
Boudreaux on Law and Legislation 12/11/2006
What this covers
Don Boudreaux of George Mason University, speaking with Russ Roberts, draws on Hayek's Law, Legislation and Liberty to argue that "law" and "legislation" are fundamentally different creatures, and that treating them as synonymous has corrupted how we think about order, justice, and predictability. Law, in his account, emerges from the accumulated expectations and practices of people interacting over time—common knowledge of how things are done, written nowhere in statute but felt as genuine obligation. Legislation, by contrast, is consciously designed by lawmakers and enforced by state power. The distinction matters because it changes everything about how we should understand what judges do, why we obey, and what the real sources of social order are.
The conversation moves through several concrete territories. Boudreaux traces the medieval law merchant as the canonical case of workable rules arising without any sovereign to impose them: merchant courts enforced nothing through violence, yet produced nuanced commercial law that losing parties obeyed willingly because reputation and access to trade were at stake. The speed limit serves as a modern example—legislation says 55, but the actual law people live by is closer to 60 in good conditions. He argues that judges do not make law but discover it, finding the pre-existing expectations of parties, and that judicial activism represents a crossing from discovery into genuine legislation. The two speakers touch on how ignorance of true law cannot be excused, but ignorance of legislation arguably can be, since legislation appears from nowhere rather than emerging from shared understanding. Throughout, they wrestle with why people struggle to grasp that order can result from human action without anyone having designed it, and what role this insight should play in thinking about economic life and the boundaries of legitimate state power.
Boudreaux argues, following Hayek, that 'law' (emergent rules grounded in shared expectations arising from spontaneous order) is fundamentally distinct from 'legislation' (consciously designed rules enforced by the state), and that conflating the two produces deep intellectual confusion about how order, justice, and predictability actually arise in society.
- Spontaneous orders are the result of human action but not human design, so order can emerge without any intending mind
- Common law and the medieval law merchant show that good, efficient law emerges from competitive evolution of expectations rather than being made by judges or legislators
- Because legislation does not emerge from shared expectations, 'ignorance of legislation' is a reasonable excuse in a way that ignorance of true law is not
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Hayek argues that rules of conduct enhance the certainty of expectations not by fixing a concrete state of affairs but by defining an abstract order, so every change must disappoint some expectations while simultaneously creating the conditions for forming new correct expectations; the only method discovered for protecting expectations is to demarcate protected domains (property rights) over which particular individuals dispose and from which others are excluded.
“every change must disappoint some expectations but that this very change which disappoints some expectations creates a situation in which again the chance to form concrete expectations is as great as possible”
The process of civilization depends on the disappointment of some expectations: a bagel-shop owner's expectation of staying in business must be allowed to be disappointed when consumers prefer a competitor, because that very disappointment maintains the ongoing process that keeps the supply, quality, and price of bagels good.
“the the expectation of the bagel shop owner that he remained in business or will be always in business that has to be something that that is that's an expectation that we have to allow to be disappointed so that the ongoing process of keeping the bagel supply high”
The medieval law merchant (lex mercatoria) is the best-studied example of spontaneously emerged law: merchant courts not enforced by any sovereign produced nuanced, workable commercial rules that even losing defendants obeyed, because reputation and continued access to Mediterranean commerce—not state force—made compliance worthwhile, and this body of law survives today as the core of the Uniform Commercial Code.
“these rules were by and large accepted and abided by even by defendants who who lost judgments the reason they abided by them is because their reputation was of great value to them”
Ferguson's phrase 'the result of human action but not of human design' is the key to spontaneous order, and the widespread failure to grasp that something can be caused by people yet intended by no one is responsible for an enormous amount of intellectual confusion.
“the notion that something can be both the result of human action but not of human design the failure to grasp that notion is responsible for an enormous amount of intellectual confusion in the world”
The reasonable-person standard pervading Anglo-American tort, contract, and property law is a monument to the idea that law is built on people's expectations: what is 'reasonable' (e.g. expecting doorknobs to remain when taking possession of a house) depends on prevailing societal expectations, and can be overridden when a contract specifies otherwise.
“the reasonable person standard that exists in in in tort law contract law property law this is all this is all up to monument to the idea that our law is largely built on the expectations of people”
Hayek's deepest insight in Law, Legislation and Liberty is that law itself can emerge from unplanned human actions in the same way that prices, product qualities and market arrangements evolve from individuals pursuing their self-interest, so good law can arise spontaneously rather than being designed.
“the idea that law itself can emerge and get good law can emerge from spontaneous interactions of individuals pursuing their own self-interest I found intriguing”
The crucial economic knowledge that builds civilization is not lookup-table facts (capitals, populations, temperatures) but subtle, tacit knowledge that itself emerges as the structure of incentives changes—for example, how a buyer or manufacturer will substitute when a price rises is not pre-specifiable but is generated when confronted with the change.
“in advance of that change in price we might not be able to specify how we would respond to those changes once we're confronted with that price change the knowledge itself emerges it's not something you can look up in a book”
Legislation is consciously designed rules enforced ultimately by the threat of state violence, whereas law is the emergent patterns of behavior incorporated into most people's expectations, which may or may not be enforced by force; much that looks like legislation (e.g. Hammurabi's Code) is actually a codification of pre-existing law.
“legislation is enforced with the threat of force threat of violence law is the emergent patterns of behavior that becoming incorporated into most people's expectations”
Reserving a cafeteria seat by placing books or a backpack on it is a clear example of true law: it is written nowhere in statute, constitution, or handbook, yet it is a widely recognized expectation whose violation feels like a genuine wrong even though it can be broken.
“this is law in my view this is a beautiful example of law it's not written down anywhere”
'Judge-made law' is a conceptual mistake; in the common law the judge does not make law but discovers, finds, or articulates the pre-existing expectations of the parties—when a judge actually makes law he is acting as a legislator, which is the kernel of truth in conservative objections to judicial activism.
“the judge doesn't make the law if a judge makes law the judge is acting as a legislator and that's the kernel of truth in the modern conservative antagonism toward judicial activism”
Milton Friedman argued in 1974 that the sheer number of laws is so great that essentially anyone could be sent to prison if prosecutors were sufficiently determined, so business leaders comply with restrictions on freedom out of fear of antitrust suits, tax scrutiny, or other charges rather than moral agreement.
“the number of laws is so great that I doubt that there's a man in this room myself included who could not be sent to prison if there were a sufficiently determined attempt by prosecutors to do it”
Following Buchanan's letter 'Order Defined in the Process of Its Emergence,' a spontaneous order cannot even in principle have been designed by an omniscient planner, because the very information that constitutes the order is created as the process unfolds and was fundamentally unavailable—not merely undisclosed—beforehand.
“that information was not only not available to a planning mind a centralized years ago or a month ago whenever the right time period passes it was fundamentally unavailable to mind that that information self was created in a very real way as the process moved on”
Calling a market 'purposeful' is a misuse of language: markets respond to taxes by evading them through reduced quantity, quality changes, and creative workarounds, but no individual buyer or seller intends this market-wide adaptation—they are simply led to it by self-interest.
“if we put a tax on a market and on the market for gasoline buyers and sellers will evade that tax in all kinds of creative ways the most obvious way being they'll transact fewer gallons of gasoline”
A homeowner can intentionally set any individual asking price, but cannot change the market value of the house; market value is the product of spontaneous ordering forces arising from buyers and sellers competing to get the best deals, which economists treat as a reasonably good measure of value.
“I can agree to sell my house for $100 that doesn't change the market value of my house”
Sellers wrongly believe their house is unique and can command above-market prices, but pervasive competition from similar houses means overpricing simply means the house won't sell or takes very long, so competition produces an emergent order of prices that constrains people and creates the illusion that they set their own price.
“you can imagine that your house is unique the of a monopoly and people so I only need to find one buyer but it's going to be very hard to find that one buyer if you charge more than than the market price”
What counts as 'reasonable' evolves through a competitive process: liberal return policies (returning worn or months-old goods, free replacement of a faulty Apple power cord) are now expected not because merchants love customers but because of competition from other stores, so what was reasonable in 1950 or 1975 differs from today.
“so eager for you to be happy not because they love you but because of competition from other stores that are doing the same thing what's considered reasonable in that context now is very different than what was reasonable in 1950 or 1975”
Speed limits illustrate the law/legislation gap: although the black-letter legislation says 55, the actual law (the accepted expectation) is that driving about five miles over in good conditions is not really breaking the law, which is why a ticket for going 60 feels like a wrong while a ticket for going 95 does not.
“the expectation is that people can drive five syndicate and have an hourly I think that most of us act that's why I chose five they could you can drive five miles an hour over the speed limit and you're not really breaking the law”
The spontaneously evolved expectations that underlie common law have genuine virtue—they are not merely arbitrary custom—because, as Bob Cooter argued, the common law is efficient precisely because courts adopt expectations and rules that emerged through a competitive discovery process in which ineffective practices are dropped and effective ones persist.
“cooter argue that the reason the common law is so efficient is precisely because it's a high Akeem point is that the court just just took these expectations and... formulator them into law”
When a judge rules contrary to widely held expectations, more conflict and litigation result; through a spontaneous process the correct ruling—the one conforming to expectations—tends to be the one that produces less conflict and therefore endures and is understood as the law.
“if the law make the judge gets it wrong uh then that results in more conflict which results in more litigation... will the will there will the amount of litigation decline and so that correct ruling that's conformity with the expectations well it it be the one that lasts”
Hayek's account blurs what judges ought to do with what they actually do; on the normative reading, judges ought to discover and confirm the expectations parties to a dispute reasonably hold, which is a controversial, largely morality-free conception of the judicial role.
“I think Hayek sometimes blurs what judges ought to do with what judges actually do and something in between”
We have a deep, mistaken presumption—drawn from our individual lives where orderly things (a clean house, a verb like 'google') seem designed—that anything orderly we observe must have been intended by someone, and this presumption is destructive and false.
“we have an inevitable presumption from the rest of our lives that anything we observe that is orderly must have been intended by someone and as you point out it's a very destructive and dangerous presumption it's not true”
A spontaneous order, unlike a firm or government bureaucracy, has no purpose of its own; it is an order of individuals each pursuing their own purposes, and the most that can be said is that a good spontaneous order maximizes the ability of individuals within it to achieve their freely chosen goals.
“a spontaneous order as an order itself has no purpose there's no purpose to society itself the the US economy does not aim toward a specific purpose it is an order of individuals each with their own purposes”
Even in a heavily lawyered house purchase, an enormous range of expectations (cleanliness, included items in their seen condition, debris cleared) is left unwritten and is sustained by trust and shared expectations rather than black-letter contract, and violations are felt as wrongs even though formal contractual remedy is costly.
“there's an immense amount of trust in faith that that going to play up... What I think really maintains that that trust in faith is a certain expectation that that we feel should be abided by”
'Ignorance of the law is no excuse' makes sense for true law (one cannot reasonably be ignorant that rape is wrong) but is cruel and unjustified when applied to legislation, because legislation is created ex nihilo by legislators and does not emerge from people's expectations, so ordinary people cannot reasonably be expected to know it.
“it's a mistake I think... it's a cruelty to say that ignorance of the ignorance of legislation is no excuse how are we supposed to know what legislation is”
Setting a price below market value (e.g. selling a house for $100) creates disorderly competition and, when done by well-intentioned officials, can cause riots and trampling as people compete for the underpriced good—a spontaneous disorder.
“in many situations where people have deliberately well-intentioned set prices below market value riots break out as people compete... people are literally trampled in some of these settings”
Law, Legislation and Liberty Volume One is Hayek's deepest work, deeper than The Constitution of Liberty despite being much shorter.
“it's deeper it is deeper I think than the constitution of Liberty even though it's much shorter I think it's Hayek's deepest work”