expected utility
The value of a choice computed by weighting the value of each possible outcome by its probability; rational agents are modeled as maximizing it.
As defined in 85 | L.A. Paul on Transformative Experiences and Your Future Selves
Where it comes up · 9
- 220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality12 claims
- John Kay and Mervyn King on Radical Uncertainty6 claims
- L.A. Paul on Vampires, Life Choices, and Transformation2 claims
- 85 | L.A. Paul on Transformative Experiences and Your Future Selves2 claims
- Daniel Kahneman1 claim
- Robert Shiller on Narrative Economics1 claim
- 385 - Ai Utopia1 claim
- 446 - How To Do The Most Good1 claim
and 1 more
Most important claims · 10 of 27Search all claims for “expected utility” →
- In Matthew Rabin's example, most people reject a coin flip between losing $100 and gaining $110 but accept a coin flip between losing $1,000 and gaining $6M; under expected utility theory with a smooth (everywhere differentiable) concave utility function, rejecting the small gamble at all wealth levels implies such extreme concavity that losing $1,000 would be more valuable than gaining any amount of money whatsoever, which is absurd.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- Rawls and Harsanyi both treated choosing a society as choosing which society to live in behind a veil of not knowing who you will be, but diverged sharply: Harsanyi assigned equal probability to being each person and maximized expected utility (indifferent between equal and unequal distributions of the same total), while Rawls refused to assign probabilities and applied a maximally risk-averse maximin rule, picking the society with the highest minimum.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- In the Allais paradox, most people prefer a 10% chance of $5M over an 11% chance of $1M, yet also prefer a sure $1M over a gamble of 89% chance of $1M, 10% chance of $5M, and 1% chance of nothing; this pattern arises because the sure option has a guaranteed $1M worst case, and anyone weighing worst cases even slightly more than best cases cannot be captured by any utility function.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- Decision theory concerns what is rational to choose or prefer, not necessarily the best method for actually making decisions; expected utility maximization could be the correct theory of rationality while being a terrible decision procedure in practice, as when calculating expected utilities to dodge an oncoming car would take too long and get you hit.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- The justification for maximizing expected utility by appeal to repeated trials does not apply to one-shot decisions: in poker many hands let losses be made up by gains on average, but for a single gamble or major life choice like which job to take or who to marry, you cannot reason that repeating it many times would yield a better average, so the averaging argument fails.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- Even though people lack the precise utility and probability numbers the theory uses, decision theory is useful for broad-brush lessons; for example, the theorem that an expected utility maximizer always prefers to make decisions on the basis of more information is a simple insight that requires complicated math to discover.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- If a person puts more weight on worst-case scenarios than best-case scenarios in a single decision, that can be modeled by expected utility; but if they do this across every decision, there is no utility function and probability function combination that can capture their decision making, so expected utility theory must declare them irrational.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- Unlike expected utility maximizers, who always prefer to decide on more information rather than less, risk-weighted expected utility maximizers will sometimes prefer to decide with the information they have; specifically, when you already have a high probability that your course of action will work, acquiring information that might shift you toward a 50-50 state can talk you out of a risk that would have been good to take, so the risk-avoidant person rationally declines that information.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- Two people can make the identical choice (preferring one cup of coffee over a coin flip between zero and two cups) for entirely different psychological reasons: one because they don't want more than one cup (a utility fact), the other because they value each cup equally but weigh worst-case scenarios heavily (a risk-attitude fact); expected utility theory must assign them the same utility function and cannot capture this difference, motivating a theory that separates risk attitude from utility.220 | Lara Buchak on Risk and Rationality
- Humans do not maximize subjective expected utility not because they are stupid but because they are smart: human intelligence is designed for large worlds, effective at understanding complex problems in imperfectly defined contexts and finding courses of action good enough to get through life, and few real problems have the character of mathematical puzzles that computers solve.John Kay and Mervyn King on Radical Uncertainty