emotivism
The early-20th-century meta-ethical view that moral statements merely express emotional attitudes ('yay' or 'boo') and are not truth-apt.
As defined in 137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality
Where it comes up · 4
- A History of Philosophy | 77 A.J. Ayer — Language, Truth and Logic4 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 79 Ethics Since Logical Positivism2 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 69 Nietzsche and Introduction to Phenomenology1 claim
- 137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality1 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “emotivism” →
- Emotivism, Ayer's position, must be distinguished from subjectivism: subjectivism (exemplified by David Hume) attempts to translate moral statements into psychological statements about subjective feelings, while emotivism holds that moral judgments are not statements at all but mere emotive expressions without factually meaningful predicates.A History of Philosophy | 77 A.J. Ayer — Language, Truth and Logic
- There is probably no determinate natural-language semantics for moral claims — people mean different things, and emotivists at the turn of the 20th century held 'good' merely expresses 'yay' or 'boo,' which cannot be true or false — but this question of what people are doing when they utter moral words is independent of the metaphysical question: one can stipulatively introduce a language about how we ought to live independent of anyone's opinion, and belief in those facts is on as good footing as belief in numbers, yet still does not settle practical questions.137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality
- Nietzsche's ethics is emotivist—moral judgments are expressions of emotion and will to power rather than objective truths, making ethics non-cognitive and fundamentally a matter of feeling and assertion rather than knowledgeA History of Philosophy | 69 Nietzsche and Introduction to Phenomenology
- WD Ross developed a non-naturalist intuitionism that avoids Ayer's emotivism by claiming we have intuitive recognition of 'right' (not 'good'), where 'right' refers to the quality of an act or motive itself independent of consequences, and is recognizable through commonly recognized obligations arising from relationships and contractsA History of Philosophy | 79 Ethics Since Logical Positivism
- Ayer distinguished four kinds of moral language: (1) psychological descriptions, (2) psychological and other subjective descriptions, (3) exhortation (pure emotivism), and (4) purported moral judgments, showing the variety of uses that positivism collapsed into emotivismA History of Philosophy | 79 Ethics Since Logical Positivism
- C.L. Stevenson, an American philosopher who taught at Michigan, extended Ayer's emotivism in his book Ethics and Language by adding that while ethical language is indeed emotive outburst, it also has a rhetorical effect: telling someone something is right or wrong engages in rhetorical persuasion, so moral arguments are not about right or wrong but about facts, with rhetorical force added on top.A History of Philosophy | 77 A.J. Ayer — Language, Truth and Logic
- Since no definition can capture the meaning of ethical judgments—whether naturalist/utilitarian, conventional/deontological, or intuitionist—the only remaining option is emotivism: ethical judgments are not genuine propositions at all but merely expressions of emotion or feeling, like exclamations.A History of Philosophy | 77 A.J. Ayer — Language, Truth and Logic
- Francis Schaeffer's anti-abortion film exemplifies emotivist rhetoric: it presented bare facts (dolls on landscape) with no moral argument, only the emotional rhetoric of the images. The lecturer suspects Schaeffer may not have realized he was employing the positivist emotivism game.A History of Philosophy | 77 A.J. Ayer — Language, Truth and Logic