Financial institutions levered up to 33-to-1 before the crisis not primarily because they expected to be rescued, but because competition from new rivals following the elimination of Glass-Steagall and other financial innovation squeezed them into a gamble to survive; moreover, in the Bear Stearns case equity holders were wiped out and only creditors (with small fractional exposures) were made whole, so moral hazard was not a major driver.

causalpending

Speaker

Barry Eichengreen

Evidence Quote

“why did they have a leverage ratio of 33 to 1 I don't think it was primarily because they expected to be rescued... they were being squeezed by competition... following the elimination of the glass-steagall Act”

Source

Barry Eichengreen on the Dollar and International Finance 06/06/2011— EconTalk
Created: 6/13/2026, 7:01:30 PM

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