagining he can arrange members of a great society as easily as pieces on a chessboard—forgetting that each human piece has its own principle of motion; when the legislature pushes people at odds with their own principles of motion, the result is disorder.
“in the great chessboard of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it.”
Smith's second source of approval—the recipient's gratitude—is morally significant because a beneficent act can be unwelcome: when an actor helps a neighbor who doesn't want help, source one (sympathy with motive) may approve while source two registers the recipient's lack of gratitude, showing that moral evaluation cannot focus solely on the giver's motivation but must weigh the recipient's response.
“you could imagine a case where Jim is trying to help... when his neighbor doesn't really want his help... source one would be a check good way to go, Jim, but point two would be like, hey, but wait a second, your neighbor doesn't actually want you bothering him”
Smith's impartial spectator operates on two levels: in some passages it is a literal disinterested bystander observing a bilateral interaction, but Smith elaborates this into an allegory of an internalized spectator—conscience—who is privy to all our personal knowledge and whose imagined assessment of our conduct shapes our sense of right and wrong, with the relationship between this internal spectator and a possible singular God left deliberately mysterious.
“in some contexts, he's actually meaning some other guy who happens to be around and spectating and doesn't have an interest... Other times he means your conscience... turns that into a very elaborate allegory about how we then develop the notion of such a spectator in our minds”
The four sources of approval interrelate and have no fixed weights, so moral judgment of anything significant is necessarily loose, vague, and indeterminate—there is no single algorithm or magic formula resolving them; whether we even sympathize with an agent's motive at source one can depend on how much economics we understand at source four.
“There's no single algorithm here. There's no resolution on the four... There's no magic formula. There's multiplicity. That's why in the end these moral judgments about anything of real significance is loose, vague, and indeterminate. And they interrelate actually these four.”
Smith's third source—propriety to the established rule of the setting—means a beneficent act can be improper even if motive and gratitude are present: a judge releasing a criminal out of compassion, or appealing to a baker's charity on his crowded shop floor, mismatches the context; one must not confuse the focal points of everyday interaction across different settings.
“out of overwhelmed by some kind of compassion, the judge says, I'm going to relent and not punish you... there's a mismatch there with the context... It's not proper to appeal to them out of beneficence, to appeal to their charity... on the floor of his bakery when there's customers around”
Smith's distributive justice—'proper beneficence in the becoming use of what is our own'—presupposes a classical-liberal configuration of ownership (this is my car, my house, my income), explicitly distinguished in his footnote from Aristotle's distributive justice (proper distribution of rewards from the public stock); modern social justice instead assumes resources are ultimately owned collectively by the polity, which then delegates sub-domains of use, so minimum-wage laws or similar are restrictions on what is mine, not mere definitions of a sub-domain granted to me.
“distributive justice consists in proper beneficence in the becoming use of what is our own... The distributive justice of Aristotle is somewhat different. It consists in the proper distribution of rewards from the public stock of a community... that different configuration of ownership in my view is what social justice implies.”
In Smith's framework everything in the moral domain is loose, vague, and indeterminate—even prudence and beneficence—with the sole exception of commutative justice, which he treats as precise, accurate, and indispensable like the rules of grammar, in contrast to the loose, vague rules critics lay down for what is sublime in writing.
“basically everything in the Moral Sentiments except for his demand for commutative justice. which he says is precise and accurate and indispensable like grammar.”
Smith's warning that compelling good offices is the duty requiring the greatest delicacy—'to neglect it altogether exposes the commonwealth to gross disorders, and to push it too far is destructive of all liberty, security, and justice'—closely parallels Hayek's Fatal Conceit warning that applying the unmodified rules of the microcosm (family/small band) to the macrocosm of civilization, as our instincts urge, would destroy it, while applying the extended order's rules to intimate groupings would crush them.
“It's remarkably parallel to Hayek's paragraph in The Fatal Conceit when he talks about the microcosm and the macrocosm and the natural impulse to take the connections in the family and extend them beyond the family to society at large.”
The decisive practical difference Smith draws between commutative and distributive justice rests on enforcement: commutative justice can be established and protected by force, and its violators may be coercively punished (even hanged), whereas distributive justice and beneficence carry only moral obligation—failure can be socially frowned upon but not physically punished, taxed, or coerced without violating the liberty principle.
“justice, commutative justice, can be protected by force... violators of it, people who fail in commutative justice can be physically, coercively punished... Whereas distributive justice has absolutely no claim on physical enforcement or punishment.”
Smith's 'man of system' is enamored with the supposed beauty of his ideal plan of government and tries to arrange members of society like pieces on a chessboard, forgetting that unlike chess pieces, every individual has a principle of motion of its own; when the legislator pushes people against their own principles of motion, society falls into disorder, whereas harmony results when he respects them.
“in the great chessboard of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it.”
Commutative justice for Smith is precise and forcibly enforceable: it consists in abstaining from what is another's—not violating people's person, property, or contracts (and sometimes reputation)—and these are black-and-white, bright-line rules, distinct from all other virtues.
“you shouldn't commit crimes that are violations of people's person, property, or violations of contract. So those are Yeah. black and white lines.”
Smith's revolutionary moral idea is that you cannot judge an act solely by the actor's intention: a well-intentioned act that harms a neighbor and creates resentment may, in Smith's view, shift from a moral to an immoral act, especially when the actor ignores local knowledge of the neighbor's situation—and statesmen, who know far less than individuals about their own affairs, are especially prone to this error.
“It's an incredibly rich idea of Smith's to say you can't just judge it on the basis of the intention of the actor. You've got to look at the impact on the recipient... he plays up local knowledge and how much others don't know as much as we do about our own affairs, particularly statesmen.”
Smith identifies four sources of moral approval when we judge an actor's conduct: (1) we sympathize with the motives of the agent; (2) we enter into the gratitude (or resentment) of those affected; (3) we observe whether the conduct accords with the general/established rules of propriety for that setting; and (4) we consider whether the action, as part of a system of behavior, promotes the happiness of the individual or society, deriving a beauty from this utility as from a well-contrived machine.
“First, we sympathize with the motives of the agent... secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions... The third one is we observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules... last of all, when we consider such actions as making a part of a system of behavior which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or of the society”
The fourth source—system-level utility—throws moral evaluation wide open to the unseen and long-term consequences, and this is precisely where most people go wrong; Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations to instruct people at the fourth source so they would understand that honest profit and free markets redound to unseen downstream benefits and thus give the fourth source proper weight against the more visible micro sources one through three.
“this fourth one throws it wide open... People don't understand the unseen to use Hazlitt's or Bastiat's metaphor. And that by and large natural liberty or the free market works out very well in terms of the fourth source... that's why he goes off and writes the Wealth of Nations.”
The homo economicus 'Max U' caricature is a slander on classical liberalism, because Smith—the fountainhead of original liberalism—wrote an entire book positing that humans have a natural, innate, unexplained impulse toward sympathy and toward sharing experiences with others, just as he posited hunger, rather than deriving it from self-interest.
“here's Smith... He wrote a whole book about why we're not that, why we have this natural innate impulse towards sympathy... He equally posited that we have this concern to connect sentimentally with others... Very different than the homo economicus slander on classical liberalism”
The modern welfare state damages moral sources one and two even as it raises more money than private charity by coercively overcoming the free-rider problem: by displacing voluntary giving it destroys the human side of caring about one's neighbor, replaces a becoming use of one's own (which would evoke gratitude and norm-formation at sources one through three) with forced extraction whose moral significance is lost, and erodes natural bonds between parent and child.
“while it does raise a lot more money than private charity because of its coercive ability and overcome the free rider problem through force, it destroys the human side of caring about your neighbor, which is part one and part two.”
The Wealth of Nations is probably the most important moral authorization ever written for the honest pursuit of profit: it tells the commercial person they need not feel guilty, tells neighbors not to be antagonistic toward honest profit-seekers, and tells the legislator to let people pursue honest profit because it works out well.
“in a very significant way, I think that The Wealth of Nations is a is probably the most important ever moral authorization for basically the honest pursuit of profit.”
Smith's invocations of God and a benevolent designer are equivocal and cloaked, likely conventional rather than load-bearing; his account works as well or better on an evolutionary reading in which humans are not designed but aspire toward understandings of morality and beauty that mimic design, making it easy to read Hayekian evolutionary thinking into Smith.
“I think it's not hard to read a lot of Hayekian evolutionary thinking into Smith. And whether Smith is that sincere when he speaks of God, even when he speaks of God it's very equivocal. It's very very cloaked.”
It is legitimate to draw political implications from TMS even though it is pitched as a non-political book about neighbors and equals, because Smith implicitly wants a society organized mostly around relations between equals rather than inferior-superior relations—his egalitarianism—implying we should degovernmentalize and depoliticize as much as possible since virtue best resides and flourishes among equals.
“he very much wants a society where it is mostly about equals. Like where there's not that much of the inferior-superior relationship... And that's really his egalitarianism. And so I think he's promoting that... degovernmentalize, depoliticize as much as we can. Cuz this is where virtues really reside.”
Smith is fundamentally a comparativist, not primarily an invisible-hand utopian: following Maitland's reading, Smith argues for liberty as much because the alternative (government restriction) has severe problems of its own—governments know little and are usurped by interest groups—as because voluntary exchange works beautifully; he concedes commercial society creates anonymity and breakdowns of community (Dickens may have a point) but counsels going with its core because it works out well and frees a fund for personal community and beneficence.
“Smith really is a comparativist... Maitland says that just as much Smith is saying that the alternative it is got such bad problems of its own... commercial society is going to create these new situations, breakdowns of community, more anonymity... let it go with it.”
Charles Dickens, via the character Gradgrind in Hard Times, represents a counter-tradition that sees commercial calculation and the pursuit of a good deal as dehumanizing and degrading, directly opposing Smith's moral authorization of honest profit and treating market norms as degrading rather than enlightening.
“Dickens really caricatures a capitalist view... in his character of Gradgrind... Gradgrind is homo economicus. He's Max U... Gradgrind is despicable... he's countering to some extent, maybe explicitly even, the moral authorization that you invoke for Smith.”
Governmental decision processes systematically silence the fourth source: politics sets up procedures and viewpoints that blind themselves to bad indirect consequences—dispersed, unintended, unrepresented effects that are not salient—so the four sources fail to communicate; Smith dislikes a governmentalized society partly because freedom keeps a candid flow among the four sources, producing greater cultural cohesion in conduct.
“government often sets up procedures and points of view which exclude a lot of the bad things at the fourth source... there's a sort of silencing of a lot of what should actually be vocal or seen in the judgment. And I think that's one of the reasons Smith doesn't like a governmentalized society is that these four sources need to communicate with each other”
The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations are not in tension but part of a single larger project: TMS lays out the moral system, and The Wealth of Nations applies it as a moral authorization of commercial behavior; the fact that TMS spans the writing and publication of Wealth of Nations (1759-1790) reinforces this unity.
“sometimes people feel that there's some kind of tension between the two books. I don't particularly feel that way and what you remarked on, the fact that Moral Sentiments spans the time of the writing and publication of the Wealth of Nations helps to make that point.”
The distinction between describing what humans are and prescribing what they ought to be is largely a false dichotomy in Smith, because human beings are, descriptively, beings who long for moral exhortation and guidance and who continually review and assess their own moral action; aspiration is part of what humans are.
“this whole distinction between what human beings are and sort of a project of what you should do, an exhortation is almost a false dichotomy because partly what he's saying is that what human beings are are beings longing for exhortation, are beings looking for moral guidance.”
Restrictions on so-called price gouging after natural disasters illustrate the fourth source: sources one through three may favor not charging a premium to hard-up customers, but at the fourth source unregulated prices induce speculators to stockpile, take precautions, and bring in supplies—Smith in WoN says markets in a famine must be left unregulated because restricting them removes the foresight and provisioning that make shortages less severe.
“Smith in the Wealth of Nations says just what you said. He said we have to let it be unregulated in a famine... we have to let speculators speculate because when we step back and think about the full consequences of restricting in these markets, we see that people won't take the same precautions, they won't step in with supplies”
Natural jurisprudence, as Smith used it, means proper or desirable law—what the laws ought to be—as opposed to the positive law of each nation, and it includes political economy.
“Natural jurisprudence is what the laws ought to be. Natural juris- jurisprudence is proper law or desirable law as opposed to the positive law of each nation, as he put it.”
Smith's moral authorization of commerce mattered causally for the Industrial Revolution: because moral authorization and culture matter, his specific authorization contributed to the rapidity and success with which industrialization arose just after his death.
“his moral authorization was actually very significant in the extent to which the Industrial Revolution, you know, arose so rapidly and and and so successfully... Because I think that the moral authorization matters. Culture matters.”
The Theory of Moral Sentiments is not merely descriptive social or moral psychology; it is an agenda-driven enlightenment project aimed at advancing and refining our moral understandings toward wisdom and virtue.
“It's not just sort of a social psychology or a moral psychology. it is kind of a gen- agenda driven. he's part of an enlightenment movement.”
Left-leaning readings of Smith that emphasize passages like the higher tolls on luxury carriages overstate their significance: the carriage remark is a passing aside that may not even violate Smith's proportionality rule of taxation (the higher toll could still be roughly the same percentage of income), and on the whole Smith should not be read in a left or social-justice direction at all.
“There's a remark about why the tolls on luxury carriages ought to be maybe higher... It's not even clear that it violates his rule of taxation of proportionality... I don't think we should read Smith in a left sort of way, really much at all.”
Coercing charity does not make people charitable; forcing someone to help another induces resentment rather than beneficence and destroys what is valuable about the human enterprise, while making subtler vices (rudeness, cruelty, bigotry) illegal does not transform human beings into better ones but sets in motion expensive, hard-to-monitor consequences—though force may occasionally be judged worth it in extreme cases.
“forcing somebody to be charitable doesn't make them charitable... It induces resentment. It destroys the human what's important about the human enterprise... making cruelty illegal doesn't make human beings better. There are better ways to create better human beings.”
A market-oriented analyst must concede a genuine tension: a world without social security or anti-price-gouging rules would perform well at source four (system-level utility) but worse at sources one through three (motive, gratitude, propriety), so the libertarian case is not clean and the social-democratic critique that capitalism 'delivers the goods but degrades the human spirit' captures a real, if loose, vague, and indeterminate, trade-off.
“I have to then concede as a market-oriented guy that my preferred world without social security, say, or without regulations against price gouging will although really good at four are going to have one through three problems. And that it's not so clean for our case.”
Smith leaves the door open for a 'superior' (the civil magistrate) to violate commutative justice in exceptional cases of expediency—taxation, regulation, forcing good offices—but he insists these exceptions remain exceptional, since requiring government always to obey the liberty principle would forbid all taxation and interventionist regulation as violations of natural liberty.
“he does sort of leave the door open to the superior... violating commutative justice... but for Smith, he wants to keep these exceptions exceptional... if government had to always abide by the liberty principle, they could never force people to do things with their property or their person that people didn't want to do. So they wouldn't be able to tax them, they wouldn't be able to regulate them”
Smith distinguishes commutative justice—'abstaining from what is another's,' covering person, property, and contracts—from distributive justice, which he defines as 'proper beneficence in the becoming use of what is our own,' meaning the becoming use of one's own resources, in explicit contrast to Aristotle's distributive justice as the proper distribution of rewards from the public stock of a community.
“this commutative justice, which basically is like respecting other people's stuff. He says abstaining from what is another's.”
Smith's distributive justice presupposes a libertarian/classical-liberal configuration of ownership in which 'my car' and 'my house' are mine from the start and the law merely restricts subdomains of what I do with them; this is fundamentally distinct from modern social justice, which presupposes that a polity's resources are collectively owned and individuals are merely delegated subdomains—so a minimum-wage law is, on the libertarian view, a restriction on liberty and freedom of contract, not a mere defining of a granted subdomain.
“the former understands a libertarian or classical liberal configuration of ownership. No, this is my car. No, this is my house. You're just putting restrictions on what is mine. It's not yours to start... So, it's a very different configuration of ownership.”
The four sources of moral approval cannot be reduced to a single algorithm or weighting; there are no fixed weights and no magic formula across the four, which is precisely why moral judgments about anything of real significance end up loose, vague, and indeterminate, and why the sources interrelate (e.g., whether we sympathize with an agent's motives depends partly on how much economics we understand).
“There's no single algorithm here. There's no resolution. on the four... There are no weights... There's multiplicity. That's why in the end these moral judgments about anything of real significance is loose, vague, and indeterminate.”
The decisive practical difference Smith draws between commutative and distributive justice is enforceability: commutative justice may be established and protected by force and its violators physically punished (a thief imprisoned, a murderer hanged, a home intruder shot in self-defense), whereas distributive justice and beneficence have no claim on physical enforcement—failures can be met only with disapproval, never with coercion, taxation, or molestation of the person's property.
“justice, commutative justice, can be protected by force... violators of it, people who fail in commutative justice can be physically, coercively punished, deterred... Whereas distributive justice has absolutely no claim on on like pun- like physical enforcement”
The modern welfare state, exemplified by Social Security, succeeds at the fourth source (raising more money via coercion and overcoming the free-rider problem) but corrupts sources one through three: it destroys the natural fellow-feeling and human caring between people (and between parent and child), inducing resentment and dissolving the moral message that comes from voluntary giving, because forcing someone to be charitable does not make them charitable.
“while it does raise a lot more money than private charity because of its coercive ability and overcome the free rider problem through force, it destroys the human side of caring about your neighbor, which is part one and part two.”
Although the Theory of Moral Sentiments is not pitched as a political book—its subtitle describes how men judge the conduct of neighbors and themselves in everyday civil life—it is legitimate to draw political implications because Smith implicitly favors a society of equals (egalitarianism) with minimal inferior-superior relationships, which implies degovernmentalizing and depoliticizing as much of society as possible since that is where virtues best flourish.
“he very much wants a society where it is mostly about equals... that's really his egalitarianism. And so I think he's promoting that... In other words, degovernmentalize, depoliticize um as much as we can. Cuz this is where virtues really reside.”
The Wealth of Nations is the most important moral authorization ever written for the honest pursuit of profit: it tells the commercial actor they should not feel guilty about honest profit, tells neighbors not to be antagonistic toward those who pursue it, and tells the statesman to let people pursue honest profit because it works out well.
“in a very significant way, I think that The Wealth of Nations is a is probably the most important ever moral authorization for basically the honest pursuit of profit.”
Smith identifies four distinct sources or dimensions of moral approval by which we judge an actor's conduct: (1) sympathy with the agent's motives, (2) entering into the gratitude or resentment of those affected, (3) the conduct's agreement with established general rules of propriety for the setting, and (4) its place within a system of behavior that promotes the happiness of the individual or society, deriving beauty from utility like a well-contrived machine.
“First, we sympathize with the motives of the agent... secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions... The third one is we observe that his Jim's conduct has been agreeable to the general rules... when we consider such actions as making a part of a system of behavior which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or of the society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility not unlike that which we ascribe to any well-contrived machine.”
Smith's 'impartial spectator' has two senses that he conflates into an elaborate allegory: in some passages it literally means a disinterested bystander observing a bilateral interaction, while in others it means one's own conscience—an internalized spectator, privy to one's personal knowledge, that we conjure and develop a relationship with to evaluate our own conduct, leaving open whether it is merely internal, a god, or a useful fiction of a common god.
“Smith talks a lot about when you're acting, what an impartial spectator would think of your actions... in some contexts, he's actually meaning like some other guy who happens to be around and spectating... Other times he means your conscience.”
Smith accepted commercial society as an inevitable, rapidly developing trend (as he observed in Scotland) and counseled going with its flow rather than hedging it in; this is part of his cultural agenda of learning to accept the fragmentations, anonymity, and breakdowns of community that commerce brings—learning, as it were, to not be offended by the McDonald's on the corner—rather than claiming commerce is as warm as old-time community.
“commercial society is going to create this these new situations, uh breakdowns of community, uh more anonymity... rather than trying to hedge it in and control it, and just kind of like go with what the the core of it, which can work out well”
The social democratic age makes the polity-defined group ('us taking care of us') the actor at the first three moral sources—people become caught up in the intentions and gratitudes of political acts—while doing very bad political economy at the fourth source, ignoring the dispersed indirect consequences.
“the whole notion is sort of us taking care of us, and that's sort of the first sort of it's it's the group at large, basically defined by the polity, who become actors at the first three sources... And meanwhile, they do very I think very bad political economy at the fourth source.”
The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations are not two books in tension; rather Moral Sentiments is the umbrella moral project and Wealth of Nations is a specific application of that moral inquiry to commerce and policy, evidenced by the fact that Moral Sentiments was revised across the entire span (1759-1790) that bracketed the writing of Wealth of Nations (1776).
“sometimes people feel that there's some kind of tension between the two books. I don't particularly feel that way uh and what you remarked on, the fact that Moral Sentiments spans the time of the writing and publication of the uh Wealth of Nations helps to make that point.”
Smith's invocation of God or a benevolent designer in the Moral Sentiments is equivocal and conventional rather than load-bearing; his arguments would survive equally well under a Hayekian evolutionary reading in which humans are not designed but aspire toward morality and beauty in ways that merely mimic design.
“even when he speaks of God it's very equivocal. It's very very cloaked. Um it's not clear that he really sees the need for the evo- invocation of God.”
Modern utility maximization (Max U) is not even captured by Smith's notion of prudence, because Max U functions like a precise grammar—a fully specified optimization where you draw your optimal point and know exactly what to do—whereas Smith's prudence is loose, vague, and indeterminate, as in whether it is prudent to buy Treasury securities today.
“the idea of maximizing your utility in in in modern economics is actually more like a grammar because it's all laid out and you kind of draw your optimal point and you get there and you know what to do. Um so I'm not sure that that that kind of theorizing is even prudence.”
In Smith's system, everything moral is loose, vague, and indeterminate—including prudence, beneficence, and generosity—with the single exception of commutative justice, which Smith treats as precise, accurate, and indispensable like the rules of grammar, in contrast to the necessarily loose rules of aesthetics that govern everything else.
“everything in the Moral Sentiments except for his demand for commutative justice. Okay, which um he says is precise and accurate and indispensable like grammar.”
Smith's insistence that we judge an act not only by the giver's motive but also by its impact on the recipient is a revolutionary moral idea: a well-intentioned act that harms a neighbor and creates resentment—because the actor ignored available local knowledge of the neighbor's situation—can shift from a moral act to an immoral one, contrary to the common view that good intentions alone make an act moral.
“I think it's an incredibly rich idea of Smith's to say you can't just judge it on the basis of the intention of the of the of the actor. You've got to look at the impact on the recipient. I mean, that alone is is sort of a revolutionary idea.”
Following Frederick Maitland, Smith should be read not primarily as celebrating the invisible hand's beautiful harmony but as a comparativist: the voluntary system may be imperfect and Dickens may have a point, yet the interventionist alternative has such severe problems of its own—governments know little and are usurped by interest groups—that classical liberalism, which puts the presumption on liberty, is the better focal alternative for a culture to cohere around.
“my reading of Smith is um not really that he puts the emphasis exclusively or primarily even on the invisible hand... But Maitland says that just as much Smith is saying that the alternative it is got such bad problems of its own.”
Government procedures and viewpoints systematically silence the bad consequences that arise at the fourth source—the dispersed, unintended, indirect harms that are not conspicuous or represented—so a governmentalized society blocks the candid flow of communication among the four moral sources that a free society allows, which is a key reason Smith would prefer a freer society for both material and cultural betterment.
“government often sets up procedures and points of view which exclude a lot of the bad things at the fourth source... So, there's a sort of uh silencing of a lot of what should actually be vocal or seen”
For Smith, justice and liberty are two sides of the same coin, because a large part of liberty is ownership—what is one's own in person and property—and commutative justice is precisely abstaining from what is another's, so regulation or forced contributions by the magistrate read as violations of both liberty and commutative justice.
“the justice and the liberty are kind of two sides of the same coin. Cuz big part of liberty is is ownership, um what is our own, person, property... justice is abstaining from what is another's.”
Smith's warning that forcing good offices among equals 'requires the greatest delicacy and reserve'—neglecting it altogether exposes the commonwealth to gross disorders while pushing it too far is destructive of all liberty, security, and justice—closely parallels Hayek's Fatal Conceit argument that applying the unmodified rules of the microcosm (family/small band) to the macrocosm (extended civilization) would destroy it, while applying macrocosm rules to intimate groupings would crush them.
“It's remarkably um parallel to Hayek's paragraph in The Fatal Conceit when he talks about the microcosm and the macrocosm and the natural impulse to take the connections in the family and extend them beyond the family to society at large.”
There is a deep human impetus to attend to the seen rather than the unseen, so that the political process naturally favors short-run regulation 'for the here and now' that fails badly at the fourth source; only people trained in economics tend to perceive the dispersed, unintended, long-run consequences of interventions.
“the the impetus of the political process to impose short-run regulation for the here and now to help... help people is such a natural impulse”
The moral authorization Smith provided for honest commerce was itself a significant cause of the rapidity and success of the Industrial Revolution, because culture and moral attitudes toward commerce matter for economic outcomes.
“his moral authorization was actually very I mean, his specifically, was actually very significant in the extent to which the Industrial Revolution, you know, arose so rapidly... Because I think that the moral authorization matters. Culture matters.”
The 'left' or social-justice readings of Smith—drawing on passages like higher tolls on luxury carriages or tax-financed education—are largely overblown: the carriage remark is a passing aside that may not even violate Smith's proportionality rule, and his endorsement of state-financed education is far more ambiguous than commonly claimed, so Smith should not be read in a left way much at all.
“There's a remark about um why the tolls on, you know, luxury carriages ought to be or maybe higher... I don't I don't think it implies a whole lot... on the whole, I I I don't think we should read Smith in a left sort of way, really much at all.”
Restrictions on so-called price gouging after natural disasters fail at Smith's fourth source of moral approval: while sources one through three may favor charging less in hard times, the fourth source reveals that preventing sellers from recouping inventory and precaution costs destroys the incentives for people to take precautions and step in with supplies, making shortages worse—which is exactly why Smith wrote Wealth of Nations to instruct people on the unseen consequences at the fourth source.
“Smith in the Wealth of Nations says just what you said. He said we have to let it be unregulated in a famine and so on... when we step back and think about the full consequences of of of restricting in these markets, we see that people won't take the same precautions, they won't step in with supplies”
Smith leaves the door open for a 'superior' (the civil magistrate) to violate commutative justice as a matter of expedience or politic—allowing taxation, regulation, or forced contributions that would be violations of natural liberty among equals—but he insists these exceptions remain exceptional and be exercised with great caution, since pushing them too far is destructive of all liberty and security.
“he does speak of the civil magistrate um of the civil magistrate say violating commutative justice... And we know from the Wealth of Nations that he endorsed some exceptions... but for Smith, he wants to keep these exceptions exceptional.”
Dickens (via the character Gradgrind in Hard Times) caricatures the free-market commercial ethos as dehumanizing—reducing everything to costs and money—and his cultural followers amplified this, whereas Smith viewed the mutual benefits of voluntary exchange and the customary norms of commerce as enlightening and morally enhancing of our humanity; Smith's defenders have largely failed to make this case well.
“Dickens really caricatures a capitalist view of modern free market view uh of commerce in his character of Gradgrind... Smith, I think, saw those as enlightening. And Dickens sees them as degrading.”
The Theory of Moral Sentiments was first published in 1759 and revised through a final edition in 1790, while The Wealth of Nations was published in 1776, so TMS's lifespan brackets the writing and publication of WoN.
“The book was written in 1759, first published in 1759. It was revised and I think the final edition came out in 1790... The Wealth of Nations, which was published in 1776.”
Forcing people to be charitable does not make them charitable and may make things worse by inducing resentment and destroying the very fellow-feeling that matters; likewise, making subtle moral failings (rudeness, cruelty, bigotry) illegal does not transform human beings into better ones—it merely sets in motion expensive, hard-to-monitor enforcement, so there are generally better ways to create better human beings than coercion.
“forcing somebody to be charitable doesn't make them charitable... it's the opposite. It induces resentment.”
The Wealth of Nations is much more widely known than The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and many people wrongly assume it represents Smith's complete view of human motivation as selfish acquisitiveness.
“almost everybody knows, or at least lots more people know about The Wealth of Nations and I think a lot of people think that was Adam Smith's last word on economics and his first word.”
The Theory of Moral Sentiments was first published in 1759 and its final revised edition came out in 1790, so it spans the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776.
“The book was written in 1759, first published in 1759. It was revised uh and I think the final edition uh came out in 1790... of The Wealth of Nations, which was published in 1776.”