longtermism
The view that positively influencing the long-term future, possibly over millions or billions of years, is a key moral priority.
As defined in Peter Singer
Other definitions
A philosophical and ethical framework that prioritizes the welfare of humanity's long-term future and potential far-future descendants, often used to justify present-day AI development as necessary for ensuring beneficial superintelligence.
Authors of "THE AI CON" discussing the problematic hype about AI & what those working tech should do
Where it comes up · 15
- Will MacAskill - Longtermism, Altruism, History, & Technology6 claims
- Fin Moorhouse - Longtermism, Space, & Entrepreneurship4 claims
- Will MacAskill on Longtermism and What We Owe the Future3 claims
- 342 - Animal Minds Moral Truths2 claims
- 207 | William MacAskill on Maximizing Good in the Present and Future2 claims
- Peter Singer1 claim
- Charles C. Mann - Americas Before Columbus & Scientific Wizardry1 claim
- Holden Karnofsky — History's most important century1 claim
and 7 more
Most important claims · 10 of 27Search all claims for “longtermism” →
- Concern for the long-term future and existential risk has received disproportionate airtime in effective altruism relative to the number of people working on it and relative to the ideal balance; neglecting present poverty in favor of extinction risk could create a less compassionate world, which might itself increase the risk of extinction or lock-in of a bad state.342 - Animal Minds Moral Truths
- Effective Altruism has moved too far toward very long-term thinking (the next million or billion years); while preventing extinction matters, there is uncertainty about whether we can make a positive difference that far out, and encouraging people to ignore present suffering may make them more callous and actually make the world worse, so EA should retain a major focus on reducing extreme poverty, animal suffering, and climate change now.Peter Singer
- Longtermism is complicated by the fact that we don't actually know what future people will want—our present desires would have seemed abhorrent to people in the 1800s—so while wizards assume future people want maximal comfort and long lives, the prophets' counsel of epistemic humility (preserve as many options as possible, as with not permanently burying nuclear waste) is a genuinely powerful response.Charles C. Mann - Americas Before Columbus & Scientific Wizardry
- Against Tyler Cowen and Patrick Collison's view that predicting the future is a mug's game so one should boost economic growth and technological progress as consistently-good bets, MacAskill argues that some long-standing technological trends (Moore's Law over 70 years, scaling AI, engineerable pandemic viruses) are predictable enough to justify specific targeted interventions like AI safety and pandemic prevention.Will MacAskill - Longtermism, Altruism, History, & Technology
- Moses argued that the advantage of not being democratically elected is the ability to build projects that may not be the favorite of people alive now but will benefit the city for generations and centuries—a longtermist justification that gains force from the fact that his bridges and highways still stand and are in wide use.Kenneth T. Jackson - Robert Moses, Hero of New York?
- Self-replicating Von Neumann probes could in principle settle the reachable universe, which makes choices about who launches them and with what values an extremely high-stakes, potentially irreversible decision.Fin Moorhouse - Longtermism, Space, & Entrepreneurship
- John Stuart Mill and early utilitarians had a longtermist phase worrying Britain would run out of coal, but this rested on wrong views about fossil-fuel quantities and the economy's adaptability and would likely have been harmful; by contrast Mill's promotion of women's suffrage—being the first politician to do so—was a value-changing act that stood the test of time, suggesting promoting better values is the more robust long-term strategy.Will MacAskill - Longtermism, Altruism, History, & Technology
- Naive utilitarianism is flawed because you can always win the moral calculus by adding more people: a quadrillion miserable lives can be made to 'outscore' a short flourishing civilization, which is unacceptable; moreover, the impossibility of defining a well-defined measure on infinitely large sets means counting all future people equally would imply the only moral act is preventing the heat death of the universe, which is absurd.AMA | November 2021
- The expected-value argument for prioritizing extinction risk—that reducing the chance of canceling trillions of future happy lives outweighs helping the present poor—resembles Pascal's wager, and is weakened because its mathematics rests on assumptions (that future lives will be very rich and fulfilling) that may be quite wrong, given persistent bad tendencies in human nature evidenced by current wars.342 - Animal Minds Moral Truths
- Existential risk matters much more than almost anyone thinks, but EA people overvalue it because the good things we can actually do to limit it are not very different from a familiar list—lowering mortality, growing GDP, supporting science—rather than the super-specific hypotheses they generate; they are not epistemically modest enough about existential risk.Tyler Cowen - Talent, Collapse, & Pessimism of Sex