occupational licensing
Government requirements that practitioners obtain a license to work in a profession, which can create protectionist barriers to earning a living.
As defined in Cass Sunstein
Where it comes up · 18
- Dan Klein on Truth, Bias, and Disagreement 03/16/20094 claims
- Clint Bolick Defends Judicial Activism 10/31/20064 claims
- Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles on the Captured Economy3 claims
- Peter Boettke on Katrina, Ten Years After2 claims
- Beth Redbird on Licensing2 claims
- Edward Glaeser on Joblessness and the War on Work2 claims
- Michael Munger on Crony Capitalism2 claims
- Cass Sunstein1 claim
and 10 more
Most important claims · 10 of 30Search all claims for “occupational licensing” →
- Occupational licensing exemplifies the 'bootleggers and Baptists' / 'unholy coalition' dynamic: a high-minded advocate for regulation provides moral cover for a self-interested advocate, so superficially sensible competency requirements end up restricting entry and keeping wages high with no productive benefit.Clint Bolick Defends Judicial Activism 10/31/2006
- Occupational licensing does its real work not by ensuring complex tasks are done by trained people—there is no licensing of heart surgeons, only of general practitioners, and commercial incentives plus malpractice liability already ensure complex tasks go to experts—but by requiring that routine tasks not needing extensive training (like splinting a finger or treating an ear infection) be performed by highly trained licensees who overcharge a captive audience.Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles on the Captured Economy
- Organized interests exert influence not just through coercive money in lobbying but through a 'second face of power'—controlling whether ideas are even considered legitimate; occupational licensing is protected most durably not by defending its merits but by making any alternative seem nuts, so incumbents never have to defend their policy on substance.Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles on the Captured Economy
- Occupational licensing is a significant factor reducing mobility because licenses do not transfer easily across states, so as more jobs become service-sector and license-covered, people are less likely to make long-distance moves — which is why long-distance moves have declined while short-distance (within-state, cross-county) moves have not.Tyler Cowen on The Complacent Class
- Occupational licensing exemplifies the 'bootleggers and Baptists' coalition: a high-minded advocate for regulation provides cover for a self-interested advocate, so seemingly benevolent training requirements actually serve the profession's desire to restrict entry and keep wages high, with no productive benefit.Clint Bolick Defends Judicial Activism 10/31/2006
- The fundamental US problem is not too much or too little market fundamentalism but that creative destruction has become harder to absorb; the single biggest fixes are a failing K-12 education system, restrictive housing and zoning policies that make cities unaffordable, and excessive occupational licensing—all interventionist, non-neoliberal problems caused by too much government rather than too little, that impede people's ability to relocate and retool.Dani Rodrik on Neoliberalism
- Occupational licensing regimes, often controlled by the profession itself (the legal cartel being the most pernicious), are designed not to promote public welfare but to restrict entry and keep wages high; the proper judicial role is to sift laws genuinely promoting welfare from those serving special interests, as the court did in the cosmetology case.Clint Bolick Defends Judicial Activism 10/31/2006
- People have a basic right to the government justifying itself when it regulates them, so if there is no good reason to regulate (e.g., occupational licensing for interior designers) the government shouldn't—but rather than labeling this an absolute 'right to economic liberty,' the battle should be over justification on the facts, not over whether a categorical right exists; labeling it a right carries baggage and inflates expectations.Jamal Greene
- Both the 2001 and 2007-09 recessions produced prolonged long-term unemployment, involuntary part-time work, and declining participation because they hit when labor market fluidity was already low — fewer job-to-job moves and less business job creation/destruction; the underlying causes include restrictive land use, occupational licensing, and healthcare-related job lock, and fixing fluidity would make matching models work better in the next shock.Jason Furman
- Occupational licensing slows growth by blocking business-model innovation—such as minute-clinics handling routine care—by requiring a doctor present even when the doctor does nothing substantive, and it protects incumbents from the market entry that would otherwise compete away supernormal medical incomes; combined with no strong state counteracting force, the U.S. gets a double-whammy of slower innovation, higher prices, and protected swollen incomes.Brink Lindsey and Steven Teles on the Captured Economy