Cass Sunstein
What this covers
Cass Sunstein sits down with Tyler Cowen to explain the unifying logic behind his work in law, regulation, and behavioral economics. The conversation moves across judicial philosophy, the mechanics of choice design, and the moral foundations—or lack thereof—required to reach practical agreement. Sunstein's core argument rests on a single economical principle: when institutions or individuals face hard decisions under uncertainty, they should minimize the combined cost of making a decision and the cost of making a mistake. This idea, he contends, explains both judicial minimalism, where courts resolve only the case at hand rather than laying down sweeping doctrine, and libertarian paternalism, where modest interventions in choice architecture steer people toward better outcomes without eliminating their freedom to choose otherwise.
The discussion unfolds across several territories. Sunstein defends incompletely theorized agreements—the idea that people with opposing moral frameworks can converge on concrete rights and rules without settling their deepest disagreements. He distinguishes between legitimate nudges and manipulation by appeal to whether an intervention engages deliberative reasoning or bypasses it entirely. He offers a ground-level account of nonsectarian welfarism that does not privilege any single metaphysical view but measures policy by its actual human consequences. The conversation also ventures into harder cases: when nudges become bans (smoking and heroin), whether democratic processes or judicial deference should settle occupational regulation, and what action bias reveals about institutional decision-making. Throughout, Sunstein engages counterarguments—including challenges from economic rationality and libertarian skepticism—while drawing illustrations from Star Wars, Joseph Campbell, and his own experience in government.
Sunstein argues that good legal and regulatory decisions can be reached through 'incompletely theorized agreements' and choice-preserving nudges that minimize the sum of decision costs and error costs, grounded ultimately in a nonsectarian welfarism rather than any single metaphysical foundation.
- Incompletely theorized agreements let people converge on rights and rules without agreeing on moral foundations
- Nudges preserve freedom while improving welfare given human fallibility
- Minimalism and nudging both work by minimizing decision costs plus error costs
Nudges that appeal to deliberative reasoning while preserving override capacity are legitimate tools for improving welfare.
- Choice-preserving nudges are valuable because they preserve people's ultimate freedom to go their own way while pointing them toward welfare-promoting outcomes; given that humans rely on error-prone heuristics for savings, eating, and mortgages, nudges are often vital for well-being, and a nudge-free world is literally unimaginable since nudges are all around us.
“given human fallibility, nudges are often super important for well-being. They’re actually all around us, so a nudge-free world is actually literally unimaginable”
- The one world-transforming idea from the economic analysis of law is that when you're stuck, you should minimize the sum of the costs of decisions and the costs of errors; this single principle underlies both judicial minimalism (deciding one case rather than all cases avoids decisional overload and future blunders) and nudging (which is decisionally less burdensome and lower in error cost because people can override it).
“when you’re stuck, minimize the sum of the costs of decisions and the costs of errors”
- Nudges appropriate in a democratic society either appeal to people's reflective capacities or do not exploit or inflame solely their non-deliberative capacities; if a nudge does bypass deliberation, the nudger owes people publicity about what is being done, as with cigarette graphic warnings which were preceded by a transparent public comment period and which evidence shows make smokers know the risks better, not worse.
“The nudges that seem to me to be appropriate in a democratic society are either nudges that appeal to people’s reflective or deliberative capacities or that don’t exploit or inflame solely people’s non-deliberative capacities”
- As a first approximation, manipulation is when an agent appeals to System 1 (intuitive, rapid processing) rather than to people's deliberative System 2 faculties; a System 2 nudge like a reminder or fuel economy label is by definition not manipulation, whereas appeals that wholly bypass deliberative capacities carry at least a risk of manipulation, even if they may be justified all things considered.
“Manipulation, we can say as a first approximation, is when the agent is appealing to System 1 and not appealing to people’s deliberative faculties”
- In many domains a small nudge — changing a default rule or providing information — has a larger effect on behavior than tax or economic incentives, as in Denmark where automatic enrollment promoted savings more than economic incentives, and double-sided printing defaults save more paper than raising paper prices; this is also cheaper since it doesn't burden taxpayers, though in some domains like cigarette taxes incentives have a bigger effect.
“In Denmark, economic incentives have had significantly less effect in promoting savings than automatic enrollment”
- While Sunstein is open to Robin Hanson's idea of a Banned Products Store with heavy negative nudges instead of bans, he worries heroin is nearly instantaneously addictive and tempting to a wide range of people, so merely nudging rather than banning could leave a lot of tragedy and bodies on the streets, even though prohibition does not eliminate heroin and has bad ancillary consequences.
“I worry that it is nearly instantaneously addictive and extremely tempting to a wide range of people in different life circumstances. To be a heroin addict is really, really rough”
Democratic process and constitutional safeguards, not metaphysical principles, should determine when to nudge versus ban.
- Hard cases like transgender bathroom rules should be resolved by addressing mundane questions of jurisdiction and authority — which level of government has power — rather than large questions about sexuality, because democracies function well by rarely setting people's hair on fire and using questions of democratic process to let people live together peaceably despite disagreement.
“one way democracies work well is they put people’s hair on fire very rarely. They try to use issues of democratic process and who has the authority to do what as a way of allowing us to live together peaceably, notwithstanding our disagreements”
- The existence of bad nudgers attests to the importance of free markets, which discipline bad nudging since choice architecture in a market society more often than not serves consumers' interest, and of democratic controls on government nudging, so that if people hate it or it goes in a senseless direction the democratic safeguard will kick in.
“the fact that we can find bad nudgers, which is very true, attests to the importance of having either free markets which discipline bad nudging”
- The question of who decides when to nudge versus ban has an easy answer — our elected representatives, subject to democratic and constitutional safeguards — because there is no other option; a libertarian president disinclined to bans reflects what 'we the people' want, and a ban-friendly president faces constitutional and legal restrictions, while stronger constitutional safeguards against the whole enterprise would themselves have to come from 'we the people.'
“it’s actually a good, substantive question that does have a pretty easy answer, which is our elected representatives, subject to the democratic and constitutional safeguards that they face”
- Our constitutional framework rightly understood requires a public-regarding justification for all legislative acts, prohibiting naked self-serving preferences, yet the judicial role over ordinary legislation should remain modest — ramped-up rational basis review to strike down objectionable occupational licensing would produce an excessively aggressive role for federal and state judges, so deference to the knowledge and accountability of the political process is appropriate.
“I do think our constitutional framework, rightly understood, requires a public-regarding justification for all legislative acts”
- The US Constitution is underrated because it has been the foundation for probably the greatest experiment in democratic self-government in the history of the world, and whether it is a set of specific prescriptions or a framework for a radically changed society, something that has accomplished that much is hard to overrate.
“it’s been the foundation for probably the greatest experiment in democratic self-government in the history of the world. And there’s grave difficulty in overrating something that’s done something like that”
Star Wars ultimately celebrates choice, redemption, and the individual's daily capacity to choose a better path.
- In the original trilogy Lucas borrowed Joseph Campbell's idea of the hero with a thousand faces — the arc of a hero common to many myths and religions — and described Campbell as 'my Yoda,' but added a twist involving freedom of choice and redemption concretized in a father repudiating his terrible life course to save his child.
“what Lucas did in the original trilogy was to borrow on Joseph Campbell’s idea of the hero with a thousand faces. Many myths and religions have an arc of a hero, and Lucas described Campbell as “my Yoda.””
- Against the dark reading that Star Wars is fundamentally about the potency of evil, Sunstein holds that the authorial voice — captured by Lucas's statement that every one of us has a choice of being a hero every day — is that we stand at a crossroads and can go one way or the other; though the films go to the dark side, they do not in the end honor it, as shown by Luke's line 'I am a Jedi, like my father before me' claiming the redeemable goodness of even the worst person in the universe.
“Every one of us has a choice of being a hero every single day of our lives. We can treat somebody with dignity and kindness or not.”
- Yoda is nominally the wise figure but makes a fundamental error in thinking detachment is good and attachment is bad, taking a Stoic or Buddhist view; the saga ultimately defeats that view because it is attachment — Anakin's inability to bear his son's loss — that brings balance to the Force and restores him, so Yoda is deeply wrong.
“Yoda is nominally the wise person, but he makes a kind of fundamental error, which is, he thinks that detachment is good and attachment is bad”
- Sunstein and Thaler were committed to calling Nudge by the title Libertarian Paternalism, but recognized no one would have bought a book with two unpopular words combined; writing the Star Wars book made Sunstein more libertarian by focusing him on the deep truth that each person constantly faces a crossroads and should be left to choose their own path, whether for welfarist or dignity reasons.
“the title for Nudge — we were committed to calling it Libertarian Paternalism. I don’t think anyone would have bought that book”
- Although Star Wars appears militaristic with fighting resolving every situation, the best analogy is the American Revolution or the fall of communism — an authoritarian regime whose horribleness is glimpsed rather than constantly shown — and the rebels' aim of restoring peace and justice is sincere, so the rebel heart of the saga is republican rather than militaristic.
“the best analogy to Star Wars is the American Revolution or the fall of communism, meaning there’s an authoritarian regime whose horribleness you don’t see constantly on screen, but you get glimpses of it”
Welfare consequences, not abstract rules, should guide policy decisions across domains.
- Evidence shows cigarette taxes have a big impact in reducing smoking, which is presumptively a good idea given that 480,000 Americans die each year from smoking, whereas current warnings on cigarettes appear less effective than increasing the economic incentive not to smoke.
“We have evidence that taxes for cigarettes have a big impact in reducing smoking”
- The semihidden unifying assumption behind all Sunstein's books is a form of consequentialism focused on how one or another thing will make human lives better, deliberately not centered on legitimacy as a master value; for a highway safety regulation this means asking the actual human consequences — will it save one life or 80, will it hurt small businesses — rather than what subcommittees or Left or Right think.
“it’s a form of consequentialism that is very much focused on, “How will one or another thing make human lives better?””
- The claim that banning smoking is 'too coercive' is a conclusion in search of an argument; the real shorthand is that the all-things-considered welfare consequences of a ban would be negative, but that has to be earned rather than asserted, and the goal is that whatever one's metaphysical assumptions, one can reach conclusions compatible with nonsectarian welfarism — with liberty counting both as an ingredient in welfare and as a Millian heuristic since people generally know better than third parties what makes their lives go better.
“the claim that it’s too coercive — to ban smoking — that’s a conclusion in search of an argument”
- Preferences are a very good clue to what will promote a person's welfare but should not be deemed sovereign; if someone prefers something that significantly truncates their life, deferring to that preference is not clearly correct because by their own reflective lights it may be a bad idea, as with smoking, where education and nudges to help people not die are acceptable even though an outright ban would be too coercive.
“I think preferences are a very good clue to what is going to promote people’s welfare”
Institutional and administrative experience reveals gaps between academic theory and how governance actually works.
- There is a documented action bias whereby when stuck in a tough situation, an institution or individual feels compelled to do something rather than stand there, but acting is often a mistake; sometimes you should strike when the iron is cold and wait to have a chance to think, which is a more convincing account than Yoda's 'do or do not, there is no try.'
“there’s work — in fact I’ve coauthored an article on this — on action bias, which says, when you’re stuck in a tough situation, either an institution or an individual, do something. Don’t just stand there; do something. But that’s often a mistake”
- Sunstein differs from Posner in being more concerned about the need for stable rules that discipline judicial authority even where discretion would be exercised wisely, because rule-following is an important safeguard for most judges against the willful exercise of discretion, even though Posner is a superb judge whose case-by-case judgment is often excellent.
“I am more concerned about the need for stable rules that discipline judicial authority, even if it would be exercised wisely by some judges”
- Time in government led Sunstein to conclude that academics, including himself, were in important respects clueless about how things actually happen, surprising him with how steep his own learning curve was in administrative law that he thought he knew well; yet he came away even more admiring of rigorous basic empirical research, such as NBER findings on what programs work, which he likened to having an almost religious purity.
“I concluded that academics, including people like me, were in important respects clueless, and I did not think that before”
- Sunstein disputes Hayek's Road to Serfdom claim that the worst rise to the top, citing his close work with high-level civil servants at the Department of Transportation and OMB who have superb judgment and are tremendous, arguing that the worst are typically in jail rather than at the top, even if sometimes they are.
“this “worst rise to the top,” I think that’s — I wish Hayek hadn’t said that. That’s — the worst are — you know, a lot of the worst are in jail. Worst aren’t typically at the top”
Star Wars prequels deserve recognition for institutional analysis and visual ambition beyond focusing on individual heroes.
- The Star Wars prequels are underrated because they boldly avoid the standard focus on individuals and instead concern institutions, showing how an institutional failure — a squabbling legislature leading to interest in a strong paternal leader — mirrors how an individual goes bad through the threat of loss, and Lucas's visual imagination in them exceeds the original trilogy.
“the institutional failure of a squabbling legislature leading to interest in a strong paternal leader — that’s mirrored in the democratic process as it is in the individual life”
- Star Trek and Star Wars represent alternate growth models that diverge because Star Trek captures a tiny, as-yet-undiscovered technological something that produces replicators and advanced ships, which Star Wars lacks, making the two universes look fundamentally different.
“there’s a technological something that Star Trek captures, and there’s nothing quite like that that Star Wars gets at”
- There is no worst Star Wars movie; one might be the least amazing, but none is the worst, with The Phantom Menace being the sixth-greatest movie ever made and merely the least good of the six.
“the only answer to the question “Which is the worst of the Star Wars movies?” is, there is no worst Star Wars movie”
- The Empire Strikes Back is the greatest movie of all time and A New Hope the second-greatest, so President Obama's claim that A New Hope was the best of the Star Wars movies was a colossal blunder.
“The President said that A New Hope was the best of the Star Wars movies…and that was a colossal blunder on his part”
People can reach important agreements on practical principles without settling foundational philosophical disputes.
- We can often figure out what our rights are and what to do without committing to a particular conception of the foundations of morality; a free speech principle like 'clear and present danger' can be endorsed by a welfarist, a Kantian, an Aristotelian, or the philosophically indifferent alike, making it an incompletely theorized agreement.
“the idea of incompletely theorized agreements is often we can figure out what our rights are and what to do without committing ourselves to a particular conception of the foundations of morality”
- Joyce is underrated and Ulysses is arguably the richest novel in the last 150 years — not the greatest but the richest — because it is full of multiple interpretations that are actually present in the material rather than projected by smart readers, drawing on Irish history, the Bible, and surprising treatments of men and women that vary chapter to chapter.
“Ulysses is arguably the richest novel in the last 150 years. Not the greatest, but the richest”
- Sunstein's writing advice is that being too critical of your own production at the early stages is an error — if you have something to say, write it, and assume it's good early — while reserving harsh self-criticism for late stages when deciding whether a book or article is worth showing the world.
“To be too critical of your own production, I think, is — at the early stages, at least — is an error. Be critical — if it’s a book or an academic article, be really hard on yourself late. But early, just assume it’s good”
- What ties Byatt's novel Possession and the Mill-Taylor correspondence together for Sunstein is their dialogical letter form and their alertness to the particulars and preciousness of the human heart — both one's own and one's lover's — capturing the truth that everyone has an inaccessible inside of needs, fears, and loves while we ordinarily see only surfaces, even of friends.
“every one of us has that inside ourselves, and we just see surfaces. Even of our friends, we just see surfaces. But there’s stuff going on in them about — you know, it can be needs or fears or loves that are just inaccessible”
Rational choice theory's assumption of perfect rationality, while productive, cannot explain genuine behavioral anomalies.
- Gary Becker's greatest virtue and biggest mistake was an unfailing commitment to the rationality assumption, which both made him fantastic and led him astray, producing 'explainawaytions' — accounts with surface credibility that explain away anomalies like the endowment effect (valuing a mug more once you own it) by appealing to things like transaction costs, which is desperate and not a genuine explanation.
“His biggest mistake was his greatest virtue, which was an unfailing commitment to the rationality assumption”