credit default swap
A financial contract insuring against the default of a debt instrument; banks used them to appear to have transferred risk away.
As defined in Anat Admati on Bank Regulation and the Bankers' New Clothes
Other definitions
A derivative contract functioning like insurance against a bond defaulting; AIG sold these to banks, transferring the banks' risk to AIG.
Neil Barofsky on BailoutsA derivative contract in which a buyer pays periodic premiums to a seller in exchange for compensation if a reference debt instrument defaults; it can be used to bet against credit.
Blockchain’s Carpenter
Where it comes up · 13
- Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/20106 claims
- Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/20104 claims
- The Big Short and Beyond3 claims
- Blockchain’s Carpenter2 claims
- Cathy O'Neil on Wall St and Occupy Wall Street2 claims
- Michael Burry Interview - Are We In An Index Bubble?1 claim
- The Bubble Hasn't Burst Yet | TCAF 1101 claim
- The Three Body Portfolio1 claim
and 5 more
Most important claims · 10 of 25Search all claims for “credit default swap” →
- Credit default swaps made it possible to short the riskiest tranches of mortgage securitizations for roughly 1% a year, while shorting the equity of the same companies cost 25-40% a year, creating extreme asymmetry.Blockchain’s Carpenter
- When Bear Stearns was rescued, Lehman credit default swap prices fell back sharply because markets expected Lehman would also be rescued, and when Lehman failed, markets revealed that expectation had been wrong.Russ Roberts on the Crisis 05/17/2010
- During an Asian crisis, Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin asked an aide what the US financial system's credit default swap exposure to Korea was, and the answer was 'we don't know.' Nocera blames Rubin more than anyone for failing, at minimum, to make derivatives transparent so the government could see counterparties and danger points. Rubin's circle instead held that all smart people knew derivatives made the world safer and dismissed dissenters as idiots.Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/2010
- Goldman's collateral demands on AIG can be viewed as a run on AIG while it was still somewhat solvent; simultaneously Goldman bought credit default swaps against AIG's own default because the collateral battles revealed AIG was in more trouble than anyone realized—making Goldman the 'smart devils'.Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/2010
- Embarrassing pre-crisis analyses tend not to be discussed. A paper by the Orszag brothers and Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz showed how remote the chance of a Fannie or Freddie bankruptcy was. Gary Gorton has had a career rehabilitation, with a crisis-causes paper praised by Bernanke, while his role building the models behind AIG's credit default swaps is forgotten.Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/2010
- Shorting New Century and Credit Home Lenders stock was not viable because little stock was available to borrow, borrow costs reached 40% to 50%, and large quarterly dividends were being paid, so buying credit default swaps on the mortgage bonds was cheaper.The Big Short and Beyond
- Goldman's collateral calls can be seen as a run on AIG: getting cash out while AIG was still somewhat solvent, without knowing a bailout would come. At the same time, Goldman bought credit default swaps against AIG's own default, because the collateral battles revealed that AIG was in more trouble than anyone realized.Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/2010
- CDOs are financed with debt (leverage) at multiple levels: mortgages are themselves leveraged (low down payment), mortgage-backed securities are financed with debt, and synthetic CDOs using credit default swaps amplify leverage furtherMichael Burry Interview - Are We In An Index Bubble?
- Banks bought credit default swaps partly to satisfy regulators by appearing to have transferred risk away, which let them avoid holding equity against those assets; but the risk accumulated at AIG, which no one monitored for creditworthiness, so banks merely replaced their creditors' default risk with AIG's default risk.Anat Admati on Bank Regulation and the Bankers' New Clothes
- Documents released by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission show that AIG Financial Products was actually a fairly cautiously run division. It made one terrible mistake, insuring AAA mortgage securities with credit default swaps, based partly on Yale economist Gary Gorton's risk models and partly on its own reading of the mortgage market.Joe Nocera on the Crisis and All the Devils Are Here 12/20/2010