
A History of Philosophy | 79 Ethics Since Logical Positivism
What this covers
This is a single lecture from Wheaton College's history of philosophy series, delivered by an instructor in ethics, and it covers the period after logical positivism. It begins with the damage positivism did. Ayer's emotivist theory of ethics treated "stealing is wrong" as an expression of feeling rather than a cognitive judgment. The lecture then follows the responses. G.E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy and W.D. Ross's intuitionism about "right" come first. Ordinary language philosophy follows, including Ayer's own taxonomy of four kinds of moral language, Hare)'s view of moral claims as prescriptions, and John Searle's argument that the practice of promising lets an "ought" be derived from facts.
The middle of the lecture is about the is/ought gap. William Frankena argues that a deduction becomes possible once a further premise is added, such as a theological one about a personal moral God. The lecture also distinguishes three roles divine command theory can play: grounding obligation, supplying moral knowledge, and fixing the meaning of moral terms. Elizabeth Anscombe's 1955 claim that moral law loses its sense without a lawgiver is given considerable weight. The lecturer treats it as showing that meaningful moral law depends on divine command.
The last part surveys the normative revival. John Rawls is presented as consequentialist in how he distributes benefits but Kantian in his commitment to equality, and the veil of ignorance is explained. Robert Nozick builds on acquisition rights, with only a minimal safety net. Alan Gewirth derives respect for others' freedom from consistency, and Alan Donegan's ethic of respect for persons led him to Christianity. The largest portion goes to Alasdair MacIntyre. The lecture covers his history of ethics from Homer to modernity, his criticism of utilitarianism's indifference to character, and his claim that the Aristotelian, Enlightenment and Nietzschean traditions are incommensurable. It also reads his trilogy as a personal path ending in Thomistic Catholicism, and notes his influence on Stanley Hauerwas.
The speaker traces how ordinary language philosophy broke logical positivism's stranglehold on ethics, enabling a renaissance of normative ethical theory through multiple competing frameworks (divine command, contractarianism, virtue ethics, rights-based approaches) that restore meaning to moral language after positivism rendered it cognitively meaningless.
- Logical positivism's emotivist theory reduced all moral claims to mere psychological expressions with no cognitive content, eliminating moral meaning entirely
- Ordinary language analysis revealed moral language's diversity—prescriptions, speech acts, value-laden facts—breaking positivism's reductive account
- Contemporary ethical theories (Rawls, Nozick, Gewirth, Donegan, MacIntyre) restore moral meaning by grounding ethics in contracts, rights, virtue, or divine command rather than utility or intuition alone
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RM Hare's prescriptivism analyzes moral language as fundamentally imperative rather than indicative in form—moral assertions are prescriptions (commands like 'don't do it') not descriptions of facts, allowing moral language to evade positivist verification requirements.
“came to the conclusion that what pervades moral language is an imperative rather than an indicative form of Grandma so that the means that the root significance is not that you are making some factual statement a is B of something of that sort stealing is wrong but the imperative mood don't do it moral language is pre striving not describing and as such it evades the positivist verification of purportedly factual descriptions”
Alan Gewirth's principle of generic consistency holds that if I want maximum freedom to pursue my own life projects, logical consistency requires that I respect others' equal freedom to pursue theirs, making this Kantian principle of universalizability the foundation of ethics.
“Alan Guth tries to spell that out in terms of the fact that I and each one of us want to have the maximum freedom possible to pursue our own life project now the fact that I want that freedom if I'm going to be logically consistent rather than logically self contradictory means that I should respect other people's freedom to the same end so we have what he calls a principle of generic consistency a principle of generic consistency which is really can't see universalizability principle you don't want to assert your own ends your own goals your own rights in violation of the same rights in others that would be violating the principle of generic consistency”
William Frankena's key insight was that while one cannot logically deduce an 'ought' from an 'is' (Hume's law), if one adds an additional premise—such as a theological premise like 'God exists as a personal moral being'—then one can deduce an 'ought' from facts, because the theological premise introduces a source of moral obligation and value.
“he wrote in the late thirties as I recall it was in response to GE Moore's naturalistic fallacy where he argued with a while you cannot a deduce an ort from an ears if you have some additional premise for instance of a theological sort then you can to talk deduce an ort from anis that is to say where where as a you does not logically imply big a plus B do logically implied V so with the addition of some premise which can introduce a source of moral obligation basis for values you can deduce some moral obligation from from certain factual premises so that if you say premise B God personal moral being exists then immediately you've got some value judgment into the initial premise”
Rawls's approach to ethics is not purely utilitarian because while it is consequentialist in distributing benefits and costs, it incorporates a Kantian emphasis on equality that is not reducible to the utilitarian principle of maximizing aggregate utility.
“it's not quite a utilitarian approach although when he talks of equalizing benefits and costs is obviously a consequentialist note but it's not a utilitarian approach he's not simply saying outright maximize the benefit for the maximum number of people no there's a Kantian note in it the emphasis on equality ignoring other considerations there's a Kantian note in it but it's not a county and ethic acting out of a basic sense of duty it's a contract arianna arrangement”
The concept of human flourishing (eudaimonia) is central to Aristotelian virtue ethics and means to actualize to the full the complete flowering of human potential, which involves an Aristotelian teleology—a view that human nature has an inherent purpose or end.
“human flourishing in fact is the term that is often used for the end the goal human flourishing what does it mean to flourish well in the Aristotelian tradition it means to to actualize to the full the full flowering flourishing the full flowering of human potential that involves an Aristotelian teleology”
G.E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy argument claims that 'good' cannot be defined or reduced to any natural property (happiness, pleasure, utility, natural law, or anything empirically or metaphysically definable) and therefore good must be known through intuitive recognition rather than empirical definition.
“Moore maintained that we have some intuitive knowledge of good and intuitive recognition rather of the good though we cannot reduce it to any natural property happiness pleasure utility natural law or anything at all empirically or metaphysically definable his naturalistic fallacy”
Logical positivism's emotivist theory of ethics, articulated by Ayer, claims that moral judgments like 'stealing is wrong' or 'war is shameful' are not genuinely cognitive judgments about moral properties but merely emotive expressions—descriptions of psychological states with no moral meaning whatsoever.
“they are articulates it very effectively in that chapter of his on ethics and theology when he argues that there are really no moral judgments that can be made only emotive expression not even statements about subjective states of affairs not even those judgments they are simply descriptions of psychological states not moral judgments and so to say anything like stealing is wrong or war is shameful is simply emoting and not bringing any predicates to bear”
John Searle's descriptivism demonstrates that moral obligations can be derived from empirical facts by showing that promising is a social practice that involves empirical facts (Jones said 'I hereby promise to pay Smith five dollars') which logically entail moral obligations (Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars) through analysis of how speech acts work.
“John Searle here the the essence is that if simply of empirical facts but of value-laden empirical facts and in order to make his point John so in an article called how to derive and aught from an is he showed the way in which that can be done so that here on the board let me turn this off at the moment so that you can see it a little better Jones said I hereby promise to pay Smith five dollars now that's a factual statement empirically verifiable okay so it follows that Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars simple translation therefore it follows a game that Jones placed himself run under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars simply a matter of definition of terms if follows then simple translation Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars and as a result again simple translation Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars”
John Rawls's theory of justice proposes that a just society is one that would be agreed to by rational people behind a 'veil of ignorance' (not knowing their future position), leading to two principles: equitable distribution of benefits and costs, and arrangement of inequalities to benefit the least advantaged.
“John Rawls at Harvard his book on the theory of justice introducing a contract theory approach you recall John Locke's notion of a state of nature which led because of common needs and rights led to a civil society that depended on some sort of social contract what Rawls is doing is not just talking about a contract Tyrian basis for government but a contract arian basis for all morality so he needs to have his equivalent of Rawls state of nature and what he describes is what would go on behind what he calls a veil of ignorance”
Elizabeth Anscombe argued in her 1955 article 'Modern Moral Philosophy' that for approximately half a century there had been a systematic elimination of the conception of moral law from modern ethical theory, particularly through utilitarianism and logical positivism, and that without a moral lawgiver the conception of moral law cannot have genuine meaning.
“Elizabeth Anscombe who's a name you you ought to be acquainted with a British Catholic woman philosopher who from way back in the forties onwards has been doing a great job in largely matters of moral philosophy and philosophical psychology well I think it was a 1955 I think it was she published an article in the British Journal mind called modern moral philosophy modern moral philosophy in which she complained that it seemed as if for half a century there had been some sort of a conspiracy to eliminate the conception of law from modern ethics”
MacIntyre has had significant influence on Christian ethicists, particularly through theologian Stanley Hauerwas, who develops virtue ethics from a theological perspective and connects virtue to narrative approaches to ethics—the idea that moral development involves participating in a tradition's narrative and making its story your own.
“mcintyre is having a lot of influence among christian ethicists he's had a great influence on the theologian stanley how her wife h au ER w a s who's been developing virtue ethics from a more theological position and tying it in with narrative approaches to ethics the narrative of the tradition you can see that sort of thing implicitly in the emphasis on different traditions there so participating in the life of a tradition the life of a community and making its story your own is one of the ways in which you interiorize the values of that tradition and begin to take on the virtues of that tradition”
MacIntyre initially contrasted the Homeric aristocratic ethic (concerned with beauty, strength, and honor) with the Socratic ethic (concerned with justice, friendship, and reverence), suggesting that the Socratic ethic built a superior kind of society.
“you try to maintain a consistency you try to look at the effect on others and the end product but he doesn't seem to have developed any clear-cut critical points of reference so it becomes a matter of of weighing the the I was going to say the morale the social value of the thing you find in ask to virtue one of the first things that he does is to get a contrast going between the aristocratic ethic of the of the Homeric tradition and what becomes later the Socratic ethic you'll see where the one is interested in Beauty strength and honor that's the eros to cry together and if you're familiar with homers writings you can see it in his heroes yes now Socrates is very different his concern is with justice with friendship in a respect reverence yes now he wrong inferior yes he doesn't seem to say wrong seems to say inferior in terms of the kind of society that it built one built Sparta the other built Athens”
WD Ross developed a non-naturalist intuitionism that avoids Ayer's emotivism by claiming we have intuitive recognition of 'right' (not 'good'), where 'right' refers to the quality of an act or motive itself independent of consequences, and is recognizable through commonly recognized obligations arising from relationships and contracts
“WD Ross continued a kind of intuition ISM where what is intuitive is the right not the good but the rut... it is right that we fulfill our obligations and so the meaning of the term then has to do in that context two commonly recognized obligations arising from certain relationships and contracts”
Ayer distinguished four kinds of moral language: (1) psychological descriptions, (2) psychological and other subjective descriptions, (3) exhortation (pure emotivism), and (4) purported moral judgments, showing the variety of uses that positivism collapsed into emotivism
“remember arrows four kinds of moral language remember there are psychological descriptions there are psychological and other subjective descriptions there are exhortation okay which is simply emoting there are out riding motive utterances there are purported moral judgments there are metal statements I should say as well all right”
Robert Nozick's political philosophy rests on one basic moral principle: individual acquisition rights (the right to acquire whatever one can without illegally taking it from others), which Nozick implements as thoroughgoing ethical egoism with minimal state intervention, though he does allow a safety net for the least advantaged.
“Robert Nozick anarchie the state and utopia is about as conservative in economic and political thought as one could be no Sixpoint is that there is just one basic principle but each in every individual has the right to acquire whatever he can as long as he doesn't take it illegally from somebody else acquisition rights it's a form of ethical egoism the one basic moral principle is respect for acquisition rights oh he does advocate a safety net for the least advantaged but essentially it's a thoroughgoing individualism”
Divine command theory can function in three distinct ways: (1) explaining the basis of moral obligation (why be moral? Because God commands it), (2) explaining the source of moral knowledge (how do we know what is right? Because God has revealed it), and (3) explaining the meaning of moral terms (what does 'right' mean? What God commands)
“divine command theory can be used in at least two or perhaps three different works it can be used and I think this is it's perhaps it's most helpful significance it can be used in talking about the basis of moral obligation why be good well God's will define command theory the basis of moral obligation it could it has also been used in terms of the source of our moral knowledge how do we know what's right because God has said and incidentally Carl Henry in his writings on ethics lays emphasis on it in that regard actually he doesn't distinguish these different regards but it's mainly his concern to stress the source of moral knowledge I think you can still use it to stress the source of moral knowledge if you recognize that there is general as well as special revelation in moral matters and of course in Romans 1 Paul is talking plainly about moral knowledge by means of general revelation insofar as there is witness to moral law in the way in which human nature is constructed function availing that sense having God as creator means this divine command back there but the third way in which divine command theory is used and the one which is significant in this post positivist context is in terms of the meaning of moral terms”
MacIntyre argues that the Aristotelian tradition, the 18th-19th century Enlightenment rationalistic tradition, and the Nietzschean tradition represent three incommensurable ethical traditions that cannot be evaluated by each other's standards because they rest on fundamentally different conceptions of rationality and human flourishing.
“he also makes the point that these rest on different traditions different philosophical traditions that are incommensurable now to talk of incommensurability is to say that you cannot evaluate one by the norms of the other you cannot translate one into terms of the other they're not reducible the wonder the other”
Alasdair MacIntyre traces the history of ethics from Homeric times through modernity, showing that pre-Enlightenment ethics (ancient Greeks, medieval Christianity, medieval Islam) emphasized virtue and character development, while 18th-century Enlightenment ethics replaced this with rule-governed approaches to decision-making and action.
“Alastair MacIntyre name you've heard in number of connections I'm sure three works in this field that are very influential and represent a turn from rule governed approaches to moral decisions and actions turning from that of wool governed approach to moral decisions an ethic of decision making a turning from that rather to what we call virtue ethics an emphasis on moral character the moral qualities of the person rather than the moral quality of individual actions now it has deferred to you he really traced s' the whole history of ethics from pre-socratic times in fact from Homeric times before the pre-socratics from Homeric times way up into post content times making the point that the early Greeks and on into Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics and on into the middie evils were all interested primarily in the cultivation of virtue concern for the growth the development of the soul”
Prescriptivism is non-committal about the grounds for moral prescriptions—moral commands could be based on social prescription, parental authority, divine command, or other sources—meaning prescriptivism as a theory of meaning is compatible with multiple theories of moral authority.
“prospective ism that kind of prescriptivism of course is quite non-committal about the grounds on which it is based this may be a social prescription it may be a parental prescription it may be some other command or order it could even be a divine command”
Taking a moral point of view, according to Frankena, is itself a non-cognitive ingredient (not merely a cognitive attitude)—it is a commitment to assessing things morally that introduces a psychological and attitudinal dimension, such that moral terms come to refer to the attitudes involved in adopting that moral stance.
“the meaning of ethical terms depends on your taking a moral point of view that is to say to take a moral point of view represents a itself a non-cognitive ingredient not a motive simply a burden on cognitive kind of attitude as you commit yourself to assessing things morally so with the addition of that non cognitive point of view then you begin to see that moral terms refer to such attitudes as are involved in a moral point of view they have that psychological point of reference”
MacIntyre argues that utilitarianism represents a departure from virtue ethics in that it is completely indifferent to matters of virtue and character, interested only in maximizing utility, and pursues non-moral aims (like pleasure or preference satisfaction) rather than the moral end of character development.
“what MacIntyre does however is not only trace then the development of these two traditions in ethics look at what came after virtue in a rule governed ethic look at the development of utilitarianism and its complete indifference two matters avert you it's simply interested in maximum utility of actions and policies it's after non-moral aims rather than the moral end of character development”
MacIntyre's movement across his trilogy of works ('After Virtue,' 'Whose Justice? Which Rationality?' 'Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry') represents his personal intellectual journey from existential theology to Marxism to Aristotelian philosophy to Thomistic Catholicism, with the third volume representing his return to Christian faith as a confessing Catholic.
“interestingly this sort of thing tie is very much into his own autobiography because he started as a young man in the fifties writing on the religious language problem you remember his contribution to the religious language discussion was in talking of the idiosyncratic platitude of the idiosyncratic nature of religious language as distinct from other language uses so that you could not support religious belief by virtue of any other kinds of language uses the point being that back then he had a thoroughly barity and theology that God is known quite independently of rational processes by some sort of existential encounter well over the years he drifted away from Christianity completely was interested in Marxism and these three books represents the gradual movement that he's been having back towards some kind of theism”
Kant would likely approve of Anscombe's claim that moral law requires a moral lawgiver, even while rejecting her natural law theory and its metaphysical basis, because Kant recognizes that the connection between moral law and moral lawgiver follows from the structure of rationality itself
“my my guess is that Kant would applaud and scum for that point while rejecting her natural law theory with its metaphysical basis yes a but the connection between moral law and moral lawgiver can't recognizes just as plainly as as I'm Scott yeah Kant would say you have to postulate the lawgiver”
Unless a moral lawgiver exists, the concept of moral law has no empirical or factual reference point, and while humans can enact laws through legislatures or rulers, such human laws lack the universal and unchanging authority of divine law, making the concept of meaningful moral law dependent on divine command.
“unless there is a moral lawgiver the concept of moral law has no meaning there's no empirical referent point no factual reference point for moral law now there could be laws enacted by humans but in that case you would have a legislature or a ruler who's performing the function of moral law but that would not have the authority of divine law so she wants the divine lawgiver right the divine lawgiver in order to give meaning to universal and unchanging moral law which concept would be empirically meaningless factually meaningless without”
Alan Donegan's theory of morality applies the principle of respect for persons to develop a specific ethic, and concludes that the essential principles of Judeo-Christian ethics are true, leading him to become a Christian, illustrating how ethical reasoning can lead to theological conclusions.
“alan Donegan who was also at chicago for many years and then moved to Caltech died just a year and a half two years ago alan Donegan's book the theory of morality also Kantian what he tried to do is to pick up on the principle of respect for persons and see what could be inferred from that in terms of the implementation of a more specifically developed kind of ethic what he did was to argue that the essential principles of Judea judeo-christian ethic a truth you'll be interested that he told me this once when he was out here that while it took him many years to work this through and argue it after the book had gone to the printer he came to the conclusion that if the judeo-christian ethic was true that the underlying theology probably was too and he ought to become a Christian and being an ethical person he did”
Even when medieval theologians like Thomas Aquinas developed just war theory (a rule-based approach), they did so under the rubric of virtue—specifically the virtue of love—because love requires that justice be tempered with compassion, illustrating that virtue frameworks can encompass rules within a larger ethical perspective.
“certainly in people like Agustin and Thomas Aquinas with their natural law approaches to ethics there is quest there is concern about moral rules namely natural moral law as well as biblical law to guide moral decisions and produce right actions that's there but the larger concern is that of the virtues in fact it it's interesting to notice and it may seem initially paradoxical to hear it but when Thomas Aquinas is talking about the rules for Just War theory he's doing so under the large rubric of the virtue was love because love requires that justice be tempered with love and so just war has to be understood in that sort of way”
Over the last twenty years (from the time of this lecture), the five most influential ethicists are Rawls (contractarian/justice), Nozick (libertarian/rights), Gewirth (Kantian/respect for persons), Donegan (Kantian/respect for persons with theological implications), and MacIntyre (virtue ethics), with Rawls and MacIntyre being the two most discussed contemporary ethical voices.
“my sense is that Rawls influence is continuing and will continue more so than Nozick worth and Donegan and that at this juncture it's perhaps roles in rule governed principle governed ethical decisions and MacIntyre in virtue ethics or the two most discussed individual writers the people you want to get acquainted with”
The outcome of recent debates in normative ethics is that normative ethics, like philosophy of religion, is alive and well and thriving, in contrast to the period of positivist dominance when ethics seemed moribund.
“the outcome is that normative ethics like philosophy of religion is again alive and well they are not withstanding”
Rawls's approach has generated enormous discussion not only among ethicists but in political science, economics, and related fields, and his leanings are generally toward liberal rather than conservative political-economic philosophy
“his approach has had an immense amount of discussion not only among ethicists but in political science in economics so forth in general his leanings are towards a more liberal than conservative political economic philosophy on the basis of these principles”