What this covers
Robert Frank of Cornell discusses Ronald Coase's economic framework with host Russ Roberts, centering on how Coase's insights into externalities should reshape policy thinking. The core claim is that Coase was fundamentally a consequentialist: since externalities are reciprocal—both parties to a conflict cause mutual harm—the right policy is one that mimics the agreement free people would have struck if negotiation were practical. Because negotiation usually is not practical, laws and property rights should economize on transaction costs by steering toward that efficient bargain. Frank draws on his book The Darwin Economy to trace this logic across cases spanning pollution, cigarette smoking, interracial hand-holding in 1960s Atlanta, and carbon policy.
The conversation ranges across when and how to apply this framework. Frank argues that cost-benefit analysis distorts when wealth disparities skew willingness to pay—a wealthy neighbor's willingness to pay drowns out the poor violinist's genuine preference. He contends that adaptation over time matters: offensive whites in 1960 would have outbid an interracial couple if frozen in place, but offended preferences fade while forbidden couples suffer lasting injury. Roberts raises skepticism about psychic harm, arguing it opens a Pandora's box if anyone's offense suffices to restrict others. On smoking, Frank invokes behavioral contagion—each smoker raises prevalence and likelihood others smoke—while Roberts counters that cultural norm shifts, not taxes, drove the smoking decline. The pair also contest whether the cheapest solution to an externality is thereby the morally right one, and whether consequentialist reasoning is too vulnerable to motivated reasoning when the person estimating costs also benefits from the action.
Frank argues that Coase's true insight was thoroughgoingly consequentialist: externalities are reciprocal, so the right policy is the one that mimics the agreement free people would have reached, with laws designed to economize on negotiation costs — and this applies even to morally charged cases like carbon, smoking, and hand-holding.
- Externalities are reciprocal ('it takes two to tango'), so there is no inherent perpetrator and victim
- Coase saw negotiation as usually impractical, so laws should mimic the bargain free parties would have reached
- Cost-benefit must account for how outcomes evolve over time as people adapt, and for income disparities
Coase's insight that laws should mimic efficient bargains parties would reach applies broadly to externality problems.
- You can obtain the efficient outcome on car radio theft without declaring it legal: keep theft illegal and immoral so a passing officer would arrest a thief, but decline to mount costly patrols, which still lets motorists and manufacturers develop private deterrents as a second-best — gaining the desired result while preserving the moral and legal norm against theft.
“I think there's a way to get everything you want without giving up anything... We're not going to develop costly patrols... But we want to say it's immoral; we want to say it's illegal... And we get the outcome you and the car owners like as a second best. But we don't have to say it's okay to steal car radios.”
- The hand-holding example shows a proper Coasean analysis must consider how costs and benefits evolve over time: even if offended whites in 1960s Atlanta would collectively outbid an interracial couple in a static snapshot, those offended adapt and lose their aversion if hand-holding is permitted, whereas a couple forbidden to hold hands suffers a lasting and possibly intensifying injury — so a forward-looking cost-benefit analysis favors a hands-off (permissive) rule.
“if you said, Which way should the law be formulated, how will the relevant costs and benefits play out in the future, I think it would have been clear to anybody who posed the question that way that the injury suffered by a couple who was told you can't hold hands--well, they are not going to adapt to that.”
- Because Coase believed private negotiation is usually impractical, the proper role of laws, property rights, and social norms is to economize on negotiation costs by being designed to steer parties toward the same efficient agreement they would have reached had they been able to bargain freely.
“Laws and regulations, property rights, all such things should be designed in such a way to mimic the agreements that free people would have reached in their own interest had negotiation been practical.”
- Negative externalities should not be framed as perpetrator versus victim, because in any conflict between incompatible activities both parties cause the harm together — restraining the confectioner harms him just as the confectioner's noise harms the doctor — so the right question is not who is guilty but how to solve the mutual problem at least cost.
“no matter whether you turn left or you turn right in a case like that you are going to cause harm. Coase's insight, and I think it's the real, enduring insight he had, was that it's in the interests of both parties... to solve that problem in the least costly way.”
- In Coase's 1959 confectioner-doctor example the candy maker was first on the scene with noisy machinery, then a doctor built an adjacent examination room and won a court injunction against the noise — prompting Coase to ask where the presumption came from that the doctor had a right to a noise-free environment.
“Coase said: Wait a minute; where did the presumption come from that the doctor has the right to a noise-free environment?”
- Existing noise ordinances — like banning horn-honking near a hospital in mid-afternoon but allowing it a mile away — already implement the Coasean logic of mimicking the agreement parties would have reached, because they implicitly weigh that the harm to those needing quiet exceeds the value of honking, even though it is absurd to expect a recovering patient to run down and bribe a motorist.
“the noise ordinances really do try to ask what agreements the people would have reached if they could have negotiated with one another. Of course, it's not practical for a patient to run down and bribe a motorist not to honk his horn”
Consequentialist reasoning about costs and benefits is the proper moral and practical framework for policy.
- Broad free speech rights are best defended consequentialistly rather than deontologically, because the enormous benefits of free expression outweigh its harms and because any attempt to write laws micromanaging speech to filter harmful from beneficial expression would be a hopeless fool's errand.
“if we try to write a law that would micromanage the speech of individuals and filter out the harmful speech and let the good stuff through, it would be a fool's errand, really. You could never hope to fine tune it in that way.”
- The cheapest way to resolve an externality is in a profound sense the morally right solution, because any more expensive resolution leaves surplus on the table such that both parties could have been made better off — so moral intuitions that reject the cheap solution have simply failed to identify the right answer.
“So the cheaper solution is in a very profound sense the right solution. So when people say Coase offended their moral intuitions, well, maybe their moral intuitions didn't lead them correctly to identify the right solution in this case.”
- There are good consequentialist explanations for moral norms, because groups that hold strong moral norms and feelings prosper in competition against groups less inclined to them, so the importance of moral judgment for keeping behavior in bounds does not require deontological grounding.
“There are good consequentialist explanations for why groups that have moral norms and strong feelings about them prosper in competition against groups that are less inclined.”
- Because the MIT Global Climate Simulation Model estimates a roughly 1-in-10 chance of more than 12 degrees Fahrenheit average warming by 2095 — which would melt all permafrost, release billions of tons of methane (each ton 50 times more potent than CO2), and effectively end life as we know it — a carbon tax that would not be onerous to adjust to is the clearly cheapest way to essentially eliminate that catastrophic tail risk.
“by 2095... there is a 1 in 10 chance that we are going to see an increase of average global temperature by more than 12 degrees Fahrenheit... All the permafrost melts; all the methane, the billions of tons of methane are released into the atmosphere, each ton 50 times more powerful than CO2 as a greenhouse gas. That's essentially the end of life as we know it on the planet.”
Whether deontological or consequentialist, the practical debate over rights should weigh costs, enforcement, and damage rather than assert inalienable rights.
- Libertarians operate from a deontological framework that treats certain rights as inviolable regardless of cost-benefit, so they invoke Mill's harm principle for direct harms like theft or assault but resist applying it to subtler indirect harms — yet a true Mill libertarian, committed to allowing restriction only to prevent undue harm, is logically compelled to accept Coase's consequentialist conclusion.
“So I think the libertarian framework is kind of a deontological framework... they say there are just certain rights and principles that you can't violate no matter what the underlying costs and benefits say. And Coase's framework is very thoroughgoingly consequentialist.”
- Whether social norms or government intervention is the cheapest way to handle harmful behavior is a practical question to be settled case by case; the proper debate should weigh where rights come from, what they cost to grant and enforce, and how much damage the enabled behavior does — rather than relying on unsupported assertions of inalienable rights.
“Instead what we see is assertions--unsupported assertions of inalienable rights to do certain things, with no reference to: Where did these rights come from? How much does it cost to grant people these rights and to enforce them? How much damage is done by the behavior that the rights enable?”
- In practice deontologists reach exactly the same conclusions as consequentialists in about 99% of cases, so the two moral frameworks diverge only at the margins despite their foundational differences.
“the deontologists reach exactly the same conclusions as the consequentialists in 99% of the cases.”
- Being a smoker unequivocally harms others because the strongest predictor of whether someone smokes is whether their friends smoke, so each additional smoker raises the prevalence ratio and thereby increases the likelihood that every non-smoker becomes one — making smoking a contagious behavioral externality rather than merely a private choice.
“the best predictor of whether you'll smoke is whether your friends smoked... the mere fact of adding one more to the list, in the numerator that you use to calculate the ratio of smokers in the population increases the likelihood that every other person who is not yet a smoker will become one. So, the answer is: Unequivocally, Yes: that you cause harm to others by being a smoker.”
- The thought experiment of a botanist told that shooting one villager will spare nine others is used to illustrate the purported moral blindness of consequentialism, since the consequentialist seems forced to endorse killing the innocent victim while the deontologist refuses on the principle that killing is wrong.
“That's one that's often used to illustrate the purported moral blindness of consequentialism. The consequentialist is supposed to say... I guess it's better than one person die than that all 10 die.”
- Heavily taxing cigarettes was the right policy response to the contagious harm of smoking and was the main reason smoking prevalence fell dramatically — from roughly 60-plus percent of American men when Frank was a teenager to about 19% of Americans today — without having to outright ban people from smoking.
“what we did do, and what I think we were right to do, was to tax cigarettes heavily. And that was the main reason that smoking became so much, much less prevalent.”
Efficiency analysis ignores distributive effects that matter to people, so agreement to changes depends on how individual shares are affected.
- Efficiency analysis tells you how big the surplus pie is but ignores who gets which slices, yet people care critically about their own share, not just the total — so whether parties will agree to an efficiency-enhancing change often depends on how individual shares are affected.
“Whether you can reach agreement to do it is often going to depend critically on how individual shares will be affected. It's not just the total that matters to people. It's: How is my share going to change?”
- Free trade makes the total surplus bigger but can shrink labor's share, so absent compensating transfers from the gainers (capital) to losers (labor) it is not irrational for labor to vote against free trade — and the efficiency argument alone is therefore not a convincing case for it.
“if you don't do that, then labor is not irrational to vote against free trade. Good that it makes the pie bigger, but my slice is small.”
- To an economist a situation is efficient if it produces the largest possible economic surplus, where surplus is the gap between what someone would be willing to pay and what they actually pay; if things can be rearranged to make total surplus bigger, the situation cannot be efficient.
“if I'd be willing to pay $100 for a radio and I can buy it for $20, then I get $80 of economic surplus by doing it. So if there is some way to rearrange things to make the total economic surplus bigger, then that situation can't be efficient.”
Cost-benefit analysis distorts when willingness to pay scales with wealth, but small repeated decisions and tax correction can mitigate the bias.
- Cost-benefit and Coasean analysis are distorted by income differences because willingness to pay scales with wealth: a poor violinist might value playing at night greatly in psychological terms but only pay $5, while a wealthy neighbor mildly inconvenienced might pay $10,000 to stop it, so the wealthy person's preference dominates the calculation despite his smaller real harm.
“The cost to him of playing late at night on a psychological meter would register almost imperceptible, but because he's so wealthy we get a big number there. That's the offensive part of cost-benefit analysis that causes people to object to its use.”
- The income bias in cost-benefit analysis can be ignored for small-dollar policy questions because, like a favorable repeated coin-flip bet, applying the Coase rule across thousands of independent small decisions leaves both rich and poor better off on average — and any residual unfairness can be corrected through the tax system, such as raising the Earned Income Tax Credit funded by higher taxes on the rich.
“if we apply this Coase rule to a thousand different policy decisions, each one of which has a small effect on any individual's wellbeing, then you come out ahead whether you are rich or poor.”
Deontologists mistrust consequentialism's flexibility, but Coase's concern with economizing negotiation costs and moral norms' evolutionary basis show consequentialism's depth.
- Deontologists distrust consequentialists because the flexibility in estimating costs and benefits means a person deciding whether to do something that harms others — while also being the one making the estimates — usually finds enough wiggle room to conclude their desired action is acceptable, making consequentialist reasoning prone to motivated rationalization.
“there's such flexibility in making cost-benefit estimates that if you are a person trying to decide what to do... you are the person making the estimates of the relevant costs and benefits, and there's usually enough wiggle room in the material we have to work with that you'll figure out a way to say, Yeah, it's okay to do this thing I want to do.”
- Coase's first work analyzed why firms exist rather than doing everything through individual spot-market contracts: the contracts needed for arms-length coordination would be so cumbersome to negotiate that it is cheaper to have a firm organize them internally, demonstrating his lifelong concern with economizing on negotiation costs.
“His very first work... was a detailed study of why we have firms in the first place. Why don't we just do everything through individual contracts in the spot market? It's because all the contracts you'd have to write would be so cumbersome to negotiate that it's just much cheaper to have a firm organize them all internally”
- Some persistent interpretations of Coase's work are inconsistent with what is known about his broader beliefs and writings, and no scholar has fully plumbed the depth of his ideas.
“some of the interpretations that persist of his work out there just don't seem at all consistent with what we know about his beliefs and writings on other topics.”