Stephen Kotkin — How Stalin became the most powerful dictator in history
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Stephen Kotkin traces how Stalin consolidated absolute power by examining the structural pressures that shape autocratic systems rather than the psychology of individual dictators. In conversation with Dwarkesh Patel, Kotkin moves through Russian history from the tsarist period through the early Soviet decades, arguing that Stalin became who he was not because of inherent traits but because of the ruthless logic of building a dictatorship while modernizing under geopolitical threat. The discussion develops The Modernization Dilemma at the core of authoritarian regimes: they must acquire modern industry, engineers, and technology to survive as great powers, yet the educated workers and intelligentsia who drive this progress naturally generate demands for freedom and constitutional limits that threaten regime survival. The regime therefore must repress the very people it depends on.
The conversation spans how peasant land hunger—unresolved by the tsarist emancipation—created the radical base that allowed Bolsheviks to seize urban power, how collectivization and the secret police were built simultaneously in an act of mass enslavement, and why communist ideology produces a perverse resilience: when the system catastrophically fails—famine, terror, poverty—believers blame the individual leader rather than the system itself, granting each new regime a "second wind." Kotkin argues that Political Legitimacy as the Decisive Variable separates enduring power from fragile systems. He contends that Half-Pregnant Leninism is structurally impossible—any political liberalization in a communist state triggers unraveling—and that authoritarian power ultimately rests on a Political Bank Run: the moment the repressive apparatus loses belief in the system, it ceases to obey, and the entire edifice collapses.
Kotkin argues that authoritarian regimes face an unsolvable dilemma—they must import the attributes of modernity (industry, engineers, technology) to compete geopolitically while repressing the political freedoms those same forces demand—and that communism specifically survives its own catastrophic failures because ideology converts each failure into a 'second wind' rather than a discrediting indictment, with the system ultimately resting on a fragile foundation of political legitimacy that can collapse the moment the repressive apparatus stops obeying.
- Modernization is driven by geopolitical competition, forcing autocracies to repress the very workers and intellectuals they need to compete
- Communism's failures (famine, terror, poverty) don't discredit it because believers blame the individual (Stalin, Mao) rather than the system, generating a 'second wind'
- Repressive regimes ultimately depend on people choosing to repress, so a collapse of political legitimacy can trigger a 'bank run' where the apparatus refuses to act
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In a striking paradox, pre-revolutionary Russia hosted a massive radical-right antisemitic movement (the Union of the Russian People, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion) while Germany had the largest socialist party in its parliament—so a pre-1917 observer would predict socialism triumphing in Germany and fascism in Russia, yet the opposite occurred.
“Russia has the fascism before Germany. Germany has the largest socialist party in its parliament”
A repressive apparatus is not a machine or AI but people who grew up in neighborhoods and villages alongside those they are ordered to repress; repression works only until the moment the people in it decide to stop—as when tsarist elite military units refused to shoot the striking workers in 1917 because the workers were the same peasants they came from—making the collapse a 'political bank run' that is impossible to predict but rooted in the loss of legitimacy.
“The repressive apparatus is not a machine. It's not AI... It's people who grow up in neighborhoods, come from villages, and went to schools with other people.”
Dictators like Stalin survive assassination from within because of a collective action problem rooted in pervasive distrust: anyone who proposes a coup cannot know whether the other person is a provocateur sent to test loyalty, so the rational move is to immediately denounce the conspirator to the dictator for self-preservation—the surveillance system (drivers, maids, tapped phones, provocateurs) deliberately enmeshes everyone in distrust, making coordination against the leader nearly impossible.
“you have a collective action problem that's really important.”
During the 1920s Stalin resigned six times—three in writing and three orally between 1923 and 1928—and every time the men around him begged him to stay; within ten years he killed nearly all of them, which shows that he was not yet 'Stalin' and his colleagues had no way of knowing he would later murder them.
“During the 1920s, Stalin resigned six times, three times in writing and three times orally, between 1923 and 1928. Every time those guys around him beg him to stay.”
Unlike Hitler—who attacked his real enemies and merely retired or pensioned his officer corps and party officials—Stalin's terror was uniquely self-destructive: he murdered not only enemies but vast numbers of system loyalists who would walk through fire for him, including the very police carrying out the murders, yet the system did not collapse, which is more astonishing than the psychology of the participants.
“The thing about Stalin's terror is the police are also murdered during the terror while they are doing the murdering.”
Subsistence-level peasant agriculture is politically unstable; because the tsarist emancipation of the 1860s failed to give serfs enough land (to protect the landowners who supported the autocracy), the unresolved peasant land hunger drove a peasant revolution in 1917-18 that seized land directly—not for the Bolsheviks—but created the radicalism that became the platform allowing socialists in the cities to seize and hold power.
“Subsistence level agriculture is not politically stable.”
Stalin's gigantic secret police was built in the very act of enslaving the hundred million peasants—you couldn't enslave the peasants without a huge secret police, but enslaving them produced exactly that capacity—a chicken-and-egg process where the repressive apparatus and the act of repression were constructed simultaneously.
“It's a kind of chicken and egg thing. How do you enslave the peasants without the gigantic secret police? But then when you enslave the peasants, the result is you have this gigantic secret police now”
The central lesson from the formerly secret archives is that the perpetrators genuinely believed their ideologies—the Nazis were Nazis and the communists were communists—even when, like Goebbels with his clubbed foot presiding over the murder of the disabled, they personally embodied the category their ideology condemned; they had doubts and suffered them, but they believed.
“The main thing that we know from the archives that were formerly secret... is that the Nazis were Nazis and the communists were communists.”
Communist revolutions occurred in peasant countries rather than industrialized ones, contradicting the Marxist prediction that capitalism and industrialization must precede socialism—because the private property engendered by capitalism actually helps and buys peasants into the system, whereas land-hungry peasants in pre-capitalist societies become the radical base.
“It's the opposite of the Marxist prediction that you would first need capitalism and industrialization before you would see the turn towards socialism.”
Authoritarian regimes face a fundamental dilemma: they must import the attributes of modern power (industry, engineers, technology) to compete as great powers, but the same educated workers and intellectuals who produce that power also generate political ideas—separation of powers, freedom, property rights—that threaten the regime, so the regime must repress the very people it needs like oxygen.
“How do you bring in modernity—meaning you have tanks, you have airplanes, or you have AI—but keep out, for example, separation of powers, freedom, property rights, all the things that undermine your dictatorial rule.”
Modernization is not an inevitable sociological process that simply happens; it is a geopolitical process driven by the need to compete militarily in the international system—if a rival has ships made of steel, you must build them too or they will arrive at your door and dominate you.
“Modernization is not a sociological process that kind of just happens. It's a geopolitical process. You modernize because you need to compete in the international system.”
A paradoxical feature of communism is that its failures don't discredit it but give it a 'second wind': once horrors are acknowledged and denounced, believers conclude it was the individual (Stalin, Mao) who was at fault rather than the system, so de-Stalinization under Khrushchev subtracted Stalin while keeping collective farms, state ownership, planning, and the party monopoly—renewing belief that persisted through Gorbachev, and the same pattern reappears with Xi Jinping despite his family's suffering under Mao.
“the revelation of the horrors, the denunciation of the horrors, ironically gives you the second wind of belief in the system”
Constitutional order and rule of law can only take root if instituted before the mass age—as in England, the US, and France—when the franchise is restricted to property-holding men, giving a breathing space to embed constitutionalism that can later be democratized; once peasants, workers, and nationalist movements are politically mobilized, constitutional order alone is insufficient for them and the revolution radicalizes leftward.
“When you have the constitutional revolution in the mass age—when you have the peasants and the workers and those for national self determination participating in the constitutional revolution—constitutional order and rule of law isn't enough for a lot of them.”
Stalin was not 'Stalin' when he first came to power; it was the experience of sitting in the chair—building the dictatorship within the dictatorship, enacting collectivization against all predictions of failure, and bearing responsibility for Russian power against Nazi Germany and the great powers—that made him who he became, so personality formed before power explains less than the circumstances and exigencies of wielding it.
“Stalin is not Stalin when he first gets into power. It's the experience of being in power that makes Stalin, Stalin.”
Communism can fail at everything—starve the people, kill the people, wreck the economy—and still survive, because it only has to do one thing to endure: suppress political alternatives, leaving subjects with no option but a return to the old regime or continued communism.
“Communism can fail at everything. It can starve the people, it can kill the people. It only has to do one thing to survive: suppress political alternatives.”
A Leninist system cannot be half-communist: you either have a party monopoly or you don't, so any attempt at political liberalization becomes a Pandora's box that liquidates the system—every time communists liberalized politically (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Gorbachev) the system unraveled, which is why China studies the Gorbachev case in party school and refuses political reform, leaving only economic and technological options.
“A Leninist system can't be half-pregnant. You can't be half-communist. You either have a communist monopoly or you don't.”
Authoritarian power can evaporate like a bank run on a seemingly solid institution: just as depositors all rush to withdraw the moment they suspect the bank lacks their money, a repressive apparatus can suddenly cease obeying, and because the leader's order must pass through the entire chain of command, disloyalty or political defection can occur at any link—triggered by the loss of legitimacy, because people will not die for something they no longer believe in.
“You can have a political bank run in the repressive apparatus.”
The tsarist secret police (the Okhranka) were extremely small—mostly following a few thousand intellectuals—and their repression consisted largely of surveillance, infiltration, reading mail, and Siberian or European exile, not mass arrest and execution; the main force of repression was the army, not a large armed secret police.
“The tsarist regime has a very small secret police, really small. The secret police for the tsarist regime is mostly following a handful of intellectuals.”
Leftist urban revolutions endure or fail depending on whether there is a peasant army with a stake in the existing order to put them down; in Germany, Italy, and Hungary the peasant-staffed army crushed city leftist revolts, but in Russia the peasant army was itself the one seizing land, so there were no forces of order to destroy the leftist movement—which is why the Bolsheviks held power.
“You don't have a peasant army ready to put down the revolt in the Russian case, because the peasant army is the one seizing the land.”
When communist regimes refuse political liberalization and find economic reform either insufficient or threatening, they turn to technological fantasies—believing computers and tech can perfect planning, overcome the pathologies of the planned economy, and make their dictatorship immune to challenges through all-encompassing surveillance—thereby avoiding the hard structural choices that would end the party monopoly; the Soviets tried this and it failed, and China is now seduced by the same temptation.
“So what's left? Technological fantasies. Maybe technology can perfect planning.”
Rather than fitting binary categories of either-believer-or-cynic, almost everyone in the system held belief, suspension of disbelief, cynicism, and knowledge simultaneously; humans can hold contradictory thoughts at once without much trouble, so the participants' psychology is not as surprising as commonly assumed.
“There are elements of belief and elements of, let's say, suspension of disbelief, and elements of cynicism and knowledge and understanding simultaneously in almost everybody. They coexist.”
The fundamental and ultimately decisive vulnerability of authoritarian regimes is a deficit of political legitimacy: economic growth can legitimate a regime only temporarily, and tech may do the same for a time, but neither is permanent; what is permanent is power rooted in real citizens with real freedoms who can punish what they don't like at the polls—legitimacy China, Russia, and Iran cannot manufacture.
“It's fundamentally a deficit of political legitimacy.”
The peasants' radicalism in seizing the land helped bring Lenin and the Bolsheviks to power, but Stalin then violently reversed the peasant revolution—re-enserfing and enslaving roughly 100 million peasants across 11 time zones through forced collectivization, annihilating in blood the very land ownership that had enabled the revolution.
“Stalin's going to reverse the peasant revolution violently and re-enserf or enslave the peasants across all the 11 time zones”
The secret of success in the modern world is bringing all levels of society into an inclusive polity as citizens regardless of property and providing them opportunity to rise; a handful of countries (West Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan under American occupation or alliance) achieved this from a non-democratic starting point, but these are exceptions that have served as false guiding stars, since the opposite—failure to institute enduring constitutional order in a mass society—has happened in most cases.
“There are these exceptions which have turned out to be false normative, or guiding, stars for us in every case.”
For an autocratic regime, technological competition is existential every day because losing legitimacy threatens the entire system; for a democracy like France, failing to compete in AI may cause a change of government but the system itself survives—so the stakes of falling behind are fundamentally different.
“If you have an autocratic regime, it is existential for you every day. You want to compete. France can compete or fail to compete, and its political system is not at risk.”
The leftist and rightist versions of revolutionary overthrow are codependent: each uses the threat of the other to consolidate its dictatorship, and when the traditional right invites the radical right to power thinking it can control it (as in Germany and Italy), the radical right instead institutionalizes itself and seizes full control.
“They're kind of codependent. Each uses the threat of the other to further consolidate their dictatorship.”
The secret to getting rich in the modern world is to manufacture and export to the insatiable American domestic middle-class market: Japan did this, then its former colonies South Korea and Taiwan, then Deng Xiaoping's China followed the same export-led trick—so the East Asian miracle is fundamentally about partnership with America, and those who are partners and can compete on quality and price get rich.
“The secret sauce is, you have to manufacture and export to the American domestic market because the American middle class is insatiable.”
The entire world order rests on the backs of farmers, because how much surplus farmers can produce beyond their family's subsistence determines how rich or poor a country is and how much wealth is available to build an army and modern industry—so mastery or failure to master the integration of the peasantry into the polity is fundamental to political outcomes.
“The whole world order rests on the backs of farmers. How much farmers till means how rich or poor your country is.”
Khrushchev's de-Stalinization subtracted only Stalin's personality—denouncing his crimes in the Secret Speech discussed at party meetings everywhere—while leaving intact collective farms, state property, central planning, and the party monopoly, so the effect was a second wind of belief that it was Stalin, not the system, that had been the problem.
“The de-Stalinization is to take away Stalin. It's not to take away any of the other attributes of the system.”
The Chinese miracle depended on external structures the party didn't create: British-controlled Hong Kong provided a rule-of-law international financial system that allocated capital by risk-and-return rather than party dictate; overseas Chinese and Taiwanese FDI (the ironic legacy of the unfinished civil war) and Japanese war-guilt tech transfer flowed through Hong Kong into the special economic zones—without British Hong Kong there would be no Chinese miracle.
“Had the British not done this, there would be no Hong Kong and there would be no Chinese miracle in the Deng Xiaoping and after period.”
Interior Minister Pyotr Durnovo correctly foresaw that if the liberal constitutionalists took down the Tsar they would not get a constitutional order but chaos, anarchy, and a massive social revolution by peasants, nationalities, and workers—therefore they should ally with the Tsar against the revolutionaries rather than fight him.
“if you take down the Tsar, you won't get a constitutional order. You'll get chaos and anarchy and you'll get a massive social revolution by the peasants predominantly”
The notion that the Chinese or Russians struck a bargain—giving up freedom in exchange for a higher standard of living—is false, because there is no enforcement mechanism: if the regime fails to raise living standards, the people cannot sue them or vote them out for breaching the deal; instead the regime simply represses with batons, water cannon, and disappearances, which is why such regimes maintain gigantic repressive apparatuses.
“There is no bargain. Because if the regime fails to raise the standard of living, the people can't sue them in court.”
The claim that the Communist Party brought 700-800 million people out of poverty is backwards: the party put those people into poverty through its rule, and the people themselves lifted themselves out through their own diligence, entrepreneurialism, and ingenuity—society, not the party, created the Chinese miracle, and the party then expropriated and took credit for it.
“People say the Communist Party brought 700-800 million people out of poverty. No, the Communist Party put those people into poverty.”
Chinese economic liberalization began not as proactive policy but as the party's grudging acceptance, decree by tiny decree, that society would rebuild through its own hard work—and what reform actually did was surface existing illegal market behavior (already pervasive even at the level of the military-industrial complex obtaining ball bearings on the black market) into a legal or quasi-legal realm, rather than inventing markets from scratch.
“the decrees are all grudging with very few exceptions. The society is forcing more and more concessions onto the ideologues in the Marxist-Leninist system.”
China's economic liberalization began in part because the Cultural Revolution had unwittingly destroyed the planning system—sending economic planners to manual labor and smashing intellectuals—so unlike Stalin's purges which left the Soviet political and planning system intact, Mao's frenzy annihilated state capacity, forcing the party to grudgingly allow market behavior to rebuild and avoid famine.
“the communists have unwittingly destroyed the planning system. They have sent down to the village people who do economic planning.”
The argument that Marx wanted freedom and only Stalin deformed it is like ordering generals to nuke a population but insisting nobody dies—once you nuke capitalism (eliminate markets, private property, and politics) you necessarily lose freedom and end up with some version of a Leninist system; the catastrophic outcome is intrinsic to the act, not a deviation from it.
“You're going to get rid of capitalism, you're going to nuke them, but instead everybody's going to live... They nuke them, and everybody dies instead of everybody living.”
There is an unresolved civil war within the left, ongoing to this day, between revolutionaries who believe capitalism is evil and must be eradicated and revisionists (like Bernstein and the Swedish Social Democrats) who accept markets, private property, and democracy while redistributing income; the left's tragedy is that it never definitively renounces anti-capitalism, and left-wing social democrats keep drifting back toward the Leninist analysis, giving the right ammunition to paint the whole left as anti-capitalist.
“The left has a civil war, a civil war on the left which is still going on.”
Communists could only define socialism as the negation of capitalism because socialism didn't exist and they had no idea what it looked like or how to get there—so they destroyed capitalism's features one by one (markets became planning, private property became state property, parliaments became the dictatorship of the proletariat), but eliminating private property and individual choice makes the state responsible for everything, delivering not freedom and prosperity but massive state-ization, ration tickets, and the Gulag.
“The only thing they know is that it's not capitalism. So let's destroy capitalism. That will be the step to get us to socialism.”
All the Marxist-Leninists wanted to eliminate capitalist relations in the countryside, but they believed it couldn't be done; Stalin was the one who not only believed it was necessary but doable, powered through the famine, resistance, and criticism, and came out the victor with a gigantic secret police—so the person who could become Stalin had to come from inside that group and be uniquely willing to undertake those risks despite his colleagues carping at him, which seeded his later paranoia.
“All of them want to get rid of capitalist relations in the countryside... But they don't think it can be done. They think if you try it, you'll fail. He goes and tries it.”
Inverting Keynes's dictum that in the long run we are all dead, Kotkin argues that in the short run we are potentially all dead because of the risk of a World War III (which would be a multiple of WWII's 55 million deaths), but in the long run the free system wins—so the strategic imperative is to elongate the short run by avoiding hot war with China, accepting a cold war of competition and rivalry instead, to reach the long run where the better system prevails.
“In the short run, we're all dead because there could be a World War III. But in the long run, we're all good because our system is better. So we have to elongate the short run.”
Jiang Zemin's Three Represents brought millionaire capitalists into the party hoping to control them, but it backfired—instead of transforming the capitalists, it corrupted party members who began expropriating property and accumulating wealth—so Xi Jinping predictably reversed course, forcing the party back into the private sector (party officials as board directors and CEOs) and destroying non-cooperating tech-sector figures to reassert that the party is the boss.
“Instead of bringing the capitalists into the party, he's going to force the party back into capitalism.”
Social engineering is always coercive; the only question is how much of the coercion is necessary and acceptable in the tradeoff to right genuine wrongs.
“Social engineering is always coercive, always coercive. The issue is how much of the coercion is necessary that we accept in the tradeoff to right some of the things that are obviously wrong.”
We are wrong to assume that the perpetrators of communist atrocities were merely cynics who couldn't have believed obviously ridiculous ideology; in fact they genuinely believed it, often young people drawn to the promise of ending war, imperialism, and exploitation and making their small lives world-historical—ideology is pervasive and can endure even in the face of empirical reality that flatly contradicts it.
“We may think that no one really believes the ideology... In fact, it's wrong. They do believe the ideology and they're young.”
The United States has held roughly 25% of global GDP with about 5% of the population since 1880, through every imaginable variety of policy regimes—income tax and no income tax, high and low taxes, tariffs and free trade, regulation and deregulation—demonstrating that policy can affect the economy but can neither create nor strangle the underlying wealth.
“America has been 25% of the global economy since 1880... For 150 years, more or less, we've been around 25% of global GDP, 5% of the population, through every imaginable variety of policy regimes.”
Beyond believing in class conflict and revolution, Marxist-Leninists held a theocratic conviction that the party is always right and cannot be contradicted—so loyalty was not merely to the party but to the outcome the party is dedicated to achieving, and contravening the ideology made one an accomplice in the very evils (imperialist war, exploitation) one sought to overthrow.
“It's not just that you're loyal to the party. You're loyal to the outcome that the party is dedicated to achieving.”
Stalin spent 20 years as a penniless, jobless revolutionary genuinely dedicated to fighting the real injustices of the tsarist regime, but the revolutionary methods he used and the regime he built turned out to be far more unjust and bloody than the system he opposed—a classic case of perverse and unintended consequences.
“What he'll produce is a much more unjust regime than the one he's fighting against. This is known as perverse and unintended consequences.”
Interrogators and executioners could continue victimizing people they knew were likely innocent because they believed to their bone marrow that real enemies—masking loyalty, hiding as a future fifth column—existed and were hard to identify, so they overcompensated to ensure they caught every last enemy, accepting that some innocents would be destroyed in the process.
“you also know to your bone marrow that some people out there are enemies. It's hard to identify and find them. So you're overcompensating a little bit to make sure that you get every last enemy.”
Marxism-Leninism is especially attractive to intellectuals and the lumpen-intellectual class because it empowers them to be in charge: using the state as an instrument for social engineering, they get to make all decisions on the economy without submitting to elections or mandates, justifying their rule purely by ideological claims to be building a new world—a power they could never obtain in a decentralized market or federalized political system.
“Marxism-Leninism empowers the intellectual class and the lumpen-intellectual class.”
Unlike Hitler and Mussolini, who faced serious assassination attempts, Stalin faced none, partly because he walled himself off from the public but more deeply because the people around him recognized he was unusually good at dictatorship—carrying the entire system through collectivization, industrialization, and defeating Hitler—so removing him risked losing not just their lives but the revolution and the radiant future they believed in.
“Stalin is the guy who is building and personifying the system. The people around Stalin can see that he is unusually good at dictatorship.”
Counterfactuals are critical to historical thought because every causal claim implies one: to say Stalin caused collectivization is to say that without Stalin there would have been no collectivization, and to say Hitler caused World War II is to say no Hitler, no World War II—so historians who claim to reject counterfactuals are in fact practitioners of them.
“If you say that Stalin caused collectivization, that means without Stalin there's no collectivization.”
Rent control or rent freezes produce the very lack of affordable housing they aim to solve, because the way to get more affordable housing is to build more housing—if supply massively exceeds demand the price must fall—but rent control inhibits new construction since no one will build housing they can't profit from.
“What rent control does, or freezing of rent, it inhibits the building of new housing. Because who's going to build new housing when you can't make money off of it? So rent control is what produces the lack of affordable housing in the first place.”
The strategic partnership among authoritarian regimes is a fake: Russia and China gave Iran no military or economic support while Israel rolled back Iranian power, because authoritarian partners are purely opportunistic and self-interested, helping others only insofar as it helps themselves and abandoning them the moment it doesn't.
“The strategic partnership among the authoritarian regimes is a fake.”
The entire archive of the Paris branch of the tsarist secret police (the Okhranka), which conducted surveillance and infiltration of revolutionaries in Europe, was ordered destroyed after the revolution but was secretly shipped to the United States and now resides at the Hoover Institution.
“we have their entire archive right here at the Hoover Institution. It was supposed to be destroyed.”
Stalin was an unusually successful student who sang in the choir and was on track for success in society, attending the seminary that was the highest level of education available in the Caucasus, but he gave it all up to read forbidden underground literature and become a penniless, jobless revolutionary for two decades.
“He's in the seminary. He's highly successful, unbelievably successful. He's great at school... He gives it all up.”
During collectivization beginning in 1928, around 100 million peasants were enslaved and, in resistance, half the livestock was killed, yet this destruction did not break the regime.
“after the collectivization in 1928 where literally 100 million peasants were enslaved... They kill half the livestock and so forth.”
Per capita GDP under Mao during the Cultural Revolution was about $200 a year for roughly a billion people, illustrating the depth of the poverty that the party's rule produced before the reform era.
“Per capita GDP under Mao is $200 during the Cultural Revolution.”
China was about 75% favorable globally until recently but is now roughly 25% favorable, a collapse Kotkin attributes to Xi Jinping's making enemies around the world.
“China was 75% favorable globally. Now it's 25%, more or less, favorable globally. That's Xi Jinping's doing.”
Closing exchange of thanks between host and guest.
“Thank you so much for coming on the podcast.”