What this covers
This Business Breakdowns episode has host Zack walking through AIG's history with Austin Hawley, starting with the economics of the industry before turning to the company. Hawley explains why insurers price products without knowing their true cost of goods sold, how adverse selection punishes small mispricing, and why average returns on capital sit around 8 to 10 percent. He then separates two routes to advantage: scale in standardized personal lines, as at Progressive and GEICO, and underwriting talent and culture in specialty lines, as at Berkley, Arch, and Berkshire.
The company story begins with the pre-crisis expansion into aircraft leasing and, above all, bond insurance on mortgage-backed and municipal securities. Collateral demands from that business caused the liquidity crisis behind the 2008 government takeover. Hawley argues the core insurance operations were still worth far more than the crisis valuation implied. He then covers the post-2017 turnaround under Brian Duperreault and Peter Zaffino. The pieces include the Berkshire Hathaway adverse development cover, the re-underwriting of the whole book, and more than a trillion dollars of coverage limits withdrawn from the market. He also covers the Validus purchase and its sale to RenaissanceRe, and the separation of Corebridge. A deferred tax asset and rating-agency diversification credit are cited as reasons management delayed that split.
Some positions are more contestable. These include the claim that the industry barely earns its cost of capital, the view that turnarounds are ten times as hard as expected, and the argument that steady reserve releases and managerial track record matter more than detailed accounting analysis.
Austin Hawley argues AIG's turnaround under Brian Duperreault and Peter Zaffino is real because management removed tail risk, shrank and re-underwrote the book, and divested non-core units, so the stock's value lies in underwriting returns that can reach top-quartile levels. Investors should judge insurers by managerial underwriting discipline rather than accounting detail, since reserves are estimates.
- Berkshire's adverse development cover removed tail risk from pre-2017 underwriting, and the re-underwriting shrank the book 10-12% in 2018-2020
- Divesting life, reinsurance, and crop businesses and spinning off Corebridge lets AIG become a pure-play specialty P&C insurer
- Insurance returns are poor on average, so only top-quartile underwriters with managerial discipline create value
Duperreault and Zaffino's management reset AIG's underwriting after years of underpricing and lost reputation.
- Between 2018 and 2020 AIG re-underwrote its entire book, repricing or non-renewing policies at each renewal, which shrank revenue and market footprint by around 10 to 12 percent, a necessary pain for a stronger company.
“they actually shrank the business in terms of the revenue and their footprint in the insurance market by around ten to twelve percent between 2018 and 2020”
- Under the leadership of Brian Duperreault, followed by Peter Zaffino as his number two, AIG's new management team arrived in 2017, a clear inflection point, after the company had lost reputation and kept writing underpriced business.
“The new management team that came in in 2017 was a clear inflection point in the trajectory of AIG”
- After AIG lost the trust of clients, it was trapped in a vicious cycle: to keep premium flowing and retain clients it had to underprice, which left mispriced business on the books from 2012 through 2017.
“AIG was trapped in that vicious downward cycle of trying to keep those clients, keep money coming in the door”
- Peter Hancock waffled for years on splitting the company despite activists such as Carl Icahn pushing a breakup, and the spin only became possible once Zaffino improved underwriting enough to stand alone with adequate ratings.
“when Peter Hancock, who was the CEO prior to Brian Duperreault, was asked about the spin many times, he waffled on this issue”
Separating life from P&C through Corebridge unlocks value that the mixed company's discount obscured.
- Post-crisis constraints, especially a large deferred tax asset that would be hard to use if the companies split, plus rating agency diversification credit, gave management an easy excuse to delay separating life and P&C, even though synergies were minimal.
“that deferred tax asset was an easy excuse to not split these two companies up”
- Life and P&C insurance have no real synergies because they differ in underwriting, distribution, and balance sheet leverage, so the mixed company traded at a discount to a rational sum-of-the-parts value, which the Corebridge separation was designed to fix.
“the market has a hard time digesting a company that mixes those two types of balance sheets”
- Corebridge is now below 50 percent AIG ownership and deconsolidated, AIG agreed to sell an additional 20 percent stake to Nippon Life in early 2025 at a premium, and the remainder is expected to be sold over one to two years after.
“It has now been deconsolidated off of AIG's balance sheet because they are now below 50% ownership—just barely below”
- AIG announced a plan to divest its life and retirement business, which was a $20 billion-plus equity business, as part of narrowing the portfolio to a top-quartile commercial P&C franchise.
“they announced a plan to divest themselves of the life and retirement business, which is no small task because it was a $20 billion-plus equity business”
- The life spin is still difficult because shared parent-company costs are stranded and must be reduced over time, and Zaffino's cost reduction programs have been used to bring them down.
“you have some stranded costs that were shared at the parent company that you have to work down over time”
Competitive advantage depends on line type: scale in standard lines, underwriting talent in specialty lines.
- The investable opportunity in insurance is concentrated in top-quartile underwriters, which earn attractive returns on capital and persist through time; investors should own companies that are already top quartile or have a clear path to it.
“that's what I focus on when I think about the insurance industry: I want to focus on those companies where I think they are either a top quartile underwriter”
- Insurance is a business of promises: the insurer pays if an uncertain event occurs, so counterparty trust and a reputation for paying consistently create a real advantage for incumbents such as Chubb over startups.
“he talks about insurance as being a business of promises”
- Specialty lines are lines of business that require real underwriting expertise, are difficult to standardize, and often need individual structuring, such as marine, aviation, and excess and surplus lines, where admitted insurers reject risks they cannot underwrite.
“lines of business that require real underwriting expertise. They are difficult to standardize. They often require individual structuring”
- Insurance has two routes to competitive advantage: in standardized personal and small commercial lines, scale advantages from fixed expenses such as advertising dominate (Progressive, GEICO), while in specialty lines, underwriting talent and culture create advantages that are more fragile but can be very profitable (Berkley, Berkshire, Arch).
“there are two paths you can take to having a competitive advantage that allows you to deliver that type of returns”
- Berkshire Hathaway's recent large position in Chubb is not a coincidence and signals the quality of Chubb's specialty insurance business.
“I don't think it's any coincidence Berkshire Hathaway took a pretty large position in Chubb recently”
- Direct-to-consumer insurers like Progressive and GEICO spread a fixed advertising expense over a growing customer base, so per-customer acquisition cost falls steadily relative to competitors.
“your advertising expense is a fixed expense, and as you get more and more customers, your per-customer cost of acquiring goes down”
- Chubb is the most notable comparable for AIG, and Evan Greenberg, who runs ACE, which acquired or merged with Chubb, is the son of AIG's former leader Hank Greenberg, which Austin notes as coincidence.
“I think Chubb is the most notable in that”
- Berkshire's National Indemnity track record in Buffett's 2004 letter showed profitable underwriting in which premium volume grew when pricing was good and shrank sharply when pricing was bad, illustrating the discipline specialty underwriters need.
“Buffett put a table in that letter that was called 'Portrait of a Disciplined Underwriter.'”
- Insurance competition mirrors asset management, where scale wins for index-type players and niche active managers with domain expertise can outperform only with discipline through cycles.
“there are two paths you can take to having a competitive advantage that allows you to deliver that type of returns”
Turnarounds are extremely hard, so conviction in management is the critical factor in investing.
- A turnaround investment requires belief that management recognizes a crown jewel within the business and will make it shine over years; this was the case at AIG and at Hartford, and conviction in management is the critical factor.
“you really, really have to believe that there's a crown jewel that the management team recognizes and is going to make shine for everyone in the market over a period of years”
- Turnarounds are not twice as hard as you think; they are about ten times as hard, especially for financial companies with large balance sheets and in-force books that take years to re-underwrite.
“they're not twice as hard as you think they are; they're like ten times as hard as you think they'll be”
- Austin's growing conviction in AIG rests on watching Peter Zaffino and his team over several years, because their methodical actions move AIG from an industry-median company toward something much better.
“it's largely because of my conviction around the management team involved in turning AIG around”
- In insurance managerial talent has a disproportionate impact on outcomes, so a long track record of conservative behavior and a trusted management team matter more than detailed accounting analysis.
“insurance is an industry where managerial talent has a disproportionate impact on the outcomes”
Berkshire's adverse development cover removed legacy reserve risk and was a value-creating transaction.
- The Berkshire deal is win-win because Berkshire's expertise in casualty underwriting and its flexibility to invest equities let it price long-duration liabilities better than any other reinsurer, and it received about $10 billion of upfront premium to invest.
“Berkshire was very interested in taking those on because it got $10 billion of premium that it's allowed to invest upfront”
- AIG bought an adverse development cover from Berkshire Hathaway for a very large premium, which transferred the tail risk on all business written in 2016 and earlier and removed a key uncertainty that had caused repeated reserve increases.
“they bought a large contract from Berkshire Hathaway to protect the balance sheet”
- Although the Berkshire adverse development contract cost AIG near-term pain, it was a positive net present value transaction because the downside of not removing legacy risk was far more severe.
“getting this off the table, even if it requires some near-term pain, is a positive NPV transaction for AIG”
- Consistent reserve releases every quarter over the last three years, contrasted with billion-dollar reserve charges in the 2009-2017 period, are evidence that AIG has become conservative in how it estimates costs for policies it wrote years earlier.
“we've had consistent reserve releases over the last three years at AIG, every single quarter”
AIG's core commercial P&C businesses are worth far more than the market price implies.
- AIG's commercial lines make up about 75 percent of its roughly $24 billion net premium base, split about 50/50 between international and domestic business, and AIG is one of few large insurers with a true global commercial footprint.
“Today, AIG's commercial lines business is about 75% of the total of that $24 billion. And it's split roughly 50/50 between international business and domestic business”
- Although AIG lost almost all its equity value and went bankrupt in effect, its core international and domestic insurance businesses were worth a great deal, so the sum of the parts was far higher than the crisis-era valuation implied, as later government repayment proved.
“But in fact, it was a very, very valuable company overall. If you looked at the sum of the parts, that was proven out over the next several years”
- AIG's P&C business has tangible book value a little over $30 billion against a market cap near $50 billion, but after subtracting a $9 billion Corebridge stake and about $4 billion of deferred tax assets valued at face, AIG's core price is low relative to peers.
“And so if you back those out of the market value, you've got a pretty low price for AIG relative to a lot of its peers”
- AIG writes about $35 billion in gross premiums, cedes about $10 billion to reinsurers, and has about $24 billion of net premiums, which is the figure investors focus on because returns are earned on net premium.
“they write about $35 billion in gross premiums”
Value creation comes from the underwriting margin rather than from investment returns on the balance sheet.
- For AIG the value creation comes from the underwriting margin rather than the asset side of the balance sheet, so investors should focus on underwriting to judge whether the turnaround succeeds.
“more of the value creation is coming from the underwriting side of the business, the underwriting margin. And that's where you really should focus your time as an investor”
- AIG has reduced investment risk relative to its past and now runs a plain-vanilla portfolio largely outsourced to BlackRock at very low cost, so investment returns contribute little to its value relative to underwriting.
“It is largely outsourced to BlackRock at very, very low cost”
- Insurers hold float from premiums before paying claims and generally invest it in high-grade bonds matched to claim duration, with only some firms like Berkshire investing large amounts in equities, because regulators largely restrict insurers to high-grade bonds.
“float is basically the money you get upfront from premiums that eventually gets paid out as claims”
- AIG's return on tangible equity has been around 10 percent and should move toward top-quartile levels in the teens over the next several years.
“move from being close to a 10% return on tangible equity business over the last year or so to something that's closer to top quartile returns, which would be in the teens”
Insurance pricing is cyclical, and capacity withdrawal by disciplined players forces the industry to price up.
- Insurers price products without knowing their true cost of goods sold, which makes the business difficult to price and produces a cyclical industry where a few bad years of underpricing force reserve increases.
“You don't know the cost of goods sold when you price your product, and that leads to a cyclical industry over time”
- The insurance industry as a whole earns roughly its cost of capital, possibly a bit less, because underpricing companies suffer adverse selection; typical returns on capital are around 8 to 10 percent, so the median outcome is poor.
“If anything, the industry overall earns roughly its cost of capital, and it's probably even a little bit worse than that”
- Insureds with private knowledge of their riskiness are most likely to seek cheap coverage, so an insurer that misprices by a small amount faces much worse outcomes than the median company.
“the company that misprices by a small amount in this industry is likely to have much, much worse outcomes than the median”
- In insurance, tangible equity is the true capacity of the industry; when companies mispriced and equity falls, they must raise reserves and withdraw capacity, which forces the whole industry to price up.
“Tangible equity is the true capacity in this industry, and when that comes out, you have to price up”
- Commercial insurance pricing was very favorable from about 2019 through 2022 and has since faded but remains above loss cost inflation.
“we've had very favorable commercial pricing from about 2019 through 2022—is it's faded a little bit, but still above loss cost inflation”
- AIG has reduced the total coverage limits it offers by more than a trillion dollars, pulling capacity out of the market, which forces competitors to price up and is a key driver of the recent margin expansion.
“AIG has reduced the limits they offer by a trillion dollars—more than a trillion dollars”
AIG's portfolio was reshaped by exiting past overreach and by Greenberg-era specialty underwriting.
- AIG sold its reinsurance and crop businesses and a small travel personal lines business, and moved its high-net-worth homeowners business into a joint venture to shift it off balance sheet, leaving a commercial P&C business focused on specialty lines.
“They sold the reinsurance and crop business, and then they sold a small personal lines business—the travel business”
- AIG's pre-crisis downfall came from using its scale and balance sheet to diversify into aircraft leasing, complex asset investments, and especially bond insurance on hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgage-backed and municipal bonds; the collateral demands from that business caused a liquidity crisis that led to the 2008 government takeover.
“they were insuring hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities, as well as municipal bonds into the financial crisis, is what ultimately took AIG down”
- AIG bought Validus early in Duperreault's tenure to build catastrophe reinsurance knowledge and talent, then sold it to RenaissanceRe at a higher multiple during a hard property catastrophe reinsurance market, after Zaffino decided it no longer fit the specialty primary model.
“They were able to sell this business at a higher multiple to RenaissanceRe”
- AIG's international accident and health business sells supplemental health products similar to what Aflac sells in the United States and has been very successful.
“Think about what Aflac does in the United States, and you have some similar types of products internationally for AIG”
- Under Hank Greenberg from the 1970s to just before the financial crisis, AIG built a reputation for entrepreneurial underwriting of complicated risks that others would not take, which allowed fast growth at good margins and made AIG the most powerful insurer in the world for a period.
“for having a real entrepreneurial drive, an appetite to underwrite complicated risks that many other people were not willing to take on”
- AIG was founded in 1919, was one of the first companies to build meaningful distribution outside the United States, and was founded in China as a managing underwriter in its early days.
“this company was founded in China as a managing underwriter during its early days”