substance
In Aristotelian philosophy, an entity composed of both form (morphe) and matter, where the form determines the proper function and nature of the thing—the complete metaphysical reality of a thing as it exists
As defined in How Any Idiot Can Memorize The Entire History of Philosophy
Where it comes up · 9
- A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza6 claims
- Dr. Darren Staloff, Aristotle's Metaphysical Views5 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 42 John Locke's Theory of Ideas3 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 47 Hume: Do We Know What's Real?3 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 11 Aristotle's Metaphysics 22 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 32 Descartes' Meditations 12 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 37 Reason and Emotions in Spinoza2 claims
- How Any Idiot Can Memorize The Entire History of Philosophy1 claim
and 1 more
Most important claims · 10 of 25Search all claims for “substance” →
- The historical problem of universals plays a crucial role in 18th century philosophical debates: Locke is a conceptualist affirming abstract ideas, Berkeley is a nominalist denying abstract ideas, and Hume is also a nominalist—because of nominalism, Hume rejects conceptions of matter and mind as substances, of causal power, and of infinite space or infinite time.A History of Philosophy | 42 John Locke's Theory of Ideas
- For Aristotle, the distinction between particulars as primary substances and forms as secondary substances is not merely academic but theologically revolutionary—the Platonic tradition informed Augustinian and Franciscan theology, while the Aristotelian tradition informed Thomas Aquinas and Dominican and Jesuit theology, and this distinction persists to the present day.A History of Philosophy | 11 Aristotle's Metaphysics 2
- Leibniz, unlike Spinoza, is a pluralist who understands basic constituents of reality as units of energy (substances as force), so he conceptually anticipated e=mc² without access to modern physics, understanding matter fundamentally as energy around 1700.A History of Philosophy | 37 Reason and Emotions in Spinoza
- Knowledge of matter is obtained through the senses (which apprehend physical substance), while knowledge of form is obtained through the intellect (which grasps the essential structure).Dr. Darren Staloff, Aristotle's Metaphysical Views
- In Spinoza's system, there is no notion of separate substances; there are only distinguishable attributes and modes, so one finite mode can be distinguished from another finite mode but not by virtue of substance distinction.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
- Spinoza is a pantheist who rejects both of Descartes's dualities—the mind-body dualism and the God-nature dualism—in favor of a metaphysical monism where God and nature refer to one and the same thing, with God emphasizing the intelligible rational side and nature emphasizing the material changing side, mirroring the Stoic double-aspect monism of logos and matter.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
- Spinoza's definition of God as 'a being absolutely infinite, that is a substance consisting in infinite attributes of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality' logically follows from his definitions of self-causation and substance, with the conclusion that God necessarily exists because God's essence involves existence.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza
- The term 'substance' (from Latin 'substare,' meaning 'to stand beneath') does not necessarily refer to something physical; it means an underlying reality or that which supports or undergoes properties; in philosophy, a substance is that which exists independently and underlies or grounds the existence of properties and accidents.A History of Philosophy | 32 Descartes' Meditations 1
- The form of things is often defined in functional terms—a lectern has the shape and structure it does because it serves the purpose of providing a place to lean and speak from; a chair has a bottom and back because its function is to allow sitting.Dr. Darren Staloff, Aristotle's Metaphysical Views
- Spinoza insists that his technical terms—particularly substance, mind, God, and good—must never be understood in their vulgar common or figurative sense but only in the specialized sense given to them in his definitions, a caution that is essential for correctly reading his work.A History of Philosophy | 36 Spinoza