What this covers

This is Russ Roberts alone, presenting his paper "Gambling with Other People's Money" after eighteen months of EconTalk conversations about the crisis. He starts from a puzzle: why did losses on subprime mortgages, a small slice of the housing and investment world, sink major institutions? His answer is leverage. Typical positions ran about 32 to 1, so $3 of capital stood behind every $100 invested. He argues that creditor rescue, not "too big to fail," is the right name for the problem. Regulators do let firms fail, but they protect the people who lent to them, and that removes the lender's incentive to restrain risk.

The middle of the talk is historical. He traces a line from Continental Illinois in 1984 through the savings and loan crisis, the Greenspan put, the 1995 Mexican bailout (read as a rescue of Wall Street lenders), and Long-Term Capital Management, to Bear Stearns. Lehman's failure becomes a story about broken expectations, with credit default swap prices as evidence. A second thread covers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: housing mandates from 1992 onward, borrowing costs barely above Treasury rates thanks to the implicit taxpayer guarantee, and price increases in low-income neighborhoods that made subprime lending look viable. Basel II capital rules and the tranching of mortgages into new triple-A securities also get a role.

Nearly every causal claim here is contested, and Roberts says so. He ends with his own doubts: lender myopia, and the possibility, argued by John Taylor, that loose monetary policy in 2002 to 2004 was the decisive driver. Along the way he also argues that arguments should be judged on evidence rather than on the author's bias, and that after-the-fact crisis narratives deserve suspicion.

Sharpest takeaway

Roberts argues the 2008 crisis was driven less by capitalist instability than by policy-created incentives, especially repeated creditor rescues and government backing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which let leveraged firms gamble with other people's money.

  • Leverage of roughly 32 to 1 turned modest subprime losses into institutional insolvency
  • Creditor rescues from Continental Illinois through Bear Stearns taught lenders not to monitor risk
  • Fannie and Freddie's implicit guarantee let them fund riskier mortgages cheaply and pushed up housing demand

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0.81

When Bear Stearns was rescued, Lehman credit default swap prices fell back sharply because markets expected Lehman would also be rescued, and when Lehman failed, markets revealed that expectation had been wrong.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“when Bear Stearns got rescued the credit defaults fell back down to a much much lower level”

0.80

Dismissing an argument because its source is biased is an ad hominem move, and listeners should instead judge the evidence on its merits while remaining skeptical of how an ideologically motivated author may have shaded claims.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“it's a form of the ad hominem fallacy to just say well because Roberts is biased I can just dismiss this evidence”

0.80

A highly leveraged gambler facing a small downside will take increasingly large risks for large upside, and a lender who is not protected will restrain that risk by demanding higher interest, collateral, or covenants.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“the gambler will take a lot more risk than you'd like so you keep an eye on the gamble”

0.78

Willem Buiter warned in 1995 that bailing out creditors of Mexico created a one-way bet that made lenders lazy, so investors no longer did their homework on risk, a dynamic Roberts sees as the core of the 2008 problem.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“that makes for lazy private investors who don't have to do their homework figuring out what the risks are”

0.73

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac borrowed at very low rates, barely above Treasury rates, even as they moved into riskier loans, because lenders priced in the implicit taxpayer guarantee; without that guarantee they could not have made those bets.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“without that promise of taxpayer money they couldn't have made those bets”

0.73

Creditor rescue, not too big to fail, is the right name for the problem: regulators do let large firms fail, but they consistently rescue their creditors, which is what changes lender behavior.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the problem is not too big to fail because we do let firms fail large firms large financial institutions the problem is the rescuing of their creditors”

0.73

The 1995 Mexican peso bailout was in substance a rescue of the creditors, largely Wall Street institutions, who had lent to Mexico, not of Mexico itself, and it set the template for later creditor protection.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“it's not the institution that gets bailed out it's the creditors”

0.73

The panic after Lehman's failure was caused less by Lehman's bankruptcy itself than by investors learning that government policy would not rescue every creditor, a change in expectations that Roberts argues is the real source of the turmoil.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“it was the knowledge that people gained about what government policy was that it was different”

0.73

Fannie and Freddie's low-income lending drove up housing demand, which raised house prices most sharply in low-income neighborhoods between 1998 and 2003, which in turn made subprime lending appear viable.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the price of housing between 98 and 2003 particularly in low-income neighborhoods”

0.73

Basel II and related US rules set very low capital requirements for triple-A assets, allowing leverage of up to about 60 to 1, which created huge demand for triple-A paper, and tranching of mortgages then manufactured new triple-A securities to meet it.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“if you want to invest in triple-A can leverage those sixty to one because they're safe”

0.73

Basel II's leverage rules and the tranching of mortgage-backed securities created new triple-A supply that rating and capital rules favored, and this would have mattered less if creditor rescue had not removed monitoring.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“that wouldn't have mattered if there weren't creditor rescue because there would have been some prudence”

0.73

Ex post narratives about crises are unreliable, and the Lehman and Bear Stearns episodes show that people revise their explanations after outcomes are known; creditors and policymakers can only be judged on what they expected ex ante.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“it was not an ex post description of the problem it was an ex ante before the fact description”

0.73

The creditor rescue history began with Continental Illinois in 1984: after risky, heavily borrowed bets, lenders balked, and the Treasury ensured creditors were repaid even beyond FDIC insurance limits, setting a precedent.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“the Treasury made sure that all the creditors got all their money back even above and beyond what was covered by FDIC insurance”

0.73

Friedman's point that capitalism is a profit-and-loss system implies that profits encourage risk-taking and losses encourage prudence, so when policy reduces the chance of losses, reckless behavior follows.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“capitalism as Milton Friedman like to point out is a profit and loss system”

0.70

Typical crisis-era leverage was about 32 to 1: an investor putting in $3 of its own money for every $100 invested, borrowing $97, and almost every major player was leveraged at roughly 32 to 1 or more.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“you'd put three dollars of your own money into the investment you would borrow 97 and that's about a 32 to 1 ratio”

0.68

The crisis puzzle is why losses on subprime mortgages, a tiny part of the housing and investment world, brought down major institutions; the answer is leverage, because the bad bets were financed overwhelmingly with borrowed money.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the reason that this crisis turned out to be so bad the reason that bad bets bad decisions turned out to lead to such bad outcomes is because of the way they were financed through leverage”

0.68

Roberts argues that policy mistakes created incentives for myopia, overconfidence, and hubris, and that markets were still quite stable, so the crisis is better explained by incentives than by inherent capitalist instability.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“I'm gonna argue that there were policy mistakes that created incentives for myopia overconfidence hubris”

0.68

A historical sequence of creditor rescues, starting with Continental Illinois in 1984, through the savings and loan crisis, the Greenspan put, and Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, taught creditors that large institutions' lenders would be protected, reducing their incentive to monitor risk.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“most of them the history goes back to 1984 continental Illinois”

0.66

From 1992 onward, under both Clinton and Bush, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were pressed to finance a growing share of mortgages for low-income borrowers, using mortgage originators like Countrywide, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual as intermediaries.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“starting around 1992 Fannie and Freddie were encouraged at ever-larger with ever larger encouragement to in finance more and more mortgages from low-income people”

0.66

Creditors, not equity holders, are the real watchdogs of recklessness, because equity holders are diversified and want high-variance upside, whereas creditors only receive fixed returns and therefore monitor solvency.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“creditors are the watchdogs of recklessness not equity holders”

0.65

Starting in 1998, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac increasingly bought mortgages with little or no money down, expanding low-income lending enormously through 2003 while their borrowing costs stayed nearly flat.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“starting around 1998 Fannie and Freddie started to increasingly invest in mortgages with little or no money down”

0.64

Possible alternative causes Roberts doubts include plain myopia by lenders who only realized late how risky their holdings were, with short-term lenders panicking in 2008 when they woke up to risk, and loose monetary policy in 2002 to 2004 that may have been the main driver.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“maybe it's the whole thing maybe without the low interest rates of 2002 to 2004 that John Taylor talks about”

0.64

Fannie and Freddie are not the sole cause of the crisis, but they had a significant role driven by two things: government housing mandates requiring them to invest in risky assets, and the implicit government guarantee that let them fund those bets with cheap borrowed money.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“what was driving their destructiveness were two things the government housing mandates ... and the implicit guarantee”

0.62

Low interest rates from 2002 to 2004, as John Taylor argues, may have been the decisive driver, and without them the housing and securities boom might not have exploded, a possibility Roberts says he worries about.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“maybe without the low interest rates of 2002 to 2004 that John Taylor talks about”

0.61

The government honored AIG's credit default swap and insurance obligations at 100 cents on the dollar in fall 2008, even though AIG had earlier been negotiating settlements around 60 to 65 cents, and Roberts considers that a mistake.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“they went to goldman sachs and said you know i don't think we're gonna be able to pay everything we promised you might have to settle for sixty five sixty cents of the dollar”

0.61

Regulatory restrictions on Fannie and Freddie, including 20 percent down payments, income-to-debt ratios, and documented income, were loosened in the 1990s and 2000s so the agencies could make riskier and riskier loans.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“they moved away from 20% down loans they moved away from loans that had good documentation on income”

0.60

Rising house prices gave borrowers with 3 percent down and poor credit effective skin in the game, so lenders could rationalize subprime loans as safe even though the underlying risk was high.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“they're only have 3% down but if the asset goes up 10% they've suddenly have skin in the game”

0.57

Equity losses did not discipline executives because compensation was asymmetric: Bear Stearns CEO Jimmy Cayne was left with about $500 million after losing roughly a billion dollars, while Goldman's Lloyd Blankfein and JPMorgan's Jamie Dimon got close to the edge and still became enormously wealthy, so the heads-they-win, tails-they-win-a-lot structure rewarded gambling.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“Bear Stearns CEO Jimmy Cayne he was left with a mere five hundred million dollars”

0.57

The Bear Stearns rescue was really a payoff to its largest creditor, JPMorgan Chase, while the failure to rescue Lehman punished its creditors, many of them foreign banks such as Japanese, Asian, and Korean banks, so policy winners and losers must be read through the creditor lens.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“JPMorgan Chase were there was their largest creditor so that the guaranteeing of Bear Sterns bad assets was really a payoff”

0.56

Fannie and Freddie bought roughly 20 to 30 percent of subprime mortgage-backed securities purchased from 2004 to 2006, making them a non-trivial part of the subprime market even though others might have filled the gap.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“maybe 20 to 30% of the purchases of subprime mortgage-backed securities were made by Fannie and Freddie over the 2004 to 2006 period”

0.56

The gains from the housing and mortgage system were private while the losses were socialized onto taxpayers, because policies allowed people to gamble with other people's money and rescues of creditors weakened natural restraints.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“the gains were private the losses Republic the policies allowed people to gamble with other people's money”

0.56

Creditor rescue worked psychologically rather than through conscious planning: repeated rescues eroded the natural cautiousness of creditors, so they paid less attention to risk even without expecting a specific bailout.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“the natural cautiousness of a creditor was eroded by the continual rescue of creditors”

0.56

A lender who provides 97 percent of a leveraged bet receives only fixed interest and does not share in upside, so the lender cares only about whether the borrower stays solvent, while the borrower, with little of his own money at stake, is motivated by the upside and will take more risk than the lender would like.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“as the lender you don't share in that upside no matter how much money the gambler makes on his bets you just get your promised amount of interest”

0.53

When lenders expect Uncle Sam to cover losses, they stop imposing discipline: they accept lower interest rates, do not demand more collateral or covenants, and keep lending as the borrower becomes riskier; without a backstop they would respond by demanding higher rates, collateral, or restrictions.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“if you think that Uncle Sam will cover your friends debts when the friend goes bust you will worry less and pay less attention to the risk-taking behavior”

0.53

In a Bank of England stress-test meeting Andrew Haldane found bankers' worst-case scenarios implausibly modest, and one banker said the banks would be bailed out so they did not need to plan for severe scenarios, showing that the expectation of rescue was openly held.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“if it really is hard but we know you'll bail us out so we don't worry about that situation”

0.52

Since 2008 the persistence of rescue expectations means policymakers still retain discretion to bail out creditors, and as long as they do the recklessness incentive remains, so reform bills have not solved the problem.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“if they still have that discretion we haven't solved this problem we have continued to encourage recklessness”

0.52

What exists on Wall Street is crony capitalism rather than capitalism, because government rescues and guarantees weakened the profit-and-loss discipline that makes markets reliable.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“what we really have on Wall Street unfortunately is not capitalism but crony capitalism”

0.52

Wall Street was in effect a government-sanctioned Ponzi scheme in which home buyers, lenders, Fannie and Freddie, and investors were all paid by a chain that ultimately relied on taxpayers, so the gains were private and the losses socialized.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“Wall Street was and remains a giant government sanctioned Ponzi scheme”

0.52

Implicit creditor guarantees let investment banks finance mortgage-backed securities plays with borrowed money at low cost, so the bulk of subprime investment came from investment banks responding to rescue expectations rather than from direct government housing mandates.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the bulk of the subprime investment came from the investment banks not because of any government housing mandate”

0.52

Policymakers' practice of honoring creditor claims at 100 cents on the dollar in every case except Lehman was a mistake, because it removed any haircut that would have made creditors price risk; the AIG counterparty settlements were an example.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“honoring creditors promises made to creditors at a hundred cents on the dollar every single time when firms turned sour is a mistake”

0.40

Drexel Burnham was the one large financial institution in the last thirty years not rescued, but it was a criminal organization under legal threat, so it is not a clean exception to the creditor-rescue pattern.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“one is drexel burnham which was a criminal organization under threat of all kinds of criminal proceedings”

0.38

Friedman and Caplan argue the crisis reflected once-in-a-century mistakes made under imperfect information rather than systematic policy-induced errors, a view Roberts considers possible but less convincing than his incentive account.

factualcontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“Bryan calls it a once a century mistake”

0.37

The Lehman credit default swap example shows the market expected a Lehman rescue, and Roberts notes that many of Lehman's creditors were foreign banks, so the failure hit creditors more than shareholders.

factualcontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“a lot of those were foreign banks Japanese banks Asian banks Korean banks”

0.35

Lehman's leverage was even higher than it publicly reported, and its management engaged in dishonest accounting, though Roberts does not yet know the magnitudes.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“we do know that Lehman tried to hide how much leverage they had had actually even more than they publicly revealed”

0.35

Roberts claims the mortgage originators such as Countrywide, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual acted as middlemen that filled out paperwork for Fannie and Freddie.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the mortgage originators which are countrywide Wachovia wham-o Washington Mutual they were intermediaries”

0.35

In the savings and loan crisis, depositors got back nearly all their money, roughly 99 percent of deposits were ultimately insured even above the FDIC limit, which Roberts cites as another example of government ensuring creditors were repaid.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“I think was 99 point something percent of all deposits are ended up being insured regardless of whether they were above the limit”

0.35

Hayek's view that prices communicate information and Friedman's view that markets can take care of themselves are both seemingly contradicted by the housing boom and bust, which Roberts treats as the key test of those views.

causalestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“certainly seems to contradict the Hayekian view that prices and markets communicate information”

0.35

The Federal Reserve's 1998 meeting of Long-Term Capital Management's creditors was not a bailout with government money, but it signaled the government's readiness to protect creditors and reinforced the expectation of rescue.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the Federal Reserve called a meeting of their creditors to try to orchestrate a rescue rather than a collapse”

0.35

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's 2003 to 2004 accounting scandal makes their reported data questionable, so the housing figures Roberts uses may not be fully accurate.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“that an accounting scandal in 2003 in 2004 which is an all I don't talk about the paper”

0.34

In March 2008 the Fed and Treasury brokered JPMorgan Chase's acquisition of Bear Stearns by guaranteeing about $30 billion of Bear Stearns assets, justified on grounds of financial stability.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“guaranteeing about 30 billion dollars worth of bear stearns assets”

0.34

Samuelson's claim that markets cannot regulate themselves and that government is the only solution reflects a widely held view among some economists that the crisis showed capitalism's instability; Roberts rejects that conclusion.

normativecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“there can be no solution without government”

0.33

Samuelson, and to some extent Greenspan, argue that markets cannot regulate themselves and that the crisis shows government is needed; Greenspan admitted in congressional testimony that he had found a flaw in his belief that firms would protect their shareholders.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“I have found a flaw I don't know how significant or permanent it is”

0.33

The fundamental question is not whether government is needed but what role it should play, and in particular whether the crisis proves capitalism is inherently unstable or proves something else.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“the fundamental question is what should the role of government be”

0.33

Paul Krugman is wrong to say Fannie and Freddie had nothing to do with the 2004 to 2006 crisis, because they pulled back only somewhat and remained a dominant player in housing and a significant buyer of subprime securities.

factualcontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“turns out it's not true they do reduce a little bit but there's still a dominant player”

0.33

Roberts believes we will never know with certainty what caused the 2008 crisis, just as we have not settled the causes of the Great Depression, so competing ideological narratives will persist.

forecastestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“we will never know with certainty what caused the crisis any more than we figured out what caused the Great Depression”

0.31

Compensation structures on Wall Street were set up so that executives who lost large sums still ended up with enormous amounts, so the executives effectively extracted money from taxpayers through leverage financed by others.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“allowed them to take enormous sums of money out of effectively taking it out of taxpayers”

0.29

Confronting one's own bias has a virtue: examining Fannie and Freddie forced Roberts to learn what they actually did, which helped organize his thinking about a complex situation even though confirmation bias is a risk.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“it has a virtue which is it forces you to look for things that confirm your bias”

0.28

The crisis is like the blind men and the elephant: each commentator blames the part of the story they know best, such as Fannie and Freddie, the Community Reinvestment Act, or mark-to-market accounting, so competing narratives are each partly relevant but none is the fundamental cause.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“there's a tendency to take the issue that you are most knowledgeable about and blame everything on that”

0.28

Roberts initially dismissed subprime as a tiny part of the housing and investment world and was wrong, because he did not understand the role of leverage in turning those losses into systemic failure.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“so I was totally wrong about that I did not understand what was going on in the investment world which was the role of leverage”

0.26

Roberts argues the bailouts transferred hundreds of billions of dollars to Wall Street and financed bonuses, a result he considers destructive for democracy and for capitalism.

normativespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“we have transferred hundreds of billions of dollars to Wall Street and we have allowed them to finance those bonuses”

0.21

The Abacus deal and the Magnetar story are examples of complex packaging that outsiders cannot easily understand, and new information about them could change the picture of the crisis.

forecastspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“it's very hard for a non insider to figure out maybe when we know more about those things”