intentionality
The technical philosophical term for the directedness or aboutness of mental states and representations toward objects or states of affairs.
As defined in 125 | David Haig on the Evolution of Meaning from Darwin to Derrida
Where it comes up · 16
- A History of Philosophy | 71 Jean-Paul Satre14 claims
- 125 | David Haig on the Evolution of Meaning from Darwin to Derrida5 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 72 Other Phenomenologists4 claims
- Bonus Podcast Uncovering Afflictive Emotions3 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 32 Descartes' Meditations 12 claims
- 281 | Samir Okasha on the Philosophy of Agency and Evolution2 claims
- 80 | Jenann Ismael on Connecting Physics to the World of Experience2 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 81 Philosophy Today and Tomorrow1 claim
and 8 more
Most important claims · 10 of 41Search all claims for “intentionality” →
- If meaning can be defined entirely in the mathematical language of signaling games—so that a peacock's tail 'means' he's a good mate—then you don't need higher cognitive capacities like intention or planning to mean something, suggesting human-language terms steeped in intentionality may have a core that doesn't require it.337 | Kevin Zollman on Game Theory, Signals, and Meaning
- Most meditators fall into a 'more or less mindful' state where they are partly on the breath while thoughts run in parallel; by setting a non-verbal intention to stay completely steady for just one short breath (within our actual capacity) and turning the 'intentionality dial' up just slightly, the mind both notices lapses faster and the concentration level actually deepens within a few cycles, rather than requiring decades of practice.Bonus Podcast Uncovering Afflictive Emotions
- People often mess up meditation by making too much effort, gripping the mantra or object 'like holding on to a bronco,' which throws everything out of balance; the effective move is the most subtle intentional adjustment, just a little more energy than before, which is why reframing 'effort' as 'intentionality' avoids the ego-laden connotations of forcing.Bonus Podcast Uncovering Afflictive Emotions
- Setting the radar to catch reactive patterns depends on having strong intentionality: verbalizing or non-verbally setting a clear intention before practice (e.g., to watch for a particular thought) becomes a condition for picking the pattern up quicker, and resetting the intention when one slips is part of right effort.Bonus Podcast Uncovering Afflictive Emotions
- Language, written and spoken speech, and neural states 'represent' or are 'about' the way the world is arranged (and, in the case of desires, how we want it arranged); the central unsolved problem of philosophy of language is to explain what this aboutness, content, or representation could physically consist in.125 | David Haig on the Evolution of Meaning from Darwin to Derrida
- The basic given of human existence is not the isolated 'I' as subject, but the subject-object relationship—being-in-the-world as the fundamental structure where consciousness is always oriented toward something external.A History of Philosophy | 71 Jean-Paul Satre
- Being-unto-death (Sein-zum-Tode) is a significant existential quality: consciousness of our own existence necessarily includes consciousness of being under death, of time running out—the awareness of death is essential to authentic existence.A History of Philosophy | 70 Husserl and Heidegger
- Agency comes in graded notions: a minimal agent is anything that does something rather than merely has something happen to it (distinguished by whether the cause is internal); an intelligent agent (AI sense) is anything that changes behavior depending on circumstances via stimulus-response conditionals; and an intentional agent requires a psychology that consciously represents and intends a goal—and conscious intentional agency may have evolved from the simpler teleonomic goal-directedness of all organisms.281 | Samir Okasha on the Philosophy of Agency and Evolution
- On Dennett's early intentional-stance view, there is no fact of the matter about whether a creature has intentional states like beliefs or desires; the only question is whether it is heuristically useful to treat it that way, making it a 'fool's errand' to seek a distinction in nature between real intentionality and the 'as if' variety.281 | Samir Okasha on the Philosophy of Agency and Evolution
- One must start with the most austere, non-purpose-laden physical vocabulary and earn the right to notions like purpose by adding structure: stripped-down purpose applies once you have systems selected to get food and avoid prey, more articulate purpose with cognitive systems, and full intention only when creatures deliberately represent possible situations and choose among them; importing rich intentional words too early is illegitimate.80 | Jenann Ismael on Connecting Physics to the World of Experience