What this covers

Edward Slingerland, a philosopher and religious-studies scholar, joins Sean Carroll to examine two foundational schools of ancient Chinese thought—Confucianism and Daoism—and argue that both were animated by a single, paradoxical pursuit: wu wei, or effortless action. The conversation traces how these schools, which emerged in the same era as Plato and Aristotle, grapple with a puzzle that modern cognitive science now illuminates: the impossibility of consciously trying to be spontaneous. Wu wei (Effortless Action)) resembles what we call flow or being in the zone—a state where the sense of self and time dissolves and action flows without deliberate control. Yet the two schools diverged sharply on method. Confucius and his followers, especially Xunzi, treated wu wei as the fruit of lifelong cultural training—ritual, classical learning, music, poetry—reshaping the self through external discipline until right action became automatic. Laozi and Chuang Tzu, by contrast, saw culture itself as the corruption; they advocated emptying the mind of learned categories to perceive the world directly and respond with unforced spontaneity.

Slingerland unpacks the cognitive mechanism behind their shared paradox. Trying to be spontaneous activates the very mental control systems you must shut down—a principle confirmed by Dan Wegner's ironic process theory and everyday experience: the harder you chase happiness, love, or creative insight, the more elusive they become. Psychology confirms that certain goals resist direct striving. Mencius occupied middle ground, arguing that moral virtues exist as innate "sprouts" within human nature that require gentle cultivation rather than brute force. The discussion also covers how early Chinese thinkers developed indirect techniques—meditation, ritual repetition—to sidestep the Paradox of Wu Wei (Trying Not to Try)), and how Xunzi's functional theory of ritual anticipated modern sociology, treating practices as socially binding even when their stated efficacy is illusory.

Sharpest takeaway

Slingerland argues that the ancient Chinese schools (Confucianism and Daoism) were unified by the pursuit of wu wei or 'effortless action,' which generates the central 'paradox of trying not to try' — and that this paradox, illuminated by modern cognitive science, reveals a perennial human problem that abstract enlightenment striving-based ethics handles poorly.

  • Both Confucians and Daoists aim at the spiritual state of wu wei but diverge on whether trying/training or not-trying gets you there
  • Wu wei is cognitively paradoxical because consciously trying to be spontaneous activates the very control system you must shut down
  • Modern psychology confirms certain goals (happiness, love, creative insight) cannot be obtained through direct striving

The argument · threads10 threads · 38 claims
0.85

Confucianism pursues wu wei through lifelong cultural training and ritual internalization until virtuous action becomes automatic and unreflective.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Confucianism is the 'school of trying': it holds that humans are incomplete by nature and reach wu wei only through lifelong cultural training — ritual, classical learning, music, poetry — modeled on the lost perfect culture of the Western Zhou, reshaping the self so completely that one can eventually run on autopilot and act rightly without thought.

    “very roughly speaking, we can say they're the school of trying. So they think that the way you get to Wu wei is by training.”

  • The early Chinese developed techniques to circumvent the trying-not-to-try paradox indirectly — meditation (counting breaths), and Confucian ritual whose repetition internalizes values until they become spontaneous — rather than confronting the paradox head-on.

    “what the Early Chinese do is come up with various techniques for doing an end run around the tension”

  • Unlike Confucius, who treated the Western Zhou culture as a perfect, possibly heaven-revealed system, Xunzi was a fallibilist who held that humans invented the Confucian way over time through a series of cultural geniuses, for functional purposes — to restrain limitless human desires against limited resources (a Hobbesian state of nature) — leaving openness for new sage-kings to innovate as conditions change.

    “he thinks that humans invented the Confucian way. And they did it over time.”

  • Mencius splits the difference, holding that the Confucian virtues exist in incipient form inside us as 'sprouts' that come from human nature rather than from the Zhou dynasty; we must try to grow them but not too hard, lest we be like the impatient farmer of Song who pulled his sprouts out of the ground and killed them.

    “Mencius thinks we have all the Confucian virtues in an incipient form inside of us and all we need to do is help them grow.”

  • Confucianism contradicts the modern Western view of the self: it is dubious about reason unguided by culture and about individual creativity, and holds that who you are is inextricably constituted by your social roles, so you have no meaningful self outside the context of those roles — a direct rejection of enlightenment individualism and of Descartes' project of rebuilding all knowledge from solitary reason.

    “who you are as a person is inextricably bound up with your social roles... you don't really have a meaningful self outside the context of your social roles.”

0.85

Daoism corrects Confucian excess by rejecting culture and trying in favor of direct perception and spontaneous responsiveness aligned with the Dao.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Daoism is best understood not as a coherent standalone model but as a corrective to the excesses of Confucian trying; complete not-trying is impossible for humans, but the Daoist position becomes plausible as an antidote to over-reliance on the prefrontal cortex, tradition, writing, or logic — so a theoretical physicist must do enormous trying to get trained, yet needs Daoist not-trying to have a genuinely new insight.

    “I think Daoism is best understood as a reaction to Confucianism rather than a coherent model in itself.”

  • Lao Tzu is a primitivist who holds that culture and training are deadly to natural spontaneity; learning Confucian rituals only makes you a hypocrite who goes through the motions without genuine virtue, so the solution is to return to small-scale, low-tech natural communities — like Warring States hippies rejecting consumerism and greed.

    “if you become a Confucian and you train in the rituals and you learn the classics, you're just gonna become a hypocrite. You'll be able to go through the motions, but you won't be genuinely virtuous.”

  • Zhuangzi agrees trying and culture corrupt us but, assuming corruption has already happened, argues that escaping to a primitive utopia is itself a form of trying; instead we must empty the mind of linguistic categories so we perceive the world directly rather than seeing categories projected onto it, then respond perfectly — changing internally while outwardly looking no different from a Confucian.

    “He thinks, normally, we're using our mind in categories, and so we're not seeing the world. We're seeing linguistic categories projected onto the world.”

  • Zhuangzi has no theory of social justice, but his defense would be that directly and consciously trying to fix the world (joining political parties, donating to causes) will likely screw things up; instead, by getting in touch with the Dao you acquire De that has a slow, person-to-person ripple effect, relaxing and naturalizing those around you who then do the same — an empirically debatable but coherent strategy resembling skepticism of large-scale impositions.

    “The way you make things better is by you getting in touch with the Dao and then when you do that, you're gonna have this kind of ripple effect on the people around you.”

  • Daoism is inherently somewhat friendlier to women than Confucianism because it rejects traditional hierarchies and uses metaphors valorizing the female, weak, and dark over the male, strong, and bright; but it was mostly a guys' club and its valuing of 'the female' as essentially weak does not amount to feminism, while Confucianism by contrast treats the male-female public/private distinction as part of the structure of the universe.

    “everyone values the male, but you should value the female if you're a Daoist, because the female is passive, is dark, is the valley as opposed to the mountains.”

0.79

Wu wei is an unsolvable paradox: conscious effort to achieve spontaneity paradoxically activates the mental control you aim to bypass.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • There is a genuine, unsolvable paradox at the heart of wu wei: if spontaneity is the key to success, you cannot consciously try to be spontaneous, because trying not to try activates the very part of the brain you are attempting to shut down — analogous to Wegner's 'don't think of a white bear.'

    “I call this "The paradox of Wu wei, how do you try not to try?" It's a direct paradox. You can't... It is a genuine paradox, you can't solve it.”

  • The game Mindball, in which players push a ball using EEG-measured alpha and theta brain waves, is won by NOT trying to win — relaxation produces more force — making it a perfect microcosm of the wu wei paradox, including the choking effect when one realizes one is winning.

    “the more alpha and theta waves you produce, the more force you exert on the ball. So the way to win at Mindball is to not try to win.”

  • Lateral thinking and creative insight tasks (like the Remote Associates Test) cannot be solved by powering through with an algorithm; they require relaxing so the answer pops into your head, because such insights occur when the prefrontal cortex shuts down briefly and lets normally non-communicating parts of the brain communicate.

    “these kind of creative insights happen when the PFC just shuts down for a bit and chills out, and lets the parts of the brain that don't normally communicate, communicate with one another.”

  • Modern psychology confirms that certain goals cannot be obtained through direct striving and that the forcing actively prevents attainment: you can learn math by trying harder, but being funny, happy, in love, or loving something for its own sake cannot be forced — so the right strategy for many tasks is to back off and relax rather than try harder.

    “certain goals can't be obtained through direct striving... if you wanna be funny or if you wanna be happy, or you wanna be in love... that can't be forced. And in fact, the forcing actively prevents you from getting it.”

0.59

Chemical and linguistic technologies indirectly solve the trying-not-to-try paradox by lowering prefrontal activation or building conceptual awareness.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Cultures may use alcohol as a cultural technology to short-circuit the spontaneity paradox: instead of using the mind to shut down the mind, you take a chemical that turns down the prefrontal cortex a few notches, enabling the openness and relaxation that helps attain culturally valued goals.

    “maybe one way around the tension is to use this chemical substance to short circuit the paradox, instead of trying with your mind to shut down your mind, you're taking a chemical and turn down your prefrontal cortex a few notches”

  • A glass of wine is a chemical means of short-circuiting the trying-not-to-try tension and, in moderate doses, is genuinely helpful for achieving the relaxed, spontaneous state.

    “A glass of wine is just a chemical means for short-circuiting that tension and in moderate doses, is really helpful for that.”

  • Jazz improvisation appears to value pure spontaneity, but the ability to improv freely is completely dependent on extensive prior training and practice; the spontaneity is real but it conceals all the work that produced the underlying skill.

    “his ability to improv is completely dependent on his classical training and all of the work he's put into it”

0.57

The Warring States period spawned diverse schools—Confucian, Daoist, Mohist, legalist, logician—that debated whether morality comes from culture or inner nature.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Although Confucians and Daoists appear disparate, they share a common aim: getting people into the spiritual state of wu wei ('effortless action'), a state where one loses the sense of oneself as an agent and of time, similar to flow.

    “if you look at these otherwise disparate appearing Confucians and Daoists in early China, what they all have in common is they wanna get you into the spiritual state that's called Wu wei”

  • The dichotomy between trying and not-trying — equivalently internalism versus externalism about the source of morality — is the recurring fault line of later Chinese philosophy and religion: one side (culturally conservative externalists) holds morality comes from outside via culture, tradition, and authority; the other (liberal internalists) holds we have a good nature and need only look inside and be authentic.

    “this dichotomy between trying and not trying explains a lot of the divisions that happened later in Chinese philosophy/religion.”

  • The Warring States Period (roughly 5th through 3rd century BCE) was the golden age of Chinese philosophy when all the native schools — Confucians, Daoists, Mohist consequentialists, legalists, and logicians — got going; after China unified, philosophy became comparatively boring.

    “I studied the Warring States Period, so my specialty is roughly 5th through 3rd Century BCE, and this is the Golden Age of Chinese philosophy.”

  • Mencius held that human nature is good (xìng shàn) with innate moral intuitions, while Xunzi held human nature is bad (xìng'e) — that humans have no internal moral resources and must learn morality from outside via tradition, teachers, and inherited texts; Xunzi's view is truer to the original Confucian vision, making Mencius effectively a Daoist in Confucian clothing.

    “with Mencius: Xìng shàn, human nature is good. And then Xunzi wrote a chapter called Xing'e, human nature is bad”

  • Among the Warring States schools were the legalists (Fajia, 'school of regulations'), who were focused on ordering the state and believed the key was harsh legal codes enforced consistently.

    “we have some legalists too, these people who really were interested in just ordering the state, who believe the key was harsh legal codes enforced consistently”

0.53

Achieving wu wei brings De—charismatic virtue or power—that influences others without coercion and spreads through contagious relaxation.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • When you achieve wu wei you are in harmony with the Dao, and heaven rewards you with De (charismatic virtue or power): for a Confucian this makes people want to obey and follow you without coercion; for a Daoist it lets you move skillfully through the world and relax others, contagiously transmitting bits of your De.

    “The Early Chinese have a theological explanation for why these two things hold together.”

  • Having a word for a phenomenon helps you recognize it — just as learning the German 'schadenfreude' lets you notice an emotion you have already experienced — so acquiring concepts like wu wei and De gives us the conceptual resources to recognize situations where spontaneity, not trying, is what is needed.

    “Having the word schadenfreude helps you to recognize an emotion that you've definitely experienced... And having a word for it helps you notice it.”

0.52

Early Chinese thinkers valued pragmatic know-how and metaphorical thinking for living well over abstract logical accounts of reality.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Early Chinese philosophy is distinctive as a 'system 1 ethics': like virtue ethics generally, the right action is known spontaneously and intuitively by the internalized virtuous person, in contrast to the dominant Western enlightenment models — Kantian deontology and utilitarianism — which are both system 2, cognitive-control-based models requiring deliberate calculation and self-forcing.

    “they're a system 1 ethics, they're virtue ethicists”

  • Early China had a school of logicians who believed reality's structure could be captured in words — terms as categories mapping onto distinct groups of objects — so that logically accurate sentence construction would yield an abstract account of reality and right action; they were essentially logical positivists who never took off, and Zhuangzi was probably trained among them, using terms like 'qing' in a technical Mohist sense (the categorical essence) before abandoning the approach.

    “Really thought you could capture the structure of reality in words. So, words were categories that map onto distinct groups of objects in the world”

  • The popular view that China thinks holistically in images and metaphors while the West is analytic and abstract is overstated; all humans think in metaphors (per cognitive linguistics), but Western philosophers, uncomfortable with this, idealized stripping away metaphor to reach literal abstract representations of reality, whereas early Chinese thinkers were more pragmatic, prizing know-how (Ryle's knowing-how vs knowing-that) for living well over abstract accounts.

    “I've spent some portion of my career arguing against this view of China being metaphorical and kind of holistic and thinking in images, and Greek-based Western culture being analytic and abstract”

  • A central flaw of utilitarianism is its assumption of a universal metric of value; the step of assigning value to options is itself a system 1 intuitive process, so utilitarianism is not the purely calculative system it presents itself as.

    “that step of assigning value is a fully system 1 thing, and that's where it's not... Utilitarianism isn't what Utilitarians think it is”

0.32

Historical, geographical, and technological factors shaped each civilization's development, not metaphysical destiny or uniform human nature.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Despite China being technologically more advanced than the West for a long time, science arose in Europe due to a combination of factors: valuing of abstract thought, individualism, and crucially historical/geographical accidents — Europe's fragmentation into competing states allowed a thinker censored by the Catholic Church to flee to a Protestant ruler next door, whereas China's geography produced early large-scale centralized agriculture and group-oriented society.

    “when science gets started in Europe, Europe's fragmented between all these different states and different rulers, and if you said something that the Catholic Church didn't like, you just go to next door into the Protestant rulers' place”

  • Style of agriculture shapes cognition: labor-intensive rice farming requires elaborate group cooperation and water control, favoring group-oriented holistic thinking, while wheat farming is less cooperative and favors individualistic analytic thinking — supported by Talhelm's study showing that within China, people from rice-growing counties score more holistic and those from neighboring wheat-growing counties more analytic on psychological tests.

    “people from rice-growing regions are much more holistic... And people from the smaller scale, wheat-growing regions are more analytic.”

  • The simultaneous emergence of major philosophical traditions in Greece, China, India (the Buddha), and Persia (Zoroaster) — Jaspers's 'Axial Age' — is probably not due to a metaphysical awakening of human spirit but to agriculture ramping up worldwide around the same time, generating enough excess wealth and complexity to support non-productive scholars who could sit, think, and write books.

    “it probably has to do with just agriculture gets started and spreads round the world... once you get enough wealth and complexity, you start to have people whose jobs can be like ours, to sit around and think and write books.”

0.30

Confucius and Lao Tzu are historical figures whose teachings were recorded by communities long after their lives, not by themselves.

5 pointscentrality 1/5
  • Lao Tzu ('the old master') is probably the least historical of these figures; the Daodejing was likely assembled by a community of primitivists rather than written by one man, and the traditional story — that a border official forced him to write his teachings before he left for India, where he became the Buddha — is almost certainly legend.

    “probably the least historical, I would say, is Lao Tzu. His name literally means the old master.”

  • Confucius probably existed, and the first half of the Analects (books 1-10) likely dates to the early Warring States and reasonably records his teachings, but he wrote none of it himself — like Socrates and Jesus, he was influential despite never writing anything down.

    “the first half of the Analects, this book we have, books 1 through 10, is probably early Warring States and does a pretty good job of recording his teachings. But he didn't write any of it.”

  • Across the Warring States, conceptions of Heaven evolve from Confucius's full-blooded anthropomorphic being (who gets angry and can abandon him), to Zhuangzi's impersonal force, to Xunzi — arguably the first atheistic thinker — who relies on no metaphysical justification and grounds the Confucian way in a roughly utilitarian functional argument.

    “when you get to Xunzi, Xunzi I think is, at least that I know of, he's the first, I'd argue, the first atheistic thinker.”

  • The Dao literally means 'way' like a road or path; this literal sense persists in classical Chinese, but beginning around the Analects it takes on a philosophical-metaphysical sense — the right way to do something, or the way the universe is — and can also mean a 'teaching,' sometimes used interchangeably or compounded with Heaven (Tian dao).

    “The concept itself is pretty simple, it literally means way, like a road.”

  • Zhuangzi's butterfly dream — uncertainty over whether he is a man who dreamt he was a butterfly or a butterfly now dreaming he is a man — is not primarily about the mind-body problem but a skeptical argument cultivating epistemic humbleness, specifically targeting our fear of death: since we cannot know what reality truly is, we cannot be sure death will be horrible.

    “I think the purpose of that story is he's trying to shake up our confidence that we know what's going on... in this particular case, I think what he's targeting is our fear of death.”

0.26

Pre-modern philosophy including early Chinese schools were religiously situated ethical movements, not secular doctrines.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The distinction between philosophy and religion is a recent product of the enlightenment; all pre-modern philosophy, including Plato and Aristotle, was religious in that its ethics were formulated within religious worldviews, so the early Chinese schools are best understood as philosophically-oriented religious movements rather than secular philosophies.

    “I think that all pre-modern philosophy is religious. If you look at Plato or Aristotle, they have religious worldviews”

  • Xunzi anticipates Durkheim with a functional theory of ritual: the rain prayer has no efficacy on rain, yet should be retained because it brings people together, visually represents the social hierarchy, and reaffirms commitment to the ruler — and while the common person believes it works, the educated gentleman knows it serves only social functions.

    “he's got this very Durkheimian view of the function of rituals... "We do the rain prayer and what happens? It's gonna rain or it's not gonna rain... should we get rid of the rain prayer? Absolutely not."”