
A History of Philosophy | 54 Kant on Metaphysics
What this covers
This is a single-lecturer university lecture in a history-of-philosophy series, devoted to the part of the Critique of Pure Reason where Immanuel Kant asks whether rational metaphysics, the project René Descartes began and empiricists like John Locke took up, is possible at all. The lecturer follows the transcendental dialectic through its three targets in order: the soul, the cosmos, and God. The method throughout is to examine the structure of each argument and show where it breaks, rather than ruling it out in advance on epistemological grounds.
The first stretch covers rational psychology. Four paralogisms, one for each family of categories, are laid out, and the lecturer argues that the mind-body problem is a pseudo-problem produced by wrongly treating mind and body as substances. The three classical solutions (interaction, pre-established harmony, occasionalism) each bring in a further unjustified concept. The lecturer also notes that Kant does not deny the soul; he denies that any valid argument establishes it. The cosmology section turns to the antinomies, in which thesis and antithesis can both be proven, including the third antinomy on causation and freedom. Kant's proofs by reductio ad absurdum are shown to support both sides, and transcendental idealism is offered as the way out.
The final stretch addresses God. The ontological argument is said to fail because "exists" is not a logical predicate, and the cosmological argument and the teleological argument are presented as depending on it in turn. The lecture then turns to what Kant keeps: unstable doctrinal belief versus stable moral belief, plus moral and aesthetic arguments drawn from the other two Critiques. The most contested point is that the refutations depend on Kant's epistemology. If the categories describe reality as well as thought, as Scottish realists hold, the proofs may survive.
Kant's transcendental dialectic demonstrates that rational metaphysics cannot produce knowledge of reality because metaphysical arguments necessarily employ a priori categories that apply only to phenomena, not things-in-themselves, leaving us with justified beliefs rather than certain knowledge about God, the soul, and the cosmos.
- Metaphysical arguments about mind, cosmos, and God all depend on a priori categories that cannot legitimately extend beyond possible experience to noumena
- The three traditional proofs for God's existence (ontological, cosmological, teleological) each fail because they presuppose concepts they cannot justify
- Knowledge-claims about metaphysics must be replaced with a distinction between doctrinal and moral belief, where moral certainty derives from practical necessity rather than logical proof
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Because Kant can prove both thesis and antithesis in each cosmological antinomy with equal logical weight, we can prove nothing about the cosmos's infinity versus finiteness, divisibility versus indivisibility, freedom versus determinism, or necessity versus contingency—the contradictions reveal the questions are malformed
“we can prove nothing because of these contradictions we can prove nothing about the infinity of the cosmos in time and space as against its finiteness we can prove nothing as about about divisibility is against indivisibility nothing about determinism as against freedom nothing about necessity as against contingency”
The transcendental dialectic analyzes metaphysical arguments by examining their structure and showing they fail not merely in advance (by epistemological principle) but through detailed examination of why the arguments themselves don't work
“it's one thing to say in advance of looking at it that it's not possible it's another thing to look at the meta physicians probes and to show that they don't work and that's exactly what he's doing”
In rational psychology, Kant's central objection to Cartesian arguments for the soul as a thinking substance is that they introduce the a priori category of substance, which itself depends on unknown relationships between accidents (properties) and their underlying substrates, making the logical inference invalid
“his objection is to introducing the term race or substance and if you as I suspect you did not memorize those twelve County and categories I told you you needn't but you can check back on them and one of them is the category of substance... his point is that that connection between an accident and its underlying substrate 'im and that relationship is an unknown relationship we have the concept which we impose on things”
The introduction of the concept of soul substance, while logically invalid, serves important philosophical functions: it affirms the continuity of the thinking self through time (the 'I' that thinks now is the same 'I' that thought in the past and will think in the future) and guards against the philosophical danger of materialism
“the intrusion of the concept of substance is not a bad thing it is simply that it affirms more than is logically possible it also guards against the danger of materialism and for Kant that is a danger he doesn't like it we'll see more of this subsequently but current is very much afraid that a realistic reading of Newtonian science with its blind causal mechanisms would produce some kind of a deterministic universe in which there is no such thing as freedom and no moral responsibility”
The introduction of mind and body as substances creates the mind-body problem, but this is a pseudo-problem because neither mind nor body are, according to Kant, known as substances—the problem arises only from the improper intrusion of the substance-concept
“introducing sole substance introduces a mind-body problem what is the relationship between the mind substance and the body substance now keep in mind that's that awful pun again keep in mind that neither mind nor body are according to Kant known as substance so the mind-body problem in the sense of the relationship between two substances is a pseudo problem but it's a pseudo problem created by the intrusion of the concepts”
Knowledge extends only to phenomena (appearances, things as they seem) rather than to things-in-themselves (noumena or reality beyond experience), which is already anticipated as a negative response to whether rational metaphysics is possible
“knowledge extends only to phenomena appearances things as they seemed once rather than two things in themselves the noumenon reality began zyc so you have an anticipation already of a negative response to the question is rational metaphysics possible”
Kant achieves his goal in the Critique of Pure Reason by 'doing away with knowledge in order to make room for beliefs'—establishing that we lack metaphysical knowledge but may retain various metaphysical beliefs
“you recall my comment earlier that in the introduction he observes that he's gonna do away with knowledge in order to make room for beliefs so he does that in the dialectic and then he gets to talking about belief at the end we don't have metaphysical knowledge but we may have all sorts of metaphysical beliefs”
Antinomy occurs in cosmology when arguments can be given that prove both a thesis and its antithesis—e.g., that the world has a beginning in time AND that it has no beginning, both seemingly proven—which violates the law of excluded middle (a or not-a), the fundamental law of logic
“an antinomy occurs when the argument for a thesis and the argument against the thesis can both be given you can prove both out what are you gonna do there now in that case again you have something which violates the laws of logic it's against normos law what's against laws of logic well the law of logic is the law of excluded middle a or not a and now you've got both a it's on Antenna me is against the law of life”
Kant's solution to the antinomies is transcendental idealism: while objects of external intuition may be real as perceived in space and time, space itself, time, and all phenomena are not things-in-themselves but representations that cannot exist outside the mind
“his conclusion to this section is that what he calls transcendental idealism notice that phrase is italicized a transcendental idealism... transcendental idealism on the contrary allows that the objects of external intuition may be real as perceived in space and time as represented but space itself as well as time with all phenomena and not things by themselves they cannot exist outside of the mind and so his phenomenal new banal distinction is upheld”
The ontological argument claims God necessarily exists, but Kant argues that 'exists' is not a logical predicate—it does not ascribe a property like other predicates, so 'God necessarily exists' involves an a priori concept of necessity/modality, making the argument depend on the very thing it claims to prove
“God exists what sort of a proposition is that now be careful Kant says that is not a proposition a proposition has a subject and a predicate exists is not logically a predicate because when you predicate something you ascribe a property existence isn't the property to say God exists is simply to say to leave the rest of the sentence blank”
The idea of God is, for Kant, an ideal—a concept that completes the whole scope of human knowledge and caps off everything else—but its objective reality cannot be proven, only that it cannot be disproven
“the idea of God is however an ideal it's an ideal a concept that we come up with because it completes the whole scope of our purport acknowledge it caps off everything else look on page 480 second column new paragraph halfway down the purely speculative use of Reason therefore the Supreme Being remains an ideal only but an ideal without a flaw a concept which finishes and crowns the whole of human knowledge the objective reality of which though it cannot be proved cannot be disproved”
There are two kinds of belief distinguished by Kant: doctrinal belief (unstable, based on ideal conceptions about God's design) and moral belief (stable, based on the fact that one must obey the moral law, which implies the existence of God and a future world)
“he talks of doctrinal belief he talks of doctrinal beliefs and he talks of moral belief those two kinds two kinds of beliefs doctrinal belief has to do with this this ideal that leads us to believe certain things about God as a supreme intelligent who was ordered things for the wisest of aliens but on the other hand moral belief takes us further doctrinal belief is quite unstable because you can't prove the existence of that being but moral belief is different”
The Critique of Pure Reason's overall purpose is to inquire whether rational metaphysics—the kind Descartes began and empiricists like Locke proposed—is actually possible
“the purpose of the whole critique is really to inquire whether rational metaphysics rationalistic metaphysics is possible is the project which Descartes began possible is the kind of metaphysics which with similar ambitions was proposed on an empirical basis by somebody like John Locke is that really possible the possibility of metaphysics”
The overall outcome of the Critique of Pure Reason is that Kant 'does away with knowledge [about metaphysical matters] in order to make room for belief,' establishing a reconstruction of metaphysics not as knowledge but as justified practical belief
“the outcome of the critique of Pure Reason you see as he says in the the introduction is that he's doing away with knowledge making room for belief”
Three traditional answers to the mind-body problem all fail because they introduce additional a priori concepts that cannot be legitimately applied to reality: interaction (introduces causation), pre-established harmony (introduces necessity/harmony), and occasionalism (introduces divine action)
“there are three kinds of answer to that problem there is the end so that there is some kind of causal connection physical causation is involved that sounds like Descartes but obviously that's going to introduce another a priori concept the concept of causation the alternative is to say that there is some pre-established harmony between the two that's lightness and the third alternative is to say that there is supernatural assistance and that of course is the occasional ism which says that it's God who produces the corresponding effects but that again would be speaking about something of which we do not know”
In rational psychology, four paralogisms can be identified, each corresponding to the four types of categories (quantity, quality, relation, modality): arguments claiming the mind is simple/indivisible, numerically identical through time, related to extended objects in space, and existing with necessity
“he runs through the four kinds of categories quantity quality relation modality and shows how in rational psychology all four of those kinds of categories are involved and so what you really have in that branch of metaphysics is really an imaginative construct made up out of those a three or I concepts imposed on our actual experience reflective introspection”
Kant's proof procedure for the antinomies uses reductio ad absurdum: assume the thesis is false, derive consequences, show those consequences are themselves false, therefore the thesis must be true—but he shows this procedure equally 'proves' both thesis and antithesis, revealing the method itself is flawed
“his procedure is what in logic we call a reductio ad absurdum where you may recall you should I hope recall from your logic course... a reductio ad absurdum starts by assuming the falsity of the thesis if the thesis is false what follows from it and then you go on to show that what follows and should be true on the basis of the falsity of the thesis what should be true is itself thoughts so if that is false then the denial of the thesis is false and the thesis is true”
The cosmological argument depends on the ontological argument because it assumes the contingency of the cosmos and infers a necessary being, but the very concept of necessity/contingency is a priori and unjustified, and it presupposes the conclusion of the ontological argument
“the cosmological argument really depends on the ontological because the cosmological argument is arguing about causal dependence causal dependence that is to say it assumes the contingency of the cosmos on a necessary being so it assumes the very thing which the ontological argument assumes the cosmological argument presupposes the conclusion of the ontological argument”
Kant originates both moral and aesthetic arguments for God's existence: the moral argument appears in the Critique of Practical Reason, while the aesthetic argument appears in the Critique of Judgment, based on human aesthetic capacities being perfectly adapted to enjoying nature's beauties and grandeur
“that can't originates not only moral arguments for the existence of God that he begins aesthetic arguments for the existence of God yeah the moral argument comes up in the critique of practical reason the esthetic argument in the critique of judgment and I don't think of any dependency between the two I could be wrong in that but I don't think of any way in which the one would depend on the other they may both depend on certain aspects of his epistemology”
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant discusses four different ways to explain teleology (four worldviews) and argues for the 'physical theological' view in which the order of nature is divinely created, based on the perfect adaptation of human spirit and its categories to experiencing nature
“in the critique of judgment he doesn't he talks about two kinds of judgment one is aesthetic judgment in our sense of aesthetic the other is teleological judgment teleological judgment and he he argues that there are four different ways to explain teleology four different world views and the notion of a world view begins to arise and the one he opts for is the physical theological namely one in which the ordinance of nature is divinely created and it is a kind of teleological argument but there he's arguing from the way in which the human spirit with its categories is so perfectly adapted to the two having experience of nature to the enjoyment of the beauties and grandeur of nature”
All three traditional arguments for God's existence form a hierarchy of dependency: the teleological argument depends on the cosmological argument, which depends on the ontological argument; since the ontological argument fails, all three arguments fail
“the teeny illogical argument depends on the cosmological argument which depends on the ontological argument since the ontological fail none of them work”
Kant does not deny the existence of soul substance in rational psychology; rather, he denies that there is a valid logical argument for it while acknowledging that practical considerations may justify belief in it
“keep in mind that he's not denying the existence of soul substance he's not denying the existence of soul substance he's saying you don't have a valid argument”
Paralogism in logic is a step that goes beyond logic, where the argument's conclusion extends beyond what can be proven logically from the premises—this is the fundamental error structure Kant identifies in rational psychology
“a parallelism is a step that goes beyond logic beyond logic in other words the argument failed because the conclusion goes beyond what can be proven logically beyond what the premises require parallelisms”
The first cosmological antinomy concerns whether the world is finite or infinite in time and space: the thesis that it has a beginning in time and is limited in space can be proven, and the antithesis that it is infinite in both respects can also be proven, creating a logical contradiction
“the thesis is that the world has a beginning in time and is limited also with regards to space it's finite in duration temporarily and in extinction spatially the antithesis is the opposite the world has no beginning no limits but is infinite in regards to both time and space”
The third cosmological antinomy concerns causation and freedom: the thesis claims causality according to natural law is insufficient and freedom must exist, while the antithesis claims only natural causation exists and no freedom—both can be logically proven
“causality according to the laws of nature is not only causality from which all phenomena of the world can be adduced in order to account for these phenomena it's necessary to admit another causality that our freedom the antithesis there's no freedom and off he goes again”
Kant's refutation of the three arguments for God's existence depends on his epistemology: if the categories of understanding are not merely categories of thought but also categories of reality (as Scottish realists argue), then Kant's objections fail and the proofs might work
“why didn't this put an end then to all theistic arguments of this sort yes and the answer I think is twofold one very obvious one not everybody agrees with cants and pista mala G and if cants and piss Kamala G is mistaken and the categories are not just purely a pre or high then cants whole disproof of the arguments doesn't work”
The epistemological difference between Kant and Scottish realists is fundamental: Kant holds that we impose a priori concepts on experience, while Scottish realists argue that we derive abstract concepts from direct experience of reality through empirical learning
“but you say that's where the epistemological difference is between Kant and the Scottish realists they would not admit that we impose our concepts no we get those concepts from direct experience of the world yes they are more Aristotelian in their epistemology not in the sense of real universals but in the sense of learning to think abstract ly on the basis of experience”
Moral belief, based on the fact that one must obey the moral law, is more stable than doctrinal belief because it rests on subjective grounds—moral certainty (not logical certainty)—that cannot be shaken by theoretical argument
“moral belief is different look at the bottom of the second column on 481 because moral belief is based on action that is to say it's based on the fact that I must obey the moral law on all points you see Andes goes on to suggest that if I must obey the moral law then this has further implications of a practical validity about the existence of God in the future world and at the very top of 482 he says nothing can shake this belief it's a conviction that's not logical but a moral certainty it rests on subjective grounds on the fact that I'm morally certain”
The transcendental dialectic analyzes three domains of argument—concerning the mind, the cosmos, and God—and shows that each employs a priori concepts inappropriately extended beyond possible experience, preventing genuine knowledge of reality
“the transcendental dialectic is his attempt to analyze arguments concerning the mind the physical cosmos and God and to show that by virtue of their inevitable use of a 3 or I concepts that don't apply as far as we know to reality the proofs themselves don't give us any knowledge of reality”
Kant shows that in the first antinomy, assuming the world has no beginning in time leads logically to the conclusion that an infinite series must have elapsed, but infinite series cannot be completed, so the assumption is false and the world must have a beginning
“if we assumed that the world had no beginning in time then in eternity must have elapsed up to every given point of time and therefore an infinite series of states of things must have passed in the world however however here it comes an infinite series consists in this that it can never be completed so an infinite series is impossible and the beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence”
Scottish realists like Thomas Reid argue that if the categories of understanding are categories of reality (not merely thought), then knowledge can be established through natural beliefs and causal connections, allowing cosmological and teleological arguments for God to work without the ontological argument
“I have a friend who used to teach here with us too in Hackett who wrote a book called the resurrection of theism in which he argues that the categories cants categories essentially and not only categories of thought but a categories of reality yes he now his argument for that is what are the alternatives one of the alternatives is skepticism that's a absurd possibility and so if you're going to have any knowledge at all then the categories have to apply to reality”
Scottish realists would respond to Kant by starting from the direct experience of a material world existing and causal connections operating, working from empirically observable realities rather than from the concept of God, avoiding need for the ontological argument
“now you see that's the sort of thing that the Scottish realists do people like Thomas Reid Thomas Reid I don't know that he does this at length but he seems to say that by virtue of our natural beliefs human faculties being made to work this way a natural belief in the existence of material things and the existence of causal connections and so forth we can go on to prove the existence of God as the designer”
Charles Hodge, a Princeton theologian from about 130-140 years before the lecture, builds his systematic theology on Scottish realism and makes use of cosmological and teleological arguments without the ontological argument, working from realistic observation rather than abstract concepts
“when you read Charles Hodge the Princeton theologian from 140 years ago now hundred thirty whose systematic theology is one of the standard Presbyterian theologies he's building on that Scottish realism so what does he do he makes use of the cosmological and the teleological argument doesn't need to bother with the ontological if you don't work from the concept you work for what realistically confronts you”
The three traditional proofs for God's existence—ontological, cosmological, and teleological (physical-theological)—are also discussed by Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, establishing a common agenda between Kant and Hume on this topic
“the ontological argument then first of all you're familiar with it from Anselm from Descartes so forth... these are also the three arguments discussed by Hume and his dialogues concerning natural religion okay so it's the same agenda that juncture”
The second cosmological antinomy concerns divisibility: the thesis claims compound substances consist of simple, indivisible parts, while the antithesis claims no simple parts exist—both propositions can be logically proven, creating a second antinomy
“every compound substance in the world consists of simple parts nothing exists anywhere but the simple or what's composed of it there are indivisible units you see and the antithesis no compound thing consists of simple parts that are exists nowhere in the world anywhere anything simple indivisible”
The fourth cosmological antinomy concerns necessity and contingency: the thesis claims an absolutely necessary being must exist, while the antithesis claims no such necessary being exists—both propositions are logically provable
“in the fourth one on 444 so forth so what he does in in these cases is to argue then that we can prove nothing because of these contradictions we can prove nothing about the infinity of the cosmos in time and space as against its finiteness we can prove nothing as about about divisibility is against indivisibility nothing about determinism as against freedom nothing about necessity as against contingency”
The rational psychology section is straightforward and simpler than the cosmological and theological sections, making it a good entry point into understanding Kant's dialectical method
“I think this is the easiest of the three sections”