consumer price index
A government index measuring the average change in prices of a basket of consumer goods, used to adjust for inflation; subject to potential biases in how it accounts for quality changes.
As defined in Erik Brynjolfsson on the Second Machine Age
Other definitions
A measure of average price changes across categories of consumer goods and services, within which the health care component rose fastest by the late 1940s.
Christy Ford Chapin on the Evolution of the American Health Care SystemA measure of the average price level of a basket of goods and services bought by households, used to track inflation
Russ Roberts on Wealth, Growth, and Economics as a Science 04/20/2009
Where it comes up · 7
- Raj Chetty on Economic Mobility3 claims
- Erik Brynjolfsson on the Second Machine Age2 claims
- Philip Auerswald on the Rise of Populism2 claims
- John Taylor on Inflation, the Fed, and the Taylor Rule2 claims
- Diane Coyle on GDP1 claim
- Christy Ford Chapin on the Evolution of the American Health Care System1 claim
- Paul Romer on Growth, Cities, and the State of Economics1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 12Search all claims for “consumer price index” →
- The criticism that GDP implies gross materialism is largely misplaced, because the great majority of economic activity in leading countries is now in services and intangibles, and because the critique underestimates the value people place on choice and variety; Jerry Hausman's estimate that the apple flavor of Cheerios was worth $200-300 million a year illustrates how much consumers value the ability to shape their own lives through choice.Diane Coyle on GDP
- Health care cost inflation was not caused by Medicare's 1965 passage; as soon as the insurance company model took hold by the late 1940s, the health care component rose faster than any other category in the consumer price index, showing the model itself drove costs.Christy Ford Chapin on the Evolution of the American Health Care System
- The widely-believed claim that the average American has made no economic progress in 40 years and that inequality has grown dramatically rests on flawed data, and proponents fail to engage with contrary data—such as different assumptions about family size and non-monetary benefits that can reduce measured inequality growth by two-thirds—violating scientific standards of grappling with competing results.Paul Romer on Growth, Cities, and the State of Economics
- Using a baseline of the standard CPI and total household income, the fraction of kids who out-earn their parents fell from about 90% for those born in the 1940s-50s to about 50% for the current generation—meaning roughly half now do worse than their parents—a decline summarized as the 'Fading American Dream.'Raj Chetty on Economic Mobility
- While the level of absolute mobility is uncertain, the decline over time is robust: as long as inflation mismeasurement hasn't changed dramatically over the past 60 years, any inflation adjustment that raises today's figure also raises the 1950s figure, so the comparison across eras stays stable and the conclusion that absolute upward mobility has fallen survives different specifications.Raj Chetty on Economic Mobility
- The fraction of kids out-earning their parents in the current era ranges from about 40% (comparing sons to fathers on own earnings) to 70% (assuming 1% lower true inflation than CPI and adjusting for family size), with the baseline 50% in the middle; so the level is imprecise and depends heavily on assumptions, especially how inflation is measured.Raj Chetty on Economic Mobility
- Real wage differences between expensive cities and cheaper places are overstated because we deflate nominal wages by a national CPI that does not reflect local cost of living; high demand to live in San Francisco pushes up land values and therefore wages, so San Francisco's higher nominal wages partly reflect its high cost of living rather than purely higher productivity, unlike in Dayton.Philip Auerswald on the Rise of Populism
- Comparisons of median household income over decades are not apples-to-apples because household structure changed dramatically—rising divorce, delayed marriage, and more single-person households mean fewer workers per household—so correcting for household size eliminates roughly 20-30% of the apparent stagnation discrepancy.Erik Brynjolfsson on the Second Machine Age
- The pace of economic change is accelerating (largely mismeasured because we don't adjust for rapidly improving quality), and people differ in their ability to cope with change; rural environments were historically static, so as urbanization, depopulation, and faster technological application erode the appeal and economics of non-urban places, the people left behind face a less pleasant landscape and growing frustration—a key driver of populism worldwide.Philip Auerswald on the Rise of Populism
- Apples-to-apples comparisons of living standards across eras are essentially impossible because the people, goods, and services differ—one cannot meaningfully say whether a gas station attendant wiping your windshield is more valuable than having Siri on your iPhone—and the Consumer Price Index is plausibly biased such that living standards have grown faster than it reports.Erik Brynjolfsson on the Second Machine Age