What this covers

This is a lecture from a university history of philosophy course. A lecturer, with one brief interjection from a second voice, moves from Edmund Husserl's attempt to build a science of consciousness to Martin Heidegger's turn away from that project. The lecture begins with the failure of the subject-object split inherited from René Descartes. It then shows how Husserl tries to recover Descartes' foundational method after Immanuel Kant had dismissed his claims about the soul. Husserl's method has two parts: bracketing, borrowed from the Greek skeptical term epoché, and eidetic intuition of universal essences. The lecture also covers his claim that consciousness is inherently intentional and teleological, and that it actively constructs its objects.

The middle of the lecture looks at the lived world vs. Theoretical World) and at time as the form of inner sense. It also draws on Hegel's idea of the individual as a concrete universal, as a reason to think universals can be found by examining particulars. Objections follow. One is that abstract thought cannot proceed without particulars, so bracketing every presupposition cannot succeed. Another is Heidegger's complaint that the transcendental ego can never be caught stripped of all content.

The later part turns to Heidegger. It covers Dasein as Being-in-the-World) as being-in-the-world, being-unto-death, and the terms facticity and forhandedness for inauthentic modes of existence. The lecture also discusses his criticism of Nietzsche and Jaspers for elucidating existence without asking about being itself. It reads What Is Metaphysics? as an exercise in dread before nothingness. It also gives the etymology of aletheia as truth as unconcealment), tied to the everyday phrase "a moment of truth." The lecture ends on an open question: Being and Time was left half finished, and it is unclear whether temporal structure applies to being itself or only to being-in-the-world.

Sharpest takeaway

Husserl attempts to establish universal foundations for knowledge through transcendental phenomenology by bracketing all presuppositions and examining the essential structures of consciousness itself, particularly through the concept of intentionality, though Heidegger argues this foundational project is ultimately incomplete because the transcendental ego cannot be isolated from the objects it knows.

  • Husserl rejects naturalism and psychologism as inadequate foundations for knowledge because they reduce consciousness to natural processes rather than recognizing its universal structures
  • Intentionality—the directional, object-oriented nature of consciousness—is the key discovery that reveals consciousness always constitutes its objects through active meaning-giving acts
  • Heidegger critiques Husserl's bracketing method by arguing one can never catch the intentional state bare of objects, shifting phenomenology from transcendental foundations to existential description of being-in-the-world

The claims · ranked35 claims · weighted by value

This asset isn't compiled yet

You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.

0.80

Husserl's project is to develop a science of human consciousness—a science of the human spirit or ego—that establishes universal foundations for knowledge by examining the essential structures of consciousness itself, not just cataloging differences between psychological types.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“what um hural is after is not just uh New Foundations of new foundationalism but a universal Foundation something that isn't just an account of differences because of different psychological types as in nature and Dy but rather something about the universal structure of the human self by virtue of which there is a universal Foundation that's what he's after now uh one of the um complaints that he has in this same context is that uh the subject object dichotomy which has dominated thought since um decart”

0.80

The subject-object dichotomy inherited from Descartes, which seeks to understand knowledge by isolating the object from subjective influences, fundamentally fails because it loses sight of the human subject and human consciousness, which is essential to understanding how knowledge is actually possible.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“the subject object dichotomy which has dominated thought since um decart uh asking for an isolation of the object from all subjective influences in our thinking that subject object dichotomy is um is really very official uh after all if you're saying I know something you're hardly getting at what knowledge is if you just represent the object the I know is an act of the subject and it is the loss of that human subject Hood the loss of a an adequate understanding of the human Spirit which is what ails the naturalistic philosophy and what therefore underlies the failure of naturalism”

0.80

Heidegger's concept of Dasein (being-there) captures the fundamental existential truth that human existence is not a private, isolated being independent of the world, but rather a being-in-the-world characterized by a fundamental relatedness to and presence in a world not of our own making.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“when uh Hager says uh that our existence design literally being there you see it's not a private isolated being my being it's a being there in the world you think um and the uh the same is true in such um well-known um statement that we are um um cast into a world not of our own making uh there's a being in the world that's the very nature of human existence”

0.80

The intentional act is also constructive—just as Kant's forms of time and space schematize understanding, the act of knowing constructs the overall situation by pulling it together and interrelating parts, so that knowledge is always self-referential from the perspective of the knower.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“in addition to constitutive it is a constructive Act um just as for C it is the the time form that schematizes the understanding so the very nature of my knowing you see constructs constructs the the overall situation pulls it together for me it's not just the isolated object uh but the whole scene that is interrelated for me uh all knowledge is in that sense self- referential”

0.80

Abstract thinking always requires particulars as points of reference and symbols—one cannot think abstractly without starting from and referring back to particular instances—so any attempt to bracket all presuppositions will fail because abstract thought itself depends on particulars.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“um any attempt you might make to bracket presuppositions um bracket reference to some particular object is um going to be very difficult it's a kind of um abstraction thinking of The Hyphen relationship in abstraction but the very nature of thinking abstractly abstract ideas is that it always takes off from particulars and such particulars become symbols of something much greater than that you see so that the the difficulty involved there is the difficulty in abstract thinking that does not have some point of reference which makes um possible um meaningful symbolic language”

0.80

Heidegger's 'Being and Time' was only half completed; he completed Part One on temporality and being-in-the-world but never finished Part Two on temporality and being itself because he became convinced that phenomenological description was not the proper method to access being itself.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“his intention was to describe these existential the universal structures of Consciousness at being in this world Universal aspects of it revealing structures um he only completed half of of the project part one which has to do with um temporality and our being design part two which was to have to do with temporality and being itself Z he never got done why not well I it's usually said because he became convinced that this wasn't the method to use”

0.80

Even if being itself is disclosed in our conscious existence, the problem remains of how to interpret and understand that disclosure, since time may structure being-in-the-world but may not structure being itself, and we have no way of knowing whether temporal structures apply to being as such.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“um even granted that something like being itself is disclosed in our conscious being um how are we going to interpret that how we going to understand it time may be the structure of our being in the world but is it the structure of being itself however would we know you see”

0.80

In 'On the Essence of Truth,' Heidegger uses an etymology of the Greek word 'aletheia' (truth), breaking it into 'alpha privative' (negation) and 'lethe' (stone/rock), to argue that truth is not correspondence between thought and thing but rather the unconcealment of what is—the removal of the stone so that what lies beneath can be revealed.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“he asks himself uh in a little essay called on the essence of Truth what is truth and the uh the anemology that he uses repudiates the conventional view of Truth as the correspondence between thought and thing or as ainus put the adequation of thought to thing repudiates that and um emically looks at the Greek word Alia says there's the alpha privative that negates and here's the word for a stone or a rock so um truth is saying something about um no stone yeah that is to say the rock the stones are all rolled away and now you can see what's under them so truth is the nature of something that shows itself”

0.80

Being-unto-death (Sein-zum-Tode) is a significant existential quality: consciousness of our own existence necessarily includes consciousness of being under death, of time running out—the awareness of death is essential to authentic existence.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“the term being unto death significant as if there's intentionality in all Consciousness then the consciousness of our own existence of our own life existence uh is among other things a consciousness of being under death time's running out for all of us you think the existential quality there being under death”

0.80

One can live and survive in a world where one projects meaning and names things through language because meaning-giving and naming things with meanings we choose gives us a way to exist in the world, even if that meaning is more revealing about ourselves than about the things themselves.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“however can you live survive exist in a world like this somebody asks or by uh projecting meaning onto it your meaning and by um naming things where the name gives it the meaning you want it to have you see and by talking about it in ways that are more significant for what they reveal about you than what they reveal about the thing you think”

0.80

Knowledge is not merely isolated objective facts but is always ingredient to one's overall lived world (lebenswelt) and worldview; what one knows and how one knows it are embedded in the way one actually lives, so true phenomenology must examine consciousness as it exists in the pre-theoretical lived world, not in artificial theoretical abstraction.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“recognizing that uh when I say I know something you see uh what I'm knowing is something as part of my overall world view the overall way in which I live um what I know how I know is ingredient to my laan's velt my lived world and what he wants to do is to get at the eye of the lived World rather than the eye of some abstruse theoretical knowledge of the world”

0.80

Kant dismissed Descartes' attempts to gain metaphysical knowledge of the soul as lacking adequate grounds, but Husserl is undiscouraged by this failure and instead attempts to go back to Descartes' foundational method to elicit the universal structure of the transcendental ego phenomenologically.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“uh C in the rational psychology section of the critique of pure reason uh discusses you remember you read it you outlined it um discusses some of um decart's um attempt to get at the eye the self and um um decided that those metaphysical spe ulation simply did not have adequate grounds hurl is not discouraged by dart's failure what herur attempts to do then is to go back to the dayart foundations and see if he cannot from that starting point elicit something of the universal structure of the transcendental EO”

0.80

Being and Time does not ask what we can infer from our existence (as Descartes would do through causal inference), but rather asks whether we have direct awareness of the ground of Being in our consciousness of our own existence—whether something is present when we hit rock bottom.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“so what then is revealed in this now when I say in our being what is revealed in that he's not saying what can we infer from it day cart style is it's not that he's trying to take mental representations and do a causal inference no but do we have a direct awareness of the ground of being in the consciousness of our own existence you see when you hit rock bottom is there something there that's what he's asking”

0.80

Descartes' representational view of consciousness—consciousness as entertaining ideas within the mind—leaves open whether there are any objects those ideas are actually about, whereas Husserl argues consciousness is inherently intentional, always about something beyond itself.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“day cart gives us the image of Consciousness as simply entertaining ideas within the mind and that representational view leaves wide open whether there are any objects the ideas are about you see whereas what herur is saying is one of the universal features part of the very essence of human consciousness is that it's always consciousness of consciousness of an idea of knowing that there always reference to it”

0.80

Heidegger's problem with Husserl's bracketing is that it is an incompletable process—one can never actually strip the transcendental ego bare of all particular objects of knowledge; one never catches the ego without some content, so the foundational project is impossible.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“the problem with herur is that that process of bracketing is never completed so that you simply cannot strip the transcendental self bare of the evidence of this that or the other kind of object of knowing and catch it as it were in its B it's as if um High Digger is saying to herur what Hume said to deart or lock who had talked about having a notion of a substantive Soul even uh over and above all of the particular ideas of sensation and reflection”

0.80

In 'What Is Metaphysics?' Heidegger asks 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' and attempts to capture the existential moment of this question by imaging oneself on the edge of a bottomless precipice, experiencing dread and terror before nothingness, as a way of understanding the profound question of existence.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“he has a piece called what is metaphysics that was published in 1929 what is metaphysics where he says of course it's about Z being rather than design and then he goes about um asking um questions that have existential moment why is they are something rather than nothing good question why is there something rather than nothing and he tries to capture the existential moment of that question um as if you are hanging over the edge of a cliff a bottomless precipice and on the age of nothingness are asking bo something rather than nothing”

0.74

Husserl's phenomenological method consists of two main aspects: bracketing (suspending judgment about the existence of objects of thought and perception, using the Greek skeptical term epoché), and eidetic intuition (immediate awareness of the universal essences and structures underlying consciousness).

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“what um he did was to talk about um two aspects of the phenomenological method uh that he wants first of all bracketing which is simply suspending judgment the sort of thing dayart did about all objects of thought and objects of perception um he uses the term EP at times that's the term that the Greek Skeptics used for suspended judgment”

0.74

Perception, knowledge, and other states of consciousness are teleological acts—acts oriented toward and directed at objects—so they are not passive receptions of ideas but active directional movements of the mind.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“perception knowledge other states of Consciousness are theological acts acts oriented to toward WS an object”

0.74

Time consciousness is essential to understanding consciousness as a whole because time is the unifying form of all consciousness—the form of internal sense—and even ideas of external objects are known to us through internal sense, so the whole world for a person is temporally organized.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“he does do for instance a phenomenology of time Consciousness time Consciousness uh and time is no ordinary object of thought anything postar because if time is the unifying form of all Consciousness it's the form of the internal sense but even our ideas of the external sense are known to us in the internal sense and so they are time organized as well so the whole world for me is time organized”

0.74

Heidegger moves from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology to existential phenomenology, shifting the focus from establishing foundations for knowledge of the transcendental self to describing the existential structures of human being-in-the-world.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“here in heger you have not transcendental phenomenology phenomenology of the transcendental self but existential phenomenology phenomenology of existence heiger is no longer concerned to establish a new kind of foundationalism that's not his project”

0.74

Heidegger critiques other existentialists—Nietzsche, Jaspers, and others—for merely elucidating existence (describing how we feel and experience our existence) rather than asking about being itself, which is the traditional philosophical question from the Greeks onward.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“at the same time he's dissatisfied with hural he's also he also has problems with other existentialists people like n even jaspas he refers to all sorts of them because what they are doing um he call Simply the elucidation of existence yeah they're trying to elucidate the way in which we feel the way in which we experience our existence the elucidation of our existence oh they may be trying to elicit some authentic existence the elucidation and eliciting of existence in in other words what they are doing is a bending any traditional philosophical activity the um traditional philosophy all the way back to the Greeks was concerned with being capital B not just elucidating our existence in the world”

0.74

The phrase 'a moment of truth' coincides with Heidegger's etymological understanding of truth as unconcealment—in a moment of truth, you are forced to reveal what kind of person you are, revealing yourself to yourself in that moment of being laid bare.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“and interestingly how that coincides with our phrase a Moment of Truth a moment of truth you the in which you were forced to reveal the sort of person you were you revealed it to yourself in that moment of truth”

0.74

Heidegger uses the term 'facticity' to describe the experience of being as a bare fact—of being just an object in the world—and 'forhandedness' to describe the inauthentic status of being used as a tool by others, both representing inauthentic modes of existence.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“he uses the word facticity to describe the experience of um being uh sort of a bare fact insignificant just an object in this kind of a world he um uses the term uh he uses the term forend and uh to describe the status of something which is just an instrument a tool used by others for handen is to be on hand something that's on hand just there to be used and obviously for human existence they are very inauthentic kinds of existence”

0.74

Following Hegel, the individual is a synthesis of the universal and the particular—a concrete universal—so universal human characteristics get fleshed out in particular ways in different individuals, meaning one can find universal reference points even in examining particular individuals.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“now you say that's odd not if you've read Hegel um because in Hegel what you find is that the I the individual is a synthesis of the universal and the particular remember in his logic you move from particular no you move from Universal to particular to individual so the individual is the concretized universal what Hegel called the concrete Universal Universal possibilities Universal characteristics concretized in the individual so the ey is universal”

0.72

In 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science,' Husserl argues that no other science is truly rigorous because none of them have the underlying foundations that validate scientific method; not even logic and mathematics have established their foundations, so philosophy must establish those foundations.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“philosophy as rigorous science his point being that none of the other Sciences as rigorous because none of them has underlying Foundation that validates scientific method uh not even logic does mathematics doesn't so he's calling out for a philosophy which will establish those foundations”

0.69

Gadamer's 'Truth and Method' represents the classical work in phenomenological hermeneutics, building on Heidegger's insights about language, interpretation, and truth to develop a theory of understanding that emphasizes the role of interpretation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture Instructor

“it is that in higher which is picked up on by gadamer in his um truth and method which uh is the classic of phenomenological her Unix that we'll be talking about later”

0.69

Nietzsche's approach to knowledge, reducing pluralism of viewpoints to varying degrees of will to power, is a major influence shaping contemporary postmodernism and pluralism.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture Instructor

“he takes the pluralism uh between different viewpoints to be simply an extension of various um underlying emotional Tendencies ultimately reducible to the will to power in varying degrees and uh that it's this nichan approach which is one of the major influences uh shaping the contemporary postmodernism um and for that matter the pluralism uh of our day”

0.69

Husserl's 'Cartesian Meditations' applied the phenomenological method by literally starting with Descartes and describing his methodology in relationship to the Cartesian project of universal doubt.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture Instructor

“when he was asked to lecture at the suran uh where everybody has to pay homage to take art I mean he's the patron philosopher patron saint of French philosophy um what um he did was to present es known as the cartisian meditations cartisian meditations um starting with dayart literally and trying to describe his methodology in relationship to dayarts”

0.62

Heidegger's view of understanding and language is fundamentally postmodern: understanding is a way we have of projecting the meaning of our existence onto objects, so that in the subject-object relationship, to understand an object is to make it in our own image, projecting our own meaning onto it.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Lecturer)

“the particular thing that um uh might be uh worth noting is that he regards how he regards understanding and language because here you get that postmodern theme coming through again understanding is a way we have of projecting the meaning of our design onto objects so that in the subject object relationship to say that I understand an object is to say I am making that in my own image I'm making it an object for me I project my meaning onto it”

0.55

The quest for truth is the quest for the uncovered of being—not objective facts but the revealing of what was hidden. It is an indirect way of engaging in the quest for the being that shows itself within one's existence and chooses itself in one's use of language.

definitionhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“what then is The Quest For Truth well the Quest for truth is the Quest for the uncovered of being no stone quest for the uncovered of being so the Quest for the truth about anything else is simply a indirect way of um engaging in the Quest for the being which shows itself within my existence in how I can ever exist in a world like this you see and it chooses itself therefore in my uses of language so on and so forth”

0.43

Jaspers attempted to classify worldviews into three types—rational, value-oriented, and empirically concerned—each grounded in different aspects of human psychology, an approach Husserl critiques as naturalistic because it explains philosophy through psychological types rather than universal structures.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lecture Instructor

“a neoc Canan philosopher whom we mentioned back then I think they'll help D thigh uh who um was interested in philosophical World Views and um classified World Views into three sorts Each of which he attributed to some aspect of human psychology”

0.40

Nietzsche's reduction of knowledge to will to power and emotional tendencies is a prime example of psychologism, which explains knowledge claims through psychological factors rather than discovering universal structures of consciousness.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lecture Instructor

“n would be a prime example of psychologism uh a psychological explanation of the knowledge claims which people make”

0.37

Husserl spent most of his energies developing phenomenological method and left it to others to apply the method to specific domains of experience, though he himself did apply it to phenomena like time consciousness, mathematics, and logic.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Lecture Instructor

“if um if you read much about hurl you soon discover that he spent most of his energies trying to develop the method and left other people to use it um that may be an overgeneralization uh he does do for instance a phenomenology of time Consciousness”

0.37

Jean-Paul Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' parallels Heidegger's 'Being and Time' as another major work exploring the relationship between being and human existence.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Lecture Instructor

“you'll find almost the same view of knowledge in John Paul S not in the book you're reading but um in his larger work which parallel to higer is called not being in time but being and nothingness”

0.23

Phenomenology inspired a wide following of dedicated adherents in the 1960s, particularly at meetings like the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, where participants spoke with almost religious enthusiasm about the phenomenological project.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Lecture Instructor

“I attended a meeting of the society for phenomenology and existential philosophy uh out of Yale and um that meeting as people were standing around in the lobby of the meeting place um people would come up to you assuming that you were of like mind with them and Rave in almost Messianic t about um the project they were involved in um increased numbers from last year it looks like we're gaining ground uh that that that sort of thing a real Messianic kind of spirit to it”