adverse selection
A market failure where asymmetric information leads to the worst risks being most likely to seek a transaction (e.g., a loan).
As defined in cwt_noel-johnson-and-mark-koyama
Other definitions
A market problem where higher-risk participants are disproportionately likely to participate in a transaction, creating information asymmetry. In insurance, this means sick people are more likely to buy insurance.
Peter ThielThe tendency for the party with better information to select the worse assets for the other party; avoided by having a neutral third party allocate assets.
Esoteric Credit with Ali Hamed, Brian Harwitt, and Marc Porzecanski
Where it comes up · 32
- 232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information13 claims
- Brett Harrison — FTX US former president speaks out4 claims
- Alex Rampell - Investing in Operating Systems - [Invest Like the Best, EP. 248]4 claims
- Backing The Best Managers In Private Markets3 claims
- Ran Abramitzky on the Mystery of the Kibbutz3 claims
- AIG: Rise, Fall, and Rebirth2 claims
- Investing Pre Company2 claims
- William Black on Financial Fraud2 claims
and 24 more
Most important claims · 10 of 60Search all claims for “adverse selection” →
- Moral hazard is distinct from adverse selection: it is the behavioral effect whereby identical people who are randomly given insurance subsequently use more (drive less carefully, visit the doctor more) — confirmed by the randomized Oregon Medicaid experiment — whereas selection is about who chooses to buy in the first place; the two can be disentangled by randomizing the PRICE of insurance, since buyers willing to pay a higher price show higher healthcare utilization than low-price buyers even though both groups are insured.232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information
- When the government intervenes, the selection problem shifts from a game between customer and insurer to one between government and insurer, which the government tends to lose: in privatized Medicare Advantage, the government pays private insurers to take customers, insurers cream-skim the healthiest by age and gender (e.g. via gym memberships), the government counters by risk-adjusting on past medical claims, and insurers stay a step ahead in a continuing game of whack-a-mole.232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information
- Insurers offering discounted gym memberships and employers offering workplace wellness programs do so not because these make people healthier but because they attract customers who are already healthier at baseline — Cooper and Trivedi show gym-membership bundles draw measurably healthier buyers, and the Jones-Molitor-Reif randomized trial at the University of Illinois found wellness programs produced no health or productivity gains but were preferentially chosen by already-healthy employees, revealing the true purpose is selection rather than behavior change.232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information
- Despite insurers having vast data, sophisticated actuaries, and algorithms, buyers still possess private information about their own risk that insurers cannot capture — documented cases include people at risk for Huntington's chorea buying nursing home insurance at higher rates (especially after testing positive), and people who buy life insurance dying sooner than observationally identical non-buyers even after medical exams, family-history questions and lifestyle screening — so big data does not eliminate adverse selection.232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information
- Edmond Halley and Abraham de Moivre correctly computed mortality tables for the general population in the 17th century, but mispriced survival annuities because they failed to anticipate adverse selection: the people on whom annuities were purchased were not randomly drawn — buyers nominated unusually long-lived individuals (young French girls who had survived smallpox, hardy old Scotsmen), which helped bankrupt the French crown.232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information
- Insurance differs fundamentally from ordinary goods like broccoli or smartphones because an insurer's costs and profitability depend not just on the price and number of customers, but on WHICH customers buy — high-risk, accident-prone buyers cost more than low-risk ones — which is why there may be a role for government mandating insurance purchase but not broccoli consumption.232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information
- Adverse selection is a distinctive form of market failure because it can destroy a market even when everyone behaves rationally and even when every buyer would willingly pay an actuarially fair price plus a margin that lets the insurer profit — the market simply may not exist despite mutual gains being available on the table.232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information
- If a good investment lands on your doorstep, you are either the luckiest person in the world or everyone else has already passed on it, so you need a clear explanation for why the deal was offered to you before pursuing it.Jeremy Giffon - Special Situations in Private Markets - [Invest Like the Best, Replay]
- In a selection market, the seemingly sensible response to losses (raising prices) exacerbates the selection problem: each price increase drives out the relatively healthier buyers and leaves only riskier customers, which forces further price hikes in a 'death spiral' that can make the market disappear entirely.232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information
- Adverse selection is a global, market-driven phenomenon not confined to insurance or any country: it arises in any market where different customers impose different costs on the seller and the customer knows something the seller doesn't — examples include all-you-can-eat restaurants and college income-sharing agreements, where Hendren and Herbst show that even controlling for college and major, students with private knowledge that they'll earn little are the ones who want the income-sharing agreement.232 | Amy Finkelstein on Adverse Selection and Hidden Information