
John Taylor on the State of the Economy 07/19/2010
What this covers
John Taylor of Stanford discusses the state of the U.S. economy in mid-2010 with EconTalk's Russ Roberts. The centerpiece is Taylor's account of the 2008–2009 crisis and recovery: he argues that private investment—particularly inventory investment—naturally reversed as panic subsided in late 2008 and early 2009, and that fiscal stimulus and the Fed's unorthodox measures contributed only marginal effects atop this rebound. The conversation ranges across the Fed's post-crisis balance sheet, the trajectory of federal debt, job growth, and comparative lessons from Poland's resilience during the same period.
Taylor emphasizes the mechanisms by which policy choices created problems. He details how the Fed's mortgage-backed-securities purchases functioned as credit allocation rather than monetary policy, risking permanent entanglement of monetary and fiscal functions. He argues that paying interest on excess reserves—historically unprecedented—reflects a strategy to raise rates without shrinking the vast stock of reserves, leaving the Fed vulnerable to an exit problem. Across fiscal policy, he points to direct evidence that incentive effects remain powerful even in recessions: cash-for-clunkers and homebuyer credits produced sharp demand spikes followed by collapses. More broadly, he identifies multiple sources of regime uncertainty—rising debt, anticipated tax increases, regulatory unpredictability, and ad hoc interventions—that depress investment independently of stimulus or crisis mechanics. The discussion also covers the Taylor rule as a baseline for monetary discipline, the role of TARP clarity in halting panic, and why Greece's debt trajectory should alarm U.S. policymakers. Throughout, Taylor argues that rapid unwinding of the Fed's balance sheet and a credible fiscal correction strategy are economically feasible but politically difficult.
Taylor argues that the 2009-2010 recovery was driven by the natural dynamics of private investment rather than the fiscal stimulus, and that activist fiscal and unorthodox monetary policy (deficits, transfer payments, Fed mortgage purchases, interest on reserves) have produced policy uncertainty and a precarious Fed balance sheet that should be unwound quickly back to the 'framework that worked.'
- The data show stimulus spending and transfer payments did not jump-start consumption; the recovery's main trajectory was private investment turning around as panic subsided.
- The Fed's mortgage-backed-securities purchases functioned more like fiscal/credit-allocation policy than monetary policy, threatening Fed independence and creating a difficult exit problem.
- Rising debt-to-GDP, expected tax increases, and erosion of the rule of law create regime uncertainty that depresses investment.
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Paying interest on excess reserves (currently 0.25%) is a historically unprecedented policy whose purpose is to let the Fed raise market interest rates without reducing the enormous stock of reserves; because there are too many reserves to control rates via supply, the Fed will most likely tighten by raising the rate it pays on reserves rather than by shrinking the money supply.
“the reason they're doing that is they want to be able to control the interest rate even if there's a lot of excess money in the economy ... they'll be able to raise it by paying interest on reserves”
The financial crisis was caused or prolonged in part by the Fer deviating from the Taylor rule: Greenspan held the federal funds rate too low for too long in roughly 2003-2005 and then raised it too fast, departing markedly from the rule-based policy that worked well through the 1980s and 1990s.
“the failure to follow of a Taylor rule ... that Greenspan in though three to two dough five period basically held rates too low too long and then pushed them up too fast”
Policy-driven incentive effects are demonstrably powerful even in bad times, as shown by cash-for-clunkers and the first-time homebuyer credit, which produced huge spikes in purchases followed by sharp drops once the incentive expired.
“we saw that in some of the things like cash for clunkers huge incentive effects to buy early and then it just plummeted later first-time homebuyers”
The recession and recovery are largely explained by the natural dynamics of private investment (especially inventory investment): firms cut investment sharply out of fear in late 2008, then turned around as early as December 2008-January 2009 when expectations improved, with stimulus measures producing only small blips superimposed on that private-economy trajectory.
“that cycle is really explained by the investment in the natural dynamics of the economy you superimpose on to that the various action to stimulus package cash for clunkers first-time homebuyers and you see little blips and ripples but it's this main trajectory is the private economy recovery”
We do not have strong empirical evidence linking people's expectations of future deficits to current spending behavior, because expectations are hard to measure; the reliable evidence is the direct effect that higher taxes discourage whatever is taxed, and common sense that future higher taxes are already on the books.
“we have direct evidence that higher taxes to scourge anything is taxed ... what evidence do we have that links people's expectations of future deficits to that and they're it's necessarily weak”
The massive growth in narrow money (the monetary base/bank reserves) has not yet produced inflation because the relationship between narrow money and the broader aggregates (M1, M2) changed, so broad money has not exploded; this is consistent with monetary theory, and a recovering-slowly Phillips-curve dynamic further dampens inflation.
“the thing that has exploded so much is the very narrow money ... because of the relationship between that narrow money and the broad money has changed we really haven't had a massive explosion of the broad money so I think it's consistent with the monetary theories”
The Fed's large-scale purchases of mortgage-backed securities had a very small empirical impact on the mortgage market (per Hoover/Stanford estimation work) while transforming monetary policy into something resembling fiscal or credit-allocation policy, raising concerns about Fed independence.
“we did some work here on that at Hoover and it's Stanford trying to estimate the impacts and find that it's been a very small impact on the mortgage market but in the meantime it's changed the monetary policy in a way that's somewhat worrisome to me that's more like fiscal policy or credit allocation policy not monetary policy”
The Fed leaving mortgage-backed securities on its books risks permanently intertwining monetary and fiscal policy, because if the mortgage market weakens the Fed may resume large purchases, and because waiting too long to exit may cost credibility and make exit impossible; the Fed's loans to the ECB during the Greek rescue showed it moving deeper into unorthodox policy rather than exiting.
“if you leave those mortgage-backed securities on your books then hey maybe the mortgage market gets weak next year and you start buying a lot more of these things and then monetary policy becomes forever intertwined with fiscal policy sort of stuck”
The market interest rate is being artificially held down (not pushed up) by the massive amount of excess bank reserves, since the rate is determined by supply and demand for money/bank reserves and the enormous excess supply drove the rate to near zero in fall 2008.
“the market is being artificially held down by this massive amount of bank reserves ... there's this incredible excess of reserves which drove the interest rate down to near zero”
The Fed's discretionary ability during the crisis to selectively rescue some firms and sectors but not others (Bear Stearns creditors, Fannie/Freddie, no help then help for AIG, no balance sheet for Lehman) created back-and-forth that spooked markets and was a major cause of the panic.
“the Fed used its balance sheet Vala creditors of Bear Stearns ... then it pulled back said no balance sheet for Lehman Brothers ... then it went offered balance sheet for AIG ... I think that back and forth on again off again spook the markets tremendously”
Poland was the only EU country to avoid recession during the Great Recession because it did not overreact: it kept policies steady with no big stimulus, maintained steady monetary policy, and had pre-crisis reforms keeping debt low, limiting foreign-currency borrowing, and maintaining good inflation-targeting policy—similar to other resilient emerging markets like Brazil and India.
“the only economy in the European Union 27 countries that did not have a recession during this great recession ... they didn't really overreact they kept their policies pretty steady didn't have a big stimulus package monetary policy basically remained pretty steady”
What most stopped the 2008 panic was the clarification of how TARP would be used: the panic intensified when TARP was rolled out to buy toxic assets in a way nobody understood, and stopped quickly once policymakers changed course about three weeks later and provided clarity.
“the thing that is to me the most important thing that stopped the panic was the clarification of what the tarp was going to be used for ... they changed their mind three weeks later and and the panic really stopped right away”
As of July 2010, only about $415 billion of the ~$787 billion stimulus had been spent, of which $163 billion was tax rebates and only $252 billion was direct spending, with merely ~$14 billion going to Department of Transportation projects (about 5% of direct spending).
“there have been a hundred they've been four hundred and fifteen billion dollars spent so far ... of that 415 163 billion were tax rebates ... there was only two hundred and fifty two billion of direct spending so far and only a fourteen billion of that ... was Department of Transportation spending”
Job growth is sluggish partly because growth of 2.5-3% is barely above the economy's potential and labor-force growth, so it cannot reduce high unemployment; additionally job growth lags recoveries and the severity of this recession let firms make 'force adjustments' (permanent workforce reductions) that make rehiring slow.
“when you're getting growth or two-and-a-half three percent that's not much faster than the potential of the economy and the growth of the labor force at this point so the thing is you need to have more growth than that to get get employment down”
The argument that high productivity growth causes low job growth is mistaken; higher productivity is a benefit that, over any reasonable time period, increases the demand for and ability to hire workers because more productive workers can command higher wages, even though productivity predictably spurts during recoveries.
“high productivity is is a benefit you get more for a given amount of work and that's people demand the product so I don't really see that as something that's you know maybe short term now and then it can have some effects but the longer term”
The Keynesian claim (advanced by Krugman and Pelosi) that extending unemployment insurance is a 'win-win' stimulus omits that extending benefits reduces the incentive to take available jobs; incentive effects remain strong even in recessions and are wrongly downplayed by Keynesians.
“the extra extension of unemployment reduces some of the incentives to actually take a job which might not have been as attractive otherwise so I think that's that's got to be a big part of this argument and it's neglected”
Rising federal debt under current policy is on an unsustainable path (CBO projections imply an inconsistency that 'can't stand'), so either policy must be corrected or the inconsistency resolves through disaster scenarios such as hyperinflation or U.S. default; the lack of any articulated correction strategy is itself a major source of uncertainty depressing investment.
“there's an inconsistency that can't stand something's gotta get right ... either current policy has to change or there's some other kind of a disaster that that resolves the inconsistency the disaster could be a hyperinflation disaster could be the u.s. doesn't pay its debt”
Investment is being depressed by multiple sources of regime uncertainty: unprecedented rising debt and expected tax increases, complex financial regulatory reform left to disappointing regulators, health care legislation, and interventions (auto companies, BP escrow fund) that erode the rule of law in ways that could harm the economy gradually over time.
“I think the rule of law has been so important for the United States and for our economic system that if we start to lose that it could have effects which we which could be pretty bad may not be instantaneous it might erode over time”
Low U.S. Treasury yields despite profligate fiscal behavior reflect investor belief that the U.S. 'will get its act together' as it has before, expectations of a slow-growth low-inflation period, and a possible 'this time is different' psychological bias; the underlying inconsistency is not resolved in any obvious way, creating substantial uncertainty.
“I think the u.s. is still viewed as a country that will get its act together ... there is a tendency when you're thinking about the future for investors to sometimes be thinking of that the rosy scenario ... this time it's different view that the Rogoff and Reinhart write about”
The lesson from Greece is that these crises are largely caused or prolonged by government actions (deficits, not the private sector), and the U.S. faces a strong warning because its projected debt-to-GDP path under current policy rises more than Greece's; the U.S. must lay out a credible plan now, even if it has more time to implement adjustments.
“these crises are largely caused or prolonged by government actions as deficits at the private sector didn't do that ... our debt to GDP ratios ... are expected to Rea to rise much more than Greece has at this point”
Just as today's Keynesians claim the New Deal failed because Roosevelt didn't spend enough (raising taxes, recovery stalling in 1938), we will likely hear the same story in 20-25 years that the 2009 stimulus failed only because it wasn't big enough.
“I have a feeling we're gonna get a similar story as this recovery fizzles going twenty and twenty-five years to ... we're gonna look back on it and say well we didn't really try the stimulus back it wasn't big enough”
The Fed's actions were genuinely helpful only during the middle of the panic (supporting the commercial paper market and money market mutual funds in coordination with other central banks); the pre-panic discretionary interventions likely caused the panic and the post-panic MBS purchases create future problems, so on balance Fed policy has been harmful.
“the period where I think the feds actions were helpful was in the middle of the panic ... so there's a pre panic bad post panic bad in the panic when they helped the commercial paper market ... I think that was basically helpful”
Lowering the interest rate paid on reserves to zero would probably not cause banks to lend out their excess reserves, because banks are holding those reserves for other reasons (worries about capital ratios and the loans they could make), so the 25-basis-point rate is unlikely to make a large difference to lending.
“if the rate were zero would mean the banks get rid of all those reserves I don't think so they're holding them for other reasons they're holding them because they're worried about their capital ratios worried about the loans that they could make”
The Fed should unwind its expanded balance sheet quickly by gradually selling mortgage-backed securities, which is feasible without disruption because banks hold ample excess reserves to buy longer-term securities; the obstacle is political, not economic, since selling MBS while the economy struggles is hard to defend.
“I think they could sell those mortgage-backed securities they do it in a gradual way then other people will buy the securities ... it's quite possible to do that without being disruptive at all ... politically it's hard for the Fed”
The large stock of narrow money will eventually translate into broad money as banks start lending, so unless the Fed can bring narrow money down (which skeptics doubt is politically feasible), there will for sure be a big inflation; bond markets appear to be discounting that outcome by expecting some other resolution.
“there's a large amount of narrow money will eventually get translated into more broad money as banks start lending ... they're going to have to do that or we will for sure have a big inflation no question about it”
An alternative interpretation of Fed policy is that it is either a nasty political payoff to banks or a desperation move to hide banking-sector insolvency: the Fed bought MBS likely above their marked-down value and pays interest on reserves, which subsidizes banks by encouraging them to park money at the Fed.
“this is either a really nasty political payoff or it's a desperation move to hide the insolvency of this sector that could have catastrophic impacts what do you think of that story”
Many countries pressured by the G20 to adopt stimulus, including Poland, effectively relabeled policies they were already pursuing (such as already-scheduled tax changes) as 'stimulus' rather than genuinely overdoing fiscal expansion, which makes cross-country stimulus comparisons very hard and creates rich natural experiments for research.
“the g20 was was forcing everybody to take a stimulus ... what they did was effectively described the policies that they were taking any way as stimulus”
The fiscal stimulus and transfer payments have not done much good: the data show transfer payments and rebates did not jump-start consumption as advertised, so the debate is too theoretical when the incoming data already show it is not working.
“they just really have not if you can look at the numbers and see that they have not jump-started consumption as it's been advertised”
Greece has taken apparently necessary steps toward fiscal responsibility, including raising the retirement age toward 65 and reducing pension generosity, though the changes had not yet fully passed into law.
“Greece's decide to raise the retirement age from under 50 to 65 ... changed the generosity of the pension plans ... so they've taken what appeared to be necessary steps towards some fiscal responsibility”
The federal funds rate has been pinned between zero and 0.25% since December 2008, and long-term rates have recently fallen rather than risen due to a flight to safety stemming from European concerns.
“they've got the interest rate down to the bare minimum ... long rates have actually come down rather than up recently because of things are a flight to safety to some extent from concerns about what's going on in Europe”
The economy is experiencing a slowdown from what looked like a stronger recovery (growth declining from 5.6% to 2.7% in the first quarter), but a double-dip recession is unlikely absent some major external shock.
“it's a slowdown I don't see another recession unless there's a big shop of some kind some kind of a shock”