mortgage-backed securities
Financial instruments representing claims on the cash flows from a pool of mortgages.
As defined in George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession
Other definitions
Securities created by bundling mortgage loans and selling claims on their payments to investors.
Ryan Avent on Cities, Urban Regulations, and Growth 10/31/2011
Where it comes up · 23
- William Cohan on the Life and Death of Bear Stearns 09/28/20094 claims
- John Taylor on the State of the Economy 07/19/20103 claims
- John Taylor on Fiscal and Monetary Policy 07/18/20113 claims
- Richard Fisher on Too Big to Fail and the Fed3 claims
- George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession3 claims
- Guillermo Calvo on the Crisis, Money, and Macro2 claims
- The Divided Brain2 claims
- 293 | Doyne Farmer on Chaos, Crashes, and Economic Complexity2 claims
and 15 more
Most important claims · 10 of 40Search all claims for “mortgage-backed securities” →
- Wall Street's mortgage-backed securities were a financial innovation dreamed up by Lou Ranieri at Salomon Brothers in the early 1980s, and once a profitable innovation appears, every firm rushes to copy it, which is why Bear Stearns, Lehman, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch all vertically integrated into mortgages.William Cohan on the Life and Death of Bear Stearns 09/28/2009
- Goldman Sachs pulled back from mortgage securities trading and from using them as collateral in December 2006, a decision that protected it, while the rest of Wall Street doubled down and looked better than Goldman for a while.William Cohan on the Life and Death of Bear Stearns 09/28/2009
- Securitization of mortgages into mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage obligations severed the link between borrower and lender, so a loan resold to a pension fund alongside two hundred thousand other mortgages has no single owner with whom to negotiate workouts, making renegotiation prohibitively costly.Todd Zywicki on Debt and Bankruptcy 03/02/2009
- Quantitative easing is most instructively understood as the Fed borrowing funds from commercial banks—by creating reserves, which are Federal obligations—and using the proceeds to buy bonds; it greatly expanded the national debt and is mechanically just a bank getting funds from one source to buy a different type of security, not electronic magic.Robert Hall on Recession, Stagnation, and Monetary Policy
- The value of the Fed's roughly $4 trillion-plus balance sheet of mortgage-backed and long-term Treasury securities depends crucially on future interest rates—the 'elephant in the room'—so whether those assets are actually worth their face value is deeply uncertain and carries substantial interest-rate risk, which is precisely why such long-term assets are not normally considered good banking collateral.George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession
- The Triple-A ratings on mortgage-backed securities were a weapon of math destruction whose failure during the financial crisis was spectacular and visible to everyone because the whole financial system was at risk—unlike data-science algorithms whose failures harm targeted individuals invisibly.Cathy O'Neil on Weapons of Math Destruction
- Apollo bought Iowa-based American Equity Life in 2009 and loaded its balance sheet with then-depressed mortgage-backed securities, which normalized by 2010 and made the insurer Apollo's biggest client, eventually becoming Athene.Apollo: Connoisseurs of Complexity
- The Fed leaving mortgage-backed securities on its books risks permanently intertwining monetary and fiscal policy, because if the mortgage market weakens the Fed may resume large purchases, and because waiting too long to exit may cost credibility and make exit impossible; the Fed's loans to the ECB during the Greek rescue showed it moving deeper into unorthodox policy rather than exiting.John Taylor on the State of the Economy 07/19/2010
- The Federal Reserve's Financial Accounting Manual for Federal Reserve Banks (May 2025) explicitly authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue gold certificates to the Reserve Banks, which constitutes monetizing the Treasury's gold, and gold certificates appear as the very first line item on the example balance sheet, ahead of US Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities.FED PLAN LEAKED: Treasury To Revalue Gold To 40,000 To Solve US Debt TSUNAMI!
- The argument that the bailouts were fine because the Fed ultimately lost no money is a red herring, because the toxic securities (e.g. Maiden Lane assets worth 39-44 cents on the dollar in 2010) only recovered value as a result of the Fed's own concerted efforts to pump up their prices by continuing to buy them and keeping interest rates artificially low—not because the assets were genuinely sound.George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession