Sarbanes-Oxley
A 2002 US law passed after Enron and other scandals, tightening corporate accounting, disclosure, and executive accountability rules for public companies.
As defined in Bethany McLean — Enron, FTX, 2008, Musk, frauds, & visionaries
Where it comes up · 8
- John Bogle on Investing 4/9/20073 claims
- The Past, The Present & Future of Quant2 claims
- The Moat Portfolio1 claim
- Man + Machine, Moats, and Power of the Outside View1 claim
- Watching a Venture Fund at Work1 claim
- Bryan Caplan on Hayek, Richter, and Socialism 06/28/20101 claim
- Bethany McLean — Enron, FTX, 2008, Musk, frauds, & visionaries1 claim
- Marc Andreessen - Making the Future - [Invest Like the Best, EP. 232]1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 11Search all claims for “Sarbanes-Oxley” →
- Regulations passed after Enron, WorldCom, and the financial crisis, such as Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, were easy for large incumbents like AT&T to absorb but punitive for startups, which delayed IPOs and shifted growth to private markets.Marc Andreessen - Making the Future - [Invest Like the Best, EP. 232]
- Compliance specialization over the last twenty years (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley consultants) has made it easier for large companies to avoid competition because they can absorb compliance as a fixed overhead cost their size accommodates, whereas smaller companies cannot.Bryan Caplan on Hayek, Richter, and Socialism 06/28/2010
- The decision to list is a cost-benefit tradeoff in which costs such as compliance and quarterly reporting have risen, the median IPO age has increased, and the trend predates Sarbanes-Oxley, while the benefit of public liquidity has weakened for capital-light firms.Man + Machine, Moats, and Power of the Outside View
- Sarbanes-Oxley worked narrowly to rein in the specific accounting abuses Enron practiced—a CFO could no longer run private equity entities doing all their business with his own company—but regulation generally fails to protect investors because modern markets evolve so quickly that the next crisis always comes from a direction no one was guarding against.Bethany McLean — Enron, FTX, 2008, Musk, frauds, & visionaries
- Quarterly earnings calls and public reporting pressure would make a long-term firm like AQR behave more short-term, which is one reason it would not want to go public; Sarbanes-Oxley is probably only a partial explanation for the decline in IPOs.The Past, The Present & Future of Quant
- Sarbanes-Oxley and other regulations impose a large cost burden on public companies, and stock market mechanics that reward high-frequency access to information and fast execution fail to reward long-term shareholders, so reform needs regulatory change as well as market design change.Watching a Venture Fund at Work
- Sarbanes-Oxley was needed because large corporations lacked financial controls. Even General Motors, usually the 'gold standard' of accounting, had just announced control errors requiring it to restate about five years of earnings.John Bogle on Investing 4/9/2007
- Sarbanes-Oxley enforcement has been too weak. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 'hasn't done very much' to discipline accountants. The provision requiring CEOs to disgorge option profits after earnings are restated (for example, from $2 to $1 a share, with the stock at $20 instead of $10) has, as far as Bogle knows, not been enforced to any significant degree.John Bogle on Investing 4/9/2007
- Workiva's customer acquisition cost spiked about a year and a half to two years before the interview because it pivoted from external reporting to the Sarbanes-Oxley market, where no product exists and buyers do not budget for a replacement for an internal process. Returning to enterprise internal reporting and reorganizing sales geographically brought CAC back down.The Moat Portfolio
- Sarbanes-Oxley is often blamed for the decline in public listings, but Asness thinks it is generally overdone as an explanation and he cannot determine how much it contributes, so the decline reflects both supply and demand factors.The Past, The Present & Future of Quant