Jamal Greene
What this covers
Jamal Greene presents a fundamental challenge to how Americans understand constitutional rights. Rather than treating rights as near-absolute protections that trump competing concerns, he argues they should be understood contextually—as products of pluralism that must be negotiated and balanced against other legitimate values. The conversation centers on where this idea comes from historically, how it would change judicial practice, and what problems it solves. Greene traces American rights absolutism to a contingent historical accident: the association of rights with race-based injustice, particularly segregation, which created the binary thinking that rights are either sacred trumps or nothing at all. He contends this is not how the founders conceived of rights, and that treating rights as contextual rather than categorical would actually produce better governance and social cohesion.
The discussion moves through several concrete domains. Greene argues that courts should function with adjudicative humility, striking down laws at the margins and observing state responses rather than serving as final arbiters, and that proportionality—weighing values embedded in legal tradition—should replace the search for absolute answers. He addresses how federalism enables this by multiplying sites of political negotiation, reducing veto points that paralyze government. The conversation also examines education, exploring how law schools should train students to understand courts as engaged in deep fictional justification, and touches on law review gatekeeping and hiring practices. Greene defends disability accommodation from stigma, reframes privacy rights as contextually balanced rather than categorical, and pushes back on the idea that skepticism of American state-building is inevitable—tracing it instead to mid-twentieth-century racial politics that needn't constrain future choices.
Greene argues that America's binary, absolutist conception of rights—where rights are either near-sacred trumps or dismissed entirely—is a contingent product of its racial history, and that rights should instead be treated contextually as products of pluralism, managed through proportionality and political negotiation rather than judicial finality.
- American rights absolutism is historically contingent, rooted in associating rights with race-based pathology, not in the founders' views
- Rights conflicts are political conflicts that cannot be resolved by being 'right' but only managed for social cohesion via proportionality
- Federalism and more sites of political negotiation reduce the use of rights as absolute veto points/trumps
Rights are properly grounded in political negotiation across multiple sites, not court-imposed absolutes.
- The advice to never talk to police is not really about legalism but about a rational mistrust of state power where officers may be corrupt, abusive, or out to trick you; the genuine problem of legalism is distinct—it is the tendency to submit political disputes to legal/adjudicative resolution rather than solving them through politics and conversation.
“I think that we are too apt to submit political disputes to legal resolution. I thinkthatfor sure. What your friends are telling you about police officers is slightly different”
- The most important value for an adjudicator deciding competing-rights cases is humility—recognizing they have no superior moral knowledge about resolving conflicts that are fundamentally political; intervention is warranted only when politics is missing something, such as failing to take account of someone's full dignity or when government acts grossly disproportionately.
“the most important value for an adjudicator of a case involving competing rights is humility and the recognition that the adjudicator doesn’t have superior knowledge, superior moral knowledge, about the way of resolving these conflicts.”
- The question in rights conflicts is not whether anyone is right but whether disagreement is being managed in a way that produces social harmony and cohesion; the real problem is not that one side has rights wrong but that we disagree and lack agreement on how to resolve disagreement, so the judge's job is to manage pluralism, which doesn't lend itself to right-or-wrong answers.
“I don’t think the question is whether we’re right. I think the question is whether we’re managing disagreement in a way that leads to social harmony and social cohesion.”
- Political negotiation does not mean congressional-level negotiation but everyday interactions; there are many sites for politics beyond legislatures, and rights should facilitate negotiation across all of them rather than functioning as trumps decided in courts.
“I mean in our day-to-day interactions with each other. There are a lot of different sites for politics, not just in some legislature or some such.”
- Courts should function as part of a broader political conversation about contested balances of values—striking something down at the margins and observing how the state and people respond—rather than serving as final arbiters that resolve value conflicts unilaterally.
“I think courts should bepartof a broader political conversation about these balances of values that we all disagree about.”
- Rights pluralism is inseparable from pluralism as such: because people genuinely differ in important ways, embracing pluralism—rather than resisting it as American culture partly does—requires recognizing those differences and reconciling them, which is the foundation of how rights should be understood.
“rights pluralism is inseparable from pluralism, full stop. Part of it is being accepting of pluralism in a way that... there’s partly a culture of resistance of that, but I think that’s destructive.”
- Rights federalism does not mean creating more absolutist rights but recognizing that rights are grounded in political negotiation; multiplying the sites where such negotiation occurs gives people leverage, and because nothing is quite a 'trump,' people who know they won't necessarily win in court are less likely to resort to litigation—reducing veto points and making government more effective.
“Rights are grounded in political negotiation, and the number of sites where that political negotiation is possible should be greater.”
American rights absolutism is historically recent and stems from race-based constitutional pathology.
- The quasi-absolute way Americans understand rights today is historically contingent and recent—pre-mid-20th-century Americans understood rights quite differently, and the founders did not conceive of rights in the quasi-absolute sense we now attribute to the Bill of Rights, even though we mythologize our rights as ancient.
“The way in which Americans understood rights before the middle of the 20th century was quite different from how we understand rights today.”
- The distinctively American absolutist conception of rights stems substantially from associating rights with a history of race-based pathology—e.g., the right of African Americans not to be sent to segregated schools—which produces a binary understanding where rights are either very strong or very weak; in contrast, rights are properly understood as a byproduct of pluralism arising in many situations regardless of whether government acts well.
“insofar as we associate rights with a particular history of race-based pathology... That association of rights with pathological governance, I think, leads to a certain kind of binary understanding of what rights can do.”
- Greene is sympathetic to federalism; the perception that he isn't stems from federalism historically being used largely to defend white supremacy, but federalism does not need to be used that way and is entirely compatible with a contextual conception of rights once that pathology is recognized.
“historically,federalism has been used in large part to defend white supremacy. It doesn’tneedto be used in that way”
- There is a right to privacy as an important value, but the Supreme Court no longer grounds the things historically associated with the constitutional right to privacy (birth control, abortion) in a right to privacy; privacy should be treated like other rights and weighed contextually against competing values such as the economic rights of private actors or the government's surveillance justifications.
“I think that the Supreme Court no longer grounds the sorts of things that we associate with the constitutional right to privacyina right to privacy.”
- There is a misalignment in American culture between rights connected to deep conceptions of justice (like disability accommodation) and rights only weakly connected to justice (like watching pornography at home); the problem is not that we have too few rights and need more, but that the rights we treat as strong are misaligned with those that actually matter to justice.
“there are lots of rights that we have in our culture that are not actually connected to any deep conception of justice. I have a right to watch pornography in my home.”
Judges resolving rights conflicts need humility, recognizing they lack superior moral knowledge and must weigh competing values proportionally.
- Rather than utilitarianism, the standard for resolving rights conflicts is proportionality with respect to a set of values embedded in the existing legal tradition (free speech, racial equality, autonomy, democracy); there is no master key because that would presuppose a value hierarchy Greene rejects, so the judge's job is to assess whether values we share are being disproportionately affected in each individual case.
“It is, I would sayproportionality, which means... that one is constantly concerned with... proportionality as to a set of values that are embedded within the existing legal tradition.”
Rights pluralism and institutional flexibility allow effective governance without sacrificing substantive justice or fairness.
- The common assertion that rights must be universal is unjustified; rights are constantly contested just as governance is, and there are lessons to be learned from allowing flexibility in how rights are understood across different institutional contexts and geographic spaces.
“we sometimes say that rights have to be universal in some sense. I’m not sure why that’s true.”
- Government effectiveness can and should be understood in rights terms: people have a right to democratic participation and to the fruits of that participation bearing fruit, so invoking absolute universal rights (like an absolute free speech right) to block government action can itself be a destructive violation of the right to effective self-government.
“Government effectiveness is itself something that can and should be understood in rights terms, but we have a right to democratic participation and to the fruits of that participation to bear fruit.”
- People regularly use the putative absolutism of rights to prevent government from being effective; whenever any rights regime—Greene's own or the one he criticizes—stands in the way of effective government, that is a problem to watch for, without claiming any essentialism about it.
“what I observe is that people use the putative absolutism of rights to prevent government from being effective on quite a regular basis.”
The LSAT and law school admissions should be reformed but retain some gatekeeping rather than eliminated entirely.
- Heavy reliance on the LSAT (50-60% of admissions weight) is problematic because a three-hour test has outsized influence on which schools one can attend, yet the test retains some value due to its transparency and its prediction of certain lawyerly skills, so it should be used less rather than eliminated.
“it does bother me that your performance on a three-hour test has such a profound influence on which schools one is able to go to.”
- Law schools need not select students based on who will be the best lawyer, because they pursue varied goals such as community composition and professional diversity; the LSAT predicts a certain lawyerly skill, but that is not the only output schools are trying to produce.
“Schools have a lot of different goals that they might have in mind. They might want to have a certain community on campus. They might want to produce certainkindsof lawyers”
Rights do not require categorical labels or registries; they function when people can exercise them without legal formalism obstructing access.
- Expanding legal openness to disability claims does not require placing people in a stigmatizing registry of disabilities, because rights are for those who wish to exercise them, not imposed on those who don't.
“I don’t think that providing more openness in the law to disability claims requires people to be in some kind of registry of disabilities that’s stigmatizing or something. Rights are for those who wish to exercise them, not for those who don’t.”
- Disability rights need not turn on an individual's claim to an exemption: a business required to make a reasonable accommodation helps anyone who needs it regardless of legal designation, and there is genuine injustice—not mere legal technicality—when less able people cannot thrive, so legal formalisms should not obstruct accommodating them.
“A business having to make a reasonable accommodation helps anyone, regardless of who needs the accommodation, regardless of what their particular legal designation might be.”
Content moderation by concentrated platforms requires greater scrutiny than competitive markets, weighing multiple competing factors.
- Concern about a platform's content moderation should rise with market concentration: if Facebook is the only game in town (as in many countries), one is right to worry more about its moderation than under genuine competition, and if all major platforms do the same thing—whether coordinating or not—that warrants greater concern.
“If Facebook is the only game in town, as it is in many countries, I think one is right to be more concerned about its content moderation practices under those circumstances than under circumstances of genuine competition.”
- Content moderation decisions must weigh many competing factors beyond whether a given piece of content should spread: market concentration and power, suppression of speech that should proliferate, the fact that decision-makers are private actors, the amplified harms of certain speech in social media, and the platforms' own rights as private companies with views about their speech environment.
“One should also be concerned with the harms of certain kinds of speech and the ways in which those harms can be amplified in the social media context.”
Baseball faces structural decline unsuited to modern audiences; hiring calendars distort legal careers; textbook bundling prevents cost-distorted choices.
- Baseball faces a structurally aging audience problem similar to magazines, and rather than tweaking rules (moving second base, robot umps) to attract young people, it should recognize its structure is unsuited to the modern age and retain its committed older fans as long as possible.
“I don’t think you’re going to move second base a little bit or put in some robot umps, and then you’ll get 18-year-olds getting into baseball. You have to see the writing on the wall.”
- The early professional hiring calendar at top law schools offers prestigious firm jobs at a moment when students have no alternatives, making it irrational to decline them; this distorts the market by filling firms with people who don't want to be there and biases public-interest careers toward only those who can financially afford the risk, mismatching genuine interest with career paths.
“those jobs get offered to you at a time when you have no other alternatives. And so, regardless of one’s individual preferences, it makes no sense to turn down those jobs when you actually have no alternative.”
- Law school textbook costs should be bundled into tuition rather than purchased separately, because separate à la carte pricing leads students to make distorted choices (buying used or digital copies) based on cost perception, creating unfairness comparable to charging separately for individual courses.
“the students make different choices when they perceive it to be something that’s a baked-in cost versus perceiving it to be something that they have to pay for separately.”
- Baseball should not have its historical exemption from antitrust law, and to the extent it is less popular than before, whatever justification existed for the exemption is further diminished.
“I don’t think baseballshouldhave an exemption from antitrust law. I suppose if it’s less popular than it once was, then whatever justification there is is diminished.”
- Black Thought, lead rapper of the Roots, is the best rapper of all time because he is prolific, productive, intelligent, and unlazy in constructing lyrics, and—rarely—manages to be both musical and a poet, a combination that even Greene's own poet brother struggled to achieve early in his career.
“he manages to be both musical and a poet... He’s a poet. He’s not a musician, and he had to learn to be a musician. Trying to combine those things is a rare gift.”
- Greene's most effective work habit is using the entire day to work—doing his writing, reading, and preparation late at night since days are filled with teaching and students—working during soccer practices and in the car, never segregating times when he can't work and forgoing television.
“my most effective work habit is to use the entire day to work. I get alotof work done late at night.”
- Teaching constitutional law involves a self-conscious journey accepting that there is a realist core to what courts do; students must learn a legal language they know is not shallow fiction but a deep fiction about how change is made, and must justify for themselves why playing that role is valuable.
“What you have to do is to learn a certain language that, self-consciously, you know is not just shallow fiction but a really deep fiction about how change is made.”
- New York's poor subway infrastructure performance is real but Greene has no story connecting it to veto points; construction costs are far higher in New York for unclear reasons, while jurisdictions with more flexible rights conceptions (Canada, Western Europe) have good public infrastructure, suggesting rights regimes are not the primary driver.
“The costs of construction are much higher in New York than other places. I don’t have a good story for exactly why that’s the case, but other places that think about rights in much more flexible ways have perfectly good public infrastructure”
- Skepticism that American state-building is un-American is misplaced; there was an important inflection point in the 1960s around the Great Society that, inseparable from race, associated big government with helping racial minorities, producing a reaction that should not be accepted as an inevitable feature of the American people requiring deregulation.
“There was an inflection point... in the 1960s and around the response to the Great Society that one can’t separate from race quite as cleanly as one might wish to, that associates big government with helping out racial minorities in particular, and there was a reaction to that.”
- The extra spark marking students likely to become important producers of legal ideas is a combination of being a genuine self-starter and being genuinely curious—curiosity paired with humility (not assuming one is right and always wanting to know more), and finding ideas intrinsically interesting rather than merely instrumental to a next step.
“curiosity goes hand in hand with a certain degree of humility — not knowing that you’re right about things and wanting to know more and more and more at all times”
- The biggest risk of Greene's contextual-rights vision is deep legal uncertainty: because the US Supreme Court sits atop a pyramid of many courts that all have constitutional jurisdiction, more flexibility and inconsistency could make it hard for actors to know their rights and obligations and to plan—though Greene believes this concern is overstated and that some inconsistency is tolerable.
“you have a potential for chaos that is not present in many other jurisdictions... A kind of deep legal uncertainty is something that one should be concerned about and should watch out for. I think it’s overstated.”
- The Supreme Court should adopt a panel system in which not every justice hears every case, which could allow non-lawyers to sit on certain panels for less technical matters while reserving technical statutory interpretation cases for lawyers.
“I happen to think that the court should have panels. Not everyone should hear every case. If you did something like that, maybe you could have a non-lawyer panel or something.”
Law and economics reasoning is legitimate so long as its proponents recognize other interpretive methods are equally valid.
- The main risk in law and economics reasoning is confusing internal debates about the right answer within a method with the external question of which method is legitimate; law and economics is fine so long as its proponents recognize that other interpretive methods are also legitimate.
“Sometimes we confuse internal debates about interpretation, internal debates about the right answer to legal problems with the external question of what’s the right answer in this case?”
- In Lochner v. New York (1905), the court's error was not that courts should never strike down maximum-hours laws, but that this particular law was actually well justified; the proper battle is over the justification of specific laws on their facts, and people do have rights to contract and economic rights.
“the problem in theLochnercase... is not that the court should never strike down maximum hours laws. It’s that that particular law was well justified.”
- People have a basic right to the government justifying itself when it regulates them, so if there is no good reason to regulate (e.g., occupational licensing for interior designers) the government shouldn't—but rather than labeling this an absolute 'right to economic liberty,' the battle should be over justification on the facts, not over whether a categorical right exists; labeling it a right carries baggage and inflates expectations.
“people do have a basic right to the government justifying when it regulates them. I don’t feel a need to label that as a right. Labeling it as a right carries some baggage”
Supreme Court justices should mostly be lawyers but need not come from judging; democratic selection is compatible with their legal role.
- Supreme Court justices should mostly or entirely be lawyers, but they need not come straight from judging; experience from politics, academia, or other forms of lawyering is valuable because the Supreme Court's role differs—cases are closer, less bound by precedent, and frequently decide serious political and moral questions.
“it’s a different kind of judicial role at the Supreme Court. The cases are closer. They’re not strictly bound by precedent. They are often deciding serious political, moral questions”
- A genuinely useful confirmation process would ask nominees their views on already-decided cases and whether those cases were correct; the claim that this biases them is unpersuasive because one can hold and revise a view based on new information, and the notion that nominees' views should be hidden is profoundly undemocratic since they are political appointees who make law for society.
“One can have a view about something decided in the past and change one’s view based on new information. There’s no necessary bias.”
- While Supreme Court decisions are not democratic in the way elections are, the selection and confirmation of justices is democratic: they are political appointees chosen through democratic means precisely because they make law for society, so debating their views is appropriate.
“They are political appointees for a reason because they make law for society. People who do that should be chosen through democratic means, and they are chosen in that way.”
Scholarly and professional gatekeeping involves inherent tradeoffs between quality control and dissemination.
- There is an inherent tradeoff in scholarly gatekeeping: highly professionalized elite gatekeepers exclude good work that doesn't fit their criteria, while loose gatekeeping with many outlets sacrifices quality control but disseminates far more; given that law straddles practice and academia, getting a lot of material out has real value.
“You could have highly professionalized, highly elite gatekeepers. Then you keep out a lot of good stuff because it doesn’t go through the right gate.”
- Despite faculty resistance, law students on balance add significant value to the law review editing process—including fact-checking—and the article selection function serves both as peer review and as an experiential training mechanism for students, so apparent inefficiencies must be understood by what the institution is actually trying to produce.
“on balance, I think they add a lot of value to the editing process. They fact check, for example. We resist it because we think we know it all, but it’s actually very valuable.”