What this covers

Will MacAskill and Dwarkesh Patel explore the foundations of longtermism—the view that humanity's long-term future should weigh heavily in our moral reasoning—by examining how moral values form, persist, and change across history. MacAskill argues that technological progress follows relatively predictable paths driven by strong incentives and would arrive in similar forms across many possible societies, while moral progress is fundamentally contingent: the beliefs we now take for granted could have turned out radically differently. This distinction matters enormously because we inhabit what he calls a rare moment of plasticity—a window in which humanity is globally connected yet morally diverse, a state he believes could close within this century if artificial intelligence and other technologies enable permanent value lock-in, where a single ideology becomes self-perpetuating and irreversible.

The conversation ranges across history, philosophy, and institutional design to develop this framework. MacAskill draws comparisons between figures like John Stuart Mill and Marx, arguing that moral philosophers and religious leaders produced genuinely contingent long-term effects in ways that scientific breakthroughs typically did not. He challenges the position of Tyler Cowen and Patrick Collison that predicting the future is futile, instead contending that certain technological trends—Moore's Law, pandemic engineering, artificial minds—are predictable enough to justify targeted interventions. The discussion also examines how institutions lock in values at their founding, the problems facing long-lived foundations, and why institutions themselves have wildly different lifespans: a top corporation lasts roughly ten years, while Oxford and Cambridge have endured eight centuries. Throughout, MacAskill emphasizes the Long reflection as a longtermist strategy—using this rare period of plasticity to reason carefully about what values actually deserve to persist, rather than assuming current moral beliefs will or should.

Sharpest takeaway

MacAskill argues that moral values are historically contingent and that we live in a rare moment of plasticity before technology like AI could lock in a single ideology forever, so longtermists should focus on shaping values and reducing specific catastrophic risks rather than assuming progress is inevitable.

  • Technological progress is largely non-contingent due to strong incentives, but moral progress is highly contingent and could have gone differently
  • AI and global integration create risk of permanent value lock-in within this century
  • Some long-term technological trends are predictable enough to justify targeted interventions over diffuse growth-boosting

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0.81

Different institutions have very different rates of decay: a top-200 corporation has a half-life of only about ten years, while universities like Oxford and Cambridge are 800 years old and Bologna older still, and these natural half-lives shape how long-term their decisions are—e.g. Corpus Christi at Oxford planning a tradition recurring only every 400 years.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“a corporation that is in the top 200 biggest companies has a half-life of only ten years. It’s surprisingly short-lived. Whereas, if you look at universities Oxford and Cambridge are 800 years old.”

0.77

The current era is an unusual moment of plasticity because the world is historically unified with instantaneous communication and great moral diversity, yet this plasticity could end soon—especially if AI makes the world's rulers digital and immortal, enabling a single global ideology with no competition to persist indefinitely.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“The key technology here is Artificial Intelligence. The point in time (which may be sooner than we think) where the rulers of the world are digital rather than biological, that [ideological conformity] could persist.”

0.77

Better technology lets a ruling ideology cement and persist itself, so an alternate history where communism won the 20th-century war of ideas could have used anti-aging, genetic enhancement, cloning, or AI to build a world government that persists forever in accordance with that ideology.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“The better technology gets, the better the ruling ideology is to cement its ideology and persist for a long time.”

0.77

Against Tyler Cowen and Patrick Collison's view that predicting the future is a mug's game so one should boost economic growth and technological progress as consistently-good bets, MacAskill argues that some long-standing technological trends (Moore's Law over 70 years, scaling AI, engineerable pandemic viruses) are predictable enough to justify specific targeted interventions like AI safety and pandemic prevention.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“some people could argue (and people like Tyler Cowen and Patrick Collison do), that it's very hard to predict the future impact of your actions. It's a mug's game to even try.”

0.73

Scientists who explicitly try to maximize their impact might have an adverse effect by ignoring foundational research whose importance isn't obvious under impact-maximizing reasoning, and this is a general risk for longtermism: targeting what looks most important may miss things that don't appear important when thinking that way.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“you said that you expect scientists who are explicitly trying to maximize their impact might have an adverse impact because they might be ignoring the foundational research”

0.73

Technological contingency exists on the order of centuries to thousands of years before the Industrial Revolution (e.g. the Egyptian steam engine, late-developed semaphore), but post-Industrial-Revolution it is much harder to find technologies that wouldn't have been developed within decades regardless.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“Post industrial-revolution world, there's much less contingency. It's much harder to see technologies that wouldn't have happened within decades if they hadn't been developed when they were.”

0.73

Whereas scientific discoveries like special relativity would have arrived shortly after regardless (general relativity being a rarer multi-decade leap), moral philosophers and religious leaders like Marx, Mohammed, Jesus, and Confucius made enormous and genuinely contingent long-run differences.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“Religious leaders like Mohammed, Jesus, and Confucius made enormous and contingent, long-run difference.”

0.73

There are moments of plasticity during the formation of a new institution where a set of norms gets locked in—as with the Christian church or the US Constitution, created in four months and lasting centuries—and this lock-in can be miraculously good or, as with the proposed constitutional right to slavery, extremely dangerous.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“you get moments of plasticity during the formation of a new institution. Whether that’s the Christian church or the Constitution of the United States, you lock-in a certain set of norms.”

0.73

Robin Hanson's argument that competition drives emulated minds to subsistence does not imply bad lives, because subsistence is a demographic balance of income and population growth and is consistent with ems being in bliss—at subsistence they could have lives thousands of times better than ours.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“subsistence means that you get a balance of income per capita and population growth such that being poorer would cause deaths to outweigh additional births. That doesn't tell you about their well-being.”

0.73

John Stuart Mill and early utilitarians had a longtermist phase worrying Britain would run out of coal, but this rested on wrong views about fossil-fuel quantities and the economy's adaptability and would likely have been harmful; by contrast Mill's promotion of women's suffrage—being the first politician to do so—was a value-changing act that stood the test of time, suggesting promoting better values is the more robust long-term strategy.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“Their main concern was Britain running out of coal, and therefore, future generations would be impoverished... they had enormously wrong views about how much coal and fossil fuels there were in the world.”

0.71

Global integration is double-sided: it lets the world reduce catastrophic risks (as with the ban on CFCs that repaired the ozone layer) but risks converging on a single monoculture that loses valuable diversity; the solution is liberal arrangements—strong treaties on specific global public goods like climate and WMDs without a strong-arm world government imposing one vision.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“The fact that the world was able to come come together and ban Chlorofluorocarbons was one of the great events of the last 50 years, allowing the hole in the ozone layer to to repair itself. But on the other hand, if it means we all converge to one monoculture and lose out on diversity, that's potentially bad.”

0.70

Norman Borlaug is credited with saving a billion lives, but because similar agricultural developments would have happened shortly afterward, his counterfactual impact was likely saving tens of millions rather than a billion lives.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“Had Norman Borlaug not existed, I don’t think a billion people would have died. Rather, similar developments would have happened shortly afterwards.”

0.69

In a commissioned survey, about 9% of Indians and 13% of Americans said they would not want to relive their lives, with surveyed Indians more optimistic and happier despite far lower GDP per capita—though MacAskill cautions this may be a sample effect (well-off Indians vs poor Americans) or interact with beliefs in reincarnation.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“it’s something more like 9% of Indians wouldn't want to live their lives again if they had the option, and 13% of Americans said they wouldn’t.”

0.69

There is evidence that you can get people to take future generations' interests more seriously simply by assigning them that role—one study had people put on ceremonial robes and act as trustees of the future, after which they made different policy recommendations than when acting on self-interest.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“There was one study that got people to put on ceremonial robes, and act as trustees of the future. And they did make different policy recommendations than when they were just acting on the basis of their own beliefs and self-interest.”

0.69

Whether a society's intellectual talent compounds depends on what its culture incentivizes—Baghdad lost its Scientific Golden Age when theology became more rewarded than science, and Germany lagged Britain industrially because its talent focused on music, which doesn't compound the way textile automation does.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“one argument for why Britain had a scientific and industrial revolution rather than Germany was because all of the intellectual talent in Germany was focused on making amazing music. That doesn't compound in the way that making textiles does.”

0.68

Institutions created to represent future people can be devastatingly co-opted because, like the environment in environmental impact statements, future people cannot represent or defend their own interests, which is how environmental review mechanisms get gamed by actors with no real environmental interest to block beneficial projects.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“You create something to represent future people, but they're not allowed to lobby themselves (it can just be co-opted). My understanding of environmental impact statements has been similar.”

0.68

Despite the contingency of values, today's moral beliefs are better than average because abolition of slavery, feminism, liberalism, and democracy were gains we could have lost; a 'redraw' of civilization would likely look morally worse.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“The abolition of slavery, the feminist movement, liberalism itself, democracy—these are all things that we could have lost and are huge gains.”

0.68

Because moral values are contingent—had the Nazis won we would celebrate their values as progress—we should not believe we are at the end of moral progress or lock in current Western values, but instead invest heavily in figuring out what is actually morally right.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“if the Nazis had won the World War, we would all be thinking, “wow, I'm so glad that moral progress happened the way it did”

0.68

Humans are cultural creatures inclined to defer to others' beliefs even without understanding mechanisms, which works in low-change environments; but because we now live in an unprecedented period of rapid change (economy doubling every 20 years), we should reason from first principles rather than rely on tradition.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“we're in this period of enormous change, where the economy is doubling every 20 years, new technologies arrive every single year. That's unprecedented. It means that we should be trying to figure things out from first principles.”

0.68

In the long run technological and economic progress is largely non-contingent because the instrumental benefits and incentives are so strong that progress arrives across a wide array of circumstances—if thousands of societies exist and only one grows, in the long run that one becomes the whole economy.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“the instrumental benefits of tech progress, and the incentives towards tech progress and economic growth are so strong, that we get there in a wide array of circumstances.”

0.68

Long-lived foundations lose impact for two reasons: they specify goals far too narrowly (like Benjamin Franklin earmarking funds for blacksmith apprentices rather than general prosperity), and regression to the mean—exceptional founders are replaced by statistically more average successors.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“they’ve historically specified their goals in far too narrow terms. One fun example is Benjamin Franklin... he specified it to help blacksmith apprentices.”

0.68

Enormously important questions—whether the future is good, whether civilization would recover from collapse, the likelihood of long stagnation—receive almost no work because companies find them too big-picture and academia, having become focused on incremental gains, treats them as falling between disciplines and as too grand or speculative.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“Academia has developed a culture where you don't tackle such problems. Partly, that's because they fall through the cracks of different disciplines. Partly because they seem too grand or too speculative.”

0.68

Moral progress is not a random walk; among the forces acting on culture is the force of reason, empathy and argument toward what is morally right, though this is unfortunately a weak force, and the long reflection aims to let this force guide values before drastic lock-in actions are taken.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“Moral progress isn't a random walk in general. There are many forces that act on culture and on what people believe.”

0.63

Robin Hanson's 'vote on values, bet on beliefs' futarchy is a neglected and exciting idea worth trying at city scale, but most such schemes probably won't work in practice because prediction markets can be gamed or lack liquidity, problems one might mitigate with restrictions on tradeable questions and government liquidity subsidies.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“Do I think it'll work in practice? Probably not. Most of these ideas wouldn't work. Prediction markets can be gamed or are simply not liquid enough.”

0.63

Combining multiple lines of evidence—roughly 10% of people in both the US and India think their lives contain more suffering than happiness, and a 'skipping' study finds a little over 10% regarded their surveyed day as worse than being unconscious—MacAskill concludes most lives today are net positive and worth living.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“approximately 10% of people in the United States and 10% of people in India seem to think that their lives are net negative. They think they contain more suffering than happiness”

0.63

Although the deep question of whether targeted longtermism or growth-maximizing does more good may only resolve in a thousand years, suggestive evidence will come earlier: if longtermists make specific measurable forecasts about AI and biotech and visibly reduce certain risks, that supports their strategy, whereas good long-term outcomes 'popping out' of Cowen/Collison's unforecasted activity would support theirs.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“If me and others engaging in longtermism are making specific, measurable forecasts about what is going to happen with AI, or advances in biotechnology, and then are able to take action such that we are clearly reducing certain risks, that's pretty good evidence in favor of our strategy.”

0.63

Although moral change historically took centuries, it can be much faster today: the EA movement growing ~30% per year compounds quickly and the gay rights movement changed values fast by historical standards, so even in a pivotal century there can be time for value promotion to pay off—unless AGI brings a singularity-level end of history within 10-20 years.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“If that's growing at something like 30% per year, compound returns mean that it's not that long. That's not growth. That's not change that happens on the order of centuries.”

0.61

If humanity settles space with many independent settlements pursuing different visions before any lock-in occurs, physics makes diversity durable since a settled solar system is very hard to conquer at technological maturity; but MacAskill worries control could happen earlier—this century, with maybe 10% probability.

forecasthigh valuefringenovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“Once a solar system has been settled, it's very hard for other civilizations to come along and conquer you—at least if we're at a period of technological maturity where there aren't groundbreaking technologies to be discovered.”

0.61

Scientific and technological progress is modeled as the number of people times the fraction of the population devoted to R&D, so declining research productivity combined with slow population growth is concerning; concentrated environments like Bell Labs punch above their weight but such effects are small compared to the broad culture and sheer size of a population.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“number of people times fraction of the population devoted to R&D”

0.57

An expert panel of superforecasters predicting the probability of great-power war over the next ten years, aggregated into a 'war index', would be more important than the stock market index because incentivizing only economic growth ignores tail risks of catastrophe.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“imagine a panel of super forecasters predicting the chance of a war between great powers occurring in the next ten years that gets aggregated into a war index. That would be a lot more important than the stock market index.”

0.53

Institutions to represent future people are inherently weak because future people cannot lobby for themselves; a possible design is a randomly-selected assembly whose members' pensions and assessments are judged by successor panels 30 years later, but MacAskill is skeptical it would work in practice though worth a country trying.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“If you're trying to represent or even give consideration to future people, you have to face the fact that they're not around and they can't lobby for themselves.”

0.52

Rather than building hard-to-implement institutions that represent future generations, longtermists should focus on a narrow set of changes that are robustly good for the long-term—like requiring liability insurance for dangerous bio labs—which improve the future without trying to represent it.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“Regulation to have liability insurance for dangerous bio labs is not about trying to represent the interests of future generations. But, it's very good for the long-term.”

0.49

Before the institutionalization of academic research, one was not considered a real philosopher without a grand unifying theory spanning ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, logic, epistemology and often the natural sciences and economics—and some scholars should still play that big-picture role today.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“you weren't a real philosopher unless you had some grand unifying theory of ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. Probably the natural sciences too and economics.”

0.49

Effective Altruism is contingent on the order of decades rather than being inevitable, because similar impartial-morality ideas (Mohists, early utilitarians, Peter Singer in the 70s) were promoted throughout history without gaining traction until the internet gathered like-minded people and lucky catalyzing meetings occurred around 2010.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“Evidence that Effective Altruism is somewhat contingent is that similar ideas have been promoted many times during history, and not taken on.”

0.43

Under a dictatorship a single person rules society, making outcomes heavily contingent on the views, values, beliefs and personality of that individual, which is why the deaths of dictators produce large and persistent regime changes.

causalestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“If you've got a dictatorship, then you've got single person ruling the society. That means it's heavily contingent on the views, values, beliefs, and personality of that person.”

0.37

It is not in the interest of a company's CEO, board or shareholders for the company to last a long time—most don't particularly care—which is why corporations are short-lived, unlike institutions whose members value persistence.

causalcontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Will MacAskill

“Is it in the interests of the people who constitute the company (like the CEO and the board and the shareholders) for that company to last a long time? No, they don't particularly care.”

0.34

First-principles thinking paid off during the COVID pandemic, as EA and longtermist communities took it seriously from January 2020 while existing institutions failed to properly update to new evidence and the new environment.

factualcontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“From January 2020, my Facebook wall was completely saturated with people freaking out, or taking it very seriously in a way that the existing institutions weren't.”

0.31

The historical trend is that federated political bodies see their central powers gain more authority over time even when constitutionally constrained, as seen in the US and the European Union, which is potentially worrying for lock-in unless the embedded culture is itself liberal and pro-diversity.

factualcontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Dwarkesh Patel

“even if constitutionally, the Central Powers constrain over time, they tend to gain more power. You can look at the U.S., you can look at the European Union.”

0.24

Potato is close to a superfood: one could survive indefinitely on butter mashed potatoes if occasionally supplemented with something like lentils and oats.

factualfringenovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Will MacAskill

“potato is close to a superfood, and you could survive indefinitely on butter mashed potatoes if you occasionally supplement with something like lentils and oats.”

0.20

MacAskill judges his best long-term use of time is developing ideas, getting the big picture roughly right, and communicating them understandably to get more people doing long-term good, and an Oxford professorship is helpful for that path.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Will MacAskill

“it's developing ideas, trying to get the big picture roughly right, and then communicating them in a way that's understandable and gets more people to get off their seats and start to do a lot of good for the long-term.”