act-state independence
An assumption in decision theory that the act of choosing does not itself alter the states or outcomes being chosen among; transformative choices violate it because choosing changes the chooser.
As defined in 85 | L.A. Paul on Transformative Experiences and Your Future Selves
Where it comes up · 2
- L.A. Paul on Vampires, Life Choices, and Transformation2 claims
- 85 | L.A. Paul on Transformative Experiences and Your Future Selves1 claim
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- Transformative choices violate the act-state independence axiom because the act of undergoing the experience changes who you are, so the state (your post-choice self and its satisfaction) is dependent on the act rather than independent of it; you cannot tell whether your future satisfaction reflects a pre-existing preference being realized or your preferences simply being replaced, leaving no principled way to decide which self should take priority.L.A. Paul on Vampires, Life Choices, and Transformation
- The reference class problem—knowing that evidence about others actually applies to people like you—takes on special significance in life-changing decisions because so many idiosyncratic variables beyond standard demographics matter, and because the high stakes mean getting the reference class wrong has severe consequences.L.A. Paul on Vampires, Life Choices, and Transformation
- Transformative choices break the assumption of act-state independence in decision theory: because making the choice itself changes who you are and what you prefer, you cannot assign value to the outcome ex ante and the question of whether the post-change self's satisfaction validates the choice becomes incoherent—the agent who is supposed to choose rationally for themselves is not the agent who ends up living with the choice.85 | L.A. Paul on Transformative Experiences and Your Future Selves