
Arnold Kling on Hospitals and Health Care 06/30/2008
What this covers
Arnold Kling and Russ Roberts discuss the structural failures of American health care through the lens of Kling's experience watching his father navigate hospital care after a hip fracture. Rather than attributing system problems to incompetence or lack of medical knowledge, Kling argues that the core dysfunction flows from the absence of direct payment between patients and providers. When insurers and Medicare—not patients—bear the cost, hospitals and doctors optimize for reimbursement and reporting metrics rather than coordinated care. This severs the feedback mechanisms that discipline ordinary markets and leaves no one accountable for the whole person.
The conversation ranges across how third-party payment distorts incentives throughout the system. Kling identifies a specific crisis for complex patients—those with multiple chronic conditions or in late decline—who comprise 70 percent of spending but receive fragmented specialist care with no coordinator responsible for interactions between treatments. He contrasts this with fields like LASIK surgery, where direct payment and competitive pressure have produced steadily falling costs and improving quality. The pair also explore why generalist gerontologists are disappearing despite their value, how doctors trained as competitive individualists struggle in team-based care, and why adding patient advocates remains economically invisible to hospital balance sheets. Kling frames the underlying problem not as a market failure but as a breakdown of order—neither market nor hierarchy functioning properly—and sketches how continued pressure on Medicare reimbursement may eventually create a two-tier system favoring those who pay directly.
Kling argues that the U.S. health care system fails complex patients not because medicine is inherently too hard, but because third-party payment severs the link between patients and providers, producing a 'breakdown of order' rather than a functional spontaneous or corporate order.
- Most health spending goes to complex patients who need coordinated 'corporate order' but receive fragmented specialist care with no one in charge of the whole person
- Because insurers and Medicare—not patients—are the real customers, hospitals optimize for payment and reporting rather than patient outcomes
- Markets where patients pay directly (LASIK) show better cost and quality trends, suggesting insulation from payment is the core distortion
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Hayek's concept of spontaneous order does not mean an absence of planning; rather it means planning is done by competing organizations and individuals from the bottom up, and the real question is not whether there is planning but who plans.
“it's important to make an observation that that Hayek made then we talked about spontaneous order we don't mean a world of no planning ... there's lots of planning the real question is who plans”
Interest-group politics is the rational core of politics: interest groups, unlike many other political actors, behave rationally, so loading up bills with favors for specific companies is simply 'the way the game is supposed to be played'—a perspective that serves as a healthy antidote to outrage over the political process.
“my father's view of interest group politics was that it was the rational core of politics that ... interest groups were behaving rationally ... he'd say isn't that the way the game is supposed to be played”
There is a basic moral quandary of health care: we instinctively want care to be free because of a deep repugnance to charging people who are in distress (analogous to the origin of usury laws), yet we recognize providers deserve payment—so we set up a layer of insulation where third parties pay over 80% of health spending across the industrialized world.
“we really instinctively want health care to be free but we understand that the providers of health care need to be paid ... there's a deep moral repugnance to taking advantage of somebody in distress ... so what do you do you set up a layer of insulation and all over the world ... over 80% of health care spending is paid for by third parties”
Because politics is about the rules of the game and the incentives of the players rather than the players themselves, electing a favored candidate ('White Knight') will not change the underlying interest-group dynamics—a painful reality most people have trouble absorbing.
“don't expect that if your favorite White Knight is elected that it's going to change ... it's the rules of the game ... that affect the play not the players and that's a painful reality that most of us have trouble absorbing”
Increased longevity is a blessing but has a consequence: by the time people reach end-stage decline they often have multiple things wrong simultaneously (multiple chronic and complex illnesses), making medicine more complex even as the specialized 'lone wolf' doctor model has not adapted.
“one of the things about greater longevity is that by the time people do start to break down their multiple causes ... by the time people do reach an end stage they often have multiple things wrong with them”
Most health care expense (70% or more of total costs) goes to 'complex patients'—people with diabetes and many complications, those in late stages of life, and those with chronic illnesses—who require team-based coordinated care, unlike simple cases (broken arm, strep throat) that an individual doctor handles.
“most of the expense in the healthcare system goes for what I'll just use a non-technical term complex patients ... those people account for 70% or more of the total expenses in the healthcare system and that requires something different than the individual doctor”
What the U.S. has created in health care, despite attempts to do better than a market, is a breakdown—neither community order, corporate order, nor spontaneous order—analogous to how well-intended 1970s gasoline price controls created an absolute breakdown in the gasoline market.
“for all the attempt to do better than a market what we've done is created a breakdown just as the price controls which might have been well intended for gasoline in the 1970s ended up creating an absolute breakdown ... what we've created in healthcare is a breakdown it's not a community order it's not a corporate order it's not a spontaneous order it's a breakdown”
A large 'gray area' of medicine exists where it is neither absolutely sure you need a treatment nor that you don't, and much care (including elective and screening procedures like colonoscopies done without acute distress) falls into this area—suggesting it should be more subject to market forces and less to payment insulation.
“I talk about the gray area of medicine being very large that the area where it's not absolutely sure that you don't need it it's not absolutely sure that you need it and with so much of health care being in this gray area then ... we ought to be more receptive to subjecting that to market forces”
Pay-for-performance schemes for hospitals are undermined by a reporting problem: when local providers do the reporting, they game the metrics—for example, a death may be listed as caused by cancer rather than a hospital-borne infection to avoid being penalized—because managing performance from a central distance invites manipulation.
“one of the reasons that they put down cancer the esophagus is that they didn't want to get dinged on a performance issue for having him die of infection ... when you try to manage people's performance from a long distance from a central location you're going to get gamed”
Within a hospital, unlike a competitive gas station, no one has a direct incentive to take care of the whole patient: the heart surgeon is rewarded for preventing heart attacks but bears little incentive to avoid giving the patient an infection in the process, because the feedback mechanisms that discipline ordinary businesses are absent.
“there's no one in that facility who has an incentive to take care of that patient ... the heart surgeon wants to make sure he doesn't die of a heart attack that's how he gets judged ... but if as a result of preventing that heart attack he gives your father an infection well for some reason the way that current system is structured there's not as much of an incentive form to worry about that”
The number of gerontologists—generalist doctors who treat the whole elderly patient (illustrated by Gawande's anecdote of examining a patient's toenails to prevent falls rather than only treating her tumor)—is declining rather than increasing, because doctors are reimbursed for codeable procedures and holistic generalist attention has no billing code.
“the number of gerontologists is declining it's not increasing ... look at how doctors are reimbursed they're reimbursed for procedures ... saying take off your socks and let me look at your toenails is not a procedure ... there's no code for that you can bill Medicare for”
The Medicare/Social Security fiscal projections are not really a crisis of inherent bankruptcy but of an inevitable political fight: since health spending cannot rise to 100-300% of GDP (Stein's Law—what can't go on forever will stop), the political process will lower benefits, raise taxes, or some mix as the train wreck approaches.
“it's pretty obvious to me that we will choose not to afford the level of care that we have insulated people from ... the political process as that train wreck gets closer will lower the benefits raise the tax rate do a mix ... the inherent bankruptcy of the system isn't what's threatening it's the political fight”
Paying doctors by procedure code rather than by patient outcomes or well-being is an ironic tragedy: efforts to organize health care as a community/moral enterprise (rather than a market) have ended up treating doctors like day laborers paid by the piece for filling out forms.
“isn't it ironic that those of us who defend the market and defend profit as an incentive ... look what it's led us to it's led us to treating doctors like day laborers who are paid by the piece this bizarre idea that you would reimburse doctors based on what they literally do not the outcomes not their patient's well-being”
Doctors are trained primarily as competitive individual overachievers—taught to be skeptical of others' judgments and to outperform peers—which does not lend itself to the team-oriented behaviors required for complex patients in the operating room or hospital floor.
“doctors are trained primarily as individuals ... they're taught to think for themselves to be skeptical of the judgments and capabilities of others ... this does not lend itself to team-oriented behaviors in the operating room or in the hospital floor”
Competitive pressure forces businesses to fix broken internal processes (via reorganization, new systems) or go out of business, but health care lacks this disciplining pressure—especially because broken processes that hurt customers normally drive them to alternatives, whereas in health care that feedback is muted.
“you do a reorganization you change your business process you build a new computer system or you go out of business because your competitor figured it out ... if you have a process that's felt by customers and it hurts them then ... as soon as they see an alternative they go they go somewhere else”
We could subject more health care to market mechanisms—competition, guarantees, brand names, review articles—just as we do for complex products like computers that consumers don't fully understand, but we don't because we pay through insurance rather than directly.
“when I shop for a computer I sure don't know what I'm shopping for but there are all these devices that work there's competition there are guarantees there brand names ... and there are all these mechanisms at work that could work in healthcare but we don't use them as much because we're not paying for it”
Because hospitals are paid mostly by Medicare or private insurance, their administration and procedures are geared toward meeting the payer's needs rather than the patient's, and you cannot have patient-centric care until the patient is actually the customer.
“what does hospital administration consist of it consists of making sure the hospital gets paid who pays the hospital Medicare mostly or private insurance so all of their procedures are geared toward meeting the customers need where the customer is the insurance company or Medicare ... until the patient is the customer you're not going to have patient centric care”
The most likely resolution of Medicare's fiscal pressure is continued squeezing of doctor reimbursements, which is already causing doctors to leave Medicare and refuse Medicaid patients, leading toward a two-tier system: government-funded patients get poorer and fewer choices of doctors, while those who pay out of pocket get better care with somewhat better quality incentives.
“Medicare has been kept afloat so far has been by squeezing and squeezing on that ... doctors are leaving the Medicare system they're refusing to treat Medicaid patients ... we seem to be headed toward a two-tier system ... people who rely on Medicare and Medicaid get poorer and poorer choices of doctors ... and other people having to pay more and more in order to ensure that they're seen by a doctor”
State insurance mandates—requiring health insurance policies to cover certain things—keep growing longer, driven by a 'bootleggers and Baptists' coalition of self-interested providers and well-meaning advocates, even though economists consider catastrophic insurance (which covers less) to be good insurance.
“state mandates where the state requires if you offer a health insurance policy you have to cover certain things those lists get longer not shorter ... a combination of the self-interested providers of the product with those who are actually worried that people won't take care of themselves”
Hospitals do not provide patients an advocate, gatekeeper, or 'Shepherd' (project manager who watches for interactions and multiple effects) because the incentives are absent: patients don't pay their own bills, so adding such a staff member would not improve the hospital's financial position, leaving overwhelmed family members to play that role badly.
“why isn't it that when you walk into a hospital today as an elderly patient you don't get an advocate a gatekeeper a Shepherd ... patients don't pay for their own health care and the bottom line improvements in the hospital's financial situation are not going to be particularly improved by adding that staff member so it seems to be the incentives are just totally messed up”
LASIK surgery, which is generally not covered by private insurance or government programs and relies on direct payment and a profit motive (including advertising), has gotten cheaper and better over time—suggesting market mechanisms can work even for emotionally charged medical procedures.
“lasik surgery which is not covered by typically by private insurance is not covered by government welfare programs ... I'm told ... that LASIK has gotten cheaper and better despite the fact that we rely on this grubby profit motive to sustain that market”
Nearly everyone—not just the uninsured—is at risk in the health care finance system: employer-provided insurance is unraveling (creating large wage differentials and trapping the unhealthy in jobs), and Medicare is projected by the CBO and Medicare trustees to be effectively bankrupt.
“the employer provided health insurance that system is unraveling ... if you're healthy and you want a high wage you leave your job to become a consultant ... if you're unhealthy you're scared to death of losing your job ... the system that's the biggest risk is Medicare because it's projected ... as being sort of bankrupt so everyone's at risk it's not just the uninsured”
Over a two-week period after breaking his hip, Kling's father passed through eight different hospital units with no continuity of care between them, being pushed from one procedure or emergency to the next, which Kling identifies as a breakdown of the system rather than failure of equipment or personnel.
“over the two-week period from the time that he broke his hip over the next two weeks he was in eight different units and I could see that there was not really any continuity of care between those eight units”
Doctors maintain control because of a tradition that a doctor must be in charge and a personal desire for total control; if they relinquished some control—allowing others to prescribe drugs or make decisions—they would have a more sensible workload and patients would likely be better off, but in the current system there is no market force curbing this control-seeking behavior.
“the doctor doesn't want to give up the control the head of the unit doesn't want to have to be told what to do ... if they would allow other people to be involved ... they would have less work ... but they have to lose this sense of being in total control ... the market would normally have curbed that desire”
There are three forms of organization—spontaneous order, corporate (top-down designed) order, and breakdown of order—and complex medical patients require corporate order (a designed process with assigned roles and a coordinator) rather than a spontaneous system, just as building a skyscraper requires a project manager rather than ad-hoc amateur effort.
“I want to talk about three things a spontaneous order a corporate order and a breakdown of order and what I thought I served with my father's care was a breakdown of order”
Kling's father was diagnosed with esophageal cancer and listed as dying of it, but Kling believes he actually died of an infection contracted and worsened in the hospital—originating from bed sores developed while kept flat on his back for days after hip surgery.
“they actually put esophageal cancer on the death certificate he died in April but I think he died of an infection that was probably contracted in the hospital and made worse”
Russ Roberts states that he is the host of EconTalk, affiliated with George Mason University, Stanford's Hoover Institution, and the Library of Economics and Liberty.
“welcome to econ talk part of the library of economics and liberty I'm your host Russ Roberts of George Mason University and Stanford University's Hoover Institution”