too-big-to-fail
The condition where an institution is so large and interconnected that the government will rescue it rather than allow its failure, creating an implicit subsidy.
As defined in Luigi Zingales on Capitalism and Crony Capitalism
Where it comes up · 8
- Cathy O'Neil on Wall St and Occupy Wall Street4 claims
- Rana Foroohar on the Financial Sector and Makers and Takers4 claims
- George Selgin2 claims
- Eugene White on Bank Regulation2 claims
- Joseph Stiglitz on Inequality2 claims
- Charles Calomiris on the Financial Crisis 10/26/20092 claims
- George Selgin on the Fed 12/06/20102 claims
- Luigi Zingales on Capitalism and Crony Capitalism1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 19Search all claims for “too-big-to-fail” →
- Just as a multiple-listing monopoly with free entry causes too many real estate agents doing too few deals each rather than enriching individual agents, the too-big-to-fail implicit subsidy to finance let the sector grow disproportionately and let managers (more than shareholders) capture the subsidy, so finance's growth and high pay cannot all be attributed to genuine productivity.Luigi Zingales on Capitalism and Crony Capitalism
- There are two distinct kinds of spillover: too-big-to-fail interconnection (where one firm's insolvency makes others insolvent) and Bagehot-style panic (where one failure triggers a liquidity shortage for otherwise-solvent firms); only reserve primary was actually insolvent among money market funds, so the rest faced a liquidity—not solvency—crisis, which is the case for open-market liquidity support but not for keeping Lehman alive.George Selgin on the Fed 12/06/2010
- Institutions that cannot fail tend to absorb subsidiary enterprises that then become insured too and may begin doing everything poorly (as in the abysmal handling of foreclosure documents); removing the permanent guarantee would likely lead banks to become simpler, more specialized institutions that contract out the rest, which is preferable to dictating what they can and cannot do.Eugene White on Bank Regulation
- The current US system has three compounding failures: deposit insurance and too-big-to-fail (first seen in the 1983-84 Continental Illinois bailout) removed depositor discipline, leaving only prudential regulators to identify risk; those regulators fail because they outsource risk measurement to the banks themselves and to ratings agencies; and the government simultaneously subsidizes huge housing risk—so when loose 2002-2005 monetary policy (negative real Fed Funds, >1-2% departures from the Taylor rule) added cheap credit, a severe banking crisis was the predictable result.Charles Calomiris on the Financial Crisis 10/26/2009
- Economists have been too congratulatory toward those who rescued failing companies, thereby helping enable the too-big-to-fail doctrine; praising Bernanke, Paulson, and Geithner for keeping the system going while only nominally acknowledging too-big-to-fail's problems will create the next crisis.Charles Calomiris on the Financial Crisis 10/26/2009
- Too-big-to-fail is internally incoherent: if large spillovers are the worry, the proper response is ample liquidity provision (Bagehot-style) to still-solvent firms, never bailing out a particular firm; moreover too-big-to-fail has always been a lie, since after-the-fact analysis (e.g., George Kaufman on Continental Illinois showing only two banks would have lost more than half their capital) shows the predicted catastrophes did not materialize.George Selgin on the Fed 12/06/2010
- Too-big-to-fail banks used risk firms as a rubber stamp—asking about font size and color rather than the numbers—and even ran models later found to be broken without noticing, because individual employees in a risk office have no personal incentive to understand portfolios that are too large to comprehend.Cathy O'Neil on Wall St and Occupy Wall Street
- The London Whale episode—where JPMorgan's Chief Investment Office, meant to hedge and be the safest unit, instead lost roughly $9 billion—shows that no too-big-to-fail bank is small enough to be understood or controlled, even by its own CEO, regardless of whether the trades were intentional or attempts to evade Dodd-Frank.Cathy O'Neil on Wall St and Occupy Wall Street
- Dodd-Frank did little about too-big-to-fail and has no teeth because its roughly 1,500 pages sit largely in outline and delegate implementation to the agencies, so the ultimate outcome is unknown; meanwhile the people with the incentive to monitor implementation are special interests rather than the informed but inattentive general public.Eugene White on Bank Regulation
- The government 'foams the runway' for banks and refuses to punish criminal activity—as in HSBC's decade of laundering drug and terrorist money, settled with a fine paid by shareholders that was small relative to profits and with no one going to jail—on the rationale that prosecution would threaten financial stability, leaving taxpayers to bear the cost of failures.Cathy O'Neil on Wall St and Occupy Wall Street