What this covers

Dan Klein and Russ Roberts work through the second part of Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments, examining how Smith constructs moral judgment from layered passions and distinguishes justice from beneficence. Klein, a philosopher and economist, guides Roberts through Smith's framework: moral sentiment arises not from intentions alone but from what Klein calls a compound of motive and consequence, always mediated by an imagined spectator—a mental proxy through which we evaluate actions even when their victims cannot physically register the judgment. This spectatorial principle, Klein argues, is the seed of Smith's later concept of the impartial observer. The pair trace how Smith justifies what seems like a moral failing: that we praise and blame based heavily on actual results rather than effort or intention, even when two agents expend identical effort but fortune treats them differently.

The discussion centers on commutative justice as a purely negative virtue—a set of duties not to violate person, property, or promise—radically distinct from beneficence, which is positive and must remain voluntary. Klein emphasizes that justice is enforceable by force and as precise as grammar, while beneficence is aesthetic and loose. Roberts and Klein explore how this framework resolves an apparent contradiction: Smith shows that society can function on mercenary self-interest alone but flourishes when reciprocal assistance flows from love and gratitude. They also unpack why the seemingly unjust focus on consequences rather than designs is actually functional—monitoring intentions is impossible, and focal points around observable actions prevent the chaos of endless moral inquiry. The episode touches on loss aversion (how deprivation feels worse than mere disappointment), the moral distinction between passive gladness and active agency, and how the sovereign's special status tempts him to punish treason with disproportionate violence.

Sharpest takeaway

Klein and Roberts argue that Adam Smith's Part II of The Theory of Moral Sentiments shows that moral judgment is built on compounded sentiments (motive plus consequence) mediated by an imagined spectator, and that justice is a strictly negative, commutative virtue distinct from voluntary beneficence; the seemingly 'unjust' human tendency to judge by results rather than intentions is actually functional given our knowledge limits.

  • Merit/demerit elicit gratitude/resentment, which are active passions that make us moral agents rather than passive experiencers.
  • Justice is precise, negative, and enforceable (commutative justice = person, property, promises); beneficence is loose, positive, and must be voluntary.
  • The 'irregularity of sentiment' (judging by consequences not intentions) is sustained by the impossibility of monitoring intentions and the value of focal points.

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0.86

Justice and grammar are merely 'negative virtues': merely satisfying their rules earns no praise (a blank page is grammatically perfect yet fails aesthetically; one can fulfill justice by sitting still and doing nothing), while violations earn disapprobation. Beneficence, like aesthetics, is both positive and negative—it can earn genuine praise.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“justice and grammar are but negative virtues ... merely fulfilling the rules of grammar is not cause for any positive evaluation or praise”

0.86

Smith identifies an 'irregularity of sentiment': although philosophically praise and blame ought to depend only on intentions/effort, in practice we assign far more praise or blame based on actual consequences and how fortune (chance) falls—e.g., the architect with only a blueprint, the general with an unimplemented plan, the friend who solicits a job that never materializes, the messenger of bad news, two stones thrown over a wall with different outcomes, or a shot that wounds versus kills—even though effort was identical.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“two different guys they make let's say the exact same effort ... the first guy who succeeded gets a lot more praise but it's the exact same effort as the second guy ... and yet they do not get equal praise”

0.86

Smith justifies the seemingly unjust irregularity (judging by results/actions rather than designs) as 'salutary and useful': if praise and blame rested only on intentions it would require an inquisition into everyone's efforts and intentions—an impossible knowledge/monitoring problem—so the rule that men are liable to punishment for actions only, not designs, is founded on this useful irregularity.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“if it were somehow based just on intentions just on effort that could create a real Inquisition like we have to sort of know and judge and scrutinize everybody's efforts”

0.86

Justice and grammar are merely 'negative virtues': merely satisfying their rules earns no praise (a grammatically perfect blank page is still no composition; you can fulfill justice by sitting still and doing nothing), while violations earn disapprobation—whereas beneficence, like aesthetics, is both positive and negative and can earn genuine praise.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“justice and grammar are but negative virtues ... merely fulfilling the rules of grammar is not cause for any positive evaluation or praise ... if you turn in for your homework a blank piece of paper ... fulfills all the rules of grammar not a single grammatical error ... but it totally fails as any kind of aesthetic composition ... we can often fulfill all the rules of justice by sitting still in doing nothing”

0.86

Smith identifies an 'irregularity of sentiment' whereby praise and blame attach not only to intention but to actual consequences and the actor's bodily action, so that two people who make identical efforts receive unequal praise depending on how chance/probability resolved—illustrated by the unbuilt architect, the general with a brilliant unimplemented plan, the friend whose solicited job fails to materialize, and the beheaded bearer of bad news.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“he sets it up by saying it seems philosophically that our praise and blame ought to look really only to the intention ... you got two different guys they make ... the exact same effort and in one ... it actually all pans out because the probability came up ... the first guy who succeeded gets a lot more praise but it's the exact same effort as the second guy”

0.83

To be deprived of something one already possesses is a greater evil than to be merely disappointed of something one only expected—an asymmetry between losses and gains that anticipates the loss aversion of modern behavioral economics.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“to be deprived of that which we are possessed of is a greater evil than to be disappointed of what we have only the expectation this is the gains and losses are not symmetric the behavioral economics reference”

0.83

Smith asserts that to be deprived of what we already possess is a greater evil than to be merely disappointed of what we only expected—an early articulation of the loss-aversion asymmetry between gains and losses later formalized in behavioral economics.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“to be deprived of that which we are possessed of is a greater evil than to be disappointed of what we have only the expectation this is the gains and losses are not symmetric the behavioral economics reference”

0.81

Smith's method employs a 'spectatorial construct' for everything: a spectator always mediates our moral reactions, so that even when the person acted upon is dead (e.g., a murder victim), we judge by imagining how they would feel—an 'illusive sympathy' or 'imaginary resentment' that marks the beginning of the impartial spectator concept.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“he speaks of the elusive sympathy or imaginary resentment where he says ... his smith scholars use this term that he's got basically aspect to toriel construct for everything”

0.81

The distinction between active moral agency and passive experience matters greatly in moral evaluation: one may passively be glad to see a disliked neighbor ruined, but to actively be the moral agent who violates justice to bring that about is regarded as a terrible thing.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“we may dislike a neighbor or somebody and actually be happy to see him ruined or something like that but to actually be a moral agent than to violate justice and doing that you know is just the most terrible thing”

0.81

When the beneficiary fails to feel gratitude even though an action was genuinely meritorious, Smith preserves sympathy by having us imagine the gratitude the beneficiary 'should' feel—demonstrating his principle of always inserting a spectator, even a manufactured one, to suit the judgment, building toward an imaginary spectatorial construct.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“we imagine the sympathy that Bert should feel essentially or that the should Bert would have if you will and again this is a step towards the imaginary construct”

0.81

Smith introduces 'illusive sympathy' and 'imaginary resentment'—the idea that we sympathize with a dead murder victim by imagining how they would feel—and this insertion of an imagined sentiment is the seed of the later 'impartial spectator,' showing Smith's principle of always supplying a spectator even when he must manufacture one to fit the desired judgment.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“he speaks of the elusive sympathy or imaginary resentment ... even when it comes to the person being dead at this point ... he says we imagine how they would feel ... this is the beginnings of the impartial spectator”

0.81

Attempting a crime is generally punished far less than completing it (premeditated attempted murder draws lesser punishment than murder), but treason is the exception: because the sovereign judges in his own case and indulges his own resentment rather than entering by sympathy into others' resentment, he punishes treason more violently and 'sanguinary' than the impartial spectator can approve, often before any attempt is even made.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“trying to commit a crime as never punished ... as severely as someone who actually commits the crime ... there's one exception which is trees ... the sovereign resents the injuries which are immediately done to himself ... he's very apt to be more violent and in sanguinary ... than the impartial spectator can approve of”

0.81

Smith's distinction between active moral agency and passive experience is morally crucial: one may passively be glad to see a disliked neighbor ruined, but to actively be the moral agent who violates justice to cause that ruin is among the most terrible things—so the framing of a thought experiment (passive bystander vs. moral agent) changes the moral evaluation entirely.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“we may dislike a neighbor or somebody and actually be happy to see him ruined or something like that but to actually be a moral agent than to violate justice and doing that you know is just the most terrible thing”

0.80

Justice is the pillar/main load-bearing support of society and is more essential to its existence than beneficence; Smith contrasts three worlds—one where people are pleasant and decent (flourishing), one merely mercenary (still functional), and one of vicious animals where justice is trampled (hopeless)—with the division of labor surviving in the first two but not the third.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“all that's necessary in order for the good offices actually to forthcoming is the maintenance of justice justice is the pillar of society beneficence is less essential to the existence of society than justice”

0.80

A fundamental principle Smith articulates is that though every man is the whole world to himself, to everyone else he is most insignificant; though one naturally prefers oneself to all mankind, no one dares avow that he acts on that principle to others' faces. People consistently overestimate how much others think about them.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“though every man may according to the proverb be the whole world to himself to the rest of mankind he is a most insignificant ... yet he dares not look mankind in the face and the vow that he acts according to this principle”

0.80

Smith distinguishes justice and beneficence sharply: justice is necessary, precise, and accurate and may be enforced by physical force, while beneficence must be voluntary and free and ceases to be beneficence if forced (at least among equals). Justice is like grammar—precise and necessary—and beneficence is like the rules of sublime and elegant writing—loose, vague, and indeterminate, more aesthetic.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“the justice is necessary precise and accurate and can be enforced with force ... whereas beneficence has to be voluntary it has to be free and should never be forced”

0.80

Justice is precise, accurate, and enforceable by physical force among equals, whereas beneficence must be voluntary and can never be forced—indeed forced beneficence would not be beneficence; justice is like grammar (necessary, exact) while beneficence is like the rules of sublime and elegant writing (loose, vague, indeterminate, aesthetic).

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“justice is necessary precise and accurate and can be enforced with force ... whereas beneficence has to be voluntary it has to be free and should never be forced ... beneficence is like the rules of sublime and elegant writing loose vague and indeterminate ... justice is like grammar precise and necessary”

0.80

People consistently overestimate how much they occupy others' attention—Smith says that though a man is the whole world to himself, to everyone else he is most insignificant, and though he naturally prefers himself to all mankind he dares not avow that he acts on that principle to the world's face.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“though every man may according to the proverb be the whole world to himself to the rest of mankind he is a most insignificant ... part of it ... yet he dares not look mankind in the face and the vow that he acts according to this principle”

0.80

Smith's 'fair play' principle holds that in the race for wealth and honors a man may strain every nerve to outstrip competitors, but the moment he jostles or throws down a rival, spectators withdraw their indulgence—they will not enter into the self-love by which he prefers himself, marking the moral boundary of acceptable competition.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“in the race for wealth and honors and preferment he may run as hard as he can and strain every nerve ... but if he should just or throw down any of them the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end it is a violation of fair play”

0.80

Justice—not beneficence—is the pillar that upholds society, because society can survive without much mutual love but cannot survive the trampling of justice; all that is strictly necessary for the good offices of commerce to be forthcoming is the maintenance of justice.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“all that's necessary in order for the good offices actually to forthcoming is the maintenance of justice justice is the pillar of society beneficence is less essential to the existence of society than justice”

0.80

Smith's commutative justice—the only thing he simply calls 'justice'—consists in abstaining from what is another's: a person's life/body, property, and the promises due them by contract (and in one passage reputation); strictly speaking this would not require rescuing a drowning stranger, matching the low legal standard of the Good Samaritan rule.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“he speaks of the sacred laws of justice ... he talks of property person and promises do you ... he describes commutative justice as abstaining from what is another's”

0.79

In the race for wealth and honors a man may run as hard as he can to outstrip competitors, but if he jostles or throws down a rival the spectators' indulgence ends entirely—because they do not share the self-love by which he prefers himself, they cannot go along with the motive; this defines the boundary of fair play in competition.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“he may run as hard as he can and strain every nerve ... in order to outstrip all his competitors but if he should just or throw down any of them the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end it is a violation of fair play”

0.79

Smith argues that a society of purely mercenary self-interested exchange (no gratitude, love, or esteem) still functions and works pretty well, but a society where assistance is reciprocated from love, gratitude, friendship and esteem flourishes and is happier—so benevolence is not necessary for society but improves it; this dissolves the apparent contradiction with the famous 'butcher and baker' passage in Wealth of Nations.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“if it's if the relationships between us are purely mercenary and all we care about is our own self-interest our interactions will not be as effective as if we have some fellow feeling”

0.79

Smith argues that a society works best when reciprocal assistance is rendered from love, gratitude, friendship and esteem; but it can still subsist by a purely mercenary exchange of good offices at an agreed value—so benevolence is desirable but not necessary, whereas a society of mutual injury (vicious animals) cannot hold together at all.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“where the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded from love from gratitude from friendship and esteem the society flourishes and is happy ... it may still be upheld by a mercenary exchange of good offices according to and agreed-upon value”

0.78

Smith's commutative justice consists in abstaining from what is another's—not harming a person's person, property, and promises-due (contract), and (in some passages) reputation. Significantly, Smith calls only this 'justice' (later qualifying it 'commutative' after Grotius and the schoolmen) and never calls beneficence or distribution 'distributive justice,' implying he wants 'justice' to mean only commutative justice—a fact revealing his political sensibilities.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“he describes commutative justice as abstaining from what is another's so I am not to mess with Russ's person property or promises do you and contract”

0.78

The deeper justification for judging by results rather than intentions is incentive-based: rewarding people solely on their intentions would produce more intentions and fewer results (and would be exploited because intentions are unknowable), whereas rewarding actual results motivates people to work hard to bring plans to fruition—which is why Smith is content with the 'author of nature' in this design.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“we want people to work ... you really want them to make an effort to carry it to fruition ... if we reward people solely on the basis of their intentions will get more intentions ... and fewer results ... if we reward people based on results that work really hard to achieve results and I think that's his justification”

0.77

Nature gave us an instinct for revenge/retaliation not so that we would intend to make the world better, but as an original and immediate instinct; this instinct, combined with personal morality, is a major deterrent against bad behavior, and a world without laws against murder would see far more private revenge, gang and tribal defense rather than dramatically more murder.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“nature gave us an instinct for revenge or for retaliation ... nobody intends to make the world a better place by taking revenge on the their a murderer they are just motivated by a passion”

0.77

Smith holds that nature implanted an instinct for revenge/retaliation not entrusted to slow and uncertain reasoning, so that justice violators get checked; nobody takes revenge intending to improve the world—they act from passion—yet this instinct could plausibly be understood as evolutionarily selected because societies with it deterred bad behavior and survived.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“nature gave us an instinct for revenge or for retaliation ... nobody intends to make the world a better place by taking revenge on the their a murderer they are just motivated by a passion”

0.75

Strictly speaking, Smith's commutative justice would not legally require or punish failure to rescue (the 'idly by' case)—e.g., an expert swimmer who declines to save a drowning person commits no punishable injustice—even though most people morally feel rescue is obligated; this is a very low legal standard.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“strictly speaking I think the law in line with Smith's commutative justice would not require it and would not punish the person who stood idly by”

0.75

Gratitude and resentment are 'compounded' sentiments because they require both that an action flowed from proper motives AND that it actually had merit (good consequences); they are active passions that spur us toward moral agency in reacting to others, unlike passive sentiments such as love, esteem, hatred, or dislike which do not necessarily prompt moral action.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“these notions of merit and demerit in particular gratitude and resentment gratitude for merit resentment for demerit already calls compounded sentiments because the the action that one is grateful for ... has to have flown from good motives proper motives as well as actually had merit in terms of consequences”

0.75

Smith embeds a providential 'invisible hand' / law of unintended consequences: humans act for their own immediate ends (hunger, pleasure, avoiding pain) without considering the beneficent social ends that nature intended to produce through them, so private motives generate hidden, unintended public benefits.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“hunger thirst the passion which unites the two sexes the love of pleasure the dread of pain prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great director of nature intended to produce by them”

0.75

When evaluating an actor's action, the spectator does not judge motives and consequences alone but views the actor through the eyes of the person acted upon—keying off the recipient's reaction—which is why storytellers and filmmakers convey impact by showing onlookers' reactions rather than the action directly.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“how we evaluate the actors action depends not only on you what we think of his motives and his consequences but also on the reactions of the other person ... we view the actor through the eyes of the person acted upon”

0.75

We unfairly assess people's merit by the consequences they were associated with rather than their actual contribution—e.g., calling a player 'a winner' when he was merely surrounded by great teammates while an equally talented player with mediocre teammates is judged inferior—yet Smith treats this as a near-inevitable feature of human nature with socially beneficial design.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“they'll say so-and-so is a winner ... it's invoked constantly to praise one player who just by good fortune found himself surrounded by ten other great players ... it's disturbing to me that people unfairly assess people's careers based on their teammates and yet Smith saying it's almost inevitable”

0.75

Gratitude and resentment are 'compounded sentiments' because to feel them properly requires both that an action flowed from good or bad motives AND that it produced meritorious or harmful consequences—so moral evaluation depends jointly on motive and effect.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“these notions of merit and demerit in particular gratitude and resentment ... already calls compounded sentiments because the the action that one is grateful for ... has to have flown from good motives proper motives as well as actually had merit in terms of consequences”

0.74

Moral judgment operates like common law or precedent: rather than possessing a rich full description of spectators' sensibilities, we accumulate 'markers' or focal points from prior accepted judgments and carry them forward as guides to evaluate new cases.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“we have all these markers of like Oh in that case it's almost like precedent it's almost like common-law right like the judgment was this and we had worked through why that makes sense”

0.74

When we oppose misguided policies, Smith observes we generally cast about for arguments beyond mere dislike of their advocates—typically invoking 'the disorder and confusion of society which would result from the universal prevalence of such practices'—showing how lower-level moral disapproval calls forth higher-level, consequence-based and more impartial reasoning.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“we generally cast about for other arguments and the consideration which first occurs to us is the disorder and confusion of society which would result from the univille universal prevalence of such practices”

0.74

Smith preserves sympathy even when a beneficiary fails to feel gratitude by having us imagine a recipient who is appropriately grateful—we coordinate our sentiments with the gratitude the recipient 'should' feel—demonstrating his principle of inserting an idealized spectator and using built-up precedents (akin to common-law markers) to guide moral judgment rather than full knowledge of others' sensibilities.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“suppose Jim acted on Bert ... and Bert fails to be grateful nonetheless what Jim did was actually meritorious ... we imagine a Bert who is grateful ... we imagine the sympathy that Bert should feel ... it's almost like precedent it's almost like common-law right”

0.74

Smith holds that when we oppose measures we think wrong, we must justify our opposition by reasons beyond mere dislike of the advocates—and the consideration that first occurs to us is the disorder and confusion of society that would result if such practices became universal—showing how the lower-level intuition that something is wrong calls forth higher-level appeal to broad social consequences.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“we generally cast about for other arguments and the consideration which first occurs to us is the disorder and confusion of society which would result from the ... universal prevalence of such practices ... how the different levels the different sources of moral approval will interconnect and call each other forth”

0.73

To fully approve of an action we must see the actor in the same light as the person acted upon; applied to government, recipients of benefits like Medicare or Social Security may feel gratitude, but spectators who view the government's actions as destructive or harmful are not required to coordinate their sentiments with that gratitude and may withhold approval of the merit attributed to government.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“we have to see the government the same way that the recipient does and if we don't agree essentially with the recipients sentiments we may not have that same praise you know or gratitude sense of gratitude or merit for the original actor”

0.73

Resentment and retaliation function as a desire to transform or educate the wrongdoer—to communicate how their action affected us and that they should care—rather than merely to punish; it is part of a 'discovery procedure' and a dialectic of moral communication.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“really sees that as a desire to transform that person to to almost educate them more than to punish them”

0.73

Even if consumers would gain widely from removing trade restrictions, most would be unwilling to 'push the button' to remove them—because losses loom larger than gains and they would feel morally responsible for the resulting job losses—so their willingness to pay to cause the change may be zero or negative, which is why the standard free-trade efficiency argument is uncompelling to non-economists.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“if you ask any one of them will you press the button to remove these restrictions ... they're like well I know that ... losses loom larger than gains and people are going to lose their jobs and I will have been the one morally responsible”

0.73

Economic efficiency (e.g., Kaldor-Hicks compensation, willingness to pay) is actually loose, vague, and indeterminate rather than precise, because it is ambiguous whether the relevant counterfactual is one in which people have moral agency, and because willingness to pay diverges sharply from willingness to actively cause harm.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“we talk about efficiency as though it's a well-defined thing all right kind of a precise notion I think for a great many reasons it's actually loose vague and indeterminate”

0.73

Politics tends to highlight certain consequences and intended actions while silencing certain reactions; when those affected (e.g., the taxed or restricted) stop expressing their indignation or resentment, that harmful aspect of the original government action tends to get lost and becomes less seen.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“if they're expressing indignation resentment against that if people stop doing that we lose you know then that aspect of the original action tends to get lost right and it becomes less seen”

0.73

Attempting to salvage the efficiency criterion by appealing to people's 'true' or 'enlightened' preferences (what they would pay after studying political economy) only throws the criterion further into the loose, vague, and indeterminate, defeating its claim to precision.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“then you're like saying that the efficiency criterion of willingness to pay is what you think people's true or proper and lightin preferences are which is throwing you totally into the loose vague and indeterminate”

0.73

Smith attributes the retaliation instinct to 'original and immediate instinct' rather than the 'slow and uncertain determinations of our reason,' a framing highly conducive to an evolutionary interpretation: societies whose members had this instinct tended to survive because it kept bad behavior in check—though Smith himself invokes providential nature rather than making an evolutionary argument.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“we can imagine being evolutionarily selected that is in societies where people had this instinct they tended to survive because it kept bad behavior and check ... but of course he doesn't make an eeveelution airy argument he just invokes ... providential nature”

0.73

Smith's choice to reserve the unqualified word 'justice' for commutative justice—only adding the qualifier 'commutative' later when reviewing the scholastics, and never calling beneficence 'distributive justice'—is textually significant and reveals his political sensibility that justice properly means only the negative duty to abstain from what is another's.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“the fact that he just calls commutative justice justice when he actually addresses it I think is very significant in thinking about ... what his political sensibilities were if he pretty much wants to just mean that by the word justice that means ... a lot I think”

0.73

When people who are taxed or restricted stop expressing their indignation and resentment, the harmful aspect of the original government action tends to become invisible, while the official or intended benefits remain salient—so politics systematically highlights certain consequences and silences others.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“particularly for examples are being taxed or being restricted if they're expressing indignation resentment against that if people stop doing that we lose ... then that aspect of the original action tends to get lost ... politics again tends to highlight certain aspects certain consequences and sort of the silence ... certain reactions”

0.73

Gratitude and resentment are 'active passions' that spur us toward moral agency—not merely passive feelings—because they prompt us to react, and resentment in particular functions less as punishment than as an attempt to communicate to and transform/educate the wrongdoer about how their action affected us.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“those again are sort of active passions which sort of spur us to be moral agents in a way which reacts to Jim showing our gratitude ... and similarly with resentment it's a moving passion and we want if we're going to sort of retaliate against someone who we resent we want that person to know why we're doing this”

0.73

Attempting to rescue the efficiency criterion by appealing to people's 'enlightened' or 'true' preferences (what they would pay after studying Smith and political economy) does not save it but instead pushes it fully into being loose, vague and indeterminate, since willingness-to-pay then becomes whatever the analyst judges proper preferences to be.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“then you're like saying that the efficiency criterion of willingness to pay is what you think people's true or proper and lightin preferences are which is throwing you totally into the loose vague and indeterminate”

0.73

The standard economic concept of efficiency (Kaldor-Hicks compensation) is 'loose, vague and indeterminate' rather than precise, because measuring willingness-to-pay depends on whether the relevant counterfactual frames people as passive beneficiaries or as moral agents who must 'push the button'—and these yield radically different valuations.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“we talk about efficiency as though it's a well-defined thing ... kind of a precise notion I think for a great many reasons it's actually loose vague and indeterminate ... when we talk about people's willingness to pay or be paid ... is the counterfactual the hypothetical one where they have moral agency or not”

0.73

The Kaldor-Hicks compensation argument for free trade is morally problematic because compensation to harmed workers never actually takes place, and even if it could, it is unclear it should—the protected workers were not the ones who lobbied for protection, so their gains and losses are arbitrary, making the 'gains can compensate losses' criterion ethically empty.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the compensation never takes place ... and then you have to ask the question should it take place ... if somebody through political force has artificially benefited from protection and we take the protection away should they be compensated and then even more complicated fact that the workers themselves were not probably part of the enterprise that impose the protection”

0.73

Because losses loom larger than gains and because individuals feel morally responsible when they are the agent removing a protection, a consumer who would benefit from removing a tariff might nonetheless be unwilling—or even pay—to NOT push the button that removes it, meaning their effective willingness-to-pay for the efficient outcome can be zero or negative.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“if you ask any one of them will you press the button to remove these restrictions ... they're like well I know that ... losses loom larger than gains and people are going to lose their jobs and I will have been the one morally responsible ... in terms of their actual willingness to push the button ... it might be zero or negative”

0.73

Because gratitude requires the spectator to see the actor in the same light as the recipient, whether we credit a benefactor (including government) with merit depends on whether we agree with the recipient's view; we can decline to enter into a recipient's gratitude toward government if we judge its actions destructive, and that refusal becomes part of our moral judgment of the policy.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“we must see the actor in this case they the government in the same light as object ... if we don't agree essentially with the recipients sentiments we may not have that same ... sense of gratitude or merit for the original actor”

0.73

Smith argues that hunger, thirst, sex, the love of pleasure, and the dread of pain prompt us to pursue their immediate objects 'for their own sakes' without any consideration of the beneficent ends nature intended to produce through them—an early statement of a providential law of unintended consequences underlying his invisible-hand premise.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“hunger thirst the passion which unites the two sexes the love of pleasure the dread of pain prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent ends which the great director of nature intended to produce by them”

0.72

Klein offers a focal-point interpretation of Smith's providentialism: reality is 'a fog' with only a finite number of 'stars' (focal points) to coordinate on, and how things actually turn out is highly focal whereas effort or intention offers no focal point to hang judgment on—so consequence-based evaluation is the best available coordinating device, which can be squared with providential nature as the giver of a world with limited focal points.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“so much in Smith ... is showing a great appreciation of focal points and the importance of synchronizing ... the reality is a fog as it were and there are some stars up there that ... flicker and there's a finite number of focal points ... one thing that's very focal is whether how things actually pan out”

0.71

Treason is the exception to the rule that mere attempts are punished less than completed crimes: because the crime immediately affects the being of the government itself, the sovereign judges in his own case and is apt to be more violent and sanguinary than the impartial spectator approves, punishing treason on smaller occasions and not waiting for the crime's perpetration or even attempt.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“in the punishment of treason the sovereign resents the injuries which are immediately done to himself ... as he judges in his own case he's very apt to be more violent and in sanguinary ... than the impartial spectator can approve of”

0.71

Smith's resolution of the irregularity rests on what amounts to a knowledge/monitoring-cost argument: because we cannot reliably observe intentions or even the precise bodily actions (how well someone aimed, whether they meant to miss), judging purely on intention would require an intolerable inquisition into everyone's inner efforts, so we rely instead on principles keyed to consequences, which instills a 'sacred regard' against negligence that might hurt others.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Dan Klein

“if it were somehow based just on intentions just on effort that could create a real Inquisition ... we have such imperfect knowledge or such a knowledge problem in knowing intentions ... it's so hard to know those things that we have to have principles ... that ... give rise to this what he calls an irregularity”

0.68

The standard economic argument that removing a tariff is efficient (because consumer gains could compensate harmed workers) is morally problematic because compensation never actually takes place, because it is questionable whether those who benefited from political protection deserve compensation, and because the harmed workers were typically not the ones who lobbied for the protection.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“morally it started to bother me for a couple reasons one is the compensation never takes place ... should they be compensated and then even more complicated fact that the workers themselves were not probably part of the enterprise that impose the protection”

0.66

The irregularity that praises actors who succeed and blames those whose plans don't come to fruition pervades modern life unfairly—e.g., calling a player a 'winner' or judging an athlete's career by teammates' quality (which modern sabermetrics tries to correct)—yet Smith argues it is socially beneficial because rewarding results rather than intentions induces people to actually work to bring plans to completion.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“it's invoked constantly to praise one player who just by good fortune found himself surrounded by ten other great players ... this poor wretch ... is viewed as having a yeah so so career”

0.66

The strongest case for free trade in a wealthy society is not the quantifiable consumer savings but the non-monetary human benefit of allowing people to express their talents and gifts in a more open society; in poorer countries the material benefits matter more and can be a matter of life and death.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“much of the reason to be against protectionism and to be in favor of free trade is it allows us to express our talents and gifts in a more open society and that's more important than the ... consumers are going to pay less for sugar”

0.66

Smith's image of all members of society 'bound together by the agreeable bands of love and affection... drawn to one common center of mutual good offices' is best read metaphorically—a poetic, almost substitute-religious vision of belonging to the spontaneous order/division of labor (akin to Durkheim)—rather than a literal claim that the economy is one coordinated organization.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“it is a kind of poetic spontaneous order almost as a religion ... like let's serve the great concatenation the spontaneous order and appreciate that in a kind of ... meaningful way a sense of connection”

0.66

In a wealthy society with large internal gains from trade, the strongest case for free trade is not the monetary consumer savings but the non-quantifiable human benefit of allowing people to express their talents and gifts in a more open society; the material argument is more decisive only in poorer countries where trade can be a matter of life and death.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“much of the reason to be against protectionism and to be in favor of free trade is it allows us to express our talents and gifts in a more open society and that's more important than the ... those human benefits that are not quantifiable ... in a poorer country it could be a matter of life and death”

0.66

Laws against murder may deter relatively little murder directly, since most murderers expect to get away with it; in a world without such laws there would likely be far more murder via private revenge, gang and tribal defense, so the real deterrent is the combination of internalized personal morality (murder is wrong) plus the threat of private revenge.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“it's not obvious to me how many how much murder is deterred by a law against murder ... in a world without a law against it there'd be a lot more revenge ... more gang defense ... more tribal defense ... most murders of course ... get away with it so to me the ... combination of restraints ... the personal morality of same murder is wrong plus the potential for revenge is a big deterrent”

0.61

In a modern division-of-labor world, one cannot rely on love and affection because most exchange partners are strangers; instead, capitalism functions better when there is generalized trust and people behave decently, as illustrated by unwritten understood conventions (e.g., what is included with a house sale)—but it can still work via rule of law and contracts even without such decency.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“in a modern world of division of labor I better not rely on love and affection because I'm not gonna get much of it they're strangers”

0.61

A possible reading of the 'great concatenation' passage is that capitalism functions far better in high-trust societies, because trust lets people rely on informal expectations (e.g., the unspecified but understood items conveyed with a house sale) rather than costly top-down enforcement of every term—making commerce more pleasant and effective when people behave decently.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“a lot of people say capitalism doesn't work very well unless you have ... trust ... attempts to ... use capitalism and societies that don't have a lot of trust don't work very well that you have to use more top-down methods to enforce expectations”

0.56

Smith's reality is 'a fog' with only a finite number of focal points—stars that flicker—and we must work comparatively with what is available; how things actually turn out (e.g., whether the pitcher won 20 games) is highly focal and provides a usable anchor for judgments of propriety, whereas the philosophically purer standard based on effort or intention 'sounds nice but there are no focal points to hang it on.'

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Dan Klein

“the reality is a fog as it were and there are some stars up there that sparkle somewhat that flicker and there's a finite number of focal points ... one thing that's very focal is whether how things actually pan out”

0.27

Government does not have emotions and is not genuinely generous; politicians act as if generous but usually with other people's money. Many people nonetheless hold a 'romance' about government, viewing it as generous and looking out for them.

normativecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“I don't think of government as generous yeah because government isn't a doesn't have emotions now politicians act as if they're generous right but usually with other people's money”

0.24

Part 2 of the Theory of Moral Sentiments is titled 'Of Merit and Demerit, or of the Objects of Reward and Punishment' and consists of three sections.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Dan Klein

“part 2 of merit and demerit or of the objects of reward and Punishment consisting of three sections”

0.12

Today's podcast is the third episode of the EconTalk book club on The Theory of Moral Sentiments and covers Part II.

factual· Russ Roberts

“welcome to the third episode of the econ talk book club on the Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith with Dan Klein ... today's podcast is on part 2 of the book”