William Black on Financial Fraud
What this covers
William Black, a former banking regulator and author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One, traces the financial crises of the past three decades—from the Savings and Loan debacle through 2008—to a single engine: accounting control fraud. In this episode with EconTalk host Russ Roberts, Black argues that during booms, bank executives deliberately originate poor loans at premium yields, lever them heavily, and maintain minimal loss reserves, thereby inflating reported profits and justifying enormous compensation packages for themselves. The same structural recipe, he contends, appears in both the S&L crisis and the recent housing collapse. Deregulation removed the enforcement mechanisms that had worked in the 1980s, while the failure to prosecute turned fraud into a rational choice—a "sure thing," as George Akerlof and Paul Romer characterized it.
Black uses liar's loans—stated income products where borrowers claimed but did not verify earnings—as his central case. He frames them as a natural experiment: neither the Bush administration nor any government agency promoted them, yet their volume exploded over 500 percent between 2003 and 2006, proving the behavior was lender-driven, not policy-driven. The fraud operated through broker incentive structures that rewarded volume and appearance of safety rather than true creditworthiness. Black further argues that the shift from enforceable underwriting rules to mere guidelines, paired with the collapse of criminal referrals from over 1,000 convictions in the S&L era to nearly zero, eliminated the prosecution deterrent. He diagnoses a regulatory and prosecutorial breakdown that left fraudsters facing no meaningful consequences, and describes how private market discipline—the supposed guardrail—failed entirely because firms reporting record profits attracted eager creditors instead of scrutiny.
Black argues that major financial crises—from the Savings & Loan debacle to 2008—are driven primarily by 'accounting control fraud,' in which executives deliberately make bad loans to inflate reported profits and enrich themselves, and that deregulation plus the failure to prosecute made this fraud a 'sure thing.'
- The same fraud recipe (grow fast, make crappy loans at premium yield, extreme leverage, no loss reserves) appears in both the S&L crisis and 2008.
- Liar's loans were lender-driven fraud, not borrower-driven, and were encouraged by no government policy yet expanded massively.
- The shift from enforceable underwriting rules to unenforceable guidelines, plus zero criminal referrals, removed the deterrent that worked in the 1980s.
Accounting control fraud is a reliable path to record profits and executive wealth in the near term despite underlying economic losses.
- In the 'cash for trash' scheme, a lender facing a real loss on a bad development loan makes a much larger loan to a new straw borrower who uses most of it to overpay for the troubled property, transmuting a real economic loss into a fictional accounting gain while letting executives book profits and bonuses.
“I have transmuted a real economic loss into a fictional gain. Remember the pesky examiner who was about to force me to recognize the $30 million dollar loss.”
- Accounting control fraud is a 'sure thing' because, as Akerlof and Romer argued, looting a firm for profit reliably produces record reported income and personal wealth in the near term, regardless of the underlying economic losses that will eventually surface.
“as Akerlof and Romer put it, aptly in the title of their key article in 1993, looting the economic underworld of bankruptcy for profit, accounting control fraud is a "sure thing."”
- The accounting control fraud recipe for a lender has four ingredients: grow like crazy, by making really crappy loans at a premium yield, with extreme leverage, and virtually no allowances for future losses—guaranteeing record profits and executive wealth in the near term while maximizing real economic losses.
“for a lender, it's got four ingredients: grow like crazy, by making really crappy loans but at a premium yield--and those first two things are related--with extreme leverage, and virtually no meaningful allowances for the future losses being recognized currently.”
- Executive compensation systems like GE's 'rank and yank' can transmit the fraud message that the firm doesn't care whether reported income is real—if you create fictional reported income you'll be made rich—achieving pervasive fraud without an explicit memo that would expose participants to jail.
“We don't care whether your reported income is real or not. If you create fictional reported income--and Enron did that pervasively--then we will make you rich.”
Enforceable underwriting rules forced fraudsters to leave criminal evidence, while their elimination enabled liar's loans to proliferate without paper trails.
- The 1980s rules requiring lenders to underwrite a loan before making it, establish apparent ability to repay, and keep a written record created a low-cost regulatory framework that forced fraudsters to either insert false information or remove honest information from files, generating the evidence that enabled successful prosecutions.
“what you would typically do is either put false information in the files or remove honest information from the files that would demonstrate to the examiners that you knew you were making a bad loan.”
- In 1993 under Clinton's 'reinventing government,' enforceable underwriting rules were replaced by unenforceable guidelines and examiners were told to call bankers their clients, making the undocumented, unverified liar's loan the perfect device for fraud because it removed the paper trail that previously created criminal exposure.
“the absolute perfect device for fraud, is the liar's loan. Because you don't document. You don't verify. And so the paper trail is much easier for fraud in the current crisis.”
- Liar's loans constitute a natural experiment proving the fraud thesis because no government entity encouraged them, even Bush-era regulators disparaged them, and no one required Fannie and Freddie to buy them—yet from 2003 to 2006 the number of liar's loans increased by over 500%, showing the behavior was driven by accounting control fraud rather than housing policy.
“Liar's loans is something where no governmental entity encouraged them... And nobody ever required Fannie and Freddie to purchase a liar's loan. They chose to do so, and they increased it massively; from 2003-2006 the number of liar's loans increased by over 500%.”
- Despite the FBI warning in September 2004 of an epidemic of mortgage fraud and the industry's own anti-fraud experts warning in 2006 that stated-income liar's loans had a 90% fraud incidence, the industry massively expanded liar's loans such that by 2006 about one-third of all loans were liar's loans.
“The incidence of fraud in liar's loans is 90%--nine, zero... by 2006, the best estimates are that 1/3 of all the loans made in that year were liar's loans.”
Lenders' incentive structures, not borrower behavior, drive fraud by rewarding high-yield bad loans through brokers and term sheets.
- Liar's loans involve false statements about income, but the fraud is overwhelmingly driven by lenders—not borrowers—because lenders set the incentive structures through brokers that reward high volume of bad loans, for the same accounting-control-fraud reasons as the S&L crisis.
“Liar's loans is something where no governmental entity encouraged them... And nobody ever required Fannie and Freddie to purchase a liar's loan. They chose to do so, and they increased it massively; from 2003-2006 the number of liar's loans increased by over 500%.”
- Lenders incentivized tens of thousands of brokers via daily term sheets rewarding three things—higher yield, lower stated loan-to-value ratio, and lower stated debt-to-income ratio—so brokers gimmicked the two ratios to make risky high-yield loans appear safe and earned fees up to $20,000 per jumbo loan.
“what we call a jumbo--a $600-$800 thousand dollar range--you could get as a mortgage broker, a $20,000 fee. For one jumbo.”
Market discipline fails against fraud because record reported profits attract lenders instead of scrutiny and creditor oversight.
- Private market discipline by creditors and subordinated debt holders fails entirely against accounting control fraud because firms reporting record profits attract eager lenders rather than scrutiny—creditors provide cash rather than discipline—so the very entities meant to police risk instead fund the fraud.
“as long as you are reporting record earnings, it turns out private market discipline is an oxymoron... the entities that fund the accounting control frauds are overwhelming the creditors who in theory are supposed to be the ones providing discipline. Instead, what they mostly do is provide cash.”
- Systemically dangerous institutions create a Gresham's dynamic in which cheaters prosper and bad ethics drive good ethics out of the marketplace, so the core regulatory task is to make market discipline effective by getting good information out and removing the cheaters who create perverse 'match me or die' incentives.
“they will create a Gresham's dynamic. And this is something Akerlof warned about in his famous 1970 article on lemons markets, where cheaters prosper. Bad ethics can drive good ethics out of the marketplace.”
- A purchaser of fraudulent loans can sustain the scheme for 8-10 years because 'a rolling loan gathers no loss'—refinancing bad loans hides delinquencies for a decade, especially when clustering hyperinflates the asset bubble.
“the saying in the trade is "a rolling loan gathers no loss." So, I can refinance the bad loans, and I can hide the delinquencies for a decade.”
- Unlike the usual fallacy of composition where a strategy good for one entity fails for an industry, bad-loan fraud works the opposite way—when many lenders make bad loans they cluster in the easiest markets and emulate each other's behavior, because there are better places to inflate values and hide losses with low entry barriers and low prosecution risk.
“the fallacy of composition works the opposite way; when a bunch of us make bad loans. Because it turns out there are better places to make these loans... And therefore you get clustering. And you get emulation--what Akerlof and Romer talk about--the mimicking process.”
Regulatory collapse—zero criminal referrals versus thousands in the S&L crisis—removed the prosecution deterrent that previously contained fraud.
- In the S&L crisis the Office of Thrift Supervision made well over 10,000 criminal referrals and over 1,000 elite convictions, but in the current crisis the same agency made zero criminal referrals and the OCC made zero or three, demonstrating the collapse of the prosecution mechanism that previously deterred fraud.
“our same agency in this crisis, the Office of Thrift Supervision, made 0 criminal referrals. And the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), depending on who you believe at the OCC, made either 0 or 3.”
- When regulators wiped out liar's loans among S&Ls in Orange County around 1990-91, Long Beach Savings gave up its federal charter and deposit insurance to become a mortgage banker—renaming itself Ameriquest—solely to escape jurisdiction, then became the first big maker of liar's loans and a predatory lender targeting minorities, later settling with 49 state attorneys general and the FTC for $400 million.
“they being Long Beach Savings--give up their Federal Charter. Give up Federal Deposit Insurance. And become a mortgage banker--for the sole purpose of escaping our jurisdiction. And they changed their name; and they become Ameriquest.”
- Black became Litigation Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in April 1984, with independent litigation authority, a docket of 10,000 cases, and a $100 million outside-counsel budget, which led him into anti-fraud work during the S&L crisis.
“I went over to the Home Loan Bank Board, April 2, 1984, as their Litigation Director.”
The S&L crisis and current mortgage crisis reveal fraud concentrated among new entrants with conflicts of interest, not systemic design flaws.
- Failing to underwrite or do due diligence on mortgage loans creates acute adverse selection—drawing the worst borrowers and underpricing the risk—which gives the lender an intensely negative expected value, especially in mortgages where money goes out all at once.
“if you don't do due diligence or underwriting in the lending process, we have known for centuries that you create acute adverse selection... to engage in significant adverse selection in the mortgage context is to create as a lender an intensely negative expected value.”
- There is a tribal taboo in economics against serious consideration of fraud, evidenced by Akerlof and Romer being cited in perhaps only 1 of 100 articles on the crisis and fraud almost never being discussed as even a potential major contributor.
“fraud is virtually never discussed as even a potential major contributor. And that is poor; and that is really the tribal taboo that still exists in economics against any serious consideration of the word fraud.”
- Accounting control fraud in the S&L crisis was concentrated among new entrants—overwhelmingly real estate developers with intense conflicts of interest—rather than established CEOs who had risen through the ranks and identified with their institutions, explaining why only about 10% of S&Ls engaged in it.
“the fraudsters grossly disproportionately are new entrants. And they are overwhelmingly real estate developers, who have intense conflicts of interest.”
- Relying on econometrics during the expansion phase of an accounting-control-fraud epidemic produces not just the wrong policy answer but the worst feasible answer, as when the Garn-St. Germain Act used Texas S&Ls as its deregulation model precisely because their fraudulent operations were reporting the best returns.
“this is the fundamental problem of relying on econometrics during the expansion phase of an epidemic of accounting control fraud. Because you will inherently get not just the wrong answer in terms of public policy--you will get the worst feasible answer.”
- Where the Fed and SEC sent only two people each to monitor Lehman in its final months, the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco sent 45 people to American Savings, working around the clock to make emergency lines available against reasonable collateral and survive a $6 billion run.
“We, from our Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco sent 45 people.”
- Systemically dangerous institutions are vastly beyond any efficiencies of scale, so shrinking them to a size that poses no systemic risk would make the economy more efficient and dramatically reduce systemic risk, rather than sacrificing efficiency for safety.
“they are vastly beyond any efficiencies of scale. They are inefficient; we would make the world more efficient and we would dramatically reduce systemic risk if we shrunk them”
- When Paul Volcker raised interest rates to double digits to break inflationary expectations, every Savings and Loan in America became insolvent on a market-value basis, leaving the industry collectively insolvent by roughly $150 billion by mid-1982, which kicked off the first phase of the crisis through interest-rate risk.
“Paul Volker decided to break the back of inflationary expectations; created the double-digit interest rates; and every Savings and Loan in America was insolvent on a market-value basis... insolvent to the tune of roughly $150 billion.”
- Even borrowers with no down payment suffered substantial losses because homeownership exposure extends well beyond the down payment, and many were in states allowing deficiency judgments and faced bankruptcy laws made less consumer-friendly on first homes.
“even with folks with no down payment... they actually make very substantial investments. And you know as a homeowner. It ain't just your down payment, in terms of your exposure.”