
A History of Philosophy | 77 A.J. Ayer — Language, Truth and Logic
What this covers
This is a lecture in a history-of-philosophy series that works through A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic chapter by chapter, with a philosophy instructor and other lecturers commenting. The lecture reads the book as one sustained elimination of metaphysics and then asks what remains. Ayer's verifiability criterion is the starting point: a sentence is factually significant only if the speaker knows which observations would confirm or refute it. The lecture ties this to Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions and to the use of symbolic logic as a tool for analyzing logical equivalence. It also stresses that Ayer presents philosophy's critical role as an old one, running back through Socrates, René Descartes, David Hume and Immanuel Kant.
The range is wide. On mathematics, Ayer rejects Mill's view that logic is empirical and treats its truths as tautologies. He denies both a faculty of intellectual intuition and absolutely certain sense-datum statements. He calls the problem of induction fictitious, justifying induction only pragmatically. The truth chapter treats "what is truth?" as a definition in use question, and the lecture follows it into the Strawson–Austin debate over whether truth assertions are performatives. In ethics the lecture separates emotivism from Humean subjectivism, explains why utilitarian definitions commit the naturalistic fallacy, and covers C.L. Stevenson's addition of rhetorical persuasion. A contested point is the claim that translating mental language into brain-state language loses the self-referential I language.
The sharper turns come in the critique. The lecture argues that Ayer defines metaphysics too narrowly, since Alfred North Whitehead is not interested in transcendent realities. It also argues that a positivist cannot coherently explain metaphysics as psychological pathology. After the verifiability criterion fell, the lecture says, metaphysics could be done again in good conscience. It closes with three post-positivist approaches, from Whitehead, Dorothy Emmet's coordinating analogy and Pepper's root metaphors. All three favor conceptual schemes over foundationalist deductive systems.
A.J. Ayer's logical positivism eliminates metaphysics by applying a verifiability criterion of meaning, redefining philosophy as purely critical and analytical rather than speculative, and reducing ethical and theological claims to non-cognitive expressions like emotions or definitions rather than factual statements.
- Metaphysics is eliminated because it makes claims about reality transcending experience, which cannot be empirically verified or falsified
- Philosophy's only function becomes logical analysis of language to determine cognitive meaning, not discovery of metaphysical truth
- Ethical and theological judgments are emotive expressions or linguistic conventions, not statements about objective moral or divine reality
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Emotivism, Ayer's position, must be distinguished from subjectivism: subjectivism (exemplified by David Hume) attempts to translate moral statements into psychological statements about subjective feelings, while emotivism holds that moral judgments are not statements at all but mere emotive expressions without factually meaningful predicates.
“Distinguish emotivism from subjectivism. He does. The subjectivist ethic like that of David Hume defines the good and the right in terms of certain subjective feelings which people have. Really what the subjectivist is doing is translating moral statements into psychological statements. But the emotivist is not translating moral statements into a statement at all because there are no moral statements to translate into into psychological statements. He's saying that a moral judgment like X is right, X is good is not a judgment. There's no meaningful predicate. No factually meaningful predicate. And consequently, all you have is an emotive expression. An exclamation. Exclamation. You see? An outburst. It's like saying, "Don't." You see? But the don't gets to be more the hortatory thing.”
The psychoanalytic approach to explaining metaphysics is self-refuting for a positivist to adopt, because whether metaphysical statements result from psychological pathology is not itself amenable to verification or falsification according to the verifiability criterion.
“this seems to me to be uh a rather uh pathetic kind of um scientific attempt to explain metaphysics because however would that be amenable uh to um verification or falsification? Uh you see, it's a sort of self-refuting thing for a positivist to do.”
The elimination of metaphysics is the underlying thesis that runs through the entirety of Ayer's book, because without metaphysics the function of philosophy changes: the a priori does not tell us about reality but only tautologies, truth and probability are phenomenalist rather than realist, ethics does not describe objective moral order, and theology does not describe the metaphysical entity God.
“pretty well every other topic taken up in subsequent chapters hinges on that elimination of metaphysics. After all, without metaphysics, the function of philosophy is changed. The nature of philosophical analysis is not going to be such that it's telling us about a reality beyond experience. The a priori does not tell us about reality, simply tautological. And truth and probability can be taken in a phenomenalist rather than a realist sense. And ethics does not tell us about objective moral order in reality. Nor does theology tell us about the metaphysical entity known as God.”
After the critique of Ayer's verifiability criterion of meaning and its rejection, people could now do metaphysics again in good philosophical conscience because the primary justification for eliminating metaphysics had been disposed of.
“Well, two things. One, we commented on last time, the critique of the verifiability criterion of meaning, on the basis of which metaphysics was declared meaningless. And with that criterion disposed of, people can now do metaphysics again in good philosophical conscience.”
In matters of verification and falsification, only probability is available—certain empirical verification is not attainable—and therefore philosophical discussions of truth and probability must acknowledge this limitation.
“Well, he goes on to point out that um in matters of verification and falsification, all that's available is probability anyway.”
The analysis of language is facilitated if one uses for the classification of its forms an artificial system of symbols whose structure is known, with the best-known example being the system of logistics (symbolic logic) employed by Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica, allowing for more precise logical analysis of equivalences.
“It's to be remarked the process of analyzing a language is facilitated if it's possible to use for the classification of its forms an artificial system of symbols whose structure is known. The best-known example is the so-called system of logistics, symbolic logic, employed by Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica. Uh so you get a much more precise logical analysis of equivalences if you translate it into symbolic logic.”
Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions provides the model for philosophical analysis: a sentence like 'the author of Waverley was Scottish' can be analyzed into 'One person and one person only wrote Waverley, and that person was Scottish,' which makes the logical meaning more accessible to empirical verification.
“a good illustration of this process is provided by Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions. And I mentioned this without labeling it that way when we were talking about Russell. I used his example, the present King of France is bald, or I think I used this one as well, the authorly the author of Waverley is Scott. Sir Walter Scott. Here, I notice Ayer does not say the author of Waverley was Scott, but was Scotch. Scottish. Uh well, Sir Walter Scott was Scottish. But his point is that the sentence a sentence like that the author of Waverley was Scotch is equivalent to the following and here's Russell's the theory of definite descriptions. That is to say just how do you analyze a statement like the author of Waverley was Scotch. You want to analyze it into its logical constituents. One person and one person only wrote Waverley. And that person was Scotch.”
Ayer's definition of metaphysics as claims about 'a reality transcending the world of common sense and science' is too narrow, because modern metaphysicians like Whitehead are not interested in transcendent realities but rather in whether the entities that science theorizes about and that ordinary experience encounters are properly understood.
“He says, 'We may begin by criticizing the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of common sense and science, the world of science and common sense.' Now, you've been reading Whitehead, who is 20th century metaphysician par excellence. And he is not interested in realities transcending the world of science and common sense. Whitehead is concerned as to whether the entities that science theorizes about and that ordinary experience or common sense encounters, whether these are properly understood.”
P.F. Strawson and J.L. Austin engaged in the famous Strawson-Austin debate about truth: Strawson, following Ayer, held that all truth assertions are performatives, while Austin argued that 'it is true that P' cannot be translated without loss into the performative assertion of P.
“Between um two philosophers, P.F. Strawson and J.L. Austin, came known as the Strawson-Austin debate, in which Strawson took took essentially Ayer's view that all truth assertions are performatives. And Austin said, 'No, you cannot translate the statement it is true that without loss into simply a performative utterance.'”
Ayer rejects Mill's theory that the propositions of logic and mathematics have the same status as empirical hypotheses, instead maintaining that truths of logic and mathematics are independent of experience in the sense that they don't owe their validity to empirical verification—they are discovered through induction but once apprehended are necessarily true.
“Um now to that um he says, A says, 'We maintain that they are independent of experience in the sense that they don't own their validity to empirical verification. We may come to discover them through an inductive process, but once we've apprehended them, we see that they're necessarily true.'”
In chapter five on truth and probability, Ayer treats the question 'what is truth?' as fundamentally a problem of definition in use—asking what it logically means to say that a proposition is true.
“Chapter five, talking of truth and probability, one main thing I want to stress here, it is that the question what is truth, the problem of truth is really simply a problem of definition. A problem of definition in use. When I say of a proposition that it's true, what do I mean? What's the logical equivalence?”
Dorothy Emmet's conception of metaphysics in The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking (1940s) characterized metaphysics as an attempt to work with a coordinating analogy drawn from ordinary experience, adapting the medieval notion of analogical predication and hierarchy of being.
“Um there was in addition to that a conception of metaphysics adapted from the medieval way of analogy. The medievals, you remember, with their hierarchy of being, talked of analogical predication. There are degrees of being and of various properties. And there was in the 1940s a book published by Dorothy Emmet, quite influential, a book by Dorothy Emmet called The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, which suggested that metaphysics is an attempt to work with a coordinating analogy, a coordinating analogy drawn from ordinary experience.”
Through logical analysis, the philosopher asks whether a statement is factually meaningful. If it is, the statement can be referred to whoever's appropriate business it is to determine its factuality. The philosopher's job is not to ascertain truth but only through careful logical analysis to determine who can ascertain truth and ask whether it is empirically meaningful.
“By this exercise of logical analysis uh what you are doing is asking yourself is this statement a factually a factually meaningful statement or is it not? You see. And uh if it is then you can refer it to um whoever's appropriate business it is to determine its factuality. Presumably to the literary critic. You see. It's not the business of the philosopher to ascertain truth but only by careful logical analysis to determine who can ascertain truth. To ask is it meaningful? Empirically meaningful.”
The function of philosophy is wholly critical, consisting of careful analysis of concepts and arguments, not the development of metaphysical systems. This critical function is an age-old function of philosophy, exemplified by Socrates, Descartes (in Meditation One), Hume, and Kant (who called his philosophy 'critical philosophy').
“with the overthrow of speculative philosophy, we're in a position to see that the function of philosophy is wholly critical. In what exactly does its critical activity consist? Um in the early part of the century, I think I mentioned this before, the tendency was to say that philosophy had two functions, the speculative and critical. The speculative function being the development of metaphysical systems and the critical function being the criticism of arguments and increasingly the analysis of concepts and the odd things that philosophers say. So, the development of analytic philosophy, it Russell Moore and company, was simply stressing and further developing the tools of the critical functions of philosophy.”
Ayer rejects the idea that we are endowed with a faculty of intellectual intuition which would enable us to identify Descartes-type first axioms, as this would support foundationalist metaphysics.
“notice that at the very bottom of that page he rejects the idea that we are endowed with a faculty of intellectual intuition uh which would enable us to identify some Descartes type first axioms. He repudiates that.”
Ayer denies that there can be ostensive statements—empirical sense datum statements that are so self-evident as to be absolutely certain. Some other logical positivists believed such statements existed, but Ayer later develops a view that there are basic statements that are much more sure than many others, though still not absolutely certain.
“He does make reference at one point to the um need to have ostensive statements. Ostensive statements are ones empirical sense datum statements. They are ones which um are so self-evident as to be absolutely certain. And he denies that there can be any such. Whereas some of the other logical positivists believe that there were ostensive statements sense datum statements that are absolutely certain. After all uh you might suppose um uh that um um a sense datum statement about a color you observe is absolutely certain. But is it? Once you consider all the observation conditions that go into observing a color. Observation conditions about the light in which you're seeing things and so on and so forth. He does um later on come down to the view and he mentions this in that long introduction uh that there are certain basic statements that we can appeal to that are much more sure than many others. Basic statements. Uh but still not the absolute certainty of the ostensive statements.”
Mental state language is an 'I language' rather than an 'it language,' and the self-referentiality of I language is what is lost in the attempt to reduce mental states to physical states, so the complete translation of mental language into brain state language loses something essential.
“Whereas others will say there's one dimension that is lost in that. Mental state language is an I language. Rather than an it language. And the self-referentiality of the I language of mental states is what is lost.”
If one attempts to give a utilitarian definition of 'right' or 'good'—such as 'X is productive of Y consequences'—this translates the ethical judgment into a sociological or psychological statement, not a moral statement, so utilitarianism does not capture the meaning of moral judgments and commits the naturalistic fallacy of defining the good in terms of natural properties.
“Well, let's see. Um supposing you have a utilitarian definition, and he discusses that in the chapter. But um what this translates is then X is is productive of Y consequences. That's a sociological statement, not a moral statement. The utilitarian defines a moral term in non-moral ways. It reduces the moral to the non-moral. To sociological psychological things that can be observed. And so utilitarianism does not make sense of moral judgments. He agrees with G. E. Moore in rejecting the naturalistic fallacy defining the good in terms of any natural kind of property.”
The problem of induction has historically been rooted in assumptions about metaphysical stability or metaphysical order, initially Aristotelian order but, in empiricists from Hume onwards, problematic because knowledge of such metaphysical order in reality could not be established.
“And on page 49, it's the problem of induction. The problem of induction, which has, of course, been rooted historically in there being some metaphysical stability, some metaphysical order, the Aristotelian kind of metaphysical order initially, but in the empiricists from Hume onwards, was problematic, because you couldn't know about such metaphysical order in reality.”
Ayer calls the problem of induction a fictitious problem because if the quest for metaphysical understanding is a pseudo-function of philosophy, then the problem of not being able to gain such metaphysical certainty through induction is not a real logical problem. We can justify inductive reasoning pragmatically because it works for scientific purposes, without needing metaphysical certainty.
“And on page 49, it's the problem of induction. The problem of induction, which has, of course, been rooted historically in there being some metaphysical stability, some metaphysical order, the Aristotelian kind of metaphysical order initially, but in the empiricists from Hume onwards, was problematic, because you couldn't know about such metaphysical order in reality. Well, at the very top of page 50, Ayer calls it a fictitious problem. Because if the quest for metaphysical understanding is a pseudo function of philosophy, then the problem of not being able to gain such is a fictitious problem. It's not really a logical problem for philosophers at all. Uh we can continue to engage in inductive reasoning for the simple reason that it seems to work for scientific purposes. What more do we want? There's a dose here of pragmatic justification for the purposes of science and common sense. We don't need the purposes of metaphysical systems with logical certainty. That's irrelevant.”
C.L. Stevenson, an American philosopher who taught at Michigan, extended Ayer's emotivism in his book Ethics and Language by adding that while ethical language is indeed emotive outburst, it also has a rhetorical effect: telling someone something is right or wrong engages in rhetorical persuasion, so moral arguments are not about right or wrong but about facts, with rhetorical force added on top.
“Well, that was uh picked up by uh C. L. Stevenson who taught at Michigan. In his book Ethics and Language, and Stevenson added one more thing. While ethical language is indeed emotive outburst um it also has a rhetorical effect. By telling you that something is right or wrong I'm engaged in some rhetorical act of persuasion. You see? Uh um and um insofar as we have moral arguments, we're not arguing about right or wrong. We're just arguing about the facts of the case. You see? And then we use the rhetoric the emotive rhetoric on top of the facts of the case.”
Ayer states the criterion of verifiability: a sentence is factually significant to a given person if and only if he knows how to verify the proposition it purports to express—that is, if he knows what observations would lead him to accept the proposition as being true or reject it as being false.
“And on page 35 he um states the criterion of verifiability in the middle of the page a sentence is factually significant to a given person if and only if he knows how to verify the proposition it purports to express. That is, if he knows what observations would lead him to accept the proposition as being true or reject it as being false.”
The emphasis in all three post-positivist approaches to metaphysics—Whitehead's speculative system, Emmet's coordinating analogy, and Pepper's root metaphors—is on conceptual schemes and networks rather than on deductive systems of a foundationalist sort like those Descartes and Spinoza attempted.
“So, um the emphasis uh I think it's fair to say in all three of these approaches is on conceptual schemes conceptual schemes rather than on a deductive system of a foundationalist sort like Descartes and Spinoza attempted.”
The truths of logic and mathematics are necessarily true because we never allow them to be anything else—we cannot abandon them without contradicting ourselves and violating the rules that govern the use of language, making our utterances self-stultifying.
“the principles of logic and mathematics are true universally simply because we never allow them to be anything else. And the reason for this is we cannot abandon them without contradicting ourselves. That's the old definition of a necessary truth, one whose contradictory is self-contradictory. We cannot abandon them without contradicting ourselves, without sinning against the rules that govern the use of language, making our utterances self-stultifying.”
The problem of truth is simply a problem of definition in use: when I say a proposition is true, all I am doing is asserting the proposition itself, so truth assertions do not add cognitive content but rather perform another function.
“the question what is truth, the problem of truth is really simply a problem of definition. A problem of definition in use. When I say of a proposition that it's true, what do I mean? What's the logical equivalence? And you'll find that um his argument is very simple, that when I say P is true, all I'm doing is asserting P.”
The propositions of philosophy are not factual but linguistic in character—they express definitions and the logical consequences of definitions rather than describing the behavior of physical or mental objects—so philosophy is a department of logic concerned with formal consequences of definitions, not empirical fact.
“The propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character. That is, they don't describe the behavior of physical or mental objects, but they express definitions and the logical consequences of definitions. So, we may say that philosophy, with its propositions, is a department of logic. The characteristic mark of a purely logical inquiry is its concern with the formal consequences of definitions, not with empirical fact.”
The problem of perception—whether sense data statements are logically equivalent to material object statements or whether there is something untranslatable left over in material object statements—becomes the main philosophical significance of the traditional problem of perception when subjected to positivist analysis.
“The problem of translating sentences about a material body into sentences about sense data. Ah. Sense contents. Which may be called the problem of the reduction of material things to sense contents. Now, this is the main philosophical part of the traditional problem of perception. Now, think about that for a moment. The problem of perception which is raised by Plato in the Republic and the Theaetetus about the reliability of sense perception in telling us about the real nature of physical things. The problem of perception as posed by Locke's representational theory and the correspondence between uh primary and secondary quality sensations on the one hand material object on the other.”
Definitions of ethical terms like 'right means just' are analytic linguistic conventions, not true or false statements; propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience are psychological or social descriptions; exhortations to moral virtue like 'Chin up' are not truth-valued but are performative encouragements; and actual ethical judgments like 'Voting so-and-so would be morally irresponsible' constitute a fourth distinct category.
“First, definitions of ethical terms. Okay. Right means what is just. Things of that sort. Now, you know what he thinks about definitions of ethical terms. That they're analytic. They're not true or false. They're simply statements of how we're using language. Conventions. Second, propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience. I feel terrible about that. Well, that's in psychologically interesting, isn't it? You see, such um description of the phenomena of moral experience are psychological descriptions. Or perhaps social descriptions. Society, this society frowns on. You'll see. So, there you've got psychological and sociological statements. Third, exhortations to moral virtue. Chin up, old chap. Britishism, after all. But an exhortation to moral virtue is not a statement true or false. It's an exhortation, an encouragement. Has a different function. Fourth, there are actual ethical judgments. Okay. Actual ethical judgments. Voting so-and-so in a game would be morally irresponsible. Such-and-such is unjust. Moral judgments.”
MacKay responded to this challenge by saying he has only empirical data and biblical data to work with, and the Bible does not explicitly state the existence of a metaphysical entity called mind or soul, revealing he was operating with the empirical verifiability criterion of meaning and was therefore stuck about handling metaphysical questions involved in certain Christian beliefs.
“To which he responded eventually after we'd worked through this, that, and the other, well, how would I say it? What would I have to go on? All I've got is what the Bible says and empirical data. And the Bible doesn't say anything explicitly about the existence of a metaphysical entity called mind or soul. I said, 'Well, what about a metaphysical assertion? Some metaphysical um conceptualization?' And he leaned back and said, 'Metaphysical?' And then the penny dropped. 'You mean you're operating with the empirical verifiability criterion?' Yeah. He was a positivist. You see? Um he he wanted as an empirical scientist to stick with either empirical data or biblical data.”
Since no definition can capture the meaning of ethical judgments—whether naturalist/utilitarian, conventional/deontological, or intuitionist—the only remaining option is emotivism: ethical judgments are not genuine propositions at all but merely expressions of emotion or feeling, like exclamations.
“any other definition, deontological, is a matter of convention. To say X is right is saying no more than something like that... it is simply an emotivism. An expression of emotion, an expression of feeling.”
Francis Schaeffer's anti-abortion film exemplifies emotivist rhetoric: it presented bare facts (dolls on landscape) with no moral argument, only the emotional rhetoric of the images. The lecturer suspects Schaeffer may not have realized he was employing the positivist emotivism game.
“Um do you remember the Francis Schaeffer film about abortion? That showed all of the dolls lying around over the landscape. And that's wrong. Notice there was no moral argument. What there was was the bare facts that can be seen. And the emotional rhetoric of the language. I suspect they didn't realize what they were doing. They were playing the positivist game. An emotivist ethic.”
Kant and Bradley are the whipping boys that Ayer has in mind in critiquing metaphysics: Kant for condemning transcendent metaphysics on different grounds, and Bradley whose metaphysic presented in 'Appearance and Reality' is particularly anathema to Ayer because its very title asserts the distinction between appearance and reality that positivism rejects.
“the uh whipping boys that he has in mind appear on page 34 uh where at the beginning of the middle paragraph he uh refers to Kant who condemned transcendent metaphysics on different grounds. And at the bottom of the page he refers to Bradley who you remember had a metaphysic in his major work called Appearance and Reality the very title of which is what is anathema to Ayer.”
Whitehead's metaphysics is a speculative system that grows out of and incorporates proper scientific concepts and concrete experience, developing a conceptualization of an event based on both ordinary experience and science, then generalizing that everything that exists, God included, is of the nature of an event so described.
“Whitehead's view is that metaphysics is a speculative system that grows out of and incorporates proper scientific concepts and concrete experience. It's a speculative system that intends to engage in extrapolation, generalization from what we know to encompass the whole. And so he develops his conceptualization of an event based on both ordinary experience and science, and then generalizes that everything that exists is of the nature of an event so described, God included.”
Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic was originally published in 1935, with a significantly longer introduction added in the 1946 edition that softens the hard-nosed scientific positivism of the original text due to criticisms including the ordinary language tradition.
“The introduction to the first edition was in 1935. And the introduction to this edition, the much longer initial introduction that runs up to page 26, was 10 years later in '46. And in that 10 years, Ayer had been exposed to all sorts of criticism, including the beginnings of the ordinary language tradition”
Ian Ramsey's notion of conceptual network, developed in the ordinary language tradition, views metaphysics as charting how we talk about the whole of reality in ordinary language, with the word 'I' as a unifying point in talking about one's experience, and similarly the word 'God' functioning as a unifier of discourse in theistic schemes.
“There is a third conception of metaphysics which grew out of the ordinary language movement that we'll be um exploring as a conceptual network. And uh that's represented by Ian Ramsey uh who taught at Oxford uh the notion of conceptual network. He has a book called Prospect for Metaphysics published also in the 1940s. Prospect for Metaphysics. Cons- uh conceptual network. That that is to say uh charting the ways in which in ordinary language we do talk of the whole of reality in certain um um and pays attention to the use of the word I the use of the word I as um a unifying point in uh talking about one's um experience. And uh suggests that in similar fashion the word God uh functions as a unifier of discourse a unifier of conceptualization in any theistic scheme.”
The emotivist pattern of fact-plus-emotion rhetoric is particularly prevalent and visible in election-year political discourse.
“And I think you notice that in election year you'll find a lot more of it.”
Donald MacKay, an English brain scientist and philosopher, used the I/it distinction technique to criticize purely materialistic interpretations of human nature, maintaining that physical state language omits the I language of mental states, and published through InterVarsity Press.
“Incidentally, if you've read any of the writings of Donald MacKay, um m c k a y, the English brain scientist and philosopher, uh also an evangelical, um his books have been um published by InterVarsity Press and circulated quite widely. Um Donald MacKay as a brain scientist, um used this technique in criticizing purely materialistic interpretations of human nature. And maintaining that uh physical state language omits the I language, the I states of mental state language.”
Some positivists, going beyond Ayer, explained why people persist in making metaphysical statements by claiming it results from psychopathology: Morris Lazerowitz argued the subconscious projects worlds it emotionally cannot live without, while J.O. Wisdom psychoanalytically asserted Berkeley had a pathological aversion to dirt and excretion leading him to deny the independent reality of such things.
“some positivists uh went even uh one step beyond Ayer uh into asking why it is if uh metaphysical statements are factually meaningless uh that some people have persisted in making metaphysical statements. And there are two writers of particular interest in that regard. Um one is an American Morris Lazerowitz who taught at Smith College. And in a book of his called The Structure of Metaphysics tried to say uh that this is the product of some um um psychopathology. Uh that is to say the subconscious is uh projecting worlds which emotionally it it cannot live without. And there is um uh one uh individual J. O. Wisdom incidentally not the John Wisdom of importance later in ordinary language stuff, but his brother. Uh J. O. Wisdom who um wrote a book called um Now, the title slips me. The Psychoanalysis of George Berkeley's Philosophy in which he I was going to say argued, I think asserted would be the better. Um uh that um as a result of his own posthumous analysis of Berkeley um he had a pathological aversion to dirt and excretion. And for that reason had to deny the independent reality of any such thing.”
Donald MacKay was a remarkable individual who continued publishing and doing first-rate work until his death from cancer a couple of years prior to this lecture, and produced books such as The Clockwork Universe.
“Um he um um was a remarkable individual and I think one of the real losses was that he died of cancer um just a couple of years ago. Um a man who was still publishing and doing some first-rate work. Donald MacKay. You may have seen his book The Clockwork Universe, things of that sort.”
The first four chapters of Ayer's book are concerned with the machinery and mechanisms of logical positivism and what is distinctive in its methodology, making them tremendously important to understand the framework before moving to substantive issues in chapters five and six.
“I think it's fair to say that those first four chapters um are really concerned with the machinery, the mechanisms of logical positivism and what in terms of its methodology is distinctive. Chapters and and obviously that's the tremendously important thing to get a hold of.”