Man + Machine, Moats, and Power of the Outside View
What this covers
This conversation between Patrick and Michael Mauboussin starts with market structure and ends with the mechanics of forecasting a single company. The opening looks at what investors actually earn. Ilia Dichev's 19-country study puts the behavioral gap between time-weighted and dollar-weighted returns at about 120 basis points a year, twice the roughly 60-basis-point gap between active and index fees. Mauboussin links part of that gap to buybacks and issuance, which move wealth between sellers and continuing holders. He also separates "prices are right" from "markets are easy to beat," since the first does not imply the second.
The middle stretch moves to private markets and forced flows. The count of US listed companies is below its 1976 level, and Facebook listed at $110 billion after roughly $100 billion of profit had already accrued privately. The talk covers the control-liquidity tradeoff, endowments reaching for a liquidity premium, and how mutual funds mark the same late-stage venture rounds at different values. It also covers leverage cycles and margin calls as sources of distressed prices. Patrick raises the problem that a mispricing can outlast an active manager's solvency.
The final section is the analyst's toolkit. The inside and outside view is applied through a shrinkage factor estimated from correlations. Earnings growth regresses hard toward the mean, while operating margins barely do. Of 313 companies with over $100 billion in revenue, none grew 15 percent a year for a decade, which is the benchmark Mauboussin uses for Amazon. The discussion closes on moats, profit pool charts, market-share stability, and strategy as trade-offs.
Mauboussin argues that index growth has made markets cheaper to access but harder to beat, shifting value and liquidity risk toward private markets and forced-flow situations, and that disciplined base-rate and moat analysis, not extra data, is what lets an analyst forecast well.
- Indexing removes uninformed competitors, so the remaining active managers face a harder game and fee compression follows declining available alpha
- Behavioral gaps and company-level capital transfers mean investors can lose returns even when the underlying market performs well
- Regression to the mean is pervasive but its rate varies by metric, so base rates must be measured rather than assumed
Shrinking alpha and growing indexing make active management harder and fee pressure inevitable.
- A series of regulatory changes since the 1930s, some intended and some not, moved investors from individual holdings into mutual funds and then into index funds.
“a series of regulatory changes over time... really encouraged both the move from individuals into mutual funds”
- When uninformed investors exit to indexing, the remaining competitors are the smarter investors, so the active manager's task becomes harder rather than easier.
“the only people I'm left competing with are the really smart people”
- Peter Lynch's Magellan had large alpha when small, but as assets grew his alpha shrank while total dollars extracted from the market rose, showing that spread times capital matters more than spread alone.
“he's playing poker at the nickel and dime table... now he's playing with the big boys”
- During 1972 to 1980 weak large-cap equity returns caused equity mutual funds to lose assets while money market funds grew from nearly nothing to about $75 billion, showing investors seek low-cost alternatives when returns are poor.
“Money markets went from a flat standstill to something like $75 billion”
- Over the last 10 to 15 years available alpha has declined faster than the fees investors are willing to pay, creating a natural rebalancing in which active fees must fall toward equilibrium.
“the amount of available alpha... has declined faster than the fees”
- Following Berk and Green, fund skill should be measured as gross alpha (pre-fee return minus benchmark) times assets under management, which gives the dollar value a manager extracts from the market rather than treating every fund as one data point.
“look at gross returns, so this is pre fee minus benchmark return... times AUM”
- Dichev's study across 19 countries found a behavioral gap of about 120 basis points per year between time-weighted and dollar-weighted returns, roughly twice the 60 basis point gap between average active and index fees.
“the behavioral gap is twice as important as the fee differential between active-passive”
- Vanguard indicates its index rebalancing costs are about 5 to 10 basis points and can partly be offset, so frictions exist but are not large.
“rebalancing costs are relatively modest, probably five to ten basis points”
- Active managers historically supplied liquidity, but outflows and underperformance mean roughly $3 trillion less active management exists than otherwise would over the past decade, weakening the traditional supply of liquidity in stress.
“there's $3 trillion less in active management than there would have otherwise been”
Flows and forced sellers create mispricings that patient, liquid investors can exploit, including by pre-committed liquidity providers.
- Forced or non-fundamental sellers, such as spinoff recipients a fund does not want and investors facing margin calls in a leverage cycle, create mispricings that patient buyers with liquidity can exploit.
“you may get a margin call and you're selling not because you want to, but because you have to”
- Stock prices embed expectations of future performance, so returns come from the gap between what is priced in and what the company actually delivers; step one is reverse-engineering expectations and step two is forecasting performance, and mismatches are opportunities.
“it's really the gap between those expectations and that fundamental performance, that's the key to making money”
- Because the market is an open system, corporations repurchasing or issuing shares create wealth transfers between sellers and continuing holders, which helps explain the Dichev behavioral gap.
“it isn't a closed system, it's an open system... corporations”
- Index and ETF flows raise valuations of certain stocks above where they would otherwise be, as money flowing into large mutual fund families drove large-cap stocks from very cheap in the early 1980s to expensive by 2000.
“valuation higher than it would otherwise be... from very cheap, large-cap stocks in the early 80s”
- Intra-sector correlations are rising because investors buy or sell whole sector ETFs without discriminating between cheap and expensive names, which tamps down dispersion and makes stock-picking harder.
“they all go up, and there's no discrimination between cheap and dear”
- In 2015 the average index fund fee was about 20 basis points and the average active fee about 80 basis points, a 60 basis point differential.
“the average index fee was 20 basis points across all the products, and the average active fee was 80 basis points”
- Anticipating future liquidity shocks, investors should set in advance the prices at which they will buy assets, a pre-commitment that allows them to act as liquidity providers when forced sellers appear.
“preparing yourself almost a pre-commitment that at these levels, this is something I'm going to participate in”
- Economic and finance theory do not capture irreducible uncertainty in markets, so agent-based models are better suited to understanding complex systems and liquidity, as argued in Bookstaber's The End of Theory.
“economic theory and finance theory by extension really doesn't capture the irreducible uncertainty in the world”
- Endowments are moving into less liquid assets to capture a liquidity premium, but that strategy only works if the institution does not need to demand liquidity on short notice.
“But that requires that you don't demand liquidity when you snap your fingers.”
- Bill Gurley's point is that venture capital IRRs are at all-time highs because the last hundred-million-dollar round sets the mark for unicorns, while actual liquidity for investors is at an all-time low, a combination that cannot persist indefinitely.
“IRRs for venture capital firms are sort of all-time highs because these unicorns are getting marked up, and it's the last hundred million dollar sets the price, and liquidity is an all-time low”
- In a leverage cycle, rising asset prices encourage borrowing and lax margin requirements, then a downturn triggers margin calls and tighter requirements that force sales, creating distressed prices that liquidity providers can exploit, as seen in the financial crisis.
“the margin requirements become more stringent. And that accelerates the forced selling and then you get this downside.”
Forecasts should rest on outside-view base rates and regression toward the mean rather than recent extrapolation.
- Regression to the mean is widely discussed in investing but few quantify its rate; the outside view with correlation data lets an analyst measure how fast results revert, not just that they do.
“regression toward the mean... most people think they understand it. Most people don't”
- People resist the outside view because they must discard the information and models they have invested effort in building, and because they often do not know what the relevant base rate is.
“you have to leave aside all of this cherished information you've gathered”
- Consumer staples return on capital has a shrinkage factor near 0.9, so high returns largely persist, while year-over-year S&P 500 returns show essentially zero correlation back to 1926, so a long-run average is the best forecast.
“the answer is roughly speaking, it's a shrinkage factor of 0.9”
- The average absolute market share change in a sector over time indicates stability: low average change means a stable business, while high change means a whipsawing industry, as with smartphones where Nokia fell from over 50 percent share in 2007 to effectively zero.
“in 2007 had more than 50% of the smartphone market... Now, they're effectively zero”
- The inside view builds a forecast from detailed case-specific information and one's own model, while the outside view asks what happened to other cases in the same situation, and thoughtful integration of both leads to better forecasts.
“The outside view, which is equivalent to a base rate... What happened when other people were in this situation before?”
- The best single-number estimate of long-run US equity return is roughly 6 to 7 percent real, perhaps somewhat lower given interest rates, because one-year market results carry almost no signal.
“maybe six to seven real, probably is what I would say”
- A shrinkage factor between zero and one, estimated from the correlation between past and future performance, sets how much an extraordinary result persists; zero means it is luck and reverts fully to average, one means it persists fully.
“the shrinkage factor is sort of the key idea here, and that takes a value between zero and one”
- Earnings growth rates show strong regression toward the mean, so forecasts should be pulled toward the base rate heavily, while operating margins show very low regression, so margin forecasts can be more persistent.
“earnings growth rates have very strong regression... operating margins have very low regression”
Firm value rests on sustainable returns above cost of capital and steady-state earnings.
- A competitive advantage exists when a firm earns returns above its cost of capital and above its peers, and a moat is sustainable value creation, meaning the duration over which returns stay above cost of capital.
“a competitive advantage exists when two conditions are met... earning above your cost of capital”
- Amazon went public at about $625 million in 2016-adjusted market cap and is now around $450 billion, and Facebook listed at $110 billion after about $100 billion of profits had already accrued privately, so much value accrues before public listing.
“there was $100 billion of profits that occurred before it saw the light of day”
- Dual-class share structures that give founders control despite minority ownership, as at Snap, are not best practice for governance, though narrow justifications such as media objectivity may exist.
“in terms of hygiene for governance, that's not best practices”
- Of 313 companies with at least 100 billion dollars in revenue since 1950, none grew 15 percent annually for 10 years, so Amazon's implied 15 percent growth, while not impossible, deserves a probability well below one half.
“exactly zero of them have grown 15% or more”
- In a declining industry, the harvest strategy means not reinvesting in the core business and returning its cash to shareholders, since capital markets can often redeploy the money better than a shrinking company can.
“there is no pride and should have no pride about giving money back”
- Following Miller and Modigliani, firm value equals steady-state value from current earnings plus present value of growth opportunities, and since 1961 the S&P has averaged about two-thirds steady-state and one-third future value creation.
“that ratio is about two thirds steady-state and one-third future value creation”
Private markets and institutions now capture young-company value, leaving ordinary investors without cost-effective access.
- A 1976 endowment CIO could match US equity exposure with an S&P 500 index fund, but a modern CIO needs early and late-stage venture, buyouts and public stocks, which ordinary investors cannot access cost-effectively.
“the rest of us don't have access to all those things, or certainly not cost-effective access to those.”
- The ratio of CFA charter holders to public stocks has risen sharply since 1976, because there are many more analysts and far fewer listed stocks to analyze, making it harder to distinguish oneself through public-market research.
“So there are, yeah, a lot of smart people analyzing fewer things, and it becomes difficult, from a public markets point of view, to try to distinguish yourself.”
- Private equity buyouts have taken companies out of public circulation because their exits are typically sales to strategic buyers or other PE firms, not IPOs, so those companies rarely return to public markets.
“The number one exit strategy for private equity guys is sell to other companies, and then the second strategy is to sell to other private equity firm.”
- Large mutual fund families entering late-stage venture invest in the same rounds at the same price but then mark those holdings at different values at quarter-end, so there is little transparency about true valuations.
“these investors are going in the same round, paying the same amount, and then they mark them at different prices at the end of the quarters.”
- A European buyout fund creating a vehicle to buy companies from itself extends its effective time horizon beyond the typical three-to-seven-year window, which may benefit the manager more than investors, and PE timing latitude is itself an advantage.
“if we buy it from ourselves, we can extend our time horizon beyond seven years, and it's really great for investors.”
- Institutional investors such as the CIO of Notre Dame can access early-stage venture, late-stage venture, buyouts, and public equities, but ordinary investors cannot cost-effectively access these, so the value creation of young companies has shifted away from the public.
“the rest of us don't have access to all those things, or certainly not cost-effective access to those.”
Profit pools and moat sources can reveal whether advantages are cyclical or structural.
- Beyond structural forces, cyclical factors such as the Department of Labor fiduciary rule, which was not implemented in April, caused a pull-forward effect in fund flows.
“there was a big pull forward effect and so forth. So there were some others, we'll call that more cyclical factors as well.”
- Tracking profit pools over time, such as every three years, shows whether companies are improving or deteriorating and whether aggregate industry economics are changing; airlines recently generated strong economic profit, prompting the question of whether this is cyclical or structural.
“has something changed? Is that something that's just cyclical? What's going on here?”
- Markets already price persistent high returns with higher multiples (consumer staples) and low persistence with low multiples (energy), and the open question is whether moat analysis can be linked more systematically to valuation to find mispricings.
“The market gets that certainly generally speaking, but can we do a better job, more systematically, about linking these two concepts”
- Porter's generic strategies imply differentiators earn high margins with low capital velocity and high returns on capital, while low-cost producers earn lower margins but higher capital velocity, so the two sources of advantage manifest in different financial profiles.
“differentiation, which tends to manifest in high margins, relatively low capital velocity”
Markets are efficiently inefficient, so mispricings persist yet remain hard to exploit.
- Grossman and Stiglitz showed markets cannot be perfectly efficient because gathering information is costly, so a return must exist to compensate informed investors, leaving markets efficiently inefficient.
“Markets cannot be perfectly efficient because there's a cost to gathering information and reflecting in prices”
- Prices being right (informational efficiency) implies no free lunch, but the inverse does not hold: markets can be inefficient while still being hard to beat, which frustrates active managers who see mispricings they cannot exploit.
“if prices are right, there is no free lunch... the inverse is not true”
- High-frequency market makers provide excellent liquidity in normal conditions but may withdraw in dislocations, as occurred in August 2007 when some HFT firms lost money and failed to show up the next day.
“the next day they just didn't show up”
US public listings are declining as listing costs rise and private liquidity substitutes for going public.
- US IPOs averaged about 280 per year from 1976 to 2000 but only about 115 per year since 2000.
“We averaged, from 1976 to 2000, something like 280 IPOs per annum... about 115”
- The decision to list is a cost-benefit tradeoff in which costs such as compliance and quarterly reporting have risen, the median IPO age has increased, and the trend predates Sarbanes-Oxley, while the benefit of public liquidity has weakened for capital-light firms.
“this trend was well in place before Sarbanes-Oxley”
- The number of US listed companies today is less than in 1976 and about half the 1996 peak, despite real GDP tripling and population growing 30 to 40 percent, with roughly half the decline from fewer listings and half from delistings.
“we have half as many listed companies today as we did in 1996”
- The US has about half as many listed companies as it did in 1996, while 13 comparable developed countries have grown their listed-company populations by about 50 percent, and the broader global dataset is up about 30 percent, so efficiency is a continuum and less competitive markets offer more opportunity.
“their population of companies is up 50%”
- Roughly 150 unicorns with aggregate valuations of perhaps 500 to 600 billion dollars remain private, though these marks may not be real money until they list.
“something like 150 so-called unicorns... five- or six-hundred billion dollars”
- Private liquidity for employees, such as Airbnb buying out about $200 million of employee stock in a large round, has become a substitute for public listing.
“something like $200 million of that money went to buy out employees”
Less efficient niches let specialized managers beat weaker competition.
- Alternative investments tend to be a less efficient game than public markets, so asset managers with specialized expertise have an edge, though the economic rent split between managers and clients is an ongoing debate.
“alternatives tend to be a less efficient game”
- Lo's adaptive markets hypothesis treats markets as complex adaptive systems with many interacting agents whose decision rules evolve, so the whole is more complex than its parts and efficient markets are a limiting case rather than a fixed law.
“Complex means lots of interacting agents. Adaptive means that the rules evolve.”
- Deep work, focused concentration on difficult cognitive problems, is a competitive advantage in a world where much work has become superficial, as argued by Cal Newport.
“you can gain a competitive advantage in a cognitive world by doing so-called deep work”
- Asset managers should pursue alternatives and expertise-driven niches where competition is thinner, and examine less-efficient global markets, because being the smartest player at a table with weaker opponents is the more feasible game.
“alternatives tend to be a less efficient game... So again, you're looking for the easier game. You're the smartest player at the table”
- Students interested in asset management should consider less efficient markets outside the US, such as parts of Asia, Africa, and Europe, though these markets are smaller and offer less scalability.
“there may be more opportunity in parts of Asia or Africa or parts of Europe than there are in the United States.”
Strategy rests on explicit trade-offs that profit pools help reveal.
- A bank that opened longer hours and Saturdays to serve working families chose to offer lower CD and checking rates, trading return for convenience, a conscious tradeoff that competitors with the same rates and hours could not match profitably.
“So they said their trade-off is we're going to offer much lower rates on our CDs”
- Strategy is fundamentally about trade-offs; until a company's trade-offs are explained, its strategy is not understood, and executives who describe operational effectiveness such as reducing SKUs are not describing strategy.
“at the end of the day, strategy is ultimately about trade-offs”
- Investors face a fundamental tradeoff between control and liquidity: private ownership gives control with little liquidity, public markets give liquidity with no control, and private equity sits between, with a liquidity premium requiring investors to not demand cash on request.
“there tends to be a trade-off between control and liquidity”
- A profit pool chart plots invested capital on the x-axis and ROIC minus cost of capital on the y-axis, so each rectangle's area equals economic profit, and tracking it over time reveals whether industry profits are rising or falling.
“the area of that rectangle is economic profit, by definition”