Ran Abramitzky on the Mystery of the Kibbutz
What this covers
Ran Abramitzky, a Stanford economist, speaks with Russ Roberts about his research into the kibbutz movement in Israel—specifically, how these communes survived for over a century despite organizing around full equal sharing of income and collective property ownership. Standard economic theory predicts such arrangements should collapse under the weight of free riding, brain drain, and adverse selection problems. Abramitzky's central finding is that kibbutzim did not escape these pressures but rather engineered social mechanisms—small scale, minimal privacy, communal property as a bond, and peer pressure—that neutralized them. The conversation traces how this model functioned, what it cost, and why it eventually gave way as Israel modernized.
The discussion moves through several distinct areas. Abramitzky establishes that economic incentives plainly operated: skilled members were more likely to leave, less-skilled more likely to seek entry. Yet these exodus pressures proved far less destructive than theory predicts, chiefly because social sanctions and status as non-monetary reward worked within tight-knit groups of roughly Dunbar Number scale. The kibbutz also functioned as income insurance—a practical appeal in early Israel's undeveloped insurance markets. Abramitzky notes the family as a socialist institution that has endured, and the kibbutz as an attempt to scale that model. The conversation then addresses why the system fractured: rising returns to skill in Israel's high-tech economy made outside options far more attractive, and wealth levels proved crucial—richer kibbutzim sustained equality more easily. Since the 1990s, roughly 80 percent have shifted toward market-based earnings, though most retain stronger mutual aid than comparable Israeli communities.
Abramitzky argues the kibbutz survived a century not by suppressing economic incentives but by deliberately engineering social mechanisms—small scale, lack of privacy, communal property, and idealism—that solved the free-rider, brain-drain, and adverse-selection problems standard theory predicts would destroy any egalitarian commune.
- Economic incentives provably operated in the kibbutz (skilled left, less-able sought entry), but were blunted by designed social incentives.
- Common property and lack of privacy functioned as exit-cost and monitoring devices that sustained equality without totalitarian coercion.
- Rising returns to skill and declining ideology in later generations, not the founders' error, drove the eventual shift away from equal sharing.
Kibbutzim overcome tragedy-of-commons incentive problems through monitoring and family-model sharing within a bounded group size of about 150 families.
- The kibbutz is a textbook example of what's wrong with textbooks: standard theory says such an institution cannot solve its incentive problems, yet, similar to Elinor Ostrom's finding that small communities create monitoring devices to avoid the tragedy of the commons, kibbutzim evolved mechanisms that reduced the power of those destructive incentives.
“it's a textbook example of what's wrong with textbooks. You know, the textbook says, 'This can't exist. They can't solve this. The incentives are all wrong.' Well, whether they knew it or not, they evolved such that they figured out ways to reduce the power of those incentives.”
- The kibbutz works by expanding the family-style sharing institution to roughly Dunbar's number of about 150 families, but no further, because the monitoring devices of low privacy break down in larger societies, which is why kibbutzim and groups like the Shakers deliberately split rather than scaling into one big commune despite returns to scale in services and insurance.
“you extend the family--in fact, something close to the so-called Dunbar Number of 150--so you might have 150 families; and after that, it gets quite difficult.”
- The family is itself a socialist, top-down institution that has stood the test of time—a parent does not sell the last cookie to the highest-bidding child but allocates based on need and other considerations—and the kibbutz is an attempt to expand this family model to a larger but still bounded group.
“a family is a Socialist institution. It's a top down institution... I don't sell the last cookie to the highest bidder among my children.”
Human flourishing and non-market goods like care matter more than maximizing financial output, making non-monetary incentive structures sometimes sensible.
- Calling someone who chooses caring work over lucrative work 'inefficient' misunderstands the human enterprise, because the goal of life is not to maximize the financial size of the pie but human satisfaction and flourishing; the proper definition of the pie includes non-market goods like compassionate care that cannot be assigned a monetary price.
“The goal of life is not to make the pie as big as possible. It matters. Your standard of living matters. But, it's not the only thing.”
- Wikipedia is a counterexample to the assumption that institutions built without monetary incentives must be horrible; it exists and is quite good, illustrating that economists' instinct to dismiss incentive-free cooperation can be wrong.
“I often wonder what George would have made of Wikipedia... 'Well, I'm sure it doesn't exist,'... And of course it's not horrible. It's quite good.”
Kibbutzim require either mutual insurance appeal or deep ideological commitment to sustain a 100 percent tax rate, which later generations cannot maintain.
- Staying in a kibbutz means voluntarily choosing a 100% tax rate—turning all earnings over to the chosen organization—which can only be sustained either through the insurance appeal (being cared for if things go bad) or through deep ideological commitment to human equality; without that romance, the experience becomes hell, and the kibbutz education system ultimately could not inculcate enough ideology in later generations to overcome the incentives.
“when you go outside and work outside the kibbutz but keep your earnings within the kibbutz, you are voluntarily choosing a 100% tax rate.”
Tedious agricultural labor serves as a powerful motivator for non-committed members to pursue education and leave.
- Tedious agricultural labor like crouching to clear irrigation lines spaced just far enough apart to require standing and re-crouching is a fantastic motivator to stay in school if one is not committed to the kibbutz.
“It's a fantastic motivator to actually stay in school. If you are not committed to the kibbutz.”