What this covers

Patrick interviews Danny Moses, the FrontPoint trader at the center of the subprime short, and the conversation runs from how that trade was built to how markets work now. Moses starts in the late 1990s, when Steve Eisman predicted that five subprime auto lenders would go to zero. The losses were already in monthly Moody's and S&P securitization data, while equity analysts watched only earnings per share. In mortgages, New Century sold its best bonds at 103 or 104 and kept the worst, yet the market priced its whole book at that level. Its stock was costly to borrow and paid large dividends, so the team bought credit default swaps on the bonds instead.

The range is wide. Moses compares bubbles in tulips, cotton, tech, and subprime, including telecom fiber stocks valued as if one quarter's growth would compound forever, a case of the Extrapolation Trap. He says Roger Lowenstein's Long-Term Capital book taught him that leverage eventually buries a wrong trade. He also covers activists lifting a stock's P/E ratio from about 9 to 13, and why cash flow is the first bottom-up metric.

The contentious half concerns the present. Moses traces sell-side research from commission-funded work, to investment-banking fees, to buy ratings traded for management access, and links Dodd-Frank to collapsing commissions. He argues that active managers lose when money flows into the benchmark ETF, that ETFs may be most of a stock's top ten holders, and that non-GAAP earnings tracked by momentum ETFs let a CEO manufacture a price. Patrick adds the quant view, noting REITs' over-representation and that valuation persists while informational edges decay.

Sharpest takeaway

Danny Moses argues that the subprime short worked because it was bottom-up and incentive-driven, while today sell-side research, non-GAAP reporting, and ETF flows have displaced fundamentals, so a market correction is needed before fundamental work matters again.

  • Subprime losses were visible in public securitization and rating-agency data, and the team profited by tracing how issuers and intermediaries were paid.
  • Analyst incentives shifted from investment banking fees to access-to-management, weakening research quality.
  • Passive and ETF flows, plus non-GAAP reporting aimed at ETF criteria, let prices decouple from underlying business quality.

The argument · threads2 threads · 72 claims
0.71

Investment hires should be skeptical, hungry, track-record candidates, not credentialed or pay-driven ones.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The first trait to look for in an investment hire is an out-of-the-box thinker who questions everything and is skeptical rather than cynical, and who doesn't rely on CEOs or others to confirm they are right and instead seeks people who will tell them they are wrong.

    “You have to question everything that you see. It's not so much being cynical, as it is being skeptical.”

  • Pay is falling across buy-side and sell-side, so many candidates are turned off, but such candidates should be screened out; the best hires are those who still want the business despite lower pay, because the industry is cyclical and will recover.

    “things are cyclical. There are some structural changes going on in the business for sure, but again, at the end of the day, it's not going away and it'll come back.”

  • Strong grades and polished business-case answers create a false sense of being smart; a hungry candidate with a demonstrable track record, such as the Boulder hire who offered to trade Asia or Europe for the team, is more valuable than an elite-school résumé.

    “So people that have a false sense of smart, because they did business cases correctly and got an A on it”

0.57

ETF flows and momentum cascades distort prices, making short-lived quant edges hard to time.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • REITs are heavily over-represented in ETFs relative to their market weight because dividend-focused funds buy them, yet quant data show the highest-yield REITs tend to underperform, so yield is the last metric to examine.

    “the highest yield REITs tend to go on to underperform.”

  • Hearing fundamental perspectives on balance sheets, cash flow, and aggressive accounting informs quant research, and valuation should persist across decades because there is a behavioral undercurrent to it, while short half-life informational edges decay quickly.

    “there's a behavioral undercurrent to it. But it's helpful to hear the fundamental perspective because that informs the quant.”

  • A momentum model trading other ETFs creates the momentum it then trades on, producing cascades whose timing is hard to predict, so being early can be indistinguishable from being wrong.

    “this is one of those occasions when you could be early and it'll be indistinguishable from being wrong.”