What this covers
Beth Redbird, a sociologist at Northwestern, speaks with Russ Roberts on the economic effects of occupational licensing—the requirement that workers hold a state-issued credential to practice in a field. Rather than defending licensing as beneficial, Redbird challenges the standard economist's case against it. Her argument rests on a large dataset linking nearly 2,000 licensing laws passed since 1970 across all Census-defined occupations to wage data from the Current Population Survey on 11 million workers. Against the prediction that licensing restricts entry and raises wages, she finds that across 341 occupations on average, licensing produces no wage benefit, and that entry often increases rather than decreases—especially among women and people of color. The key mechanism, she argues, is that licensing replaces informal barriers to entry—networks, discrimination, and hidden gatekeeping—with transparent institutions: licensing boards, professional schools, standardized testing, and state-issued credentials that function as indicia of quality.
The conversation moves through the contours of this finding. Redbird notes that while licensing does not raise average wages, it concentrates women and minorities at the bottom of newly licensed occupations, a phenomenon she explains by examining what alternatives those workers faced before licensing existed. She details how licensing restructures occupations internally, creating stratified specialties with different wage levels, and shows that licensing requirements vary wildly in rigor—from the bar exam's stringency down to coaching licenses requiring only a Saturday class. The discussion touches on rent-capture and the bootleggers and baptists theory, questioning whether licensing's stated consumer-protection rationales mask self-interested gatekeeping. It closes with Redbird's research on economic conditions for Native Americans, where she finds that casino jobs, while reducing unemployment initially, fail to generate livable wages or reduce poverty, instead concentrating income and creating economic inequality on reservations.
Redbird argues that occupational licensing, contrary to the standard economic view that it is purely exclusionary and wage-raising, has no net wage benefit on average and often expands access to occupations for women and minorities by replacing informal, network-based barriers with transparent, standardized institutions.
- Licensing has no net wage premium across 341 occupations; some gain, some lose
- After licensing, labor supply to an occupation often increases rather than decreases, drawing in women and people of color
- Licensing replaces hidden informal barriers (networks, discrimination) with publicized standards, schools, and color-blind testing
Occupational licensing expanded dramatically across American blue-collar and production jobs, now covering over a third of workers.
- Over the past few decades occupational licensing quietly became the norm across a broad swath of American occupations, with the most substantial growth in blue-collar production and transportation jobs; as of 2012 over 32% of workers required a license, and more workers are now subject to licensing than were union members at the peak of collective bargaining.
“we see an increase of licensing since 1983 of about 200%. Since 1970, about 2000 new licensing laws have been enacted.”
Licensing serves competing rationales of consumer protection and rent-capture, with self-interested actors cloaking rent-seeking in consumer-protection arguments.
- Licensing has two competing rationales—protecting consumers from poor-quality or fraudulent providers versus letting existing members keep out competitors (rent-capture)—and per the bootleggers-and-baptists theory, self-interested actors cloak their rent-seeking in morally pleasing consumer-protection arguments, so whether the protective effects are real is an empirical question.
“it's a classic example--for long-time listeners--of bootleggers and baptists, the regulatory theory that says there are attractive arguments for regulation and then some self-interested arguments; and people will often cloak self-interested arguments in more morally-pleasing tones.”
Licensing's real harm is excluding entire groups from opportunity, paralleling how unions protected insiders while depressing wages elsewhere.
- When evaluating whether women clustered at the bottom of a licensed occupation are harmed, the right question is what their alternatives were—if licensing created opportunities they otherwise lacked, that is an improvement, but the real worry is the unseen women who are excluded entirely; this parallels unions, which protected insiders by reducing supply while pushing excluded workers into non-unionized sectors and depressing wages there.
“when you tell me that women cluster at the bottom of an occupation because of licensing, my next question is: What were their alternatives?”
Economists ignore personal networks and cultural connections that actually shape labor supply and opportunity access in real markets.
- Personal connections play an underappreciated role in the labor market—illustrated by ethnic clustering in Manhattan groceries where relatives show newcomers the ropes and even reveal that such a job exists—and economists grossly ignore these cultural and network connections, treating supply of labor as given without examining where it comes from or how it might be mitigated.
“most of those groceries are, I think, run by people from one ethnic group... Somebody from far away calls their uncle or cousin or nephew or whatever... They show them the ropes.”