What this covers

Philip Auerswald of George Mason University joins host Russ Roberts to explain the global rise of populism as a fundamentally geographic phenomenon. Auerswald argues that the political revolt of rural areas against dominant megacities stems from three converging long-term forces: accelerating urbanization, depopulation combined with population aging, and the advance of code and automation. The discussion draws on economic data—voting shifts, opioid mortality, and firearm suicides—all correlated along the rural-urban divide, and explores why prosperity and productivity have become increasingly concentrated in the world's largest cities while the rest of the planet has entered net depopulation.

The conversation ranges across how skills and capabilities remain sticky within top metropolitan centers, how real vs nominal wages obscure the actual differences in living standards between cities and rural places, and why internal geographic mobility within the United States has declined since the 1980s. Auerswald connects these economic shifts to work on organizational learning and firm-specific knowledge, arguing that access to job mobility and learning opportunities in dense labor markets is itself a source of divergence. The discussion also addresses housing restrictions, the role of real estate in inequality, and the historical accident of mid-20th-century American prosperity—a baseline that shapes contemporary political grievance. Roberts pushes back on mechanisms of agglomeration effects, offering alternative explanations rooted in human capital concentration rather than density itself.

Sharpest takeaway

Auerswald argues that the global rise of populism is fundamentally a geographic phenomenon—the political revolt of declining rural areas against increasingly dominant megacities—driven by three deep, long-term forces: urbanization, depopulation/aging, and the advance of technology as code.

  • Voting shifts, opioid deaths, and firearm suicides are geographically correlated along the rural/urban divide
  • Productivity and prosperity diverge because skills and capabilities are 'sticky' within top cities, not just because cities attract talented people
  • Nearly all net global population growth (excluding sub-Saharan Africa) occurs in cities over one million, leaving rural areas in decline

The argument · threads7 threads · 31 claims
0.79

Rising real estate values and land-use restrictions are the primary driver of inequality and reduced mobility.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Matt Rognlie's revisiting of Piketty's results found that the famed increase in capital's share relative to labor over the last 30 years was almost entirely accounted for by growth in real estate, making land values the core driver of both inequality and restricted mobility.

    “the sort of famed increased capital share relative to labor over the last 30 years was almost entirely accounted for by growth in real estate”

  • A simple, politically feasible land-use reform would be to lift the height restrictions in Washington, D.C., which has banked billions of dollars of value in falsely-conceived, era-bound height limits that are terrible from equity and long-term-prospect standpoints for both the city and, as the nation's capital, the country.

    “the city of Washington, D.C. is really unique in the world in that it has banked billions of dollars of assets in these sort of falsely-conceived, you know, height restrictions”

  • The core driver of recent inequality is not the opening of borders but the inherent stickiness of skills and capabilities within cities—dense, combinatorially rich places accumulate location-specific know-how (per Hausmann and Hidalgo's economic geography), and proximity to those skill-rich places is the true enabler of personal betterment, which most of the world's surface lacks.

    “It is a total miscomprehension to think it was the opening of borders. It's the inherent boundary of skills.”

  • It is the fact that rich cities are getting richer that matters most for inequality—the fact that rich people get richer follows from that; the richest U.S. cities have 34% higher regional GDP than the nation, urbanites earn 30% more than rural residents, and the 50 richest cities grew 9.2% from 2010-2014 versus 3.1% for the overall population.

    “the richest cities in the United States make 34% more in terms of regional GDP than America as a whole. The urbanites earn 30% more than rural residents.”

0.73

Job mobility across firms in large metros is the core mechanism for acquiring knowledge and capability.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • A significant—perhaps more significant than the coffee shop—vector of learning is the ability to move from one job to another, gaining access to firm-specific knowledge in each; large dominant metros offer far more job opportunities and chances to move or consult across firms, so people stuck in second- or third-tier cities (e.g., by underwater mortgages) lose access to these crucial learning opportunities.

    “one of the significant factors of learning, maybe more significant than the coffee shop, is being able to move from one job to the other”

  • Internal mobility within the United States has been on a long-term, non-discontinuous decline, peaking around 1985, and this diminished within-country mobility is related both to high land values and to reduced access to the job-switching that drives learning.

    “the decrease in mobility in the United States actually has been a long-term trend. It hasn't been discontinuous. It's sort peaked in about 1985”

  • The concrete mechanism for urban idea exchange is not a literal water cooler but the coffee house (and modern co-working spaces)—centuries-old centers of mixing and mingling where, for example, Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations; people pay substantial rent differentials for access to these dynamic environments, and the market is revealing real value in what they pay.

    “it's the coffee house... coffee houses have, for centuries been the mixing and mingling... Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations in a coffee house”

0.71

Global population is concentrating in a few hundred large cities while most of the world's surface depopulates.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • If you analytically subtract the sub-Saharan African continent (which has not gone through the demographic transition), all of net global population growth has occurred in cities over one million people—about 300 cities comprising roughly 20% of world population—meaning there has been net depopulation across the entire rest of the planet's surface.

    “all of population growth has occurred in cities over a million... that means that there has net depopulation through the entirety of the surface of the planet Earth, excluding the sub-Saharan African continent and the top one-million cities”

  • All of North America, Europe, and East Asia—plus populous developing countries like Iran and Brazil—are already at below-replacement-rate fertility, meaning that absent population aging (longer lifespans) and immigration, these regions would already be in population decline; this trajectory of decline combined with aging has never occurred in human history.

    “all of North America, all of Europe, and all of East Asia today are at below replacement-rate fertility”

  • Rural and small-town depopulation is inherently destructive to local economies—when there are simply fewer people, communities lose vitality, illustrated by towns where the closing of the elementary school signals there are no longer enough young people to sustain the place, and those places are not doing well.

    “you see towns where the elementary school has closed--well, that tells you something. And it probably tells you more than any other factory relating to that town”

  • The rise of populism everywhere is driven by the intersection of three deep, long-term forces: increasing urbanization (the growing dominance of the largest cities), unprecedented depopulation combined with population aging, and the advance of technology as code (AI, automation); when these intersect, you get populist surges as a global rather than U.S.-specific phenomenon.

    “when you intersect those three, then you get the origins of popular surges everywhere. But it's a global phenomenon. It's not a U.S. phenomenon.”

  • Humanity is at a cusp after 200 years of technology-driven population growth and is now moving toward population decline, which calls into question everything we assume about net positive real rates of return and rising asset prices (real estate and otherwise) for most places outside the top 50 metros—an enormous human and policy challenge.

    “everything that we assume about net positive real rates of return, everything we assume about asset prices... for most places going up, leave aside the top 50 metros: All of that is called into question”

0.65

Populism is a predictable political response to urban dominance, rural depopulation, and technological displacement intersecting.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • County-level maps showing increased Republican voting from 2004 to 2012, opioid overdose death rates, and firearm suicide rates are geographically correlated, suggesting the rural/urban divide is linked to these health and political variables.

    “this conjecture that maybe something about the rural/urban divide in this country was correlated with some other variables”

  • Populism is best understood as the political insurgency of rural places against the urban cores of the largest cities, a tension that emerges because voting systems—worldwide, not just in the U.S.—are even moderately disproportionate by geography rather than strictly by population.

    “populism really is almost defined as the political insurgency of rural places against urban cores in the largest cities”

  • Contrary to intuition, anti-immigration populist sentiment is strongest where people have least exposure to immigrants—a Gallup study by Rothwell and Diego-Rosell found Trump support was disproportionate in places with few college graduates, far from the Mexican border, in homogeneous commuting zones, showing an inverse correlation between exposure to others and populist voting.

    “Trump's support was sort of disproportionately in places that were, few college graduates, far from the Mexican border, within commuting zones that were sort of fairly homogenous”

  • Tolerance of diversity is a necessity—an urban value—because in dense cities you must constantly interact with people of every background, whereas in rural places it is not required; this explains why urban and rural populations naturally develop different values and attitudes (e.g., toward guns).

    “tolerance of so-called diversity along whatever... in a city is a necessity. It's an urban value. It's not as necessary in a rural place.”

0.59

Rural deprivation results from geographic isolation from skill-rich agglomerations, not from trade or offshoring.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Firm-level learning curves demonstrate that organizations learn and improve over time in a way robust to employee turnover—there is something in the aggregate culture and practices that endures beyond individuals, illustrated by the German chemical industry being destroyed twice yet reconstituting itself because resilience lived in practices and people together, not just physical infrastructure.

    “there are organizations that learn better over time. And this is robust to turnover within the organization. It's not just the people, but there's something in the aggregate”

  • The decline of U.S. manufacturing jobs is not primarily explained by jobs fleeing to China: from 1995-2005 the U.S. lost roughly 2-3 million manufacturing jobs while China lost 10 million, with Chinese manufacturing employment peaking in the mid-1990s; the net global decrease reflects increased efficiency, productivity, and technology, not offshoring.

    “the United States lost roughly 2-3 million manufacturing jobs. China lost 10 million. And China's manufacturing employment peaked in the mid-1990s.”

  • For most of the world, the last 30 years has been probably the best era in human history—with hundreds of millions in China and India dramatically improving their lives—and it is only the 'Rich Six' countries, and specifically the rural places within them, that have been severely punished, essentially for doing nothing but staying put.

    “For most of the world, of course, the last 30 years has been fantastic. It has been probably the best era in human history.”

0.46

New middle-tier jobs in distributed health care and AI-augmented work can revitalize declining rural regions.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Distributed health care to the home is the largest growth category of jobs anywhere in the world and could employ millions, especially in declining rural areas; reforming Medicare and other reimbursement schemes to create a middle tier of 'health concierge' workers—filling the gap below nurse-practitioner and above home health worker—combined with mobile diagnostics and AI could deliver care as effective as a 1973 doctor while cutting costs ~20% mainly through hospital avoidance.

    “It is the largest growth category of jobs anywhere in the world. And it's most obstructed by regulation.”

  • When there is a discontinuity in the advance of code or technology (e.g., DVDs vs. movie theaters), it doesn't eliminate the prior offering but bifurcates the market into higher- and lower-value uses, making the surviving human experience higher-value; the inevitable increase in AI will similarly elevate uniquely human skills—like eye contact and empathy—that cannot be automated for at least a century, so people will increasingly do work that is more human.

    “It makes the movie theaters that continue to exist sort of a higher-value experience that then sort of bifurcates the market to a higher- and lower-value use.”

  • Standard economics has represented production for ~80 years as linking inputs to outputs, but beneath the production function lies a recipe—an algorithm or process for what you do with the inputs; in the last 30 years, code/algorithms took over this recipe, which the conventional analytical apparatus (TFP, Cobb-Douglas, Solow) leaves out, creating a big gap in understanding the core driver of the economy.

    “beneath this notion, implicit in the production function, is a recipe. Like, when you think about a literal, culinary recipe, you've got inputs, outputs, and then you've got what you do with the inputs.”

0.38

Current prosperity benchmarks are misleading; mid-century metrics ignore that era's unique historical advantages and accidents.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The U.S. prosperity of the 1950s-60s—held up as a golden-age norm by populist nostalgia—was a historical accident resulting from a world war that killed 60 million people and destroyed every production center except the United States, plus a wave of talented immigration and uncontested access to world export markets; using mid-20th-century metrics as the benchmark guarantees the present looks like decline.

    “we only got the prosperities of the 1950s, 1960s to the extent that we did as a consequence of a world war that destroyed--that killed 60 million people and destroyed every production center in the world except for the United States”

  • There is an irony that the largest cities' NIMBYism and land restrictions push people toward second-tier cities like Portland, Maine, helping those more accessible regions thrive and prosper—which is beneficial because the second-tier cities are precisely the ones that need to thrive if rural areas are to be pulled along.

    “there's this irony that the largest-city NIMBYism is actually favorable to the second-tier cities, which are the ones that actually really need to thrive, if rural is going to be pulled along”

  • The most robust modern literature on firm-level productivity, by Nick Bloom and John Van Reenen, documents large dispersion in productivity levels among firms within and across industries and countries—showing firms simply have not figured out how to do even easy things well—and similar productivity differentials exist across cities, with population-productivity correlation holding only for the top of the distribution, not the bottom third.

    “simply, firms have not figured out how to do even easy things well. This is a confusing fact.”

  • Cities are humanity's greatest invention—platforms on which we share, create, and exchange—and there is something almost mystical about urban vitality, analogous to a scale of organization above the individual neuron, that drives the advance of human society.

    “Cities are humanity's greatest invention. They are platforms on which we share, create, exchange.”