John Taylor on Inflation, the Fed, and the Taylor Rule
What this covers
John Taylor and Russ Roberts discuss the sources and solutions of the US inflation surge of 2021–2022 in conversation. Taylor, an economist at Stanford, argues that current high inflation is a monetary phenomenon—the result of the Federal Reserve holding interest rates far too low rather than the product of supply disruptions or corporate pricing power. The discussion centers on Taylor's framework for understanding what went wrong, why a return to normal policy need not trigger recession, and why monetary rules matter more than discretion.
Taylor's explanation rests on the Quantity Theory of Money: when the money supply expands relative to output while velocity remains stable, prices rise. He points to the 2021 policy error of maintaining a near-zero Federal Funds Rate even as inflation indicators climbed and the economy recovered—a divergence he calls the most unusual he has witnessed. The remedy, he argues, is a gradual, transparent increase in rates to the level the Taylor Rule prescribes: roughly 3 to 5 percent given current conditions. This measured pace, signaled in advance through Rule-Based Monetary Policy, would allow inflation to decline without the sharp contraction that a delayed, abrupt tightening would force. The conversation ranges across why a 2 percent inflation target exists, whether the COVID-era stimulus packages actually stimulated consumption, parallels between current conditions and the 1970s, the hazards of persistently high inflation even if anticipated, and longer-term fiscal sustainability. Roberts raises counterpoints throughout, including why prices failed to rise during early COVID shortages and whether supply constraints deserve more credit for inflation than Taylor grants them.
Taylor argues current high US inflation is fundamentally a monetary phenomenon caused by the Fed holding interest rates far too low relative to what a rule-based policy (the Taylor Rule) prescribes, and that a gradual, telegraphed return to a normal Federal Funds Rate would tame inflation without a painful recession.
- Inflation reflects too much money relative to output (MV=PY), not supply constraints or corporate greed
- The Fed's Federal Funds Rate near zero is the most unusual divergence from rule-prescribed levels Taylor has seen
- Rule-based policy (Taylor Rule) prescribes a rate of roughly 3-5% rather than zero, and a gradual adjustment avoids a sharp recession
Monetary policy expansion, not supply shocks alone, drives broad inflation across goods.
- The OPEC oil-embargo theory of 1970s inflation fails because it only explains why oil prices were high, not why the price of everything rose; absent expansionary monetary policy, non-energy-intensive goods could have become less expensive instead of also rising.
“the OPEC theory explains why the price of oil is high. It doesn't explain why the price of everything is high.”
Price restraints during crises prevent markets from clearing despite persistent shortages.
- The COVID-era phenomenon of empty shelves and shortages without retail price increases is startling under capitalism, because normally prices clear markets; persistent shortages with non-rising prices imply something—law, anti-price-gouging rules, or cultural reluctance to raise prices during a crisis—is restraining prices.
“For that to happen under capitalism requires there to be something that is restraining prices from rising.”
Hyperinflation destroys money's function as medium of exchange, forcing inefficient barter and harming civilization.
- Volatile hyperinflation discourages using money for exchange because money rapidly loses value while goods retain it, pushing people toward inefficient barter where they must find counterparties wanting their specific goods, which has happened repeatedly in history and devastates material wellbeing and civilization.
“you have an incentive to get rid of your money. And, after a while, you just start to insist on people giving you chickens. And then you're in a barter economy. And, all of a sudden, you're a lot poorer.”
Current producer price pressures signal future consumer price increases beyond present CPI rates.
- The Producer Price Index rose 20% over the prior year, which is suggestive of future consumer price increases that could exceed the current 7% CPI rate.
“you mentioned before we started recording that the Producer Price Index rose 20% last year, which is suggestive of future consumer price increases that will exceed 7%”
- The episode's goal is to provide a primer on the basics of inflation in response to listener requests.
“many listeners have written to me asking for some primer or the basics of inflation. That's our goal today.”