too big to fail
The idea that some institutions are so large or interconnected that their failure would threaten the whole system, so governments feel compelled to rescue them.
As defined in Andrew Ross Sorkin
Other definitions
The doctrine that certain large financial firms are so systemically important that the government will rescue them rather than let them fail, creating implicit insurance for their creditors.
George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great RecessionThe doctrine or expectation that certain institutions are so systemically important that the government will rescue them rather than allow disorderly failure.
Riccardo Rebonato on Risk Management and the Crisis 06/08/2009
Where it comes up · 27
- George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession7 claims
- Richard Fisher on Too Big to Fail and the Fed5 claims
- Anat Admati on the Financial Crisis of 20085 claims
- Neil Barofsky on Bailouts4 claims
- Why You're Getting Poorer: Major Slowdown Ahead | Donald Boudreaux3 claims
- William Cohan on the Life and Death of Bear Stearns 09/28/20092 claims
- Michael Lind on Libertarianism2 claims
- Robert Frank on Inequality 11/15/20102 claims
and 19 more
Most important claims · 10 of 49Search all claims for “too big to fail” →
- Implicit government guarantees (too-big-to-fail) are a critical amplifier of crises, linked to the debt story: if you get a great return in good states of nature and are bailed out in bad states, your willingness to borrow and take risk rises—corroborated by the fact that private debt before a crisis often becomes public debt afterward.Carmen Reinhart on Financial Crises 11/23/2009
- Rescuing failing financial firms avoids immediate cascading failures but creates moral hazard because other firms then expect to be rescued, and each successive rescue reinforces this expectation, escalating the size of firms eventually bailed out until you reach firms that genuinely are too big to fail.George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession
- Bear Stearns' counterparties were interconnected through long-term trades on its books and through its hedge fund clients, so the people owing it money for unwound trades meant that one firm's failure would cascade through the system, which is why it was too big to fail.William Cohan on the Life and Death of Bear Stearns 09/28/2009
- Deposit insurance (the FDIC) was deeply unpopular among both Republicans and Democrats—including Carter Glass, Hoover, and even Roosevelt—because they feared it would let weaker banks become effectively too big to fail by giving them the same support as strong banks.Andrew Ross Sorkin
- Rare catastrophes are almost impossible to measure, so a strategy of making catastrophes rare without limiting their size is unwise; Nassim Taleb's point is that systems should be robust so that when parts break, the damage is contained, and nothing should be too big to fail.Tim Harford on Adapt and the Virtues of Failure 05/23/2011
- Reputation is a powerful incentive for prudence and honest dealing in genuinely free markets, but the Greenspanian reliance on 'reputational risk' as a substitute for fraud controls fails when banks are implicitly and explicitly supported by government, because once an institution knows it will not be allowed to fail, its reputation matters less and it will pursue profit up to and across the line.Neil Barofsky on Bailouts
- By opening the spigot of taxpayer cash to pay AIG's counterparties in full, the government sent Wall Street the dangerous message that counterparties doing business with systemically important institutions need not perform due diligence or worry about counterparty risk because the government will bail them out, reinforcing unfairness and inefficiency and producing a government-subsidized rather than free market.Neil Barofsky on Bailouts
- What matters in moral hazard is not the rescued firm itself but its creditors, who do not care whether they are repaid out of the firm's assets or out of a bailout because the dollars are equally good; thus after Bear, money rushed to Lehman not because it was better run but because its perceived standing among potentially-too-big-to-fail firms had improved, illustrated by money market funds lending to a firm with an unhealthy balance sheet.George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession
- The too-big-to-fail moral-hazard argument is weak when examined at the level of individual decision-makers rather than abstract institutions: while a firm might be bailed out, the individuals who made the choices are not, and the CEOs who made those decisions are faring badly today, so they were unlikely to be gambling on a rescue.Riccardo Rebonato on Risk Management and the Crisis 06/08/2009
- The 1984 rescue of Continental Illinois launched the Too Big to Fail doctrine as an explicit reality, fundamentally changing the game for large financial firms by leading them to perceive part of their risk-taking as subsidized by the Federal Reserve, broadening implicit insurance far beyond prior deposit insurance.George Selgin on Monetary Policy and the Great Recession