
What this covers
This is a single university lecture, part of a history of philosophy series, in which a professor works through Sartre's account of consciousness and the self. The lecture begins from Sartre's early argument against the transcendental ego and places him within phenomenology. It describes his version as existential phenomenology: it studies universal structures of human existence, but neither tries to ground the sciences nor, like Heidegger, to investigate being itself. The basic given is not an isolated "I" but the subject-object relation of being-in-the-world, which the lecturer says makes disputes over the external world's existence beside the point. Nausea and seasickness are the examples.
The middle of the lecture is about how the self gets made. The lecturer distinguishes passive states such as hatred from actions such as playing piano or driving, and treats both as transcendent unities that the ego gathers after the fact. The streetcar example shows the point: while running for it, one is absorbed in the object and the self is absent from awareness. Consciousness unifies itself through intentionality by escaping what it was, and the lecturer presents this as creation from nothing in each moment. The body is discussed as a visible symbol of the empty, abstract "I." The lecturer also reports Charles Taylor's description of this view as a "loss of the self."
The lecture then turns to the consequences. Sartre argues backwards from absolute freedom, so that neither a fixed self nor God can exist, and he extends Dostoevsky's line that if God is dead, anything is possible. The lecturer calls the resulting picture distressing, since the individual is always fleeing itself. The lecture closes with the for-itself/in-itself dialectic in Being and Nothingness, compared with Hegel's master-servant relation. In Sartre the relation is one-sided, because the for-itself sees the other only as an object. The play No Exit is read as a failure of genuine dialogue, and Sartre's alliance with French Marxism is linked to the theme of alienation.
Sartre argues that consciousness has no transcendental ego and that the self is created through spontaneous intentional acts in each moment, leading to absolute freedom and the absence of a fixed unified self.
- The transcendental ego is neither a formal principle of unification nor materially present in consciousness, but rather a transcendent being constituted through reflective acts
- Consciousness unifies itself through intentionality by transcending what it was in each new act, creating the self ex nihilo rather than discovering a pre-existing essence
- Absolute freedom follows from the absence of a transcendental ego, because without fixed structures the self creates its own essence through spontaneous action in the world
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Transcendental consciousness is impersonal spontaneity that determines its own essence in each instant without anything preceding it, such that existence precedes essence and each moment reveals creation ex nihilo, not merely rearrangement.
“we may therefore formulate our thesis transcendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity it determines its essence at each instant without our being able to conceive anything before it existence precedes essence it determines its essence at each instant without being able to conceive of anything before it the before it is mere existence from the standpoint of this new essence thus each instant of our conscious life reveals to us a creation ex nihilo not a new arrangement but our no existence”
According to Sartre, the self is created with every act of thought, with every experience, and with every sense perception, rather than discovered as a pre-existing entity.
“I create myself with every act of thought with every experience with every sense perception I create myself”
The basic given of human existence is not the isolated 'I' as subject, but the subject-object relationship—being-in-the-world as the fundamental structure where consciousness is always oriented toward something external.
“by virtue of the intentionality of the motion our being is being for something being in relationship to what the basic term is not I that I it not subject but subject - object that's the basic given together”
Sartre's existentialism defines existence as preceding essence, meaning a human's existence comes first and they must create their own nature through acts, as there is no transcendental ego determining what they are in advance.
“he defines existentialism as saying existence precedes essence existence precedes essence and he's talking particularly about the south my existence precedes any essence yes they my existence precedes any essence I I have to create my own nature my own self there is no transcendental eager”
The ego is constituted as the spontaneous transcendent unification of states and actions—it happens spontaneously and creates itself through transcending what it was, not through any planned or predetermined mechanism.
“the ego is the spontaneous transcendent unification of states and actions spontaneous yeah just if you like happens not necessarily planned transcendent yes because in that I transcend what I was by acting I transcend what I was and become something I am not yet so transcended a self-transcending an old self transcending unification of states and actions”
If God is dead (or if there is no transcendental ego and no fixed universals), then anything is possible because there are no fixed points of reference, fixed entities, or fixed universal structures of the self—only intentionality.
“now when Sartre says that if god is dead if there's no transcendental ego anything is possible you see what he's saying is that in this creative act of spontaneously becoming a new self there is absolute freedom because your freedom to act in any way in the world is what is going to create the new you”
Sartre's concept of being-in-the-world through intentionality means that the existence of an external world is given immediately in lived experience like nausea or seasickness, making philosophical debates about external world existence irrelevant.
“it's for that reason that you couldn't even in your wildest dream imagine Sartre debating with Descartes whether an external world exists it's as if he says I vomit therefore it exists but just the experience of being nauseated by something means that the external reality is given in the feeling of nausea yes if you've ever been seasick you know what I mean there's never any question about the reality of the external world or the internal world”
By virtue of intentionality making an object into a phenomenal object, the self itself is nothing but the act of consciousness, and therefore any behavior cannot be explained as the self being a product of environmental causes.
“he develops that in another place in a little work of his the emotions where he rejects behavioistic psychology outright by which account the self would simply be a product of environmental causes now he's not going to say that nobody after the Kantian Copernican revolution who agrees with the Copernican revolution would say that behaviorists pre content enlightenment types as if the self is the passive recipient of these behavioral cause-effect mechanisms”
In Sartre's play 'No Exit,' the three characters cannot escape from the room because they each attempt to relate to others in a manipulative or dominating 'for-me' fashion rather than in genuine dialogue respecting both as conscious subjects.
“his well-known play no exit I think I asked you before how many had read no exit I've got a dismal response these in literate Philistines well you see in that room from which these three people cannot get themselves to escape you think one starts trying to relate to another but in that for me fashion it's not a dialogical i thou relationship respecting the two persons no but it's in a manipulating or dominating a sense”
When absorbed in action such as running for a streetcar, there is no reflective self-awareness—consciousness is entirely focused on the intentional object, and the ego or self has disappeared from awareness.
“when I run after a streetcar but when I look at the time when I'm absorbed in contemplating a portrait there's no I there is consciousness of the streetcar having to be overtaken that's what you can't yourself that's what focuses your attention that's where the intentionality is everything else is brought to bear on that a new unity in fact I'm then plunged into the world of objects it's they that constitute the unity of my consciousness it's they that present themselves with values attractive qualities but me the self I've disappeared there's no self-awareness in that process if you're really concentrating on the streetcar that's got to be overtaken there”
The distressing quality of Sartre's view is that consciousness reveals a ceaseless creation of existence from which the individual is ceaselessly escaping from themselves, trying to be something else, with the creative process continuing without end.
“there's something distressing for each of us to catch in the act this tireless creation of existence of which we are not the creators at this level the man has impression of ceaselessly escaping from himself trying to be something else the creative process continues”
Sartre argues backwards from absolute freedom: if there is absolute freedom, there can be no transcendental ego (because that would pre-structure freedom) and there can be no God (because divine creation would structure what is possible).
“he argues backwards from this if there is absolute freedom there can be no transcendental ego because if there were a transcendental ego it wouldn't be absolute freedom it would be pre structured but the transcendental ego if there is absolute freedom there can be no God because then the ego would be structured by what God makes possible”
Sartre extends the Dostoevsky maxim 'if God is dead then anything is possible' to argue that if there are no universals and no transcendental self, then anything is possible because there are no fixed points of reference or fixed entities to constrain possibility.
“it's in that essay that he cites dusty s key if God is dead then anything is possible but he enlarges it from if god is dead then anything is possible to saying if there are no Universal than anything is possible if there is no transcendental self than anything because there are no fixed points of reference no fixed entities no fixed Universal structures of the self it's just intentionality so anything could be possible we have to create meanings at values that world”
Sartre does phenomenology in the style of existential phenomenology, examining universal structures of human existence without seeking either to provide new foundationalism for science or to explore being itself as Heidegger does.
“Sartre is doing phenomenology he's an existential phenomenologist so you can anticipate that he's not interested in good not going to be interested in some transcendental self in order to provide a new foundationalism to rescue science from its relativizing tendencies remember his concern about the foundations of science nor is he going to be like Heidegger doing a phenomenology of human existence design as a key to perceiving xym being itself he's going to do simply a phenomenology of human existence for its own sake”
Sartre's Being and Nothingness develops explicitly the 'for-itself' and 'in-itself' dialectic, which echoes Hegel's master-servant relationship but with philosophical differences in structure and implications.
“he develops explicitly the dialectic for which he's well known that seems to echo the master-servant relationship of Hegel the loss while correspond dialectic now the terms very simple per soir is for the self and Lance wha is what is already in itself and you can readily see that if intentionality makes an object into a phenomenal object an object for me that he's going to be saying that any person in the world in meaning getting involved in relating to any other person or object is seeking to make that person part of what is for me”
For Sartre, consciousness unifies itself not through a pre-existing transcendental ego but through intentionality, where consciousness transcends what it was by escaping from itself into new experience, creating new unity in each moment.
“it's certain that phenomenology doesn't need any appeal to any such unifying and individualizing I by intentionality consciousness transcends itself it unifies itself by escaping from itself notice how he loves paradoxical statements yes a and I think he loves them because he's trying to capture the dialectic thesis antithesis it unifies itself by escaping from itself yes in the intentionality of dealing with something new I am transcending what I already am and becoming something different”
In each moment of consciousness, personal identity is constituted anew through the focusing of attention on current experience, integrating past memories and emerging future into a new unified consciousness in that present moment.
“and it's in the focus of attention in this new experience that my consciousness is unified once more so it unifies itself by escaping from itself into a you new kind of unification somehow other every new experience has to be integrated into what we are so then on 39 about eight lines down its consciousness that unifies itself concretely by a play of transversal intentionality which are concrete and real retentions of past consciousness”
The relationship between Hegel's master-servant dialectic and Sartre's for-itself/in-itself dialectic shows that unlike Hegel where each perspective can see the other as itself for itself, Sartre presents a one-sided relationship where the for-itself can only see the in-itself as object (it/thing).
“this is the interesting thing because in Hegel you you get these sense that the master-servant relationship is potentially an eyes out relationship in which the eye is a for me and the vow is another for me okay and the way Hegel plays it out in that selection you read each of these is seeing the other as he is for me right now the the thing is about sod is that it's more a one-sided relationship it's not an eye Val but an eye it that's Martin boobers language it's not an eye though it's an eye it Yesi so that the other person is we tend to say dehumanized if the in itself is indeed a human being of a consciousness consciousness I only nobody is for me I don't know what he is for himself”
Sartre defines states of consciousness such as hatred as passive states of mind that are enduring rather than momentary acts—they constitute the material of the ego but involve passivity rather than active doing.
“in two states there's transcendent unities of consciousness that runs to page 68 where he picks up on actions but in order to get what he means by States look at page 66 hatred is a state state of mind it's not simply an act for thinking feeling it's an enduring as it were state of mind and he says that by this term state I've tried to express the character of passivity which is constituted of hatred you're not doing something and just hating the state of mind”
Actions in Sartre's framework are transcendent unities realized in the world of things, such as playing piano or driving a car, involving concrete realization of something in the external world rather than mere internal mental operations.
“when you get to actions on page 68 you notice that he says at the bottom of the page would like to remark that concerted action is first of all the transcendent transcend simply a state of mind it take for instance playing the piano driving a car riding these are actions taken in the world of things it's the concrete realization of something actions”
The body serves as a visible and tangible symbol for the 'I' as the objective and empty support of action, and bodily images consummate the total degradation of the concrete ego of reflection to the abstract 'I' concept.
“the I that we find here is in some way the support of the actions that I do in the world for example the word has to be broken into small pieces for the fire to catch it has to that's the quality of the word objective relationship of the wood to the fire that hath to be lighted now I'm breaking the word the action is realized in the world the objective and empty support of the action is the I concept this is why the body and bodily images can consummate the total degradation of the concrete I of reflection to the I concept by functioning for the I concept as it's a losery fulfilment”
Sartre's alliance with French Marxism in one phase of his life reflects the theme of alienation that runs through both his dialectical philosophy and Marxist theory.
“it's no wonder that such one phase in his life sort of allied himself with French Marxism if they because the theme of alienation runs through both the dialectic with its alienation runs two bucks”
Charles Taylor in his recent book on the self identifies what he calls 'the loss of the self' in Sartre's philosophy, defined as the thesis that there is no transcendental self with any enduring identity.
“Charles Taylor in his recent book on the self calls the loss of the self because the thesis of the transcendence of the ego is that the simply is no transcendental self there's no unifying core to the self that has any enduring identity”
Emotions reveal that consciousness is intentionally directed toward its objects and that emotions disclose our facticity—our being in the world in relationship to something, whether anger toward someone, hope about something, or love for someone.
“intentionality is the characteristic of human being the act of being in the world towards the world and emotion simply reveals that emotions have intentionality emotions are directed towards you're angry with hopeful about you love somebody you feel sorry for them emotion reveals our being in the world our facticity”
Each new state of consciousness is fastened directly to the ego as its origin, created ex nihilo in the sense that the state is not given as having existed previously but is made present and real through the ego's creative act.
“begin with the undeniable fact that each new state is fastened directly to the ego as its origin this mode of creation is creation ex nihilo in the sense that the state is not given as having formerly mean in the me I make it for me I create it for me I'm creating me the for me my being in the world”
The ego never appears to reflective consciousness except when one is not looking directly at it—it hovers at the horizon or corner of the eye, and vanishes the moment one turns their gaze toward it to make it a direct object of consciousness.
“the ego never appears except ones not when one's not looking at it you you know introspect and try to see the self the reflective gaze must be fixed on the air hardness the lived experience insofar as it emanates from the state then behind the state at the horizon the ego appears out of the corner of the eye soon as I turn my gaze to it and try to reach it in vanishes”
The reason the ego is elusive to reflective consciousness is that when trying to apprehend it as a direct object, one falls back to the unreflecting level where the ego is not present as an object because consciousness is not turned toward it.
“this is because in trying to apprehend the ego for itself as a direct object of the consciousness I fall back onto the unreflecting level yes I'm not looking at myself I'm looking at the ego just like a greased pig you just can't catch it the ego disappears along with the reflective act”
Husserl attempted a scientific phenomenology but then reverted to a transcendental phenomenology that revived the transcendental ego, placing an 'I' behind each consciousness to light up each phenomenal object in attention.
“to Husserl he turns and her cells attempt at a scientific kind of phenomenology page 37 he says towards the top Hoxha Searle gives his reply having determined that the having determined in his logical investigations that the me is a synthetic and transcendent production of consciousness is a synthetic transcendent production of consciousness yes intentionality he reverted in ideas towards a new phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy to the graphic position of the transcendental I this I so to speak behind each consciousness would light up each phenomenal each phenomenon presented in the field of attention”
Consciousness is nothing but intentionality—it is the act of consciousness meaning or pointing to objects, and intentionality is a meaning-giving act in the sense of attending to and focusing on an object to make it present.
“he says that consciousness is nothing but intentionality nothing but if you like a consciousness meaning or pointing to objects is a consciousness meaning pointing to intentional reference to objects so that you can see why Husserl is often said to tell us that intentionality is a meaning giving act a meaning giving it not primarily in the sense that we talk about the meaning of life or the meaning of some political event but in the sense of attending to focusing on that object making it present to us”
Reflection is the unifying act that fastens each new state to the concrete totality of the ego, connecting present states to past ones by traversing time backwards and giving the ego as the source of all states.
“the unifying act of reflection fair is each new state to the concrete totality the mean reflection isn't confined to apprehending a new state is attaching to this totality as fusing with it it intends a relation which traverses time backwards and gives the me as the source of the state I made it for me”
When a third person intrudes into a two-person relationship (as in 'No Exit'), they objectify one of the original parties by redirecting attention and making someone who was 'for-me' become 'in-itself,' dissolving the previous relational configuration.
“in those three people in that room no exit when a third person intrudes into the block budding relationship and by intruding and making up to the one who's becoming for me makes that one in two before me fur so that what was someone for me he becomes Justin in itself dissolving the for meekness I can't reach her anymore”
Personal identity in the empiricist tradition rests on continuity of consciousness provided by memory, but memories are atomistic and fragmented with gaps, so there is actually no real continuity of consciousness across time.
“in the empiricist tradition that the continuity of consciousness born by memory but as you pointed out those memories are atomistic fragmented gapping so there's actually no continuity of consciousness and force at each moment of intentionality isn't new”
The ego exists as both an ideal unity of absent states (most of which are not present in current consciousness) and a concrete totality fully given to intuition in the present, like a tree or chair exists as a concrete totality of properties.
“phenomenology will understand without difficulty that the ego may at the same time be an ideal unity of states majority of which are absent and a concrete totality wholly giving itself to intuition a tree or a chair exists no differently it's a concrete totality of states”
Knowledge is not representational—it is not a mirror of reality existing independently of consciousness—but rather it is the intentional act of making something present to consciousness, fundamentally creating what it is 'for me.'
“so knowledge is not representational exit Descartes through cants verse critique knowledge is not representational that's an invention of philosophers it says knowledge is simply being present for me because intentionality make something present knowledge is intentionality so knowledge is the act of making something present for me”
The Dostoevsky statement 'if God is dead then anything is possible' employs the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent, since it assumes 'if no God then anything possible' and concludes 'therefore no God' from 'anything is possible.'
“so what he does with the Dostoevsky cow count is this if God is and then anything is possible okay anything is possible therefore no it's the fallacy of affirming the consequent you see there”
The concept of the self as the heart of philosophical debate has undergone an absolutization of freedom, a process that began in the Enlightenment with emphasis on freedom from tradition and authority, enlarged by Kant's assertion of autonomy, expanded by Hegel through history as manifestation of freedom.
“some people have pointed out that what you have in such then is the absolute ization of freedom a process that began in the Enlightenment with its emphasis on freedom from tradition and Authority enlarged in current with his assertion of freedom of the will the autonomy of the world enlarged in Hegel where the whole of history is the gradual manifestation of freedom more and more fully you see and now culminating in sult where in his words it is dreadful freedom”
While Romanticism celebrates complete freedom for full self-expression with hands rubbed in glee, Sartre brings hands together in despair at the dreadfulness of the fact that something one does could blow up the entire universe.
“the romanticist rubs his hands in glee at the freedom for complete full self-expression but salt brings his hands in despair at the dreadfulness of the fact that something I do could blow up the entire universe yes anything is possible”
In father-child or student-administration relationships, there is a tendency to see the other as an object ('it') rather than as a subject ('thou'), exemplifying Sartre's insight that human relations tend toward objectification rather than genuine I-Thou dialogue.
“I suppose if you're talking of a father-child relationship okay the tendency of the child is to see the father as an it especially in early adolescence growing up yes and the should I say the the unsympathetic father is apt to see a child as just another it to be provided for yes a there's a for me in some other way but my kids you get it between students and administration well faculty in administration where it's a we damn you know”
The concept of the self is at the heart of Sartre's entire philosophical position, with his consistent claim being that there is no transcendental self and that the self is created through spontaneous intentional acts.
“well the heart of that is the concept of the self do you follow okay I think he has a pretty consistent position I think he's mistaken in the phenomenological description and I want to make some comments about that next time”
Sartre's true argument is phenomenological rather than logical: if there is a God or transcendental ego, there could not be absolute freedom, yet absolute freedom is phenomenologically evident, therefore there is neither God nor transcendental ego (modus tollens).
“he's not trying to argue it logically he's trying phenomenologically to show this is the case after all if it is the case that there is a god or there is a transcendental ego then there couldn't be that absolute freedom yeah here it's as if his argument is more if there is a God there couldn't be absolute freedom and they are is absolute freedom isn't the god which is the fellow which is an appropriate modus tollens argument”
19th century idealism, particularly German Idealism, viewed reality as made in the image of the self, treating reality as fundamentally mental or spiritual in nature.
“19th century philosophy is looking through that transcendental self self consciousness so unified in order to see reality made in the image of the self and the image of the self means reality is of the nature of mind or spirit and so you get 19th century idealism”
Whitehead and Dewey both employed frameworks organizing concrete human experience into unified theoretical structures, with Whitehead using God's superjected nature and the decision of new events as unifying principles.
“you can see how its organized for whitehead by God's super ejected nature coupled with the decision of the new event which brings things into unity”
The distinction between the 'I' as the unity of actions and the 'me' as the unity of conscious states and qualities is merely functional and grammatical, with both being aspects of the same reality—the ego.
“page 60 let's see now page 60 let's start it there the I page 60 the little paragraph the I is the ego as the unity of actions the me is the ego as the unity of conscious states qualities the distinction between the distinction one makes between these two aspects the eye and the main two aspects of the same reality seems simply functional grammatical”