
A History of Philosophy | 32 Descartes' Meditations 1
What this covers
This is a university lecture on the opening of Descartes's Meditations, with a student interjecting at points and the instructor occasionally handing over to a recorded lecture by Dallas Willard. The instructor treats the six meditations as one continuous deductive chain rather than separate topics: doubt, then The Cogito, then God, then the reliability of reason, then necessary truths about material things, and finally the existence of bodies. René Descartes therefore cannot prove he has a body until the sixth meditation. The lecture is careful about terms. "Thinking" in the cogito covers every form of consciousness, not just intellect. An unconscious idea is a contradiction for Descartes, since an idea is by definition a conscious state. "Substance" is explained from the Latin for "standing beneath."
The wider range comes from the problems the method creates. Descartes's three kinds of idea (innate, adventitious, factitious) are laid out, and adventitious ideas are tied to the causal principle he quietly assumes. His proof of God in Meditation 3 is described as a causal argument. The lecture then raises Solipsism of the Present Moment, driven by the gap between now and the past, the interruptions of sleep, and memory being only a present representation. It also covers Descartes's reply to Thomas Hobbes on whether the thinker could be material.
The most contested material concerns whether Presuppositionless Thinking (Impossibility of)) is achievable, with Gilson's study of medieval influence on Descartes offered as evidence that it is not. William Temple is cited for calling the representational assumption Descartes's "faux pas." Foundationalism is traced through to David Hume's pragmatic answer. The lecture also sets Direct Realism against representationalism. It draws on Intentionality, George Berkeley's account of pain, and Sartre's example of vomiting as direct bodily awareness, and it describes the dispute as a question of which description of knowing is more accurate.
Descartes's foundational argument 'I think therefore I exist' establishes consciousness as the primary certainty, but his representational theory of knowledge creates an epistemological problem: if we are only directly aware of our own mental states, not external reality, then proving the existence of God, other minds, and the material world becomes logically difficult and may require alternative epistemologies.
- The cogito establishes consciousness as intuitive knowledge independent of body or external world, but leaves us with only mental contents and acts to work from
- Descartes's representational theory means all knowledge of external things (God, bodies, other minds) must be inferred rather than directly intuited, creating the problem of modern epistemology
- Later philosophers (Hobbes, Hume) identified gaps in Descartes's reasoning, suggesting his system collapses into skepticism without additional metaphysical assumptions
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When Descartes says 'I think therefore I exist,' the term 'thinking' encompasses not merely intellectual activity but all forms of consciousness including doubting, perceiving, imagining, affirming, denying, and any form of conscious state or conscious activity—it is equivalent to saying 'I am conscious therefore I exist.'
“the scope of what he includes within the Kito uh within the simple statement I think it includes doubting perceiving imagining affirming and denying in fact any kind of conscious State and conscious activity activity of the Consciousness”
Because of representationalism, we are not directly aware of physical bodies, other minds, or God; we are only directly aware of our own consciousness; therefore, if we want to know about the existence of God or other minds or bodies, these must be proven through a priori proofs (proofs based on the content of one's own consciousness) rather than empirical evidence from the external world.
“you're not directly aware of physical bodies for that matter you're not directly aware of um anything external to the Consciousness whether it be physical bodies or other minds or God you see um what we're directly aware of is our own Consciousness yeah so that if we want to know about the existence of God we have to prove it from our own Consciousness that is to say it has to be an a priori proof a proof based not on empirical evidence but on content of One's Own Consciousness”
William Temple, an Oxford philosopher and Archbishop of Canterbury, identified what he called Descartes's 'faux pas' (false step): the claim that all we are directly aware of is the content of our own consciousness. Temple argues this false step established the entire problem that modern philosophy has been trying to overcome ever since, making the history of modern epistemology begin with this representational assumption.
“William Temple who um was an Oxford philosopher back in the first part of this Century became Archbishop of Canterbury uh in a book of his called nature man and God which suggests a pretty inclusive sort of coverage not much else to talk about uh but in book of his called nature man and God he has a chapter called decart's fopa decart's phopa you see a fopa is a false step a mistaken step um decart's faux was precisely this the claim that all we are directly aware of is the content of our own Consciousness because this established the entire problem which modern philosophy had to overcome”
The history of epistemology from Descartes to Hume represents a concerted attempt to argue one's way out of skepticism through foundationalism—seeking indubitable foundations and building a structure of certain knowledge from them—but according to Hume this approach fails utterly, leaving him forced to find an alternative solution to skepticism through pragmatic beliefs formed by mental habit.
“the story of epistemology from dayart to Hume is the story of a concerted attempt to argue one's way out of skepticism by what we call last time a foundationalist approach okay an approach which according to David Hume fails utterly so Hume has to find another way out of skepticism and for him it's a matter of beliefs that are the product of mental habits sort of a pragmatism”
Descartes presupposes the causal principle—that there are real causal relations in reality and that any contingent thing must have a cause—but this is a suppressed premise that he does not explicitly suspend or prove, even though he claims in meditation one to have suspended judgment on all previous philosophical conclusions.
“if you're on your toes mentally on your toes you may be on your toes physically it's almost that time but if you're on your toes mentally um you'll recognize that in coming at a causal argument he has a suppressed premise in addition namely that there are in reality causal relations that any contingent things must have a Cause ideas aren't self-existent they must have a cause contingent Minds aren't self-existent they must have a cause ouch where did that come from”
The attempt to achieve presuppositionless science or presuppositionless philosophy is a 'will of the wisp'—a futile pursuit—because all thinking involves unconscious presuppositions that the thinker is not aware of, making it impossible to fully suspend judgment on all prior assumptions.
“any presuppositionless science is a will of the Wisp it was for deart we're not always aware of our presuppositions that's the problem there are your unconscious ideas the thing is if they're unconscious they're not yours you don't have them they have you”
Descartes's six meditations form a continuous deductive system where each meditation builds logically on the previous one, not a series of independent topics—moving from doubt (meditation 1) through the cogito (meditation 2), God's existence (meditation 3), reason's reliability (meditation 4), necessary truths about material things (meditation 5), and contingent truths about material existence (meditation 6).
“his method is that of a deductive system so what he's trying to do is to establish initial axioms and then by means of a series of proofs uh to draw one conclusion after another so you have an extended chain of reasoning which runs in linear fashion all the way through the meditations this is not a series of independent topics it's a logically deduced system of thought”
Descartes cannot prove the existence of his own body until meditation six, because beginning from complete skepticism in meditation one, he has no way of logically proving the existence of any material things or physical bodies until that point in his deductive chain.
“he doesn't prove he thinks he cannot prove that he even has a body until meditation six because he has no way of proving the existence of any material things logically until that point having begun where he began with complete skepticism complete doubt”
The term 'substance' (from Latin 'substare,' meaning 'to stand beneath') does not necessarily refer to something physical; it means an underlying reality or that which supports or undergoes properties; in philosophy, a substance is that which exists independently and underlies or grounds the existence of properties and accidents.
“be careful that you don't take substance to mean something physical it's our translation of the word race which means a thing and we use the term substance in ordinary English in a variety of ways now the substance of this argument is you see or we say what is the matter meaning what's the problem the matter under discussion is you see so terms like matter and substance do not necessarily refer to things physical literally substance is what stands beneath subat how many people had high school Latin bunch of Barbarians subst stands beneath you see um oh sure you know it's Greeks Romans or barbarians are the only Alternatives it's that's the way it was in Antiquity at least um so um in that sense you see the mind is that which um underlies all of the conscious States and activities the underlying reality is that of mind”
The subconscious or unconscious mind, as understood in depth psychology, may hold causes or influences on consciousness, but not actual ideas or thoughts, since Descartes defines ideas as conscious states.
“but like when you look at the subconscious doesn't doesn't the ideas I mean doesn't the sub subconscious hold ideas that you're not aware of doesn't the subconscious hold ideas that you're not aware of or do you mean that there are certain uh unconscious or half conscious influences on your conscious states is it an idea until it becomes conscious now the causes of that Consciousness is another thing you see but depth psychology has found all sorts of causes that nobody thought of before”
A scholar named Gilson has written a book titled 'The Influence of Medieval Philosophy on René Descartes' that shows Descartes, despite claiming to suspend all medieval philosophical conclusions, was deeply influenced by medieval thought—illustrating that presuppositionless thinking is impossible.
“you read a piece of jel son didn't you when we were dealing with Augustine well Jan has a book on day cart uh called the influence of medieval philosophy on Rene day cart it's a book yay thick dayart who pretended to suspend all medieval philosophical conclusions and julon writes a book yay thick on the influence of medieval philosophy on rny De”
Two keys to direct realism, according to Dallas Willard's lecture, are: (1) intentionality—the mind reaches out and directly apprehends what is out there, and (2) a substantive self—an agent that can have such intention and mental outreach.
“he talked of um several keys to that um realism uh one was the notion of intentionality that is to say the Mind reaches out and directly apprehends what is out there points to mental intention another was the importance of a substantive self that is to say an agent that can have such intention and mental Outreach”
An unconscious idea (an idea one is not conscious of) is a self-contradiction for Descartes because an idea by definition is a conscious state, and an unconscious conscious state is logically impossible—it is a conceptual contradiction like 'square circle.'
“no I think an idea that you're not conscious of he would regard as a self-contradiction it's like a square circle because an idea is a conscious State and you're asking about an unconscious Consciousness no such animals”
In Descartes's example of the wax—where a cake of wax's physical properties change dramatically when heated (melts, softens, changes color, shape) yet we recognize it as the same wax—he argues that our awareness is not of the physical qualities themselves but of a mental concept or idea of wax which is not reducible to a collection of physical properties and does not depend on unchanging qualities.
“he talks about um a cake of Wax the physical properties of which change when it's heated yeah it melts becomes soft perhaps liquid it changes color changes shape so on and so forth so that um the physical properties are Tren transient and relative yet for all of the changeableness of the physical properties of a piece of wax the idea of wax as wax is a mental concept you see not tied necessarily to unchanging uh not tied necessarily to changing qualities you think about the unchanging nature of wax that has changing qualities”
There are three problems leading to solipsism of the present moment: (1) we can only establish that we exist now, not that we have persisted from the past; (2) consciousness is discontinuous—interrupted by sleep and gaps; and (3) memory is itself a present representation, not a direct awareness of past consciousness, so we cannot know whether past moments of consciousness were genuinely ours.
“how do I know whether or not my Consciousness is gappy how do I know whether the past consciousnesses are mine but only by memory what is memory it's a present Consciousness not a past Consciousness in my present Consciousness I have a representation of what I take to be a past Consciousness but I never have a direct awareness of a past Consciousness because I'm not in the past I'm in the present so all I know is my present Consciousness the present moment of Consciousness I don't even know that I said that solipsism of the present moment see two problems leading to the solipsism of the present moment three problems one all I know is that I exist number one number two the discontinuity of my own Consciousness number three the problem of memory”
The key issue in the debate between representationalism and direct realism is the adequacy of two different descriptions of knowing, being aware, and perceiving—the question is which description more accurately captures the actual character of human consciousness and knowledge.
“I I think it comes down to um the adequacy of two different descriptions of um knowing being aware of perceiving and those of you who were in Dallas Willard's second lecture will remember that he he talked of um several keys to that um realism uh one was the notion of intentionality that is to say the Mind reaches out and directly apprehends what is out there points to mental intention another was the importance of a substantive self that is to say an agent that can have such intention and mental Outreach”
Berkeley makes a distinction between the idea of pain (voluntary, subject to our will) and the feeling of pain (involuntary, not subject to our will), arguing that both are ideas but that real involuntary pain is distinguished from imagined pain by its involuntary character, not by its mode of existence.
“George Berkeley will make a distinction between the idea of hunger and feeling hungry um his example is of pain um I think it was um one of those other 18th century English figures um his name slips me for the moment who said uh he's going to refute the Learned Bishop Berkeley and he kicked a rock and oh that hurts that's real pain not just the idea of pain to which um Berkeley responded sure the idea of pain is voluntary the real pain is involuntary that's the real difference but they're both ideas”
Adventitious ideas (involuntary ideas from external causes) provide evidence of the causal principle through direct experience: when I perceive an external object involuntarily, 'nature teaches us' that there must be a cause external to me producing that involuntary idea.
“the very existence of these adventitious voluntary ideas is um such that uh as he puts it nature teaches us that nature makes evidence that there is a cause out there I have no control over that idea you see I uh look Carl here in the face and I just can't get away there it is like it or leave it I mean there it is involuntary”
The mind is the underlying reality that sustains all conscious states and activities—it is 'that which underlies' the transient phenomena of consciousness.
“in that sense you see the mind is that which um underlies all of the conscious States and activities the underlying reality is that of mind”
Descartes' main argument in Meditation 3 is a causal argument based on the idea of God specifically, with a secondary argument based on the existence of the (finite) mind itself—both attempting to establish God as the cause.
“the main body of meditation three is arguing from our actual ideas specifically my idea of God which is one of my ideas you see but um the other would be um the existence of the mind yeah and in both cases is what he's going to do is to try and construct a causal argument”
Hegel and existentialist philosophers (like Sartre) allow for direct awareness of other minds, which is possible only through direct realism rather than representational epistemology.
“How can Hegel um Talk of a direct awareness of other minds but by virtue of a direct realism about that likewise the existentialist that's the way um assat could hypothetically say I vomit therefore I exist you see because there's a direct awareness of one's bodily existence in a state of nausea”
There is a crucial difference between having an idea of vomiting and actually vomiting—one is a mental representation, the other is direct bodily experience. If we can be directly aware of bodily vomiting (as Sartre claims), then Descartes' claim that we're only aware of ideas is false.
“if as Ruth says I'm aware of my own body or a s says I'm aware of my own bodily vomiting you think an immediate way uh if that's the case then I'm only aware of my own ideas as a misdescription you see it's a great deal of difference between having an idea of vomiting and vomiting right you have an idea right now I don't see anybody doing it thing”
Dreaming constitutes a conscious state (it is not unconsciousness) because images, sensations, and feelings occur during dreams—they are mental phenomena. Sleep itself may involve unconsciousness, but dreaming is a form of consciousness distinct from waking consciousness.
“what what would you call Dreaming or well there are mental states there are images that go through your mind in dreaming so dreaming is a state of consciousness it's not waking consciousness but it's a conscious State you can tell me sometimes what you dreamed”
Descartes's response to Hobbes is that he has an intuitive awareness of mind (the agent that thinks) distinct from and not mediated by bodily awareness, whereas he does not have intuitive awareness of body as a thinker; and while he does not have a clear and distinct idea of mind substance, he has a notion of it that provides more ground for affirming a soul than for assuming matter is the thinking substance.
“first I have no intuitive awareness of body as I do of mind that is to say I have an intuitive awareness of the agent but I don't have intuitive awareness of the body and secondly he claims I do have some notion of a soul substance now that term notion is the tricky word he's not saying I have a clear and distinct idea I have a clear and distinct idea of thinking of doubting and of a number of the ideas that I think but I I don't have a clear and distinct idea of Mind substance of Soul substance I have a rather vague notion of what that will be”
Even if one grants that 'I think therefore I exist' is a valid statement, Hobbes argues it is a mistake to infer that a thinking thing must be an immaterial soul; and Hume goes further, arguing it is a mistake to infer that there is any unified thing that thinks at all—the argument may establish that thinking exists without establishing that a substantial thinking subject exists.
“you see it may be legitimate to say I think therefore I exist hob says it's a mistake to infer that you're a thinking thing an immaterial Soul doesn't follow Hume says it's a mistake to affer that there is anything at all that thinks yeah so they think there are gaps in the argument”
Descartes distinguishes between three kinds of ideas: innate ideas (ideas that are in the mind naturally, prior to experience), adventitious ideas (ideas that come from outside, from external causes, unbidden and involuntary), and factitious ideas (ideas that the mind constructs or invents, like the idea of a fairy giraffe with butterfly wings).
“he distinguishes between three kinds of ideas ideas that are innate ideas that are adventitious and ideas that are that are factitious a factitious idea is one I make up it's a fiction like my idea of a fairy giraffe with butterfly wings and pink polka dots on its tail you see that's a factitious idea there are some ideas that are adventitious um that is to say um they come to us from outside Agents from outside causes”
An immaterial agent that concentrates on careful argumentation could experience mental tiredness or fatigue distinct from physical tiredness, suggesting that consciousness itself can become fatigued as a purely mental phenomenon without bodily involvement.
“well is there any reason why um an immaterial agent giving concentration to careful argumentation with d cart doesn't get tired I mean there's a physical tiring yeah but there's also a mental couldn't there be purely mental tiring now that's not the way dayart would answer it that's the way Berkeley would answer it”