Will Davies on the Economics, Economists, and the Limits of Neoliberalism
What this covers
Will Davies of Goldsmiths, University of London joins host Russ Roberts to examine how neoliberalism has remade political institutions by imposing economic logic where political logic once stood. The conversation traces the intellectual history and practical consequences of treating competition as a universal organizing principle, and of elevating economists to positions of unearned authority. Davies argues that this project—the disenchantment of politics by economics—has now reached an impasse: markets require rules, authority, and social norms that economic calculation alone cannot justify or sustain.
The discussion moves through several overlapping tensions. It contrasts Hayek's epistemological caution about the limits of social-scientific knowledge with the Chicago School's confidence in empirical modeling and efficiency standards. It shows how the shift from conduct-based to effects-based regulation in antitrust law—championed by Aaron Director, Robert Bork, and Richard Posner—raised the status of economic expertise while stripping away older moral judgments about market structure. It examines the paradox that neoliberals often tolerate monopoly inside markets while pushing competition into domains—schools, universities, public services—where no genuine price mechanism exists, creating pseudo-markets that inherit the romance of real ones without their properties. The conversation also addresses the Economist as Disinterested Judge—the claim that economists can don a value-free "science hat" while their own professional interests remain hidden—and asks why the 2008 financial crisis response, viewed as triumph by most economists, would have horrified Friedman and Hayek alike.
Davies argues that neoliberalism reimagines political institutions through an economic logic—prioritizing competition as a universal organizing principle and elevating economists to a falsely disinterested authority—and that this 'disenchantment of politics by economics' has run to its limits because it cannot generate concepts of legitimacy, authority, or norms that markets themselves require.
- Neoliberalism strips politics of its distinctive logic by applying an economic calculus to political institutions, yet markets depend on rules, authority, and norms that economics alone cannot justify.
- Competition is treated not as a natural market feature but as a principle actively inculcated by the state across domains, often promoting monopoly inside markets while pushing competition outside them.
- The Chicago School's efficiency/effects-based approach to antitrust replaced a moral standard with a utilitarian one, raising the authority of economic modeling while masking economists' own self-interest.
Neoliberalism transforms politics into a marketplace, replacing political reasoning with economic calculation and consumer choice.
- Neoliberalism is an attempt to remake political institutions around the ideals, norms, and ethics of the market—reimagining democracy as a marketplace and voting as consumer choice—through a deliberate project to strip political institutions of their political logic and instate an economic calculus, treating bureaucrats and politicians as economic agents.
“it's an attempt to remake political institutions and political institutions around particular ideals and norms and ethics that are associated with the market”
- The difficulty of developing a critique of or limit to lobbying and campaign finance—especially acute in the United States—is a manifestation of the colonization of the political sphere by economic logic, in which a corporation's right to spend billions politically is seen as no different from its right to spend them economically, because the two are viewed as the same thing.
“If you've got billions of dollars to spend then your right to spend them in the political arena is no different than your right to spend them in the economic arena--because ultimately they are viewed as the same thing”
- Politics can be a space in which people achieve a kind of fulfillment greater than they are capable of through business or consumer relations, because human beings are by nature political animals (Aristotle's 'zoon politikon') with an innate need to publicly debate justice and the common good; neoliberalism, fearing politics as a root of totalitarianism, strips it of this romanticism and thereby empties public and social life.
“human beings are what he calls "zoon politikon"--they are political animals. They have an innate need and tendency to debate questions of justice, of the common good, and to do so publicly”
- Western (especially European) democracies have seen a demise of political participation: Britain's Conservative Party fell from over 2 million members in the 1950s to well under 100,000, trade unions have declined, and politics has shifted to a tele-visual form borrowing business techniques like focus groups and branding, turning the political project into a product to be sold.
“In the 1950s Britain's Conservative Party had a membership of over 2 million people, and now I think it's well under 100,000. So that type of political participation has disappeared”
Market systems require prior political and social foundations that neoliberal logic alone cannot legitimize or sustain.
- Even the most pro-market system depends on institutional preconditions—property rights, money, regulations, antitrust law—that require authority (a political concept) and norms (a social concept) to function; neoliberalism's core contradiction, and the sign it is reaching its limits, is that by offering only economic calculation it loses the capacity to conceive what makes a state or regulation legitimate.
“one of the contradictions of neoliberalism, and one of the ways I would argue that it's running to its limits over the last decade, is that it doesn't offer a basis with which to think about things like law and regulation and authority. Because it only offers more and more economic calculations”
- The neoliberal intellectuals of the 20th century (Austrian and Chicago schools) were actually more attuned than classical liberals like Adam Smith to the need for rules and state interventions to make a free-market system work, being consistently concerned with the role of the state and what kind of law a free-market society requires.
“the neoliberals are actually more attuned to the need for these rules and state interventions than the original classical liberals”
- A system where economic losers can return to the game requires social safety nets, public education, and institutions producing meritocracy—and meritocracy itself requires active political intervention to prevent people being held back by their origins; Tony Blair's 1997-2007 Labour government was in some ways the most effective neoliberal government precisely because it recognized the need for an active state to keep the competitive game ticking over and help the disadvantaged stay in it.
“some form of meritocracy requires some type of active political intervention in order to prevent people being held back by their origins”
Economic expertise and modeling now determine policy, displacing judgment about intrinsic institutional design and moral conduct.
- Because legitimacy now requires assembling huge bodies of economic evidence about utilitarian effects, structural reforms that were once enacted directly—like Roosevelt separating investment and retail banking under Glass-Steagall—would today be lost in a battle over models of effects on GDP and consumers, causing policymakers to completely lose sight of the prior question of how to structure the economy in the first place.
“you'd be lost in a whole battle about utilitarian effects. And you would have completely lost sight of the question of how to structure the economy in the first place”
- Sociologists describe the 'performativity of economics': economics is not merely describing the world but is something you can do things with—a set of tools for taking decisions, making predictions, and managing situations—consistent with Milton Friedman's 1953 claim that the truth value of economics lies not in describing how things are but in its predictions, which means economists have never been innocent observers and were entangled in the financial crisis.
“the performativity of economics--which basically means that economics isn't just describing the world... it's actually something that you can do things with, rather than it being a representation”
- The shift to an effects-based (outcome-focused) approach in antitrust is amoral—not immoral—because it holds there is no bad behavior, only bad outcomes, replacing the 1950s-60s practice of punishing conduct (like product bundling) deemed intrinsically anti-competitive; this both reduces moral content and dramatically raises the authority of economic model-building, since legitimacy now turns on contestable counterfactual models of future prices that can contain errors.
“it's also quite an amoral approach--not immoral--but it is an amoral approach, because it effectively says there is no such thing as bad behavior; there's only bad outcomes”
- Chicago School lawyers and economists (Aaron Director, Robert Bork, Richard Posner) argued that antitrust authorities didn't know to what end they were enforcing the law—targeting companies merely for being large or profitable—and that the only legitimate basis for regulatory intervention is increasing efficiency, a calculable neoclassical outcome; this directly led 1970s-80s Washington regulators to leave large corporations like AT&T alone where they might earlier have been broken up.
“the only basis for legitimate intervention by the regulator in the market is to increase efficiency. And what they mean by this is, efficiency is an outcome. It's something that can be calculated using neoclassical economics”
Competition as doctrine spread into all domains while corporate monopoly power grew, revealing neoliberalism's internal contradiction.
- In a neoliberal political system, competition is not the natural competition of nature documentaries or of Adam Smith's spontaneously emerging market rivalry, but something actively inculcated and pushed by the state as a deliberate way to achieve progress and impose discipline—as when the British government makes universities compete (so bad ones go bust) without introducing a genuine price mechanism, in order to make them behave more enterprisingly.
“Competition is something which is actively inculcated in a neoliberal political system as a deliberate way of trying to achieve some kind of progress, but also to impose some kind of discipline”
- Friedrich Hayek described competition as a 'discovery process' and prioritized it as the ultimate basis for organizing a liberal society: by allowing the elimination of that which is of less value, truth, or beauty, competitive institutions (markets, but also academic publishing or culture) reveal what is of more value; as Popper argued, something must have the chance of being eliminated in order to be valued.
“he described competition as a discovery process... through eliminating that which is of less value, or less truth or less beauty, you've hit on that which is of more value”
- Paradoxically, as the West moved into a more pro-market era after the Keynesian 1950s-60s, competition enforcement became more pro-monopoly: under Chicago School influence from the 1970s onward, antitrust authorities became far more sympathetic to large corporations and provided less defense of market pluralism than they had previously—so neoliberals often pushed competition into areas outside the market while tolerating reduced competition inside it.
“we now live in a more pro-market era than was the case under the, during the Keynesian era of the 1950s and 1960s; yet competition enforcement has become more pro-monopoly over that period”
- Reality television and talent shows turn Hayek's idea of competition-as-discovery-process into a spectacle in its own right: although singing has intrinsic value that could be enjoyed without anyone being deemed a worse singer, this obsession with the elimination of the unworthy has become a cultural maxim we are almost addicted to.
“that's--in a way this obsession with elimination of the unworthy has become a cultural maxim that we almost are addicted to now”
Neoliberal competition ideology produces psychological and social strain when people must repeatedly fail and recover without institutional support.
- Silicon Valley's ethos celebrates both entrepreneurial success and widespread entrepreneurial failure, but the requirement that a large share of the population repeatedly endure failure—sustained partly by their dreams of future success—places huge strains on a society, and few cultures can sustain that level of disruption.
“the need to also have a large amount of the population that is willing to repeatedly put up with failure, partly because they still are dreaming of success in the future, is something that not many cultures can sustain”
- Davies hypothesizes (admittedly not based on evidence) that the rising burden of depression and mental health problems across the Anglo-American world reflects the loss of credibility of the neoliberal vision in which everyone can keep having another go, since for low-income people without assets that system increasingly requires exhausting amounts of personal work—SSRIs, self-help books, and constant aspirational belief—to be seen as winnable.
“when you look at the burden of rising mental health problems and the problem of depression across the Anglo-American world, I think in many ways this neoliberal vision of a society where everyone can keep having another go is losing credibility”
- Nudge (choice architecture)—altering how choices are presented to help people choose better outcomes—is not a radical departure from the Chicago School's rational-choice model but an attempt to rescue the status quo: it merely tweaks the model and shares responsibility for economic optimization across a wider range of human and non-human agents (like smartphones), allowing the neoliberal utopia of universal calculation and optimization to spread even further into our lives.
“in some ways it's an attempt to kind of rescue the status quo... it allows that to spread even further into our lives”
Hayek's thought diverged from Chicago School dogmatism by prioritizing uncertainty and skepticism of social-scientific arrogance.
- A purely Austrian/Hayekian response to the financial crisis would be to let the system be cleansed—a painful process that produces a genuinely new system—whereas the actual policy response of huge bailouts left essentially the same system that existed in 2007 (with a few fewer banks), so a Hayekian would not be happy with how the crisis was handled.
“one of the problems we have right now is that we do not have a new system. We have the same system that we had in 2007, basically. With a few less banks, ironically”
- Hayek's 1944 book The Road to Serfdom, written in a period of despair when liberalism seemed remote, became a best seller, was serialized in Reader's Digest in the United States, and led to Hayek being repeatedly flown to America (an effort associated with Aaron Director and funded by the Ford Foundation) to promote it and write an American version, after which he was picked up as a celebrity by the post-war Chicago School.
“it was serialized in Reader's Digest in the States, and he was then repeatedly flown to the United States, I think organized by Aaron Director in the 1940s and 1950s, with funding I think from the Ford Foundation”
- Although Hayek became associated with the Chicago School, his thinking diverged sharply: the Chicago School exhibited an epistemological arrogance, believing it possible through rigorous empirics and theory to know a great deal about the economy and was untroubled by uncertainty, whereas Hayek's 1930s-40s work was motivated by a fear and distrust of 'scientism'—the idea that social science could be modeled on the methods of natural science—and by the impossibility of full social-scientific knowledge.
“the Chicago School involved a certain epistemological arrogance, I would say--a certain belief that it was possible to know a great deal about what was going on in the economy”