
Dan Klein on Truth, Bias, and Disagreement 03/16/2009
What this covers
Dan Klein and Russ Roberts discuss the tangled relationship between ideology and objectivity in economics and the social sciences more broadly. Klein argues that scholars cannot cleanly separate their ideological commitments from their supposedly neutral analysis, and that institutional structures—departmental hiring practices, the pyramid of prestige in academic disciplines, and government's outsized role in funding higher education—lock entire fields into groupthink that persists even when specialists working on specific policy questions reach conclusions the broader discipline rejects. The conversation ranges from the history of scientific paradigm shifts to the mechanics of how defective ideas entrench themselves, using concrete examples like the FDA drug approval process and the Semmelweis case (doctors' rejection of the handwashing theory of puerperal fever).
Klein makes several distinct arguments about how belief formation actually works. He contends that the standard categories of reasoning—empirical evidence, logical consistency, and self-interest—are not separate but deeply interwoven, and that what counts as evidence depends on deeper, unarticulated sensibilities one already holds. He argues for ideological self-disclosure as honest scholarship, since ideological commitments shape which problems scholars choose to study and how they frame them. On institutions, he traces how departmental majoritarian hiring and the pyramidal structure of academia (where prestigious apex schools set the norms that cascade through the discipline) drive fields toward ideological uniformity. The conversation also examines whether tools like prediction markets or appeals to expert consensus can break this pattern, with both speakers raising substantial objections to each as a solution.
Klein argues that economists and social scientists cannot separate their ideological sensibilities from their 'objective' analysis, and that institutional structures (departmental majoritarianism, disciplinary pyramids, government dominance of academia) entrench groupthink that perpetuates defective ideas even when issue-specialist experts reach contrary conclusions.
- Ideological commitments unavoidably shape problem selection, formulation, and which evidence is found convincing, so self-disclosure is honest and useful
- Departmental majoritarian hiring plus a pyramidal disciplinary structure drive whole fields toward ideological uniformity
- Economists who actually publish judgments on issues like the FDA reach liberalization conclusions that random economists do not share, revealing an information failure in the culture
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Science requires an 'essential tension' (Kuhn) between tradition—keeping to established focal points—and innovation; too much innovation makes the enterprise incoherent with nothing focal, while too much tradition entrenches defective views, especially through excessive faith in the leaders at the apex of the disciplinary pyramid.
“he talks about the essential tension between keeping to established focal points in science and innovation... if you allow too much to the latter that kind of gets all over the place and nothing clearly is focal the enterprise is no longer coherent”
Major scientific paradigm shifts often occur not because the old guard changes its mind but because they die out, allowing a new generation to adopt the better view—illustrated by Semmelweis, whose correct handwashing theory of puerperal fever was dismissed by older doctors (who blamed vapors and closed windows) and only accepted after time and a new generation, costing thousands of women's lives.
“major paradigm shifts often occur through the death of the proponents of the old regime who eventually die out and can't impose their incorrect views on the next generation”
The reasons we articulate for our beliefs (evidence, logic, self-interest) are not really distinct categories but an interconnected web; in the spirit of Polanyi, our articulated reasons emerge from deeper, not-yet-articulated tacit judgment and sensibilities, and the statements we work with are roughly 90-something-percent-true claims, so counterexamples do not disprove them (a Smithian view).
“whatever we can articulate as our reasons emerges from deeper judgment sensibilities that are not yet articulated... we're dealing with statements that are a web and that are sort of ninety something percent true statements... counter examples don't really disprove the claim I think that's a very Smithian way of seeing things”
Defective ideas persist via two mechanisms: (micro) departments are autonomous and hire by majoritarian politics, so a majority that believes sharing its view is part of scholarly judgment ratchets toward uniformity; and (macro) the discipline's pyramidal structure means departments take their norms from apex schools and journals, so the dominant ideology gets swept into appointments throughout the entire pyramid, reinforced by the apex departments minting and placing the most new PhDs.
“the more micro is what goes on within a department... by and large is majoritarian politics... if they're fifty five percent and they're hiring they'll become sixty percent... then there's the wider discipline which has a pyramidal structure... if the pyramidal structure goes a certain way ideologically it's going to sweep people of that ideology into positions throughout the entire pyramid”
The Simon-Ehrlich bet illustrates how putting money behind a prediction creates strong incentives for accountable, careful judgment: Julian Simon bet Paul Ehrlich that the inflation-adjusted prices of five Ehrlich-chosen metals would fall over ten years (1980-1990), and Simon won on all five, with Ehrlich paying the difference.
“you should be willing to bet me the 10 years from now the prices of resources are going to be higher than they are today after adjusting for inflation”
Some degree of groupthink is virtuous because it embeds a small-c conservatism in the evolution of accepted ideas—it prevents the field from being 'all over the place' and requires a large set of new evidence and ideas before beliefs are radically revised (the Kuhnian 'essential tension' between tradition and innovation).
“one of the virtues of groupthink is that it creates say it embeds a sort of conservativism small c conservativism in the evolution of what is thought to be right”
The Semmelweis case shows that even in the physical sciences, correct theories backed by some evidence can be suppressed for years: Semmelweis correctly identified that doctors moving from the morgue to the delivery room transmitted puerperal fever (preventable by handwashing), but a poorly-executed experiment and his abrasive personality let the older establishment, wedded to the 'bad vapors' theory, dismiss him while thousands of women kept dying.
“His theory was that doctors eager to discover the cause of puerperal fever would go to the morgue and examine women who had died... and then they would go deliver a baby passing on the fever”
Ideological self-disclosure is not only legitimate but useful, because it alerts the reader to potential biases—functioning like a vested-interest disclosure—since ideological commitments bias not just inferences but the very formulation of problems and the selection of topics, positions, and arguments considered.
“not only is it legitimate to disclose your ideological sensibilities but that it's very useful it alerts the reader to the what you know ways that you might be biased it alerts it's like a kind of disclosure like a vested interest kind of disclosure”
When evaluating expert consensus, picking and choosing whose judgments to count (e.g., confining the FDA debate to economists rather than physicians) itself invokes the analyst's own ideological choices—so there is no escape from honesty about one's own judgments even at the meta level.
“when you go up we do start picking and choosing in ways that do again invoke our own choices or our own judgments and that's why I say there's no way out of this honesty”
Prediction/betting markets have real limitations as accountability tools: choosing valid metrics and bettable quantities is hard, there's a 'who is the expert' problem (someone always wins the last 20 coin flips), they pay no interest so nobody wants long-dated bets, and tying policy votes to a single measured outcome invites gaming ('you get what you measure').
“there's always going to be some guy who happen to get the last 20 flips of the coin right and you can say well he's the guy that you know you really was really knows yeah so who's the expert here”
Groupthink is a pejorative-by-construction term denoting a group's excessive readiness to believe ideas the analyst considers defective; importantly, groupthink can infect the argumentation for an otherwise sound policy, not just the policy conclusion itself, so even one's own ('correct') side can be plagued by hackish groupthink.
“groupthink is too too much of a readiness among the group to believe what we consider to be defective ideas the defectiveness of the ideas is essentially being priest closed by the term”
Defective ideas persist in academia through two mechanisms: a micro mechanism of departmental majoritarian politics (an autonomous department's majority, believing its viewpoint is part of scholarly judgment, hires toward uniformity—55% becomes 60% becomes 65%), and a macro mechanism of a pyramidal disciplinary structure where apex departments set norms, mint and place the most PhDs, sweeping one ideology through the entire field.
“the way it works within the department by and large is majoritarian politics now if a majority has a certain point of view... they'll become sixty percent and then they're 60 percent and they're hiring and they become 65 percent”
The death-of-incumbents mechanism (Keynesian revolution, decline of classical liberalism) is real but incomplete, because the entrenched old guard create and best-place the next generation of academics (their brightest, most industrious students), so bad views can be reproduced and persist beyond a single generation rather than simply dying out.
“there clearly are other mechanisms which are going to tend to prolong and persist in the bad views beyond this generation because they're the ones who create the next generation”
The academic labor market is unlike a private market (e.g., for waiters) because it is a cultural, network-externality market with political influence on prestige and status, where ~70-75% of college teachers are government employees and demand comes from diffuse, partly coercively-extracted funds—so normal market-correction forces are weak and lock-ins persist.
“something like 75% or maybe I think it's more like 70% of college teachers in America are government employees so it's it's not exactly a private enterprise economy”
Hayekian truth-finding forces in culture genuinely exist ('there's certain power to wisdom'), but in academia they may be outmatched rather than absent, because government is an enormous cultural player and the world is a finite, not infinite, cultural space in which a single huge actor can dominate.
“if things aren't getting better it's not necessarily because there are no Hayekian forces it could just be that they're outmatched they're overmatched by by other forces”
The three commonly distinguished sources of belief—empirical evidence, logic/consistency, and narrow self-interest (social belonging)—are not really distinct categories; they are interconnected in a web, because what counts as evidence and what it means depends on the mechanisms and logics one already holds, so seeking a single foundational 'algorithm' for one's beliefs is a mistake.
“those categories are not really all that distinct and trying to make them distinct I think could be a mistake the the evidence and tails mechanisms and and kind of logics about how things work what the evidence even means”
Many social-policy statements are not strict universal truths but '90-something percent true' web-like statements (a Smithian view), so counterexamples don't disprove them—meaning debate should aim to identify which consequential claims an opponent holds that might be reconsidered, not to refute via single counterexamples.
“we're dealing with statements that are a web and that are sort of ninety percent ninety something percent true statements is actually what we're working with in which case you know counter examples don't really disprove the claim”
An iatrogenic malady is a sickness caused by the treatment itself—from the doctor—and social scientists and economists, acting as 'policy doctors,' often breed iatrogenic maladies through their interventions.
“it's I guess an example of iatrogenic malady that is... a malady actually from the treatment from the doctor... we think of social scientists and economists as sort of policy doctors but really these doctors are so much are often breeding iatrogenic malady”
The academic 'market' is not really a free market because culture is a network-externalities phenomenon, ~70-75% of college teachers are government employees, and funding comes largely from diffuse, partly coercively-extracted government sources—so the analogy to a private labor market (e.g., for waiters) breaks down and cultures can lock into bad commitments.
“something like 75% or maybe I think it's more like 70% of college teachers in America are government employees so it's not exactly a private enterprise economy... the demanders of these new waiters are spending money which they're not all that accountable for and which come from a whole diffuse range of sources some of which are extracted coercively”
Prediction markets have real limitations: choosing what is bettable and what metrics to use is hard; deciding whose opinion to compare them against is ambiguous because some lucky individual will always have a recent winning streak; they typically pay no interest, deterring long-horizon bets; and tying policy to a measurable outcome creates 'play to the test' distortions (you get what you measure).
“there's always going to be some guy who happen to get the last 20 flips of the coin right and you can say well he's the guy that really knows... they don't pay interest you got to put your money upfront”
Hayekian forces (the power of wisdom) give good ideas a chance, but because this is not a free market—dominated by coercive taxation and government as a huge cultural player in a finite cultural space—wisdom can simply be outmatched, so the failure of culture to improve does not prove the absence of truth-seeking forces.
“it's not that there aren't Hayekian factors and forces I think there are... but on the other hand it's not a free market... governments are just huge huge cultural players so if things aren't getting better it's not necessarily because there are no Hayekian forces it could just be that they're outmatched”
Critical commentary has largely disappeared from leading economics journals (shown by Coelho and McClure's investigation, with a parallel finding in Australian journals), because academic economics has become genteel and reluctant to criticize eminent people; econ Journal Watch was created to restore the discovery procedure of dialogue, debate, and criticism.
“our own investigations at econ journal watch by Phil Coelho and Jim McClure show that critical commentary has disappeared pretty much from the leading econ journals... it's the same has happened in the Australian economics journals”
Both the Keynesian revolution and the decline of classical liberalism were phenomena of the new generation adopting new worldviews rather than the old guard (e.g., Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner) changing their minds—but academia's lock-in also tends to prolong bad views beyond a single generation because the apex faculty train and best-place the next generation.
“books have been written about the Keynesian revolution and about how it was a phenomenon of the new generation it wasn't so much that the old guard had changed their mind and I'm quite sure you can say the same thing about the decline of classical liberalism”
Ideological self-disclosure is not only legitimate but useful, because it alerts the reader to how a scholar might be biased—not just in inferences but in the very formulation of problems, selection of topics, and choice of arguments considered—functioning like a vested-interest disclosure.
“it's very useful it alerts the reader to the ways that you might be biased it alerts it's like a kind of disclosure like a vested interest kind of disclosure because after all ideological sensibilities are commitments that we carry around with us and are likely to bias not just inferences we might make but formulations of the very problem and selection of the topics”
A virtue of groupthink is that it embeds a small-c conservatism in the evolution of ideas: it prevents views from being 'all over the place' and requires a large body of new ideas and evidence before beliefs are radically revised, which can be a good thing.
“one of the virtues of groupthink is that it embeds a sort of conservativism small c conservativism in the evolution of what is thought to be right... it should take a big set of new ideas and new evidence before we revise and radically change what we believe”
A valid market-failure argument for government intervention must show how government's specialness—its coercive power to tax—brings something to the problem that is otherwise lacking; merely showing the market is imperfect (not 'blackboard perfection') is insufficient, and in the FDA and occupational-licensing cases no such argument for government's distinctive contribution exists.
“the rationale has to go further than that it has to explain how government is specialness brings something to the problem to correct this and in the FDA occupational licensing and others I don't see that there's any argument for that at all”
Plain, public, back-and-forth discourse that makes participants accountable—exemplified by media diversity from cable, blogs, and podcasts lowering entry costs—conduces toward wisdom and is a genuine source of hope for higher-quality intellectual debate.
“there's something about talking plainly talking back and forth talking publicly so that we're accountable that I think all conduces towards wisdom”
On rent control, sports subsidies, and taxi deregulation, both issue-expressive economists and random economists reach the same conclusion, which reinforces and probably strengthens that conclusion—unlike the FDA-type cases where the two groups diverge.
“rent control sports subsidies but in those cases the random economists pretty much agrees as well it reinforces and I think probably it's stronger... taxi deregulation is another one that fits in there”
On the FDA's permitting of new drugs, economists who actually express a policy judgment (Friedman, Peltzman, Becker, and topic specialists) overwhelmingly favor liberalization, yet randomly surveyed economists are rather supportive of the current FDA—revealing a significant impasse between issue-expressive and random economists.
“so many economist Milton Friedman Sam peltzman Gary Becker and many of the IND of scholars who work specifically on the topic reach maybe not the radical conclusion but certainly express a liberalisation conclusion”
The Smith-Hayek (classical liberal / free-market) contingent is roughly 10% of economists and nearly nonexistent in sociology, history, psychology, philosophy and the humanities, where the dominant policy orientation is social democratic—indicating a profound ideological imbalance in academia.
“the smith Hayek contingent is perhaps 10% of the Pope people out there but then when you go to the other social sciences you know it's even it's basically non-existent”
Critical commentary has essentially disappeared from the leading economics journals (shown by Coelho and McClure's investigation, and replicated for Australian journals), creating an opportunity for Econ Journal Watch to revive the discovery procedure of dialogue, debate, and criticism of both eminent economists and academic institutions.
“our own investigations at econo watch by Phil Coelho and Jim McClure show that critical commentary has disappeared pretty much from the leading econ journals”
Consulting issue-expressive economists (those who publicly publish and argue judgments, thereby making themselves accountable) is more meaningful than consulting random survey economists, and across six topics—FDA, occupational licensing, road pricing, rail transit, drug prohibition, postal services—the issue-expressive economists preponderantly reach liberalization conclusions while random economists do not.
“a more meaningful consultation is with these people who publish judgments because it goes back just like the same this assignment err like that just like the betting markets to incentives in coming to judgment”
The FDA's entire premarket-permitting structure is misguided; among economists who actually publish judgments on the FDA (Friedman, Peltzman, Becker, Tabarrok, Calfee, etc.), the verdict is overwhelmingly one-sided toward liberalization, yet randomly polled economists are rather supportive of the current FDA—revealing a significant impasse between issue-expressive and random economists.
“so many economist Milton Friedman Sam peltzman Gary Becker and many of the scholars who work specifically on the topic reach... a liberalisation conclusion and when you count noses of all the people actually express it's very very one-sided... yet if you poll economists at random they don't have that view of the FDA in fact they're rather supportive”
Consulting issue-expressive economists (those who publish judgments) is more meaningful than polling random economists, because publishing and arguing for a judgment makes one more accountable and should yield higher-quality conclusions; on six issues—FDA, occupational licensing, road pricing, rail transit, drug prohibition, postal services—these economists reach clear liberalization conclusions far more than random economists do.
“a more meaningful consultation is with these people who publish judgments because it goes back just like the betting markets to incentives in coming to judgment... FDA licensing road pricing rail transit drug prohibition Postal Services those six... these issue expressive economists come to a liberalization conclusion much more clearly and preponderantly than the random economists”
Because people rarely change their basic beliefs about religion and politics after age 25 or 30 (a well-established finding), cultural leaders and influentials are largely locked into their views, so bad cultural commitments can persist generation after generation rather than being corrected by persuasion.
“when it comes to basic beliefs particularly about religion and about um politics people rarely change their mind after the age of 25 or 30 this is quite well established”
The belief that one can wear two separate hats—objective scientist seeking truth and private citizen with an ideology—is naive self-deception that goes against what we understand about human nature, since we are unavoidably affected by emotional and core values.
“what you're suggesting and I've come to a part of it is that that's naive it's an illusion and it goes against what we understand about human nature which is that we are affected by these emotional and core values”
A valid market-failure argument for government intervention must explain how government's distinctive 'specialness'—primarily its coercive power to tax—brings something to the problem that is otherwise lacking; mere market imperfection ('not the blackboard perfection') is insufficient, and in cases like the FDA and occupational licensing no such argument exists.
“the rationale has to go more further than that it has to explain how government is specialness brings something to the problem to correct this and in the FDA occupational licensing and others I don't see that there's any argument for that at all”
Arguments offered in public debate are often the reasons one finds persuasive oneself rather than the reasons opponents actually hold, so they fail to move opponents; knowing whether evidence, logic, or social self-interest underlies a belief is strategically important for anyone trying to change minds.
“I always think know what's gonna be convinced by that argument that's why you think it's a good argument it's not why your opponents are holding their view”
Betting/prediction markets improve discourse by forcing people to put money behind their opinions, which creates a strong incentive to be responsible and accountable in forming judgments—exemplified by the Simon-Ehrlich bet, which Simon won on all five resources because their inflation-adjusted prices fell over the decade.
“putting your money where your mouth is gives you a much stronger incentive to be responsible and accountable in coming to your judgement... that's really the idea of prediction markets that people are putting money behind their opinion and that we would think conduces to more careful opinion making”
The belief that one can wear two separate hats—objective truth-seeking scientist versus ideological citizen—is naive self-deception, because human nature means we are unavoidably affected by emotional and core values; the realistic position is that bias is inherent and should be expected.
“that's naive it's an illusion and it goes against what we understand about human nature which is that we are affected by these emotional and core values and we shouldn't expect it to be otherwise”
When trying to change minds in debate, the productive move is to engage the specific claims and consequences the other side actually puts forward (e.g., about the minimum wage's effects) rather than disengaging or repeating arguments that only persuade your own side; people often hold a view for reasons different from the arguments they cite.
“it's important to try to listen to what the arguments the people you disagree with are saying... what claims are they making about the consequences of the minimum wage that you really might be able to get them to reconsider”
People rarely change their minds on basic beliefs about religion and politics after the age of 25 or 30, which is well established; this individual lock-in means cultural leaders and influentials are largely fixed, so bad cultural commitments can persist generation after generation.
“when it comes to basic beliefs particularly about religion and about politics people rarely change their mind after the age of 25 or 30 this is quite well established... you can easily have generation after generation locked into bad cultural commitments”
Top economists' claim to be unbiased truth-seekers is partly disingenuous and partly naive self-deception: disingenuous because they socially sort by ideology (who they'll associate with at a cocktail party), and naive because they have absorbed the norms of normal science without examining how those norms evolved to exclude radical arguments and keep discourse 'between the 40-yard lines.'
“I think that that claim is partly disingenuous when you hear it and partly not just naive um self-deception”
A university's history department exists more as a creature of the discipline of history than of the university itself—professors' identities are wrapped up in being historians, so departments look to the discipline's apex for norms of quality, fairness, and focal points rather than to their own institution.
“the history department for that matter George Mason University in an existential sense is not so much a creature of George Mason University it is a creature of history”
Articulated reasons emerge from deeper, not-yet-articulated judgment sensibilities (a Polanyian view), making belief-justification an unending dialectic: articulating reasons immediately opens them to criticism and refinement, so productive debate requires listening to and engaging the specific claims opponents actually make rather than disengaging.
“whatever we can articulate is our reasons emerges from deeper you know judgment sensibilities that are not yet articulated and this is a non ending never ending thing”
There is a society-wide groupthink that descended with the decline of classical liberalism, and within each academic discipline (history, psychology, sociology) there are groupthink dynamics pushing toward a social-democratic worldview.
“there's a sort of groupthink problem writ large... I also would even say though that there's a broader society wide groupthink which in a sense descended on us with the decline of liberalism classical liberalism”
Top economists who claim to have no ideological bias and to be merely truth-seekers are partly disingenuous and partly naive: disingenuous because they choose social companions by shared ideology, and naive because they don't reflect on how the norms of normal science have evolved to exclude certain arguments and keep discussion 'between the 40-yard lines.'
“that claim is partly disingenuous when you hear it and partly not just naive... they don't think that hard about the norms in normal science and the way those norms have evolved to exclude certain kinds of arguments exclude certain kinds of discourse keep the discussion on what I call between the 40-yard lines”
A history department at a given university is, in an existential sense, not a creature of that university but a creature of its discipline: faculty identity is more wrapped up in being a historian than in being an employee of the institution, which is why the disciplinary pyramid's ideology propagates downward.
“the history department at George Mason University in an existential sense is not so much a creature of George Mason University it is a creature of history... their identity is much more wrapped up in being a historian than being a George Mason employer”
There is a society-wide groupthink, as well as discipline-specific groupthink within each academic pyramid (history, psychology, sociology), that descended with the decline of classical liberalism and now sustains misguided pro-intervention policy views.
“there's a broader society wide groupthink which in a sense descended on us with the decline of liberalism classical liberalism”
Smith-Hayek (classical liberal / free-market) economists are roughly only 10% of economists, and are essentially non-existent in sociology, history, psychology, philosophy and the humanities, where the prevailing policy-relevant view is social democratic—creating a large potential defectiveness suspect for groupthink.
“the smith Hayek contingent is perhaps 10% of the people out there but then when you go to the other social sciences it's basically non-existent... there's practically no free market people classical liberal people in sociology history psychology and the humanities philosophy”
There is no useful way to approach the meta-question of whether social science produces truth as though one can separate one's own ideological sensibilities from the analysis, because the most important questions are ideological in nature (about public policy and how society's rules should be).
“I personally don't think it's useful to try to approach the broad question you just asked as though you can somehow separate your own sensibilities about those matters in the way you approach the the larger question the meta question”
Higher-quality discourse—talking plainly, back and forth, and publicly so one is accountable—conduces toward wisdom, and forums like EconTalk that invite ideological opponents (though they are harder to recruit) and the cheaper-entry blogosphere/podcast media are genuine, if limited, grounds for optimism.
“there's something about talking plainly talking back and forth talking publicly so that we're accountable that I think all conduces to well towards wisdom”
It is not useful or possible to approach meta-questions about how social science arrives at truth as though one can separate one's own ideological sensibilities about public policy from the inquiry itself.
“I personally don't think it's useful to try to approach the broad question you just asked as though you can somehow separate your own sensibilities about those matters in the way you approach the larger question the meta question”
There is a puzzle in that economists do not know the important findings of their own subject—e.g., FDA-specialist economists' liberalization conclusion is not propagated through the Journal of Economic Perspectives or Journal of Economic Literature—and the simple explanation is that the mainstream dismisses these conclusions due to groupthink and deference to governing structures.
“why don't economists know the important findings of their own subject like why why if economists who study the FDA say we should certainly liberalize why don't the other economists know that”
George Mason's economics department deliberately rejected the strategy of trying to climb the rankings by being better at what top-20 schools already do well—a 'fool's game'—and instead pursued a Moneyball-style niche, doing something different from the mainstream very well to exploit a market opportunity the mainstream pyramid ignores.
“the way they they try to get into the top 20 is to be better at the things that the top 20 schools are already doing very well so it's a very some sense it's a fool's game”
Schools ranked 20-50 mostly play a fool's game by trying to climb the rankings by being better at what top-20 schools already do well; George Mason's economics department instead pursued a 'Moneyball' strategy—deliberately doing something different and underpriced by the mainstream pyramid—exploiting a market opportunity the mainstream ignores.
“the way they try to get into the top 20 is to be better at the things that the top 20 schools are already doing very well so it's a fool's game... at George Mason we've eschewed that strategy... what some of our colleagues call the Moneyball strategy of looking for a niche where we can do very well because it's not rewarded by the mainstream pyramid”
Groupthink can occur at two distinct levels: the policy judgment itself can be defective, OR the argumentation for an otherwise-sound policy can be defective—so even people who agree with a correct policy conclusion can be immersed in groupthink in how they argue for it (e.g., hackish think tanks).
“you can have groupthink in the argumentation for a sound policy and that's a kind of groupthink think tanks that are kind of hackish or what have you but maybe you kind of agree with the punchline the policy punchline can still very much be immersed in groupthink”
Groupthink is an inherently pejorative term: it presupposes that the group is too ready to believe ideas the analyst considers defective, so labeling something groupthink already prejudges the defectiveness of the ideas.
“groupthink I think is a pejorative term it's pejorative by construction... groupthink is too much of a readiness among the group to believe what we consider to be defective ideas the defectiveness of the ideas is essentially being preclosed by the term”
Honest ideological self-disclosure carries a strategic drawback: it exposes the discloser to ad hominem attacks (e.g., being dismissed as 'like Milton Friedman, who's been discredited by the crisis') and can distract from the actual topic, so the honesty strategy is in tension with the groupthink dynamics it tries to counter.
“it is then prone to sort of an ad hominem attack oh you're you know oh you're you're you're free market economy you're you're like Milton Friedman but but he's been discredited hasn't he by the recent crisis”
Minority/heterodox intellectual groups have a tendency to feel oppressed and put-upon by the mainstream establishment, but the glass may be more half-full than such groups perceive.
“there's a tendency of quote our side any minority to feel oppressed and and... put upon by the the mainstream establishment and you know the glass may be a little more half-full”
Econ Journal Watch has seven Nobel laureates on its advisory committee, has attracted eminent contributors, has steadily rising readership, and was selected for indexing by Thomson Reuters Web of Science.
“we have seven Nobel laureates on the Advisory Committee we've had a lot of eminent people write for it I think our readership numbers are very good... we were selected for indexing by Thomson Reuters web of science”
The cheaper entry afforded by cable, the blogosphere, and podcasts has widened the range of voices available on economic policy, making the marketplace of ideas a little more competitive—a basis for optimism.
“as Cable has allowed entry to be cheaper I think the blogosphere I think podcasts have widened the voices that are commonly available... I think there's a little market the world's a little more competitive”
The Journal of Economic Perspectives has gotten somewhat better under editor Andrei Shleifer, who—being from Russia—understands groupthink in government and the academy.
“the Journal of economic perspectives has gotten somewhat better under Andre Schleifer who's from Russia so surely he knows about groupthink in government and the Academy”
Welcome to EconTalk and the standard show introduction and sign-off.
“welcome to econ talk part of the library of economics and liberty I'm your host Russ Roberts”
Roberts and Klein are considering a book club to read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments and invite listener participation.
“Dan and I are considering a book club where we would read the Theory of Moral Sentiments talk about it”