rents
Economic surplus above what would prevail in a competitive market, here captured by exporting countries administering their own export quotas.
As defined in et_701
Where it comes up · 13
- Barry Weingast on Violence, Power and a Theory of Nearly Everything 8/13/20077 claims
- Barry Weingast on the Violence Trap4 claims
- Michele Boldrin on Intellectual Property 05/18/20094 claims
- Michael Munger on the Sharing Economy2 claims
- John Nye1 claim
- Nathan Nunn1 claim
- Daron Acemoglu on Why Nations Fail1 claim
- Roger Noll on the Economics of Sports1 claim
and 5 more
Most important claims · 10 of 26Search all claims for “rents” →
- Although the NCAA is nominally run by university presidents, in practice athletic directors—often more powerful and better paid than the president—run it for the benefit of the athletic department, and because every player costs the same one-scholarship price, coaches who excel at recruiting generate far more revenue at identical cost, so competition in the coaching market lets coaches capture the rents that would otherwise go to players (driving coach salaries from rarely above $1M in 2000 to $5M today).Roger Noll on the Economics of Sports
- Institutions are supposed to mold individual character for the institution's greater good (turning slackers into Marines, boys into helpful Scouts), but the core sickness today is that too many people no longer see institutions as mechanisms of character formation and instead treat them as platforms to perform upon and extract status or rents for self-aggrandizement—exemplified by journalists building personal brands, Colin Kaepernick, Elizabeth Holmes, and Trump using the presidency as a personal cult platform.296 - Repairing Our Country
- It is false that innovations make everyone better off; like the saboteurs who threw wooden shoes (sabots) into power looms, those whose rents depend on the current system have a real economic interest in resisting innovations such as Uber and Airbnb, so adoption — though economically irresistible in the long run — can be delayed for a long time by concentrated interests.Michael Munger on EconTalk's 500th Episode
- In natural states no one holds a monopoly on violence; instead violence is distributed among many specialists, so the key to peace is ensuring these specialists in violence don't fight by creating rents that give them a stake in peace.Barry Weingast on Violence, Power and a Theory of Nearly Everything 8/13/2007
- Economists go wrong by assuming away the problem of violence; once you assume violence away, it looks obvious that allowing more organizations would expand the pie and benefit everyone, but the rents and privileges that limit organizations are precisely the glue keeping society at peace, so there is a genuine trade-off between growth and avoiding violent collapse.Barry Weingast on Violence, Power and a Theory of Nearly Everything 8/13/2007
- Resistance to growth-enhancing change comes from two sources: economic losers (those whose rents or skills are destroyed by Schumpeterian creative destruction) and, more importantly, political losers—rulers whose grip on power would be weakened by transformative technologies and institutional changes; because political power is more primitive than rents, rulers resist changes that would unseat them even if those changes enlarge the economy.Daron Acemoglu on Why Nations Fail
- Alfred Marshall's textbook account of a competitive industry already solves the fixed-cost problem through imitation: - A first entrant builds a plant (a fixed cost) and earns rents above marginal cost because capacity is low and demand is high. - Imitators then enter, capacity rises, and price falls along the demand curve. - Entry continues until rents just cover the fixed cost of the last plant built, which is the long-run competitive equilibrium. So innovators recover fixed costs without monopoly.Michele Boldrin on Intellectual Property 05/18/2009
- Limited access orders fail to grow as fast as open access orders because limited access makes it hard for anyone to form organizations, restricting competition and entrepreneurial power and embedding monopoly rents throughout the system.Barry Weingast on Violence, Power and a Theory of Nearly Everything 8/13/2007
- Landlocked countries lose much of the gains from transport to the final transit country (e.g., Djibouti capturing Ethiopia's port rents, India capturing Nepal's), but how much they lose depends on the number of outside options — a denser railway network connecting multiple potential transit countries, especially intra-African networks rather than colonial coast-to-Europe lines, would give landlocked countries more options and let them capture more of the rents.Nathan Nunn
- Alfred Marshall's textbook account of a competitive industry already handles fixed costs. The first entrant sets up capacity at a fixed cost and, because demand is high and capacity low, earns rents that cover the fixed cost and more. Imitators then enter, quantity rises and price falls along the demand curve until rents just cover the fixed cost of the last plant built: the long-run competitive equilibrium. Boldrin and Levine say this core theoretical point is not new.Michele Boldrin on Intellectual Property 05/18/2009