Bootleggers and Baptists
A public-choice framework where well-meaning moralists ('Baptists') and self-interested profiteers ('bootleggers') both support the same regulation for different reasons, enabling its passage and self-interested capture.
As defined in Judge Glock on Zoning and Local Government
Other definitions
A political-economy concept describing coalitions where morally-motivated advocates (Baptists) and profit-seekers (bootleggers) support the same policy for different reasons.
Luigi Zingales on the Costs and Benefits of the Financial Sector
Where it comes up · 11
- Bruce Yandle on Bootleggers and Baptists4 claims
- Robert Laughlin on the Future of Carbon and Climate 08/09/20102 claims
- Mike Munger on Profits, Entrepreneurship, and Storytelling 12/12/20111 claim
- Mike Munger on Exchange, Exploitation and Euvoluntary Transactions 06/20/20111 claim
- Ryan Avent on Cities, Urban Regulations, and Growth 10/31/20111 claim
- Paul Collier on Democracy and Violence 07/06/20091 claim
- Luigi Zingales on the Costs and Benefits of the Financial Sector1 claim
- Judge Glock on Zoning and Local Government1 claim
and 3 more
Most important claims · 10 of 15Search all claims for “Bootleggers and Baptists” →
- The Bootleggers and Baptists theory holds that durable regulation arises from an implicit coalition between an economic interest group that profits from the rule ('bootleggers') and a moralizing group that provides altruistic cover ('Baptists'), exemplified by Sunday liquor bans where Baptists lobby for closure and bootleggers gain a one-day-a-week illegal market—without the two ever needing to coordinate.Bruce Yandle on Bootleggers and Baptists
- Some social risks are exploited by self-interested 'bootleggers and Baptists' coalitions where politicians look green or protective while funneling resources to favored special interests—e.g., the corn lobby benefiting from ethanol policies, or European farmers manufacturing GMO-food fears as a protectionist tool to scare consumers away from American products.Cass Sunstein on Worst-case Scenarios 11/19/2007
- Once you adopt the Bootleggers and Baptists lens, the key analytical questions become not just whether a regulation has self-interested backers, but why the regulation happened now, who besides the moral crusaders has a stake, and—most importantly—what specific form the regulation takes, since the public attends to the general fervor but not to the details where an industry's special interests are actually served.Bruce Yandle on Bootleggers and Baptists
- Foreign intervention in poor countries creates a bootleggers-and-Baptists problem: high-minded advocates' justifications can enable others with less attractive agendas, and because the 'international community' is not a conscious decider bearing responsibility, it faces weaker feedback incentives than individuals.Paul Collier on Democracy and Violence 07/06/2009
- In the Bootleggers and Baptists model, the bootlegger is motivated by narrow economic self-interest while the Baptist takes the moral high ground, providing the politician both external moral cover and internal conscience relief so that political contributions from bootleggers can be rationalized as serving the altruistic public interest.Bruce Yandle on Bootleggers and Baptists
- Restrictions on new development are often justified altruistically, as historic preservation or green space, while serving the self-interest of homeowners who want to protect property values, which is the bootleggers-and-Baptists dynamic.Ryan Avent on Cities, Urban Regulations, and Growth 10/31/2011
- Coalitions of high-minded moralists and self-interested industries, such as greens and oil companies, form a 'bootleggers and Baptists' alliance, where well-meaning advocates are unknowingly used by more savvy interested parties.Robert Laughlin on the Future of Carbon and Climate 08/09/2010
- Some bans framed as 'do-goodism' are actually bootleggers-and-Baptists arrangements where a self-interested party cloaks its agenda in kindness, as Munger suggests is true for opposition to Walmart.Mike Munger on Exchange, Exploitation and Euvoluntary Transactions 06/20/2011
- Imposing US safety regulations on poor-country workers is arrogant paternalism, and the labor/environmental-standards provisions of trade agreements are really a 'bootleggers and Baptists' arrangement: protectionists wanting to keep US jobs use the moral language of caring about poor workers as cover.Mike Munger on Fair Trade and Free Trade 12/3/2007
- State insurance mandates—requiring health insurance policies to cover certain things—keep growing longer, driven by a 'bootleggers and Baptists' coalition of self-interested providers and well-meaning advocates, even though economists consider catastrophic insurance (which covers less) to be good insurance.Arnold Kling on Hospitals and Health Care 06/30/2008