What this covers

The episode, hosted by Hunter, traces Apollo from its 1990 founding to its current shape. Apollo was formed opportunistically to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert and the high-yield market, rather than as a spin-out like Blackstone or KKR. The early stories are about getting ownership through the debt side: the Executive Life mandate and its Credit Lyonnais shell-company structure, control of Samsonite via EII bonds, Vail after Gillett's bankruptcy, and the Harrah's buyout that hit roughly 14x debt-to-EBITDA by 2009. The narrative then moves through the 2009 purchase of American Equity Life, which became Athene, and the 2021 Leon Black exit that brought Marc Rowan in as CEO.

The middle of the episode is mechanics. Insurance rules put roughly 90–95% of assets into investment-grade paper, and Rowan treated that as a commodity while using the equity slice to seed origination platforms that raise outside capital, stretching $100 of insurance assets into about $30 of equity exposure. Hunter contrasts this with the traditional model, in which alternative managers were valued on fee-related earnings as a proxy for fundraising ability, and sets out why perpetual capital became the industry's answer to closed-end fundraising cycles. He also frames carry as a call option and notes Apollo's unusual yield, hybrid and equity segmentation.

The contested ground comes last. Hunter rejects an imminent Minsky Moment, arguing that post-crisis regulation spread risk across many managers. He worries instead about slow return erosion as debt claims more of asset ownership, about private credit's gap since sponsor-backed LBO lending tapered around 2022, and about Rowan's push to convince long-horizon investors they don't need daily liquidity.

Sharpest takeaway

Apollo's advantage comes from treating the balance sheet and insurance liabilities as its engine: it has moved from fundraising-dependent private equity to originating its own credit, a self-reinforcing structure that makes the firm a bank-like financial institution rather than a traditional alternative manager.

  • Apollo's history of distressed debt and restructuring deals (Executive Life, Caesars) shows a consistent preference for balance-sheet control over income-statement growth.
  • Athene's insurance float, seeded with equity and paired with origination platforms, lets Apollo turn $100 of insurance assets into roughly $30 of equity exposure.
  • Rowan's stated constraint is origination capacity rather than capital formation, which changes how the firm should be valued.

The argument · threads10 threads · 69 claims
0.85

Apollo is a credit-led origination platform pursuing complexity and distressed deals, unlike flow-buying alternative managers.

13 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Apollo's founding culture, traced to the Drexel Burnham Lambert and Milken school of balance-sheet analysis, seeks areas with no compromise on credit risk but with more complexity or less liquidity, while still holding an investment-grade rating.

    “is to find those areas where you're not compromising on credit risk, but you're willing to do something that may have a little more complexity in it or that has a little less liquidity”

  • Apollo was formed opportunistically in 1990 to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert and the high-yield bond market, unlike the more entrepreneurial spin-out origins of Blackstone and KKR.

    “Apollo was formed opportunistically. There was this vacuum left by the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert”

  • Each major alt manager found a growth niche: Blackstone in real estate, KKR in private equity and LBOs, and Apollo in credit, which looked unattractive in the 2000s but became advantageous as alt managers grew large.

    “Apollo focused on credit, which, if you go back to the 2000s... probably seemed like a less attractive bucket. But it looks a lot more fortuitous now”

  • Apollo's willingness to take on complex deals even when they go poorly, and its appetite for reputational risk, differentiates it from peers who avoid such situations after losses.

    “it's their appetite and willingness for this complexity—even when it goes poorly—that sets them apart.”

  • The Executive Life deal, in which Credit Lyonnais secretly controlled the buyer through a shell insurer Aurora and a U.S. subsidiary Altus to get around a foreign-bank ban on owning U.S. insurers, handed Apollo a distressed debt mandate that set it on its course.

    “What really gets Apollo off the ground is basically a mandate from the largest French bank at the time, Credit Lyonnais”

  • Traditional private equity is income-statement driven, focused on growing EBITDA and bootstrapping a higher multiple, whereas Apollo has always been balance-sheet focused, seeking value in assets through distressed situations.

    “If you think about traditional private equity, it's very income statement driven—can you increase EBITDA, and can you bootstrap a higher multiple somehow? Apollo has always been balance-sheet focused.”

  • Apollo's first two fund vintages returned 3.6x invested capital with a 47% gross and 37% net IRR, aided by deals like Vail Resorts, which Apollo gained control of through debt after Gillett Holdings went bankrupt.

    “They return 3.6x on the invested capital and it works out to an internal rate of return of 47% before fees, 37% after fees.”

  • Private credit has never argued that it has a cost-of-capital advantage; its case rests on one-to-one lender-borrower relationships and creative structuring for borrowers that might not meet conventional credit boxes.

    “private credit has never made a cost of capital argument for itself. It's made an argument for itself on the basis of a one-to-one lender, borrower relationship”

  • Apollo breaks its AUM into yield, hybrid, and equity segments rather than the private equity, real estate, and credit split used by most alternative managers, with yield at about $480 billion, hybrid at $62 billion, and equity at $107 billion.

    “They break theirs down into yield, hybrid, and equity. And this is pretty differentiated from the other alt managers.”

  • Most alternative managers are flow buyers that must purchase what investment banks or the broadly syndicated loan market supply, which constrains them to the spreads available on the market, unlike Apollo's origination model.

    “for most of the other alternative managers they are in the flow buying business.”

  • Apollo's origination platforms include MidCap, a publicly traded BDC lending mainly to mid-sized healthcare-related businesses, and Merx Aviation in Ireland, which finances aircraft leases, with the platforms generating assets that feed the insurance balance sheet.

    “There's a company, MidCap, which has a publicly traded BDC that specializes in lending to mid-sized businesses and mostly healthcare companies.”

  • Fewer people want equity risk and more want secured, higher-in-the-capital-stack positions, creating tremendous demand for assets that pass credit boxes, while there are only so many lending opportunities that meet those requirements.

    “fewer and fewer people want to take equity risk. They want to feel higher up the capital stack.”

  • Access to public equity and debt markets lets alternative managers spin up new platforms and strategies, and public equity also functions as a currency for attracting and retaining talent, which is a key reason public listing makes sense.

    “as a currency for talent, this is a key element in why it makes sense for these companies to be public.”

0.80

Insurance and perpetual capital, culminating in the Athene merger, were Apollo's strategic breakthrough and shape its value.

11 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Apollo's strategic breakthrough was doubling down on insurance and retirement solutions (annuities), and perpetual capital now makes up about $450 billion of its $750 billion AUM.

    “doubling down on insurance, more specifically retirement solutions, or what we might think of as annuities—that was the strategic breakthrough for Apollo”

  • Alternative managers pursued perpetual capital because closed-end funds forced constant fundraising; pension funds invest across every vintage, which squeezed available capital, so managers turned to open-ended vehicles like BDCs, non-traded REITs and private wealth products.

    “every alternative manager wants to get off the vintage fund treadmill, where you have a closed-end fund with a fixed life”

  • Insurance regulation requires roughly 90–95% of insurance capital to be invested in investment-grade fixed income, AAA, or cash, leaving 5–10% as equity that alt managers can use for riskier, higher-return strategies.

    “basically 90 to 95% of that capital must be invested in investment-grade fixed income, AAA, or cash. 5 to 10% of that becomes equity”

  • Athene went public in 2016 with Apollo owning 35%, but the stock struggled because it was viewed as a fee pick, and since Athene represented about 30% of Apollo's assets, Apollo could not afford to lose the account, leading Rowan to conclude a merger was necessary.

    “Athene goes public in 2016 and Apollo owns 35% of it. The stock is struggling because it's seen as just this fee pick for Apollo.”

  • Post-GFC falling yields left annuity-writing insurers with a spread mismatch, since they owed legacy rates of 4–6% but could reinvest only at lower yields, so they offloaded insurance liabilities and assets to alt managers seeking long-duration, low-cost capital.

    “Post-GFC, yields come way down and insurers face a giant mismatch—they're no longer making spread because they owe people a certain rate”

  • Apollo bought Iowa-based American Equity Life in 2009 and loaded its balance sheet with then-depressed mortgage-backed securities, which normalized by 2010 and made the insurer Apollo's biggest client, eventually becoming Athene.

    “Apollo buys American Equity Life in 2009, and it's such a great opportunity because they load the balance sheet with mortgage-backed securities”

  • Apollo's December 2021 investor day, a five-to-six-hour event with a 300-page deck, redefined the firm around asset origination and began socializing the idea of merging with Athene.

    “Mid-'21, Apollo does an investor day in December of 2021... really redefines Apollo and the industry around this idea of asset origination.”

  • An unnamed Apollo executive questioned the Athene merger, saying he understood why it was good for Athene but not clear why it was good for Apollo, since Apollo had earned enormous fees tying up little of its own capital and would now be a capital-intensive, regulated insurer.

    “I get why this is good for them, but I'm not totally clear on why this is good for Apollo.”

  • Private equity carry can be modeled as a bootstrapped call option: if the GP takes 20% of returns above an 8% hurdle, that is effectively a call option that is 8% out of the money, with limited downside if performance fails.

    “private equity is a way of bootstrapping a call option. Let's say that you're getting 20% of the returns above 8%.”

  • Layering an insurance balance sheet's long-duration, low-cost capital on top of GP call-option economics creates a structure where the GP benefits if strategies work and has little risk if they do not.

    “by Rowan layering on an insurance balance sheet on top of this, which has really long-duration, low-cost capital, you start to see the wisdom of what he's building here.”

  • Much value is created through asset conversions, refinancings, M&A, and changes to capital structure and balance-sheet allocation, not just through a rapidly growing top line that receives a multiple.

    “a lot of value gets created in asset conversions, in refinances and M&A's, and in changing the capital structure and allocating through the balance sheet”

0.55

Rowan's loop turns annuity sales into origination capacity, the binding constraint on Apollo's growth.

6 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Annuity sales are on pace for one of their best years, with about $400 billion expected in 2025, and that sales demand necessitates new credit creation, making origination capacity the binding constraint on Apollo's growth.

    “2025 is expected to have around $400 billion of annuity sales. All those annuity sales demand essentially new credit creation.”

  • Rowan stated that the biggest single constraint on growth is not capital formation or headcount but whether Apollo can originate enough attractive assets to meet its needs.

    “The biggest single constraint on growth is not capital formation. It's not how many people you have. It's really about whether you can originate enough attractive assets”

  • Rowan's structure is a self-perpetuating loop: selling annuities creates equity, that equity seeds an origination platform that creates debt returned to the top of the balance sheet, generating new equity to repeat, so more annuity sales create more credit demand.

    “he's created a bit of a financial perpetual motion machine: you sell an annuity, which creates equity.”

  • By running insurance capital through origination platforms that raise outside capital, Apollo can turn $100 of insurance assets into roughly $30 of equity exposure, compared with $10 of equity if everything stayed in-house on the balance sheet.

    “Rowan has figured out a way to buy $100 of insurance assets and turn it into more like $30 of equity by running it through this private equity structure.”

  • Rowan's breakthrough was to treat the investment-grade 90–95% of insurance assets as a commodity and use the equity 5–10% to seed or acquire asset origination platforms that generate fixed-income assets, while raising outside capital for them.

    “His big breakthrough is using the equity—the bottom 5 to 10%—to acquire or otherwise seed asset origination platforms.”

  • Apollo originated about $222 billion of credit last year in-house to feed its spread-related earnings business, which now exceeds fee-related earnings, and it owns or has a role in 16 origination platforms employing around 4,000 people.

    “despite that initial skepticism, spread-related earnings are now larger than fee-related earnings for Apollo. And last year, Apollo originated something like $200 billion of credit—$222 billion of credit.”

0.44

Private credit must broaden beyond sponsor LBOs and converge with public markets, conditioning investor liquidity expectations.

7 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Private credit's demand from sponsor-backed LBO lending has tapered off since about 2022, so the industry must find other lending opportunities, and an open question is what fills the gap if the sponsor market does not rebound.

    “up into, let's say, 2022, the private credit market was supported by private equity–sponsored lending to pursue LBOs. And that market... has been effectively closed or at least is a lot less active.”

  • Apollo and State Street launched a private credit ETF holding both listed and private credit, which Hunter presents as a concrete step toward collapsing the public-private divide and conditioning investors away from daily liquidity expectations.

    “Apollo and State Street have launched a private credit ETF which holds some listed credit and some private credit.”

  • Apollo's ability to negotiate one-to-one with borrowers, move assets into structures, and tranche the debt into an investment-grade sleeve for insurance and a B piece for evergreen vehicles or ETFs lets it meet different capital providers' requirements.

    “Apollo wants to be at the table and say, 'Hey, can we structure this?'”

  • Rowan argues that private and public markets are converging, and that retirees, pensions and endowments with long horizons do not need daily liquidity, so investors should be decondition from expecting it.

    “if you're a pension or an endowment that doesn't need money until long in the future, why are you so concerned about having daily liquidity?”

  • CoreWeave's roughly $12 billion private credit deal secured by NVIDIA chips illustrates how creative debt structuring has become, though Apollo was not involved in it.

    “think about the CoreWeave deal, which is basically a $12 billion private credit deal secured by NVIDIA chips.”

  • Apollo's CIO John Zito argued private credit should be like French fries, with many possible preparations, and not merely a replacement for high-yield or leveraged loans, so it can do investment-grade origination for the largest companies and asset-backed deals.

    “Zito's point is that they want to make private credit more like French fries. There's a million ways to prepare French fries.”

  • Although banks have been pushed out of higher-octane lending, they still provide back leverage to private credit funds and Apollo-type managers through synthetic risk transfers, creating symbiosis rather than pure competition, with some regulatory questions.

    “they're still very much providing back leverage to private credit funds and to the Apollos of the world. So they found a way.”

0.44

Alternative managers and markets evolved toward public financial services and private capital and credit-based growth after the crisis.

7 pointscentrality 3/5
  • After the 2008 financial crisis and Dodd-Frank, alternative asset managers evolved into full-fledged financial services companies that make money differently from banks but are key parts of the financial system.

    “these are becoming, especially post-2008 and post-Dodd Frank (circa 2009), full-fledged financial services companies.”

  • Alt managers went public in 2010–2011 because their founders had wealth tied in GP stakes, growth required platform expansion that private GPs could not easily fund, and public equity could serve as currency for talent and acquisitions.

    “The GP business at scale starts to become a bit of a liability, and it's really talent-heavy.”

  • Alt managers originally went public as limited partnerships but converted to C Corps in 2019, which helped founders monetize their wealth, and founders built elaborate tax structures to protect that windfall.

    “They originally, most of them including Apollo, went public as limited partnerships. But in 2019, they converted to a C Corp.”

  • Apollo's history, from late-1980s debt-collapse opportunism through post-GFC insurance pivots to a debt-centric leadership role, charts how markets have evolved toward private capital and credit-based growth better than most alt managers.

    “Apollo's history charts the evolution of markets at large probably better than a lot of the other alternative managers do.”

  • Alternative asset managers that began in niche segments now dominate a growing portion of the market, perhaps a plurality, and their business models have evolved from alternatives into integral parts of financial markets.

    “they're increasingly not so alternative... their business models are evolving from being considered an alternative to becoming integral to the financial market.”

  • Through the 2000s, institutional investors embraced alternative assets, capital deployed grew very large, and deals grew correspondingly bigger, which increased the complexity and stakes of transactions like Caesars.

    “institutional investors really embraced the asset class. The numbers are getting really big in terms of what capital has to be deployed.”

  • Apollo has roughly $750 billion of total AUM and $570 billion of fee-earning AUM, placing it second or third by asset size among the large alternative managers.

    “Today, Apollo has around $750 billion of total AUM and $570 billion of fee-earning AUM; that puts it second or third in terms of asset size”

0.39

Apollo should be valued on spread earnings like a bank, not on fee-related earnings multiples.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Alt managers traditionally traded on multiples of fee-related earnings reflecting expected fundraising ability, but Apollo broke this mold by removing fundraising as a constraint, so it should be valued more like an unregulated bank on spread-related earnings and credit losses.

    “And so I think the way that they are going to be valued is closer to a bank, albeit an unregulated one, in terms of the spread-related earnings”

  • The 2022 Financial Times headline calling Apollo-Athene the new Berkshire Hathaway was a question mark, but Athene became a full-fledged business from an opportunistic trade rather than a mere curse of headlines.

    “Apollo Athene: The New Berkshire Hathaway.”

  • Insurance is a highly regulated, capital-intensive business that typically trades at a much lower multiple than alternative managers, which made Apollo's merger with Athene risky because it moved a fee-light asset-light firm into a regulated balance sheet.

    “Insurance is a highly regulated, capital-intensive business that typically trades at a much lower multiple than alternative managers do.”

  • Alternative managers traded on multiples of fee-related earnings because earnings per share is noisy, and those multiples were largely projections of future fundraising ability rather than carry from performance.

    “for the most part, those multiples were a projection of future fundraising ability.”

  • Despite initial skepticism, Apollo's spread-related earnings are now larger than its fee-related earnings, reflecting the shift from asset management fees toward the spread between insurance liabilities and asset yields.

    “despite that initial skepticism, spread-related earnings are now larger than fee-related earnings for Apollo.”

0.30

Complex deals and Executive Life carried significant legal and reputational exposure that sets Apollo apart.

7 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Tony Ressler set up Ares in 2002 on the West Coast as a satellite credit operation, and it separated from Apollo partly because of ongoing legal troubles from the Executive Life deal.

    “One of the things that led to Ares officially separating from the relationship with Apollo was just the ongoing legal troubles with the Executive Life deal.”

  • Apollo and TPG's $31 billion LBO of Harrah's (later Caesars) started in December 2006, closed in 2008 with $24 billion of debt, and ran into the financial crisis, reaching roughly 14x debt-to-EBITDA by 2009.

    “But the deal closes in 2008 with $24 billion of debt and runs right into the jaws of the great financial crisis. By 2009, Caesars has a debt to EBITDA ratio of like 14x.”

  • Credit Lyonnais ultimately pled guilty to fraud and paid over $771 million in settlements after decades of legal fallout over its secret control of Aurora, though Apollo was never found to have committed wrongdoing.

    “Ultimately, Credit Lyonnais pled guilty to fraud and paid over $771 million in settlements.”

  • Where other managers pass on hairy, complex, or dirty situations because they are stretched across many deals, Apollo digs in, uses consultants, and parachutes people in, creating white space in complex deals.

    “Apollo sees a hairy, complex, or dirty situation and it doesn't go to their "too-hard" pile.”

  • Josh Harris's purchases of the 76ers, Devils, and Commanders reflected his preference for big deals and reputation as a real-deal guy, which was misaligned with Apollo's increasing shift toward credit, making him less suited to lead the firm.

    “Josh Harris is just the deal guy; he's attracted to these big acquisitions, which Apollo was doing less and less of.”

  • Apollo's willingness to re-engage after the Caesars fiasco, including bidding for Las Vegas Sands casinos with a sale-leaseback financing involving Vici, shows a high appetite for reputational risk in pursuit of investor returns.

    “Apollo seems to have a really high appetite for taking on this reputational risk in the spirit of generating returns for their investors.”

  • Blackstone repeatedly highlights its acquisition of Jersey Mike's to portray private equity as familiar and everyday, an attempt to connect with ordinary Americans, though Matt views this as a risky marketing approach.

    “they bought Jersey Mike's, which, to me, is an attempt to connect with the everyday American”

0.21

Post-GFC risk diffusion makes slow debt degradation a bigger threat than a Minsky moment.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The bigger risk is not a Minsky moment or a dam-breaking event, but a slow degradation of returns as self-perpetuating demand for debt securities absent productive uses causes debt to consume more of the benefits of asset ownership.

    “the bigger risk here is not fallout; it's that this truly self-perpetuating demand for debt leads to a degradation of returns over time”

  • Regulatory responses after the Great Financial Crisis made risk far more diffuse than when it was concentrated in the banking system, spreading it across many asset managers, structures, and investors.

    “the regulatory response following the Great Financial Crisis has, in fairness, made risk far more diffuse than it was before”

  • Hunter disagrees with the view that a Minsky moment with cascading credit failures is imminent, arguing that post-GFC regulation has diffused risk across many asset managers and investors rather than concentrating it in banks.

    “the regulatory response following the Great Financial Crisis has, in fairness, made risk far more diffuse than it was before, when it was housed in a somewhat concentrated banking system.”

0.12

Apollo's debt-side control and innovation echo Drexel's capital-structure innovation.

5 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Through Executive Life's distressed portfolio, Apollo held EII bonds, which gave it control of the restructuring of EII's bankruptcy and ultimately control of Samsonite, illustrating its approach of getting ownership through the debt side of the balance sheet.

    “it is through the Executive Life deal that Apollo ultimately came to control a brand like Samsonite”

  • Facing the Caesars collapse, Apollo moved assets off the Caesars balance sheet, bullied junior creditors into equity swaps, and used aggressive, esoteric strategies to preserve its investment, which led to a long legal battle.

    “They're bullying junior creditors into swapping for equity and doing all sorts of aggressive, esoteric strategies”

  • Michael Milken established the junk bond market by recognizing demand for lower-rated, higher-yielding debt, and this innovation sparked the private equity LBO boom.

    “Milken established the junk bond market. Prior to Milken, bonds were for blue-chip, safe companies.”

  • Apollo's reputation for fighting and litigation is being reshaped under Rowan, who must balance retaining the reputation for taking on difficult situations with being seen as a partner rather than an adversary as the firm moves upmarket.

    “they need to be seen as a partner to many of these businesses, not as an adversary, especially if they want to go upmarket”

  • Apollo, under Rowan's vision, has effectively remade what made Drexel successful by innovating around capital structures, sources of capital, and how markets function, learning from failures like Caesars and redeploying into Las Vegas Sands.

    “they've effectively remade a lot of what made Drexel successful in terms of innovating around these capital structures”

0.07

Leadership succession and founder roles shaped the firm's transitions across its history.

3 pointscentrality 1/5
  • In 2021 news broke of Leon Black's involvement with Epstein and further sexual assault allegations, prompting Black to accelerate his departure and leave Rowan to ascend as CEO after Josh Harris, the presumed heir, was iced out.

    “In 2021, news breaks of Leon Black's involvement with Epstein, and, right on the heels of that, additional sexual assault allegations emerge.”

  • The three Apollo founders had complementary roles: Leon Black as a tough negotiator and head of M&A, Marc Rowan as a professorial, even-keeled corporate finance restructuring specialist, and Josh Harris as the deal maker.

    “Leon Black is known as an incredibly tough negotiator. Marc Rowan is much more professorial and even-keeled, and then Josh Harris is a deal maker.”

  • Top alt managers founded in the 1970s and 1980s face succession risk: Blackstone elevated John Gray's profile before transition, KKR chose co-CEOs with less visibility, and Carlyle fumbled succession, which Apollo nearly did as well.

    “Blackstone is probably the exemplar here of really elevating John Gray's profile ahead of that transition. KKR goes with co-CEOs... And then, on the other side, you have Carlyle, who fumbled their succession planning.”