What this covers

L.A. Paul, a philosopher at Yale working on causation and metaphysics, speaks with Sean Carroll about a class of life choices that standard decision theory cannot handle. Marriage, parenthood, religious conversion, graduate school—these are transformative experiences: they give you knowledge you cannot obtain without undergoing them, and simultaneously they reshape who you are and what you value. The problem is that rational decision theory assumes you can assign value to an outcome before choosing, then execute your choice. But when the choice itself changes the chooser, this breaks down. You cannot know, ex ante, what becoming a parent will feel like or want, because the person who will live with that choice is not the person deciding now. Their conversation explores why testimony from others—or even your future self's satisfaction—cannot solve this puzzle, and what it means to act with epistemic humility about who you will become.

The discussion ranges widely across domains where this philosophical knot tightens. Paul argues that religious belief presents an especially sharp version of the problem: converting to faith is epistemically transformative, reshaping your entire interpretive framework much like a paradigm shift in science, so a skeptic can rationally refuse to genuinely entertain a believer's perspective without being closed-minded—the disagreement is not fundamentally about evidence. The stakes shift when considering disability and difference: society's tendency to dismiss the testimony of blind people who gain sight, or autistic individuals who describe rich lives, amounts to testimonial injustice, a systematic failure to credit what people know from experience. Paul also examines whether political polarization might follow similar logic—stepping fully into an opponent's worldview could transform your own values, so refusing deep empathy becomes rational self-protection rather than mere bias. She proposes that authenticity, rather than demanding fidelity to a fixed self, means acknowledging what we cannot know about our futures and caring genuinely about lived experience anyway.

Sharpest takeaway

L.A. Paul argues that some life choices are 'transformative experiences' whose outcomes you cannot know or value in advance and which change your very preferences, so standard rational decision theory breaks down and we must instead act with epistemic humility about our future selves.

  • Transformative experiences are both epistemically transformative (give knowledge unobtainable without undergoing them) and personally transformative (change who you are and what you value)
  • Because the act of choosing changes the chooser, you cannot assign value to outcomes ex ante, violating act-state independence in decision theory
  • Testimony from others (or your future self) cannot substitute for first-person experience, which reframes how we judge belief, disability, religion, and politics

The argument · threads6 threads · 25 claims
0.85

Transformative choices violate expected-value rationality because the choice itself changes the agent's identity and preferences.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Transformative choices break the assumption of act-state independence in decision theory: because making the choice itself changes who you are and what you prefer, you cannot assign value to the outcome ex ante and the question of whether the post-change self's satisfaction validates the choice becomes incoherent—the agent who is supposed to choose rationally for themselves is not the agent who ends up living with the choice.

    “there's a violation of what's called act-state independence”

  • The philosophically hard version of the decision to have a child is not when the skeptics about parenthood's joys are right, but when the optimists are right—when it really is true that becoming a parent will make you happy and find joy—because then a self that currently rejects the choice would be transformed into a self that endorses it, and there is no neutral standpoint to adjudicate between them.

    “the interesting case is when they're right, and that's a version of the happy pill.”

  • An epistemically transformative experience merely gives you new information and abilities (like tasting a new food), but when it scales up it becomes personally transformative—the discovery affects you so strongly that it restructures how you understand yourself, how you think, and your preferences; transformative experiences in Paul's strong sense are both at once.

    “you can try a new kind of food, and it might just give you new information, and it'll give you new abilities to imagine food like that, but it doesn't change or restructure, I think, how you think about yourself.”

  • When we reason about new things we often use model-based reasoning, mentally simulating ourselves in a possible future—imagining being a parent or enjoying a renovated house—and it is precisely this first-personal modeling that transformative experiences defeat, because you cannot simulate a self whose values you don't yet have.

    “a lot of times when we reason, for new things we use model-based reasoning. And I think of that, in this case, as like imagining myself, say, being a parent, or being a vampire, or just enjoying the new wing of a house I'm considering renovating.”

  • Paul reframes the philosophical 'problem of other minds'—not knowing what other people are like from the inside—into a problem of knowing the minds of your own possible future selves, since when you undergo radical self-change you face the same epistemic gap toward who you will become as you do toward other people.

    “the problem of other minds, and knowing what other people are like from the inside, and when we're undergoing these radical self-changes, we turn that problem into a problem of knowing the minds of other... Of your other selves.”

0.79

Transformative experiences teach what cannot be known from testimony, description, or art alone.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Certain big life experiences—like becoming a parent or a vampire—are epistemically transformative: they teach you something new and change how you think in a way that you cannot know or accurately imagine until you actually undergo the experience yourself, so no amount of description or testimony from others is sufficient.

    “It's a kind of experience that you can't know about until you actually undergo it.”

  • Art is the only candidate 'third way' beyond testimony and first-person experience for conveying what an experience is like, functioning as an empathy pump that communicates something ordinary description cannot; but it is still not enough—reading novels or watching films about war does not let you claim to know what combat was like.

    “the whole point of kind of work in art is to communicate something that couldn't be expressed through ordinary testimony and description.”

  • We are too judgmental and too optimistic about learning everything from testimony in cases of disability and difference: people who have undergone accidents or have different physical or neurological characteristics testify to rich, meaningful lives, and those who don't share those characteristics systematically fail to understand them, constituting a kind of testimonial injustice.

    “people who have like undergone traumatic accidents, or who just have different kind of physical characteristics... testify to how amazing their lives are in various contexts. And I think that people who don't share their physical characteristics, fail to understand what they're talking about. There's a kind of testimonial injustice involved here.”

  • Our inability to know what an unexperienced transformative outcome will be like is not a matter of intelligence or being limited or stupid; we are epistemically limited as human beings because of our capacity to know things we haven't experienced, which is just how the brain works—so analytic philosophers and physicists who think they can take a God's-eye objective viewpoint are mistaken.

    “we're epistemically limited as human beings, but it's not about intelligence, it's about our capacities to know things that we haven't experienced, it's just the way the brain works.”

0.65

Standard decision theory lacks guidance for imperfect agents choosing without experiential background in imperfect real circumstances.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • On the standard, generic model of rational decision-making, you evaluate the possible outcomes of your available choices, assign each a value (utility), weight by probability where relevant, and rationally choose the option that maximizes your expected value—it would be a mistake to pick an option you value less than an available alternative.

    “what you wanna do then is, in a very simple sense, you wanna choose the option that's going to give you the most value, that you want the most, that's gonna maximize your expected value.”

  • Ordinary people do not act rationally in all kinds of contexts, and the standard expected-value model has many well-known problems, but these are distinct from the new complication transformative experience introduces.

    “ordinary people don't act rationally in all kinds of context.”

  • Decision research has covered perfect agents in perfect circumstances, perfect agents in imperfect circumstances, and imperfect agents in perfect circumstances, but the box of how imperfect agents should choose in imperfect circumstances—where they simply lack the background experience to imagine what they need—remains unfilled, and that is the target of Paul's project.

    “that last box of the... It hasn't been filled in. And that's really where I'm targeting the project.”

  • Someone born congenitally blind who can gain sight via an operation may know from testimony that others regretted it, yet still want to do it; they are an imperfect agent because they cannot evaluate the nature of the new sense capacity until they actually have it, illustrating that the relevant imperfection is a lack of background experience rather than psychological weakness.

    “someone who grows up congenitally blind and then has the opportunity to, through having a retina operation... to become sighted, they might know from... testimony, from people who've had the operation that they will regret that operation... And yet, they might really want to do it, even though there's a really deep sense in which they don't know what it's gonna be like.”

0.59

Rational agents can defensibly refuse transformative perspective-taking when it risks restructuring their core identity and values.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Refusal to genuinely empathize with the opposing political side can be rational self-protection rather than mere closed-mindedness: fully stepping into an opponent's perspective is a transformative experience that could restructure your own preferences and change who you are, so because your identity is defined partly by political beliefs, it can be rational to refuse to be fully open-minded—making polarization not about evidence at all.

    “if I really step into this other person's perspective and kind of take on their values, What if the experience of seeing the world through their eyes restructured my own internal preferences?”

  • A basic instinct for self-preservation tends to trump even a high-minded commitment to evaluating different perspectives, so people grasp the rationality of refusing transformative perspective-taking at a deep, impulsive level rather than through explicit reasoning.

    “there's a very, very basic way, kind of instinct for self-preservation that's gonna trump even your kind of high-minded commitment to evaluating different perspectives.”

  • Within the Calvinist sensus divinitatis framework, the believer asks the skeptic to open their mind so the sense of the divine can awaken and let them detect evidence of God; the skeptic can rationally refuse, because doing so is a transformative experience that would change who they are and how they think in ways they cannot assess in advance, meaning they would be risking their very self and losing control over their own beliefs—so the disagreement isn't really about the evidence.

    “if opening your mind to engage the sensus divinitatis changes who you are and how you think... then you're risking your very self. That's the first problem... And second, they lose a certain kind of control of something I think is deeply important to them, namely how they think.”

0.46

Authenticity requires accepting epistemic limitations about future selves while valuing lived experience despite inevitable self-change.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • One way to rationally approach a transformative choice is to reframe the decision: rather than trying to evaluate an unknowable outcome, treat the choice as one of being open to discovering a new self, accepting that your preferences and who you are will change, possibly because having such experiences is intrinsically valuable.

    “one way to approach this is to kind of be open to the way that your preferences and who you are is going to change if you make a transformative choice, and to see that as what you're doing, like you're just discovering a new self, or you're choosing to discover a new self.”

  • Authenticity is not about being true to a fixed self but about being true to our epistemic limitations: recognizing what we can and cannot know about ourselves and our futures, accepting that we will be replaced by new selves over time, caring about lived experience for ourselves and others, and then doing the best we can—this reframes the existentialist appeal to authenticity in light of self-change.

    “What we have to be true to is, maybe not ourselves, but to our epistemic limitations.”

  • Paul distinguishes the multiple 'selves' that realize a person over time from being the same person, treating the self primarily in terms of one's first-person experience of oneself and the nature of one's life, including what one values—something we want to remain relatively continuous, or at least to know what we are doing when we change it.

    “I distinguish between the selves that realize a person over time, and being the same person, although ordinary language doesn't make that distinction.”

0.38

Preferences for meaning and identity continuity can rationally override maximization of well-being.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Sometimes people knowingly choose to reduce their own well-being and to suffer—for example refusing medication that would dampen depression because it would make them 'a little less of me'—and they find that choice more meaningful even though it lowers well-being on ordinary scales; this preference for meaning over well-being should be taken seriously rather than dismissed.

    “I might refuse, I think this does happen, to take the meds, and suffer. And it's because there's a sense in which I find, even though that there's suffering there, I still find it kinda more meaningful to live my life that way, than the way that arguably is gonna increase my well-being on most ordinary scales.”

  • Paul, a committed pro-choice person, says she has always been drawn to the arguments against abortion and finds a frightening, compelling argument at the heart of those discussions about ending the viability of a fetus that should be taken seriously, while admitting she doesn't fully know how to reconcile it with her pro-choice commitments.

    “I'm a very pro-choice person, but I have always, always been drawn in a certain way to the arguments against abortion... there's a frightening argument involved about ending the viability of a fetus, that I think should be taken seriously, but I don't fully know how to take it seriously, given my pro-choice commitments.”

  • Much of the difficulty experienced by people on the autism spectrum (and others who differ) stems from how society is structured rather than how those individuals are mentally structured, so hard choices arise because the world is built in a way that some people don't fit straightforwardly into.

    “there's a very good argument that it's the way that society is structured, as opposed to how they are mentally structured, that really creates many of the issues here.”

  • The switch between believer and skeptic parallels radical theoretical change in scientific communities (Kuhnian paradigm shifts): just as an Aristotelian cannot make sense of quantum mechanics, the two stances are nearly incommensurable—but the religious case is even more radical because it involves an internal revolution in how you make sense of who you are, not just the external world.

    “I think there's a really strong parallel here to the kind of radical, theoretical change that can happen in scientific communities, and the kind of radical belief change that an individual can undergo.”