justice
In Hume's ethics, a virtue and artificial human institution grounded in utility, consisting of the rules for property distribution (stability of possession, transfer by consent, keeping of promises) that are necessary for social cooperation
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics
Where it comes up · 1
Most important claims · 4 of 4Search all claims for “justice” →
- The three main laws of nature in Hume's ethics are: (1) stability of possession—without security of property there would be constant war of all against all; (2) transfer by consent—without this there would be no commerce; and (3) keeping of promises—without this there would be no alliances or treaties, and these laws apply for reasons of utility both between individuals and between nations.A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics
- For Hume, reason's role in ethics is limited to two functions: providing definitions of moral terms and relations of ideas (like defining justice, comparing benevolence and self-interest), and describing factual circumstances and consequences of actions, but reason cannot approve or disapprove actions, cannot justify appeals to utility or consequences, and cannot motivate action.A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics
- Justice is a utilitarian notion defined as giving each person what is due, and moral obligations of justice arise from the utility of stable property, fair exchange, and promise-keeping rather than from objective moral facts or rational principles.A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics
- For Locke, moral knowledge is demonstrative knowledge like mathematics—claims about property rights and justice can be evaluated by comparing ideas and finding agreement or disagreement between them, making morality a matter of rational relations of ideas rather than sentiment or emotion.A History of Philosophy | 48 Hume on Religion and Ethics