What this covers

Barry Eichengreen and Russ Roberts explore the foundations of American financial power and its fragility in this conversation on the dollar's role as the world's dominant reserve currency. Eichengreen, drawing on his book Exorbitant Privilege, lays out how the dollar's dominance rests on three concrete preconditions: a large platform of international trade and investment, proven price stability, and deep liquid financial markets. He traces how the dollar displaced sterling between 1914 and 1924—a remarkably swift transition that disproves the notion of permanent incumbency—and examines what the dollar's continued reign actually buys the United States in material terms: roughly 3 percent of living standards through seigniorage and cheap borrowing.

The discussion ranges across the mechanics and limits of currency power. Eichengreen explains how the dollar's role insulates American monetary policy from constraints other central banks face, allows US firms to avoid currency-conversion costs, and lets the Treasury export "cheap green paper in exchange for real goods." But he also identifies the genuine threat to this system: not Federal Reserve missteps but medium-term fiscal irresponsibility. If foreign holders conclude that Washington cannot manage debt, the pressure to inflate could become irresistible and the dollar could crash. The pair also examine China's deliberate strategy of currency suppression to sustain export growth, the renminbi's nascent internationalization through trade finance, and whether the dollar's supremacy rests fundamentally on being good in absolute terms or merely "the least ugly contestant" among flawed alternatives. Along the way they debate the causes of the 2008 crisis, the role of moral hazard in leverage buildup, and what structural changes the Federal Reserve itself must undergo to retain public legitimacy.

Sharpest takeaway

Eichengreen argues the dollar's global dominance confers a real but bounded 'exorbitant privilege' on the US, and that this dominance is neither permanent nor immune to challenge—the greatest threat being not Fed policy but US fiscal irresponsibility, even as upstart currencies like the renminbi could repeat the dollar's own rapid 20th-century rise.

  • Dollar dominance raises US living standards ~3% via cheap borrowing and seigniorage, but abusing it risks 'killing the goose'
  • Currency dominance requires three preconditions: a large trade/investment platform, price stability, and deep liquid financial markets
  • The dollar overtook sterling in roughly a decade (1914-1924), showing incumbency advantages can be overcome

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0.86

The three preconditions for a currency to become the dominant global unit are: (1) a large platform of international trade and investment, (2) credibility through low inflation and price stability, and (3) deep, liquid financial markets in which investors have confidence.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Barry Eichengreen

“if you ask me what are the preconditions for your currency to be the dominant global unit I would answer three things... number one a big platform... number two capability low inflation... and number three that your financial markets are liquid”

0.86

The dollar overtook the pound sterling internationally within roughly a decade (from no international role in 1914 to surpassing sterling as a reserve and trade-finance currency by 1924) due to three combined factors: the creation of the Federal Reserve and its campaign to build a market in trade acceptances, the disruption of World War One that cut London off from customary business, and the absolute growth of the US economy as a trade platform.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Barry Eichengreen

“it reflected two things the creation of the fed and fed campaign to create these markets from the international eyes of the dollar plus the drug world war one”

0.86

Keynes, a dedicated free trader, reluctantly advocated a tariff in 1931 when British unemployment approached 20% and the government lacked other tools to mobilize the fixed lump of demand at home—then reversed himself once Britain left the gold standard and monetary policy became available, illustrating that protectionism was his second-best response to a binding constraint, not a principle.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Barry Eichengreen

“he had been a dedicated free trader he found himself in in 1931 in a... situation where unemployment in Britain was approaching 20%... he reluctantly concluded that a tariff to bottle up the fixed lump of demand... was the best of a variety of bad sources... Britain went off the gold standard and monetary policy became available... a tariff really is no longer appropriate”

0.85

Other central banks face a dilemma the Fed escapes: when domestic firms and households hold debts denominated in foreign currencies (e.g., Hungarian car loans in Swiss francs), the central bank cannot pursue an accommodating low-rate policy if its currency falls, because depreciation would make foreign-currency debts unpayable—forcing it to tighten regardless of domestic conditions, whereas the US can practice 'benign neglect' of the dollar's exchange rate.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“in in the country of Hungary for example most out of the car loans are not in Hungarian forints but they're in the West Bank... if the Hungarian forints depreciates it loses value against the Swiss franc suddenly the Hungarian worker... finds that its wages in in forints won't pay for the car loan anymore”

0.80

Before WWI, US importers and exporters lacked dollar-based trade credit and had to obtain letters of credit denominated in pounds sterling through London correspondent banks, because the dollar played no international role and London was the global financial center where everyone kept deposits and got trade finance.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Barry Eichengreen

“us importers and exporters when they needed trade credit had to go to London in order to get it from English banks... everything was denominated in pounds sterling... London was the global financial center it was in 1914 what New York is today”

0.78

There is no single magic monetary variable—neither a price (interest rate) nor a quantity (monetary aggregate)—that reveals whether monetary policy is too tight or too loose; following Tobin, money, bonds, stocks, and other securities are imperfect substitutes whose prices cascade into one another, so one must watch the whole vector of interest rates and quantities together.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Barry Eichengreen

“I'm a student of Jim Tobin at Yale and Tobin believed that money and bonds and stocks and other securities are all imperfect substitutes for one another... I don't think there is a magic monetary single magic monetary variable either a prize or a quantity that will tell you whether monetary policy is too tight or too loose”

0.76

China is moving rapidly on the payment/unit-of-account dimension of currency internationalization—from zero companies using the renminbi in trade two years ago to around 70,000 today, with dim-sum bonds issued by McDonald's and Caterpillar—but enhancing financial-market liquidity and opening to foreign investors will be much harder and riskier, making its 2020 goal of turning Shanghai into a London/New York-rivaling financial center difficult to achieve.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Barry Eichengreen

“the renminbi from two years ago zero Chinese companies use their own currency and import and export trade now something on the order of 70 thousand do so”

0.75

Safety of a reserve asset has two distinct dimensions: default-safety (the country honors promises and there is no expropriation) and stability-safety (low and relatively low inflation preserving purchasing power); the US has done well on relative price stability over 50 years, but a country must do a really bad job for an extended period before a dominant currency loses its advantage—as the 1970s inflation showed when predicted dollar migration never happened.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“one definition is safe is that the country honors its promises... the other measure is safe is is stable meaning that the purchasing power of the asset is relatively stable”

0.75

The relationship between monetary aggregates (e.g., M2) and real economic activity has become unreliable because of decades of financial innovation, which is why M2 is no longer a dependable guide to what monetary policy will do to the real economy—and the discount/interest rate is likewise not a reliable guide.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“the relationship between the different ends and the real economy economic activity has been shifting around because we've had a lot of financial innovation in recent decades that means that m2 is not always a reliable company for what monetary policy is gonna do to the real economy”

0.75

Assuming we can safely let tightly connected financial institutions fail is too easy—Lehman Brothers demonstrated this—so rather than relying on bailouts, policymakers must make institutions more transparent and address interconnectedness so that bailouts are no longer felt to be the only alternative.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“I simply assume that we can safely let tightly connected financial institutions fail is too easy Lehman Brothers reminds us that it's too easy but we've got to do a variety of things to make financial institutions more transparent and deal with problems of interconnectedness”

0.73

There is a second explanation for persistent US deficits and Chinese surpluses: a global shortage of safe liquid assets that only the United States is really in a position to supply—an explanation with much historical merit but whose continued validity going forward is uncertain.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“that second explanation saying there is a shortage of safe liquid assets in the world and only the United States is really in a position to supply them... historically that explanation has it has a lot of merit”

0.73

The greatest danger to the dollar comes not from Fed monetary policy but from medium-term fiscal policy: if foreigners conclude that 'responsible adults are not making fiscal policy' and the 2012 election winner fails to push through a credible medium-term fiscal plan, they could fear open or covert debt default, the pressure to inflate away spiraling US debt would become irresistible, they would dump Treasuries, and the dollar would crash.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“the danger to the dollar it comes from medium-term fiscal policy... if foreigners are can conclude that responsible adults are not making fiscal policy in the United States... foreigners could decide there are risks of some kind of open or covert debt default... they'll dump their Treasury securities and... at some point the dollar will will crash”

0.73

Financial institutions levered up to 33-to-1 before the crisis not primarily because they expected to be rescued, but because competition from new rivals following the elimination of Glass-Steagall and other financial innovation squeezed them into a gamble to survive; moreover, in the Bear Stearns case equity holders were wiped out and only creditors (with small fractional exposures) were made whole, so moral hazard was not a major driver.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“when I look at their return before the crisis and ask myself why did they have a leverage ratio of 33 to 1 I don't think it was primarily because they expected to be rescued... it was primarily because they were being squeezed by competition... following the elimination of the glass-steagall Act”

0.73

Because the US Treasury market is the most liquid financial market and the dollar is viewed as the ultimate form of liquidity, foreign governments and central banks hold dollars as insurance against shocks (e.g., needing dollars to finance food or energy imports), and this demand grows as the global economy grows, letting the US export cheap green paper in exchange for real goods—seigniorage worth roughly 3% of US living standards.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“that allows the United States in effect export green pieces of paper which cost us very little to produce and import Toyota's and BMWs and the like economists refer to this as neeraj”

0.73

A pattern of past bailouts—especially of creditors and lenders to large financial institutions—encouraged excessive leverage and was an under-emphasized cause of the financial crisis, because free-market ideologues over 25 years were interventionist whenever it was convenient, always finding reasons to rescue the financial sector.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the role of past bailouts particularly of creditors particularly of lenders to large financial institutions in making leverage as easy as it became... most of the free-market ideologues... were only free-market ideologues when it was convenient when it wasn't convenient they were interventionist”

0.73

Doug Irwin's argument that France hoarded gold in the run-up to the Great Depression, forcing the US and other nations to absorb deflation, has parallels to what China has been doing recently in hoarding reserves.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“I've written a long similar line and my earlier book golden fetters there are those parallels between what plans did then in the run-up to the Great Depression and what sauna has been doing recently”

0.71

The dollar retains its global role not by being good in absolute terms but by being relatively better than the alternatives—the 'tallest pygmy' or 'least ugly contestant'—since all rival currencies have problems of their own, and relative performance is what matters for reserve status.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the dollar retains its attractiveness because it's the tallest pygmy so even though the dollars not doing very well everybody else is doing worse... it's your relative performance”

0.70

China keeps its currency artificially low against the dollar to maintain stable dollar-denominated labor costs and export competitiveness, buying US Treasuries (and pre-crisis Fannie/Freddie securities) whenever the renminbi tends to rise, accumulating trillions—a strategy that fueled astonishing export-led growth but now risks haunting them with losses if the dollar declines against the renminbi.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Barry Eichengreen

“the way they have been able to keep their export competitive is by keeping their current state and thereby keeping their labor costs their wages in in terms of dollars in stable... they buy the dollar if it shows a tendency to fall against the Chinese renminbi and they end up there for holding trillions of dollars in US Treasury bonds”

0.70

China's household consumption is only about one third of national income—nearly half the share seen in an advanced economy—reflecting a calculated leadership strategy of forgoing current gratification through learning-by-doing and learning-by-exporting to generate faster future growth and higher living standards.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Barry Eichengreen

“household consumption is only one third of Chinese national income nearly half what you would see in an advanced economy... Chinese leadership is engaged in this calculated strategy where they think there is a lot of learning by doing and learning by exporting”

0.69

The dollar's dominance lets US banks and firms do international business in their own currency without bearing currency-conversion costs or exchange-rate risk, which is a competitive advantage other countries (notably China) recognize and now seek to replicate by internationalizing their own currency.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“the dollar is the dominant currency is of considerable convenience to the US banking firms when they do business with foreign banks and firms that they can do it in their own currency without having to incur the cost of buying euros”

0.69

Paying interest on excess reserves is an untraditional monetary policy that functions as a backdoor subsidy to bank balance sheets, and if left alone the resulting reserves could flow out and become a quantity-driven inflation problem rather than a price (interest-rate) problem.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“he's paying interest on for banks to hold their money with him and which I view is a just a backdoor subsidy to the balance sheets of banks... if it were left alone and those reserves do go out it's a quantity issue I'm gonna be worrying about not a price issue”

0.68

The Fed will have to change in two ways to retain legitimacy: it must shed residual 'secrets of the temple' culture by explaining better why its actions benefit the average American (hence Bernanke's press conferences), and the method of appointing regional Reserve Bank presidents—currently by committees of local businessmen and bankers, giving the largest financial institutions a conduit to Washington—will have to broaden beyond bankers.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“number one residual secrets of the temple culture the Fed will have to explain better how and why what is doing is are good for the average American... number two I think the way the president sought the regional Reserve Bank's are appointed will change over time... appointed by Committees of local businessmen and bankers”

0.68

The New York regional Reserve Bank arrangement is an unhealthy political situation because the most influential and largest financial institutions in the world effectively have a say in selecting their own main conduit to Washington.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“the New York branch where it's not just oh the banks that happen to be operating in New York it's rather the most influential and largest financial institutions in the world are having a say... it's a rather unhealthy political situation”

0.68

The only real cost of the Fed's benign-neglect privilege is that abusing it excessively could 'kill the goose that lays the golden eggs'—calling into question the dollar's value as an international exchange mechanism—so the constraint is self-imposed and far milder than what other nations face.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Barry Eichengreen

“the only risk that it could kill the goose that lays the golden eggs it could it could take if it abuses that exorbitant privilege to excessively it will call into question the value of the currency as a international exchange mechanism”

0.68

A nation can consume beyond its production (run a persistent trade/current account deficit) without going into debt, provided it offers something of value—like safe liquid assets or attractive investment opportunities—that makes foreigners willing to hold its currency; thus a trade deficit does not necessarily mean borrowing.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“a nation can do that without borrowing if it provides something of value that makes the currency flows attractive... if the Chinese are willing to hold US dollars for whatever reason... if the u.s. is an attractive place to invest we can live beyond our means in a way without going into debt”

0.68

The Fed knows technically how to reverse its liquidity injections and shrink its balance sheet, but the real monetary risk is that it will lack the political will to follow a tight-money policy as the economy recovers and unemployment falls, because sharply lower asset prices in a still-weak economy would be politically untenable.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“while the Fed understands how to reverse that flow of funds it will not have the political will to do so... it'll be very difficult for the Fed to follow a tight money policy”

0.63

If there is a dollar crash, it will be self-inflicted by Americans rather than caused by China dumping reserves.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Barry Eichengreen

“the Chinese are not going to cause the dollar crash if there is one we will do it we Americans will do it to ourselves”

0.63

Chinese policy of low interest rates on safe assets like Treasuries poured fuel on the financial crisis by pushing US banks and investment funds to reach for yield in riskier markets such as subprime, though the crisis had multiple causes and no single factor was sufficient.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Barry Eichengreen

“among those causes I think were the low interest rates and on relatively safe securities like US Treasury bonds that led other investors banks and investment funds in the United States threats for yield to look for yield in in other financial markets like the subprime market”

0.63

China's export-led deflationary pressure can harm the US specifically in a crisis with inadequate aggregate demand, because the US has exhausted its normal policy tools (monetary policy at the zero bound, fiscal policy unavailable for economic or political reasons), so China diverting the fixed lump of demand toward its own cheap exports leaves less work for Americans—contributing to, though not solely responsible for, 9% unemployment.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Barry Eichengreen

“we also have a problem of aggregate demand there has to be a demand for American goods... we can't stimulate domestic demand using the normal policy instruments because we've fired those bullets... China is artificially diverting the the fixed one book demand that we have in the United States... toward its own chief exports and that's leaving less work for Americans”

0.63

Comparative advantage logic—letting China make flat-screen TVs while Americans move to other activities—applies fully only in a near-full-employment economy; in a crisis with 9% unemployment and no available domestic demand tools, the effects of foreign policies on the US differ, so comparative advantage 'is all that matters' breaks down.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Barry Eichengreen

“in a crisis time in a period when there is inadequate aggregate demand the affective effects of foreign policies on the United States are different than in normal times... in a fully employed economy... your argument about how the Chinese have a comparative advantage... is exactly right but we're not in that full employment world at the moment”

0.48

The 1907 financial crisis, managed by JP Morgan and Benjamin Strong in the absence of a central bank, taught the lesson that the US should have a central bank, leading to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and the Fed's opening in 1914.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Barry Eichengreen

“there was a big financial crisis in the United States in 1907 that was managed by JP Morgan and his right-hand man Benjamin Wong... the lesson grown from that was that the United States should have a central bank... led to the Federal Reserve Act”

0.40

For a commercial producer, credit is not a sign of inability to afford something but a structural necessity, because the timing of expenses (e.g., importing and roasting coffee beans) always precedes the income from selling the goods—so trade itself depends on credit.

definitionestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“if you're a commercial producer credit is you gotta have credit because you don't have the timing is always a little bit different... you have to be able to get access to money before the money comes in to pay it off”

0.27

We have repeatedly underestimated how fast China can move, so its currency internationalization could proceed faster than expected.

forecastcontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Barry Eichengreen

“we've repeatedly underestimated how fast but Connie can move before they may well be that”

0.12

The dollar is the dominant currency, meaning dollars are accepted in most international transactions and the price of oil is denominated in dollars.

factual· Russ Roberts

“when we say dominant we're talking about the fact that dollars are accepted in most international transactions the price of oil is denominated in dollars”