Glass-Steagall Act
Depression-era US legislation separating investment banking from retail banking, cited as an example of a structural reform enacted directly without requiring an economic effects model.
As defined in Will Davies on the Economics, Economists, and the Limits of Neoliberalism
Where it comes up · 5
- Alan Waxman - Private Credit and the Modern Financial System - [Invest Like the Best, EP.466]4 claims
- William Cohan on the Life and Death of Bear Stearns 09/28/20091 claim
- The Most Outspoken Trend Forecaster, Gerald Celente1 claim
- Will Davies on the Economics, Economists, and the Limits of Neoliberalism1 claim
- Barry Eichengreen on the Dollar and International Finance 06/06/20111 claim
Most important claims · 8 of 8Search all claims for “Glass-Steagall Act” →
- Anti-trust laws and regulations that protected small businesses from mega-corporation consolidation have been eliminated through deregulation; Glass-Steagall Act repeal (1999) and Telecommunications Act (1996) enabled banks and media companies to consolidate into handful of mega-corporationsThe Most Outspoken Trend Forecaster, Gerald Celente
- Because legitimacy now requires assembling huge bodies of economic evidence about utilitarian effects, structural reforms that were once enacted directly—like Roosevelt separating investment and retail banking under Glass-Steagall—would today be lost in a battle over models of effects on GDP and consumers, causing policymakers to completely lose sight of the prior question of how to structure the economy in the first place.Will Davies on the Economics, Economists, and the Limits of Neoliberalism
- Financial institutions levered up to 33-to-1 before the crisis not primarily because they expected to be rescued, but because competition from new rivals following the elimination of Glass-Steagall and other financial innovation squeezed them into a gamble to survive; moreover, in the Bear Stearns case equity holders were wiped out and only creditors (with small fractional exposures) were made whole, so moral hazard was not a major driver.Barry Eichengreen on the Dollar and International Finance 06/06/2011
- Bear Stearns's leverage surged after the SEC in June 2004 adopted new capital guidelines that let investment banks use much more leverage than the 10-to-12-times limit for commercial banks, a change Wall Street had lobbied for after the 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall.William Cohan on the Life and Death of Bear Stearns 09/28/2009
- As globalization advanced, European universal banks combined commercial and investment banking and took on more leverage than American commercial banks were allowed, leaving US banks at a competitive disadvantage that led to the 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall.Alan Waxman - Private Credit and the Modern Financial System - [Invest Like the Best, EP.466]
- Before the 1929 crash the US system had no guardrails, and commercial banks holding depositors' money sat in the same house as principal risk-taking investment banking, creating a massive conflict of interest that was one major cause of the crash.Alan Waxman - Private Credit and the Modern Financial System - [Invest Like the Best, EP.466]
- After 9,000 bank failures in the 1929 crash, the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act separated deposit-taking commercial banks from investment banks, and the FDIC was established to insure depositors up to a limit, creating System 1.Alan Waxman - Private Credit and the Modern Financial System - [Invest Like the Best, EP.466]
- The repeal of Glass-Steagall contributed to the GFC, but it was not the only cause; the deeper problem was the system and its incentives, specifically the lack of guardrails present in System 1.Alan Waxman - Private Credit and the Modern Financial System - [Invest Like the Best, EP.466]